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Due to the nature of their work visual artists enjoy a unique place within 
copyright law. Not only do these creators benefit in the main from the right of 
reproduction but also from the value attached to the original artefact embodying 
the protected work. Framed accordingly it might seem that visual artists are 
particularly well positioned to benefit from this remunerative duality, 
traditionally however, this has not proven to be the case. Throughout history 
visual artists have sold their work at a mere fraction of the work’s inherent value, 
a value that would only later be realised by subsequent purchasers. Recognising 
this inequity the droit de suite developed with the objective of adequately 
rewarding visual artists for their exploits by connecting their recompense with 
the work’s subsequent resale value. As the right spread through Europe it often 
embodied a social security function that distributed funds to benefit elderly, 
needy and emerging visual artists. Despite an express EU social mandate, today’s 
EU equivalent, the Artists’ Resale Right (ARR) Directive 2001/84/EC is shorn of 
any such social responsibility.  
 
The question that this thesis addresses is whether visual artists would be better 
served under a resale rights rubric that reflects its original social function. This 
investigation brings to the fore the liminality of the resale right as part copyright, 
part income security; distributing royalties to successful visual artists while 
contemporaneously providing a social net to those less fortunate. In considering 
whether a theoretical justification exists to support this liminality the thesis 
investigates the dialectic of Hegel’s personality theory and social citizenship. By 
 x 
advancing the idea of citizens’ duty to one another, social citizenship provides 
the theoretical basis upon which the aforementioned construction is justified, and 
in doing so excludes a strictly individualistic understanding of the artists’ resale 
right that is largely economically orientated and copy-centric. 
 
The primary conclusion of this thesis is that the ARR Directive would better 
serve visual artists at the margins of our society by adopting a redistributive, 
social function, redolent of the extant ARR models of Germany and Norway. It is 
concluded that a redistribution of funds, from wealthy visual artists to emerging 
visual artists reflects the liminality of the ARR, which in turn reduces 
experienced poverty and the social exclusion faced by many visual artists today. 
A key recommendation of the thesis is the inclusion of a social mandate within 
the Directive, which reflects the right’s historic origins and the mandates of 
















The construct of the ‘starving artist’ is as ingrained in society’s consciousness as 
is the stereotype of the ‘poor orphan’, the ‘corrupt politician’, the ‘peacemaker’, 
the ‘hero’, the ‘heroine’ and the ‘Good Samaritan.’ Many of these constructs are 
somewhat didactic and normative; inspiring, warning and ultimately steering 
members of society toward and away from certain choices and modalities of 
being. The normative influence of these constructs cannot be under estimated, 
indeed the narratives that have evolved around these constructs often manifest as 
existentialist ideograms from which individuals understand and perceive 
‘otherness’ and one’s own perceived reality. The degree to which individuals and 
society are capable of empathising with others is often based on these ingrained 
and highly subjective understandings.  
 
Similarly, the rhetoric surrounding the ‘starving artist’ at the early part of the 20th 
century evolved from the public’s heightened awareness of the injustice faced by 
French visual artists as they returned from World War One. This awareness 
concerning the law’s treatment of visual artists was concisely captured by 
Forain’s caricature of an auction where an artist’s painting sells for an over-
inflated sum while the artist’s impoverished children, effectively street urchins, 
looked on in disbelief.1 Public outrage followed which in turn led to political and 
legal action; and while very few members of the public could comprehend how 
the French author’s rights system discriminated against visual artists, they could 
                                                           
1 See Appendix 1: Forain’s Painting.  
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relate to the injustice of earning a derisory sum from their labours while others 
earned vast fortunes.   
 
Accordingly, the evolution of the historic French droit de suite was a social, 
political and legal response to the injustice faced by visual artists who could not 
earn a livelihood from their profession. The right not only rewarded successful 
visual artists for the successive exploitation of their work, allowing them to 
participate in their work’s sometimes astronomical increase in value but it also 
provided a form of income security for nascent career, struggling and retired 
visual artists. This duality of purpose positioned the droit de suite as not only a 
copyright in the contemporary sense but also as a form of social security.  
Today’s EU manifestation, the Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC is 
framed narrowly within the strictures of EU intellectual property law and as such 
is shorn of any social component. Shoe-horning the historic droit de suite into a 
largely copy-centric paradigm undermines its very raison d’être; to aid 
struggling visual artists. This raises several questions which this thesis addresses: 
firstly, whether the current EU manifestation is nothing more than a myopic 
capitulation to contemporary trends in copy-centrism; secondly, whether the 
apparent tension between copyright and social rights is an intractable challenge; 
and thirdly, whether the historic droit de suite can prove instrumental in 
presenting a counter dynamic to current copy-centric conceptions of the artists’ 
resale right? In answering these questions a broader contextual overview of the 
creative arts is required. In the eloquent words of President Michael D. Higgins: 
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‘Creativity and culture are about the articulation and vindication of 
rights, the right for everyone to participate fully in society. They are a 
social good which, if left to the vagaries of the marketplace, will either 
fail to survive or become so compromised and distorted that the public 
good will not be served. It is essential to have a national cultural policy, 
and to have one that recognises the fundamental role of cultural access in 
citizenship while respecting the integrity and independence of the 
personal artistic inspiration. Any balanced discussion about public 
funding for the arts must derive from that principle, rejecting as a 
starting point any uninformed populism which sees the arts as residual, 




The foregoing encapsulates much of the rhetoric that surrounded the early 20th 
century pre-cursor to the Artists’ Resale Right – the droit de suite – during its 
first legislative enactment in France. The historic droit de suite was designed to 
alleviate the plight of the ‘starving artist’ by allowing visual artists to share in the 
economic success of their work. The droit de suite required that subsequent to 
the first sale, each public resale resulted in a small but not inconsequential 
royalty payment to the artist or his/her legal heir. It is noteworthy that the droit 
de suite not only shared the characteristics of intellectual property rights, as we 
know them today, but also contained a social element, which manifested itself in 
the form of a social security payment for struggling artists. While this ‘social 
                                                           




character’ was eventually removed from the droit de suite and placed squarely 
within the French social security system, neighbouring jurisdictions such as 
Germany and Norway continued the incorporation of this facility within their 
national resale rights rubrics. Both models continue to maintain a ‘social 
character’ by effectively taxing the Artists’ Resale Right (ARR) royalty, albeit 
via alternative means, the benefit of which is used to support various social and 
cultural objectives. In the main however, this social character has been expunged 
and today’s Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC neither reflects its 
historical forebear nor the aforementioned European models.  
 
Having provided some background context to the thesis, this introductory chapter 
continues by providing an overview of the central concepts of the thesis. First, 
the central research questions are discussed, with a view to clearly setting out the 
aims of the thesis. Secondly, the structure of the thesis is described. Thirdly, the 
methodological approaches adopted are outlined. 
 
Research Questions and Scope of the Thesis 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to address whether the extant EU Artists’ Resale 
Right’s Directive 2001/84/EC serves the needs of visual artists and in the 
alternative whether visual artists would be better served under a resale rights 
rubric that reflects its original social function. To achieve this aim, the thesis 
adopts three primary research questions.  
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1) Is the ARR Directive fit for purpose and does it succeed in achieving its 
primary mandate to achieve remunerative parity between the creative 
classes and to harmonize EU law in this area? 
 
In answering this question and in fulfilling the overall aim of this thesis, an 
analysis of the development of EU law in the sphere of intellectual property is 
conducted. Within the context of EU harmonization, the analysis in Chapter 1 
provides an understanding in relation to the fragmented nature of EU intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) which in-turn legitimizes member states’ divergent ARR 
rubrics. In addition the historic international origins of the artists’ resale right 
under the Berne Convention are discussed before engaging in a thorough critique 
of the Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC in Chapter 2.  
  
2) Would visual artists be better served under a socially oriented ARR 
model and whether the apparent tension between copyright and social 
rights is resolvable? 
 
The thesis adopts an historic analysis of the ARR Directive by performing an 
investigation and critique of its predecessor the French historic droit de suite. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter 3 and the latter sections of Chapter 5 
respectively highlight the social origins of the historic droit de suite and other 
European models as a form of targeted intervention; these in turn form part of a 
wider nexus of national social security and welfare support structures. By 
highlighting the social origins of the artists’ resale right the thesis reframes the 
normative purpose of the Directive to include a social component. In many ways 
 6 
this reframing is in fact a refocusing on the intended, historic and 
contemporaneous use of the resale right as a form of targeted intervention which 
not only creates parity between the creative classes within the rights framework 
that is copyright but provides social security in the widest possible sense which 
in turn fosters social inclusion and participation. 
 
3) Subject to the findings of research question 1 and 2: What reform 
measures are needed in the context of the ARR Directive to support 
visual artists?  
 
In the concluding section, the thesis makes a number of recommendations for 
reform of the ARR Directive to include a socially orientated and targeted means 
of intervention for visual artists.  Recommendations for reform are based on the 
aforementioned analysis of the historic droit de suite, the EU ARR Directive and 
European ARR models that encompass a social component. The aim of these 
recommendations is to create a resale rights rubric that recognises the discrete, 
differentiated and often unrecognised mode of creation and exploitation that is 
unique to visual artists. A socially orientated ARR Directive not only fulfils the 
right’s raison d’être but creates an environment in which the pursuit of a career 




Chapter 1 begins by presenting an overview of the international origins of the 
artists’ resale right: namely the Berne Convention. It is observed that within the 
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context of EU copyright law, the Berne Convention served as a semi-normative, 
broad based tool for harmonization rather than as an agreed upon mandate for the 
convergence of copyright law by signatory states. Accordingly, the ‘soft law’ 
approach allowed for by the Berne Convention proved wholly inadequate 
towards the process of EU copyright harmonization. The EU was therefore 
required to take more direct action than relying on international conventions 
alone. Subsequent to considering international developments the chapter 
progresses to consider the effect that the process of EU harmonization had both 
on creating a framework of EU IPRs as well as the nature and scope of the ARR 
Directive. The chapter ultimately provides background context to the 
development of the ARR Directive and in doing so serves the function of 
providing the basis for later proposed reforms of the Directive.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth analysis of the form and content, as well as the 
objectives and aims of the ARR Directive while also questioning whether it 
achieves its intended purpose. Establishing whether the ARR Directive functions 
in practice and not just in principle is a necessary pre-requisite to answering this 
thesis’s central research question; whether visual artists would be better served 
under a socially oriented ARR rubric. The chapter underscores that the benefits 
of the ARR Directive are not just limited to wealthy and successful artists but 
also includes emerging visual artists. Nevertheless, the research indicates that 
while emerging visual artists benefit to some degree from the ARR Directive 
they are marginal beneficiaries of a right that was historically a form of targeted 
intervention. Exposing the incongruous nature of the right the chapter builds 
support and grounds the argument for a socially orientated ARR Directive.  
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After identifying the aforementioned incongruity between the beneficiaries of the 
ARR Directive and those visual artists who are most in need of income security, 
Chapter 3 presents an historical overview of the nature of the droit de suite; the 
French 20th century pre-cursor to the artists’ resale right. In this regard the 
chapter investigates the position of the visual artist within society throughout the 
ages. This analysis serves two purposes: firstly, it highlights the historic and 
prevailing precarious nature of the visual artist’s profession; and secondly, 
presents the historic droit de suite as a response to copyright law’s failure to 
adequately recompense visual artists. It becomes evident from this analysis that 
copyright’s failure is not a product of modernity but reflects society’s historical 
and prevailing attitude towards the visual arts. Accordingly, the chapter analyses 
the nature of the droit de suite, which in turn exposes the underlying social 
character of the right and the social security function that it served. Recognition 
of the underlying social character of the droit de suite is a keystone upon which 
the central argument of this thesis is based. This in turn grounds the analysis of 
Chapters 4 and 5 which consider whether there exists a theoretical, policy based 
and legal basis for a socially orientated ARR Directive.  
 
Within the overall context of this thesis, Chapter 4, reflecting on the social 
history of the droit de suite, provides a theoretical basis for a non-copy-centric 
ARR that is socially orientated. This theoretical framework is based upon the 
theories of ‘social citizenship’ and Hegel’s ‘personality theory’. The dialectic 
provides the framework upon which the reform proposals of Chapter 6 are based. 
Building on the social premise espoused in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 proposes that 
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the socio-political ideologies of 19th and 20th century France imbued the droit de 
suite with social values that challenged free-market liberal individualism evident 
in common law copy-centric polices today. Accordingly the historic droit de 
suite supposes a legal and political environment that supports the use of 
intellectual property rights as a means of achieving social goals. In this way, 
social citizenship justifies a reinterpretation of the ARR Directive that reflects its 
historic social function. In doing so the thesis proposes a social construct upon 
which reforms of the ARR Directive may be based.  
 
Chapter 5 firstly considers whether there is a legal basis within the current EU 
framework for a socially orientated ARR Directive. Having established a legal 
basis within EU law the chapter progresses to consider the concepts of welfare, 
poverty and need, within the over arching theory of social citizenship. 
Developing upon the conceptual framework set out in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 
progresses the argument for a socially orientated ARR model. While these 
concepts are formulated and advanced at a certain level of abstraction, they 
nonetheless translate into concrete institutional practices evident in European 
welfare models and more pertinently the German and Norwegian ARR models. 
Thereafter the chapter considers whether the ARR is simply an out-dated 
response to a problem that no longer exists. In this regard an evaluation of the 
available empirical research concerning the socio-economic status of visual 
artists is conducted. It is concluded that visual artists earn less than the average 
worker and less than creative contemporaries such as writers and composers. 
Accordingly, the income maintenance ARR models of Germany and Norway are 
evaluated as responses to this problem. Finally, the chapter introduces many of 
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the themes discussed throughout this thesis and in doing so argues that the EU 
ARR Directive ought to be employed as a form of targeted intervention and 
include an income security component redolent of the German ARR model and 
in doing so provide visual artists with a much needed form of financial support. 
 
Chapter 6 outlines recommendations for reform of the ARR Directive to include 
an income maintenance provision. The central conclusions of this thesis are 
three-fold; firstly, not just wealthy visual artists benefit from the Directive 
(which is a primary criticism of the Directive) but also emerging visual artists; 
secondly, the implementation of the ARR would be better served under a 
compulsory collective management schema; and thirdly, the ARR Directive 
would better serve its historic social purpose – alleviating the plight of visual 
artists – by including a redistributive social component redolent of the extant 
German and Norwegian models and the historic French droit de suite. The 
recommendations draw primarily from the Kulturwerk component of the German 
model, which aligns itself more closely with social citizenship, and Harris’s 
tripartite compensation model of redistribution. The latter recommendation is 
undermined to a certain degree by the earlier conclusion that not just wealthy and 
successful visual artists benefit exclusively from the ARR Directive. 
Nevertheless, a disproportionate amount, by value, of ARR royalty payments go 
to a minority of visual artists and their heirs. This fact alone radically undermines 
the legitimacy of the extant ARR Directive. A redistribution of funds, through a 
social mechanism, from wealthy artists to emerging, struggling and retired artists 
has the potential to provide a more thorough-going justification for the current 
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Directive reflective of its historic origins, which in turn, has the capacity to 
reduce the social exclusion faced by many visual artists today.   
 
     Aim 
 
Often within the discourse pertaining to the historic droit de suite and the current 
ARR Directive, the social origins of the resale right are largely referred to in 
merely anecdotal terms, an historic footnote to a largely misunderstood right. 
Therefore, with a specific focus on the resale right as an instrument of social 
policy, it is timely that the evolution of the resale right is considered and the 
questions asked; whether it fulfils its original mandate, to alleviate the plight of 
struggling visual artists. Focusing on the social rather than the economic 
components of the ARR recasts the right as a form of targeted intervention. 
Hence the tension between the right’s historic social character and its current 
economic manifestation is examined. 
 
      Methodologies  
 
a) Historical-Legal Research 
 
The thesis synthesises a methodology, which is part historical criticism, part 
doctrinal, part socio-legal and part comparative. The historical-legal research 
methodology attempts to find the origins and trace the development of a 
particular principle or a branch of the law, it also considers developed rules and 
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questions why they are now as they are.3 Historical-legal research can also be 
employed as a means of critiquing ideologies which support the status-quo and 
this is referred to as critical historicism.4 Applying this methodology to the 
thesis’s central research question – whether visual artists would benefit from a 
socially orientated Artists’ Resale Right – the thesis traces the development of 
the historic droit de suite from its original French civil law origins in the late 
19th century to the drafting of Directive 2001/84/EC. This methodology is 
particularly informative as it reveals the evolution of a right that was largely born 
out of a social need to protect visual artists by providing them with a form of 
income maintenance to a right – EU manifestation – that is now devoid of any 
such function. This in turn raises the question of why this evolution occurred and 
why the historic droit de suite’s social function has been abrogated from the 
current discourse. Ultimately, it is concluded that the extremely contentious 
nature of the artists’ resale right led to a prolonged drafting period – 16 years – 
which may never have reached completion had the issue of social security/social 
welfare been raised. Accordingly, the ARR Directive, by rigidly adhering to the 
strictures of extant EU IP law, emphasises ‘form over function’, placing greater 
importance on the character of the ARR Directive rather than focusing on the 
function that it ought to serve. This realisation informs much of the analysis 
pertaining to the development of the ARR and grounds the argument for a reform 




                                                           
3 S.H. Amin, Research Methods in Law, (Glasgow: Royston Publishers, 1992), p. 54. 
4 R. Gordon, ‘Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism’ (1997) 49 Stanford Law Review 
pp.1023 -1024. 
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b) Socio-Legal Methodology 
 
The aforementioned social origins of the historic droit de suite supposes a legal 
context that was to some degree influenced by non-legal factors and therefore 
demands an analysis that reflects the influence of the social, political and cultural 
environment. In this regard the socio-legal methodology is employed. Socio-
legal studies focuses on the question, ‘… of relating how the form and content of 
the law (as may be found in statements of law in legal textbooks), which are 
matters for intellectual comprehension and interpretation, move beyond such 
intellectual existence into social reality.’5 For McCrudden, the benefits of the 
socio-legal methodology can only be understood when compared to the 
limitations of the doctrinal method. The doctrinal method of legal analyses 
adopts the ‘internal approach’, which involves the analysis of law from the 
perspective of an insider in the system.6 The socio-legal methodology on the 
other hand analyses how the law operates in society.7 The advantage of this type 
of research is that it allows the researcher to look at the law within its social 
context hence allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the legal 
issues at play. As Morris and Murphy note, socio-legal methodology ‘… can 
uncover and expose the (previously unquestioned) political nature of laws, show 
whether laws have achieved their intended effect, assist in law reform proposals 
by linking law and policy goals and reveal how law actually operates in 
practice.8 A discourse that is contextually led frames many of the themes and 
narratives that run throughout this thesis: whether that pertains to the historical 
                                                           
5 C. McCrudden ‘Legal research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 112 (4) Law Quarterly Review 
p. 632. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. pp. 640 - 641.  
8 C. Morris and C. Murphy Getting a PhD in Law (London: Hart Publishing, 2001) p. 35. 
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context in which the droit de suite developed, which includes the influence of 
national continental political ideologies; the influence of legal and political 
structures on extant EU IP policy; the progressive realisation of social rights 
within the EU; and the current economic and social realities experienced by 
visual artists. This method is utilised primarily in Chapters 3 and 5. 
 
c) Comparative Methodology 
 
The thesis also employs the comparative methodology in order to fully address 
the central research question. Kamba describes comparative law as ‘the study of, 
and research in law by the systematic comparison of two or more legal systems; 
or of parts, branches or aspects of two or more legal systems.’9 There are a 
number of reasons for employing the comparative methodology; comparative 
methodology allows one to ‘critically illuminate’ one’s own legal system through 
comparison with other models;10 it also allows the researcher to investigate the 
multiple modalities of form in a given area which ultimately informs the form 
and content of proposals to reform the law in a given area.  In this context the 
research reviews the historic French position – the droit de suite – the extant EU 
manifestation – ARR Directive 2001/84/EC – and the German and Norwegian 
ARR models. An important aspect of the comparative methodology it that once 
nuances between systems have been identified and when these are further drawn 
                                                           
9 W. J. Kamba ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23(3) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly p. 486. 
10 P. Legrand ‘Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory’ (1995) 58(2) Modern 
Law Review p. 264, as cited by G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and 
Method (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) p. 14 [hereinafter Samuel].  
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upon in making recommendations a consistent stand point needs to be adopted.11 
As noted by Samuel, it is important that ‘… the criteria that will act as the basis 
of a “best solution” are set out and reasons for their criteria are given.’12 
Accordingly, the thesis adopts the principle of social inclusion and participation 
as derived from Harris’s theory of social citizenship. This approach therefore 
provides an objective basis upon which reform proposals can be made. Since the 
thesis aims to identify recommendations for legal reform, the Norwegian and 
German models provide a framework of legal responses that can be drawn from; 
and while the historic French droit de suite is useful as an historic comparator, 
the removal of a social function from the extant French regime curtails any 
reliance on that model.  
 
When engaging in comparative research, it is also necessary to consider political, 
social, economic and cultural differences between countries.13 As noted by Razi: 
 
‘The law and the institution of a country grow generally out of the history 
and national and social life of that country. Consequently, the knowledge 
of any system of law without the corresponding understanding of the 
national and social life from which that legal system grew up cannot be 
but utterly superficial.’14  
 
Accordingly, Chapter 5, in addition to considering the concept of need and 
poverty within the over arching concept of social citizenship, considers various 
                                                           
11 K. Zweigert and H. Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law 3rd ed. (trans. T. Weir ) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 4.  
12 Samuel, supra note 10, at p. 42.  
13 Kamba, supra note 9, at p. 511.  
14 G. M. Razi, ‘Around the World’s Legal Systems’ [1959] Howard Law Journal, p. 11.  
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divergent typologies of welfarism. As well as providing context to the various 
typologies of welfare and the use of the droit de suite as a means of targeted 
intervention, this exposition delimits the extent to which a ‘solution’ or ‘ideal 
model’ can be uprooted from one jurisdiction and transplanted to another.  
 
d) Doctrinal Research 
 
Finally, doctrinal research, which can be described as ‘critical reasoning based 
around authoritative texts’,15 is not only one of the main methodologies 
employed throughout this thesis but also represents the underlying method 
through which the aforementioned methodologies are conducted. Doctrinal legal 
research involves the systematic exposition of the legal concepts and principles 
governing a particular area of the law.  As Morris and Murphy explain, this 
methodology ‘… focuses almost entirely on law’s own language of statutes and 
case law to make sense of the legal world. Law is seen as a self-contained system 
which is politically neutral and independent of other academic disciples.’16 This 
methodology attempts to establish legal coherency and consistency. The 
doctrinal legal methodology presents the ‘internal’ legal perspective. As 
McCrudden explains, the internal approach ‘… is the analysis of legal rules and 
principles taking the perspective of an insider in the system.’17 Doctrinal 
methodology ‘… involves the close analysis of decisions by the higher judiciary, 
often at the appellate level, and legislation of various kinds.’18  The sources are 
then supplemented with the critical commentary of academic and practicing 
                                                           
15 McCrudden, supra note 5 at p. 632.  
16 C. Morris and C. Murphy supra note 8, at p. 31.  
17 McCrudden, supra note 5, at p. 633.  
18 Ibid. at p. 636. 
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lawyers.19 McCrudden also proposes a wider engagement with the methodology 
and asserts that it also encompasses considerations of justice and utility as well 
as evidence from the social sciences, including the policy considerations of 
politicians and law-makers alike.20 Accordingly, this thesis employs both 
primary and secondary sources of law – Treaties, Directives, Regulations, 
national legislation, case law etc. – in conjunction with academic commentary 
and preparatory materials relating to the formation of the EU ARR Directive, as 
well as empirical research from the social sciences relating to the socio-economic 
status of visual artists.  
 
In addition to providing the basis for the aforementioned methodologies the 
doctrinal methodology is used in this thesis to present an exposition of the 
Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC and to critique its nature and scope. 
The analysis includes an examination of the Directive itself, the relevant case law 
both before and after the enactment of the Directive, the Berne Convention and 
the national responses of EU member states to the enactment of the Directive. 





The analysis undertaken in this thesis establishes that the ARR Directive would 
better serve visual artists at the margins of society by adopting a redistributive, 
                                                           
19 See D. Ibbetson ‘Historical Research in Law’ in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, eds. The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2003) p. 864 as cited by McCrudden supra note 5, at 
p. 633. 
20 McCrudden, supra note 5, at p. 635. 
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social function, redolent of the Germany ARR model. It is proposed that the 
Directive incorporate a provision based on the German Kulterwerk model, 
mandating that member states adopt a social redistributive mechanism, which 
takes a small percentage of ARR royalty earnings from all visual artist 
beneficiaries, and redistributing to needy visual artists. It is concluded that a 
redistribution of funds, from wealthy visual artists to emerging visual artists 
reflects the liminality of the ARR, which in turn reduces experienced poverty and 
the social exclusion faced by many visual artists today. A key recommendation 
of this thesis is that a social mandate be included within the Directive that 
reflects the right’s historic origins, thereby satisfying its historic and 
contemporary raison d’être.  In line with Article 11 of the ARR Directive, the 
Commission should take this recommendation on board in its periodic review 











                                                           
21 It is submitted that while Article 11 appears to limit proposals to issues relating to minimum 
threshold, rates of royalty and maximum amounts laid down in Article 4(1), the section also 
makes provision for ‘any other proposal it may deem necessary in order to enhance the 
































The chapter provides context to the development of the Artists’ Resale Directive 
by outlining international and EU developments in the field of copyright.  
International agreements such as the Berne Convention have considerably 
influenced EU copyright law. Recognising this important contribution, the 
chapter begins by providing an historical overview of the Berne Convention 
before considering the development of the droit de suite – artists’ resale right – 
within that architecture. The chapter then progresses to consider the development 
of intellectual property rights in the EU with a particular focus on the process of 
harmonization. Here the commentary is divided into three parts, questioning 
firstly whether the EU enjoyed the requisite competence to legislate in the area of 
intellectual property rights and what effect if any this had. Secondly, the 
commentary questions whether EU Commission activism contributed to the EU’s 
evolving patchwork of intellectual property rights. Thirdly, by drawing on the 
relevant law – Casis de Dijon and Phil Collins – the chapter examines the extent 
to which the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) was 
influential in this regard. Conclusions drawn from this analysis explains much 
about today’s EU copyright architecture, the legal environment that gave rise to 
the drafting of the ARR Directive 2001/84 and more specifically the nature and 
scope of the Directive. The content of this analysis is drawn upon throughout this 
thesis and informs many of the concluding recommendations.  
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1.1 International Copyright law and the Berne Convention 
 
Historically, in the area of author’s rights, the need for international conventions 
such as the Berne Convention grew out of developments in the 19th century 
where methods of communication and transportation increased in efficiency and 
reliability.1 This affected publishers whose catalogues of work could now be 
exploited legally by non-rights holders in multiple territories.2 Some publishing 
houses responded to this form of legal piracy by opening offices abroad or by 
signing private agreements with foreign publishing houses.3 In the main 
however, authors and publishers alike called for international protection so that 
works could be protected in multiple territories.4 Initially the mechanism 
suggested to ensure a convergence of laws in this area was the establishment of 
multilateral treaties.5 However, the approach lacked momentum due to the 
perceived difficulties in developing common standards of protection across 
multiple and divergent legal regimes.6  This was largely due to the nature of 
copyright and the varying degrees of rights conferred differing significantly from 
state to state. Accordingly, bilateral treaties between states became popular7 and 
by the 1870s many of the most important publishing markets in Europe8 were 
governed to some extent by a network of bilateral treaties.9 These bilateral 
                                                           
1 C. Seville EU Intellectual Property Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2009) p. 8. 
2 Ibid. at p. 8. 
3 Ibid. 
4 B. Sherman and L. Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 111 – 115.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. at p. 111, noting that these agreements started to develop in the 1840s and 1850s.  
7 Supra note 4.  
8 France, Belgium, Germany and Holland. 
9 Seville, supra note 1; Sherman and Bently, supra note 4.  
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agreements also impacted the domestic laws of contracting states,10 it was 
therefore in the interests of both contracting states to ensure that a reasonable 
level of uniformity was in place before agreements were ratified. Accordingly, 
where states offered low levels of rights protection, the principle of reciprocity11 
encouraged contracting states to ‘harmonise-up’. This avoided situations where 
‘host states’ with low levels of rights protection were obliged, under treaty, to 
provide higher levels of rights protection to foreign authors than were available 
to their national authors. While bilateral agreements offered many advantages 
they often lacked uniformity and the resulting standards of protection were 
neither ‘comprehensive nor systematic’.12 In practice, multi-faceted bilateral 
agreements involving multiple state players provided for a convoluted and 
opaque international IP regulatory system. Each bilateral agreement provided an 
alternative standard of protection for rights holders and as such proved difficult 
to use. It became evident that a multi-lateral agreement involving multiple states, 
all adhering to one standard, was the best means of overcoming the difficulties 
presented by the bilateral system. However, given the diversity of the underlying 
national systems, achieving a consensus proved challenging.  A binary debate 
developed between groups of states and vested interest groups on the one hand, 
who were willing to adopt a pragmatic approach to harmonisation and accept 
lesser levels of protection, and on the other hand, those who regarded copyright 
                                                           
10 Supra note 4, at p. 115. ‘This was the result of the fact that the negotiations proceeded on the 
“assumption that the expediency between two countries depends upon a precise and minute 
equality of advantage to be derived by each contracting party respectively.”’ In essence, 
equivalence based upon raising, rather than lowering, standards of protection.  
11 Reciprocity may either be ‘formal’ or ‘material’. If it is ‘formal’ it simply requires the ‘host’ 
state to confer the same level of rights protection to foreign authors as it provides to national 
authors. If it is ‘material’ the extent of the protection conferred by the ‘host’ state will be limited 
or will be equivalent to the levels of protection available to the ‘foreign author’ in their home 
state.  
12 Supra note 1, at p. 9. 
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as a ‘natural right’13 and as such less inclined to accept a dilution of rights.14 The 
first international efforts in this area came under the auspices of the Berne 
Convention.  
 
The formation of the Berne Convention can be traced back to 1858 when a 
Congress on Literary and Artistic Property was held in Brussels.15 Its 
‘Committee of Organisation’ comprised a number of Belgian authors, artists, 
civil servants, and representatives of cultural organisations.16 The agenda of the 
Congress was divided into five distinct categories: ‘international questions’, 
‘property in literary and artistic works in general’, dramatic and musical works’, 
‘artistic works’ and ‘economic questions’.17 The debates of the Congress 
displayed a general consensus on the need for international copyright protection. 
The Congress’s resolutions formed a basic outline for a universal copyright 
law.18 Further congresses were held, notably the 1878 International Literary 
Congress, organised by the Société des gens de letters in Paris,19 which passed a 
resolution insisting that an author’s right was a form of property rather than a 
                                                           
13 Author’s rights systems such as the French and German systems placed authors at the centre of 
protection rather than the owner of the copyright as in the common law systems of Great Britain 
and Ireland. This ideological standpoint can be traced back to the writings of many continental 
philosophers such as Kant and Hegel, see generally E. Adeney, ‘The Moral Rights of Authors 
and Performers – An International and Comparative Analysis’ (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
14 Supra note 1 at p. 9. In the main it was continental jurisdictions that applied higher standards of 
protection. 
15 See L. Riviére, La Protection Internationale des Oeuvres Littéraires et Artistiques Étude de 
Législation Compare (1897) p. 141, cited in S. Ricketson and J. Ginsburg International 
Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, The Berne Convention and Beyond. Vol 1. 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
OUP, 2006) p. 44. For a summary of the proceedings of the Congress, see Annales de la 
Propríeté industrielle, Artistique et Littéraire (1858) pp. 401- 463 (‘Annales (1858)’). For the full 
proceedings and records of the Congress, see E. Romberg Compte redu des travaux du Congés de 
la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique (1858).  
16 See Annales (1858) p. 401, cited in Ricketson and Ginsburg supra note 15, at p. 45, ‘It lasted 
for four days, and was attended by nearly 300 persons, including fifty-four delegates from 
learned societies, twenty-four artists, sixteen journalists, twenty-nine lawyers, twenty-nine 
publishers and printers, and forty other persons including officials, politicians, judges etc’. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  at pp. 45-46. 
19 See Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 17, at p. 49 and Seville supra note 1 at p. 9. 
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legal concession and that it was a perpetual right.20 The Paris Congress also 
established the International Literary Association which was later expanded to 
include artists, thus becoming l’Association Littéraire et Artistique 
Internationale (ALAI). The main objective of the ALAI was to create an 
international agreement to protect literary and artistic copyright.21 It held annual 
conferences throughout Europe and its members continued to press for universal 
copyright laws. These efforts eventually led to the 1886 Berne Convention on the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, which created a ‘union for the 
protection of the rights of authors over their literary and artistic works’.22 The 
Convention was for the most part based on the principle of national treatment.23 
Ten states signed the Convention in September 1886, and it came into force the 
following year.24 The signatories were largely European countries and excluded 
many important international players such as the United States,25 which did not 
provide international copyright protection until 1891 and remained outside the 
                                                           
20 Supra note 1, at p. 9. 
21 See ALAI  <http://www.alai.org/en/information/history.html> (date accessed: 8 July 2017). 
22 See Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne]. 
23 The principle of national treatment or assimilation requires member states to confer the same 
level of protection upon non-national authors as is available to national authors. One important 
exception to this was the term of protection, which was subject to a rule of national/material 
reciprocity. The principle of national/material reciprocity requires a member state to offer non-
national authors the same level of protection available to them in their home country.  
24 Those signing were Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Spain, 
Switzerland and Tunisia. The French and British governments signed for their colonies and 
possessions also, whereas the Spanish government reserved its position until the exchange  of 
ratifications one year later. The Convention came into force 5 December 1887, all the signatories 
except Liberia having ratified it.  
25 The U.S. opted out because of the high levels of protection and inclusion of additional rights 
mandated by Berne. In many ways this led to the Universal Copyright Convention U.N.T.S. 134 
(1955). The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) is not relevant to the current discussion and 
is not considered further. For more information on the UCC see S. von Lewinski ‘The Role and 
Future of the Universal Copyright Convention’ UNESCO E-Copyright Bulletin (Sept. – Dec. 
2006) 
<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:0F_Ic150ItsJ:unesdoc.unesco.org/imag
es/0015/001578/157846e.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ie> (date accessed: 8 June 2017).  
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Berne Convention until 1988.26 Given the differences in the legal traditions of 
the signatory states, the agreement was significant. Numa Droz, the Swiss 
politician who had been president of the Berne conferences to date, described the 
creation of the Union as a ‘striking affirmation of the universal conscience in 
favour of copyright’.27 Yet despite this, many issues of principle remained 
unresolved.28 
 
The Berne Convention has been amended29 several times since its inception and 
today has 172 members.30 The Convention sets minimum standards for 
protection, which members of the Union have agreed to adhere to. The 
Convention is based on the principle of national treatment31 and the ‘enjoyment 
and exercise’ of Berne Rights are not subject to any formality such as registration 
or notice.32 Berne protection is also independent of the existence of protection in 
                                                           
26 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Title 17 United States Code (USC) P.L. 100 - 
568, 102 Statute 2853.  
27 Actes de la Conferences Réunie Berne (1885) p. 65.  
28 For instance, the recognition of ‘moral rights’ by civil law countries was something that many 
common law countries found unpalatable.  
29 The Berne Convention, concluded in 1886, was ‘completed’ at Paris in 1896, revised at Berlin 
in 1908, ‘completed’ in Berne in 1914, revised at Rome in 1928, at Brussels in 1948, at 
Stockholm in 1967 and at Paris in 1971, and was amended in 1979. It is administered by the 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). For further information see 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698> (date accessed: 8 July 2017).  
30 As of 8 July 2017. See WIPO website: 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15> (date accessed: 8 July 2017).  
31 Supra note 22, Berne, Art. 5(1) ‘Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are 
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the 
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the 
rights specially granted by this Convention.’ Art. 3 ‘(1) The protection of this Convention shall 
apply to: 
(a) authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works, whether 
published or not; 
(b) authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works first 
published in one of those countries, or simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a 
country of the Union. 
(2) Authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union but who have their 
habitual residence in one of them shall, for the purposes of this Convention, be assimilated to 
nationals of that country.’ 
32 Supra note 22, Berne, Art. 5(2) ‘The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be 
subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence 
of protection in the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this 
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the country of origin of the work,33 therefore an author’s rights and remedies are 
governed by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.34 The main 
exception to this relates to the term of protection; where a Berne union state 
provides for a longer copyright term than the Berne minimum, protection may be 
denied once protection in the country of origin ceases.35 The expression ‘literary 
and artistic works’ includes ‘every production in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression.’36 Authors 
and copyright owners enjoy a number of exclusive rights:  
 
• The right to make reproductions of the work ‘in any manner or 
form’;37 
• The right to perform/recite it in public;38 
• The right to translate it;39 
• The right to make adaptations and arrangements of the work;40 
• The broadcasting right/right of communication to the public.41 
 
The Convention provides for certain exceptions to these rights, for example for 
the purpose of criticism and review, for reporting, education etc. Exceptions to 
                                                           
Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to 
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is 
claimed.’ 
33 There are however exceptions to this general rule.  
34 Supra note 22, Berne, Art. 5(3) ‘Protection in the country of origin is governed by domestic 
law. However, when the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he 
is protected under this Convention, he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national 
authors.’ 
35 Supra note 22, Berne, Art. 7(8) ‘In any case, the term shall be governed by the legislation of 
the country where protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise 
provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the work.’ 
36 Supra note 22, Berne Art. 2 (1). 
37 Ibid. Berne, Art. 9 (3). 
38 Ibid. Berne, Art. 11 (1).  
39 Ibid. Berne, Art. 8.  
40 Ibid. Berne, Art. 12.  
41 Ibid. Berne, Art. 11bis (1).  
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the reproduction right are subject to a three-step test: they must be confined to 
‘special cases’42; the reproduction must not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work; and must not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.43 The Convention also provides for certain ‘moral rights’. The right of 
attribution and integrity which are defined as ‘the right to claim authorship of the 
work and the right to object to any mutilation or deformation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the work which would 
be prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation’.44 These rights are not 
transferable and are exclusive to the author alone.45 Berne establishes a minimum 
period of protection for these rights – equal to that of their economic counterparts 
– which last for the life of the author plus 50 years.46  In addition, and of most 
interest to this investigation, since 1947 Berne has provided for the droit de suite 
or as more commonly known, the artists’ resale right.  
 
Finally, the Berne Convention has sometimes been referred to as an ‘ancient’47 
document with some commentators questioning its contemporary relevance: it is 
important to note that while revisions of Berne halted in 1971 the Convention 
continues to form the cornerstone of more recent international standardisation 
efforts in the area of copyright. Ricketson notes that when it came to the GATT 
                                                           
42 Ricketson notes that the meaning of ‘special cases’ is open to interpretation depending upon 
whether a Union member state is party to later multilateral agreements such as TRIPs and the 
WCT (The WIPO Copyright Treaty). See S. Ricketson ‘The Berne Convention: the continued 
relevance of an ancient text’ in D. Vaver & L. Bently, eds., in Intellectual Property in the New 
Millenium, Essays in Honour of William R. Cornish, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004) pp. 217 - 233.  
43 Supra note 22, Berne, Art. 9(2). See also Art. 10 (use of quotations from a work lawfully made 
available to the public; illustrations for teaching) and Art 10bis (news items; current events).  
44 Ibid. Berne, Art. 6bis.  
45 Ibid. Berne, Art. 6bis. 
46 Ibid. Berne, Art. 7(1) ‘The term of protection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the 
author and fifty years after his death.’ 
47 Ricketson, supra note 42, at p. 217.  
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(Uruguay Round) revisions beginning in 1986, ‘ … Berne provided negotiators 
with a ready-to-wear set of norms that could be incorporated into the new 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)’.48 In addition 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performance and Phonogram 
Treaty (WPPT)49 require full compliance with Berne norms.50 
 
1.2  Droit de Suite under the Berne Convention 
 
Prior to the development of the Artists’ Resale Right Directive the EU 
Commission observed that ‘[t]he wide legislative diversity that reigns in the field 
of the artist’s resale right is due among other things to the flexibility of the 
provisions of the Berne Convention … pursuant to which countries of the Berne 
Union are free to decide whether or not to introduce the right into their domestic 
law.’51 The Commission viewed this diversity as a trade distortion and contrary 
to the functioning of the internal market. The following section outlines the 
international political debates surrounding the adoption of the droit de suite by 
the Berne Convention, thereby explaining, to some extent, the Berne 
Convention’s ‘loose’ droit de suite formulation. This will in turn explicate why 
Berne allowed for such diversity and in turn explain why such an approach 
                                                           
48 Ibid. p. 218 – referring to Article 9(1) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property, Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco on 15 April 1994. [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
49 These Treaties are considered ‘associated agreements’ under Article 20 of Berne ‘The 
Governments of the countries of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements 
among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those 
granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this Convention. The 
provisions of existing agreements which satisfy these conditions shall remain applicable.’ 
50 See Article 1(4) WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/94. 
51 See Commission of the European Communities ‘Proposal for European Parliament and 
Council Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art’ 
COM(96) 97 final, 96/085 (COD) Brussels, 13 March 1996 p. 7 [hereinafter Proposal for a 
Resale Right Directive]. 
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conflicted with the process of EU harmonization. Furthermore it will 
demonstrate that the contentious nature of the droit de suite is not just an EU 
phenomenon.  
 
Beyond Berne and subsequent to the adoption of the droit de suite into French 
law in 192052, efforts to internationalise the right began.53 By the time of the 
Rome Conference of the Berne Convention in 1928, Belgium54 and 
Czechoslovakia55 had already legislated for it. In addition, non-governmental 
organisations such as the Association Litteráire et Artistique Internationale 
(ALAI) and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (the IIIC) 
began to advocate for the right internationally.56 At the Rome Conference, the 
French Government proposed the following ‘voeu’ or ‘wish’ which was based 
directly on an ALAI resolution:  
 
‘It is desirable that the inalienable droit de suite, established in France by 
the law of 20 May 1920 and in Belgium by that of 25 June 1921, to the 
profit of artists, in their original works which are publicly sold, should be 
the object of similar legislative dispositions in other countries, on 
                                                           
52 Fr. Art 42 of Loi du 20 Mai 1920 (1957 JO 2723). 
53 See L. de Pierredon-Fawcett The Droit De Suite in Literary and Artistic Property, A 
Comparative Law Study (New York: Center for Law and the Arts, Columbia University School 
of Law, 1991) p. 93 citing efforts by the International Literary and Artistic Association (A.L.A.I.) 
in 1925, 1926 and 1928. See also Duchemin Le droit de suite des artistes  (1948) (Thesis, Paris) 
p. 271, citing the resolutions adopted by the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation 
in 1927 and those of the International Conference of Intellectual Workers in 1929.  
54 Be. Law of 25 June 1921. 
55 Cz. Art. 35, Law of 24 November 1926. 
56 See a report by the International Institute of Intellectual  Co-operation, La Protection 
Internationale du droit d’auteur (1928) as cited by Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, at p. 
673. 
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condition of reciprocity, in each of them, between their nationals and 
those of countries which have already adopted this measure.’57 
 
This was supported by the Belgian and Czech delegates58 as well as by the IIIC 
(which was present at the conference as an observer), however several 
delegations including Britain and Norway questioned the place of the droit de 
suite within copyright law. A modified text was eventually adopted but many 
delegations including the UK, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Switzerland abstained:  
 
‘The Conference expresses the desire that those countries of the Union 
which have not yet adopted legislative provisions guaranteeing to the 
benefit of artists an inalienable right to a share in the proceeds of 
successive public sales of their original works should take into account 
the possibility of considering such provisions.’59 
 
Arguably, the ‘modified text’ on the droit de suite was no more than a token 
gesture, designed to appease the pro droit de suite Union states while 
simultaneously acknowledging the Union’s un-readiness to adopt the proposal.  
However, as will be seen, the ‘modified text’, while tentative in nature, sowed 
the seed for the eventual international recognition of the droit de suite.60  
Following the Rome Conference, many non-governmental actors such as the 
                                                           
57 See Duchemin Le Droit de Suite des Artistes (1948) p. xxx, as cited by Ricketson and 
Ginsburg, supra note 15. 
58 Actes 1928 p. 103, as cited by Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, at p. 673. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Although, the right is not accepted internationally, it enjoys international recognition, if not 
acceptance. See the international campaign for the Resale Right http://www.resale-right.org/  
(date accessed: 8 July 2017). 
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ALAI, the IIIC and the International Institute of Rome for the Unification of 
Private Law continued to study the implementation of the droit de suite on both a 
national and international level.61 In 1934 in preparation for the Brussels 
Revision of the Berne Convention both the Belgian Government and the 
International Office of the Berne Convention62 proposed a new article 14bis 
which provides for Convention recognition of the droit de suite.  This 
formulation incorporated the work of visual artists as well as the manuscripts of 
writers and composers:  
 
‘As far as original works of art and the original manuscripts of writers 
and composers are concerned, the protection accorded by the present 
Convention includes equally for the author of the work and his heirs an 
inalienable right to an interest in any public sale of which the said work is 
the object after the first sale thereof has been made by the author.  
 
The method and amount of this collection are to be determined by 
national legislation.’63 
 
                                                           
61 See J.L. Duchemin Le Droit de Suite des Artistes (Paris: Sirey, 1948) p. 243 as cited by 
Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, at p. 674. 
62 The International Office of the Berne Convention was the predecessor to the Worlds 
Intellectual Property Organisation. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was 
established by a convention signed at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and entitled ‘Convention 
Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.’ The WIPO Convention entered into 
force in 1970. The origins of what is now WIPO go back to 1883 when the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property was adopted and to 1886 when the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was adopted. Both Conventions provided for the 
establishment of an ‘International Bureau’ or secretariat. The two Bureaus were united in 1893 
and functioned under various names (i.e. BIRPI) until 1970 when they were replaced by the 
International Bureau of Intellectual Property (commonly designated as ‘the International 
Bureau’) by virtue of the WIPO Convention. WIPO became a specialized agency in the United 
Nations system of organisations in 1974. < http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/history.html> 
(date accessed: 8 July 2017).  
63 See Duchemin Le Droit de Suite des Artistes (1948) p. 301 (for the text of this proposition) as 
cited by Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, at p. 674. 
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This expanded proposal received wide criticism from many Berne Union 
member states as it not only required the mandatory recognition of the right but 
also extended the right to include manuscripts. Other points of contention were 
its apparent inclusion of architectural works and works of applied art,64 its 
limitation to heirs,65 and the failure to link its duration to that of copyright.66 The 
proposal allowed nationals of any Berne Union member state or any author who 
published his work for the first time in a Union member state to be treated like a 
national author in the country where protection was claimed. This did not allow 
for differences or a lack of equivalence between the laws of each state.67 This 
element of the proposal met with resistance because of the limited number of 
countries that had incorporated the droit de suite into their legislative framework. 
Controversially, Austria proposed to subject the droit de suite to the principle of 
reciprocity.68 This would result in authors being limited to benefiting from the 
right in other Union member states to the extent that the right was recognised 
under their national legislation.69 In circumstances where there was no national 
recognition of the right an author could not claim it in another Union member 
state. This proposal meant abandoning the Berne Convention’s principle of 
                                                           
64 Indeed today there is a lack of consensus concerning the inclusion of architectural drawings 
and the types of works considered ‘applied art’ that fall under the rubric of the resale right.  
65 Accordingly, testamentary dispositions were limited to relatives/heirs rather than to other 
legatees.  
66 Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, at p. 674. 
67 Supra note 53, at p. 94. 
68 Supra note 57, the original proposal for the droit de suite was based on the principle of 
reciprocity.  
69 For example, if the level of protection of authors’ right under the droit de suite could be graded 
on a scale of 1 to 3, 3 representing the highest international level of protection and 1 representing 
the lowest level of protection: where an author applies for protection in a Berne Union state, 
other than his/her home country and that Berne Union state offers the highest level of protection 
– ‘ level 3’ – the author will only be able to claim that level of protection in that Berne Union 
state to the level of protection offered in his or her home state. So if the Author’s home state only 
offers ‘level 1’ protection of rights, then that home level of protection will limit the protection 
available in the foreign Berne Union state. This is known as ‘material reciprocity’. 
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assimilation/national treatment;70 whereby all non-national authors would enjoy 
the same benefits and levels of protection as national authors in that state.71 The 
proposal also removed the possibility of authors originating from non-Berne 
Convention states benefiting from the right where their work was published for 
the first time in the Union. Following the Austrian proposal, the criterion was 
therefore author’s nationality – albeit qualified by the principle of reciprocity – 
and not place of residence or place of publication. The droit de suite would 
therefore be given a ‘special status’, one departing from the Berne Convention’s 
principle of assimilation.72 Given the number of exceptions under Berne to the 
principle of assimilation it is questionable whether the droit de suite continues to 
represent a ‘special status’ or exemption. Other exceptions to the principle of 
national treatment include: Article 7.8, the comparison of terms of protection; 
Article 2.7, phrase 2 – on models and designs; Article 6, the possible retaliation 
against back-door protection; Article 18, the application in time; and Article 
30.2(b) part 2, the reservation of the ten-year periods regarding translations.73  
 
In 1939 the Berne Convention brought together a panel of experts in Samaden 
(Switzerland)74 to consider incorporating the droit de suite under a separate and 
related convention. Under this draft, each contracting state undertook to accord 
the authors of original artistic works ‘realized in the domain of painting, 
                                                           
70 Supra note 22, Berne Art. 4, as revised at Rome had a broad scope, it was directed at ‘the rights 
[that] the respective laws currently grant or may later grant to nationals.’  
71 ‘Assimilation’ is also referred to as ‘formal reciprocity’.  
72 The Berne Convention’s principle of assimilation requires Berne Union member states to 
provide nationals of other Berne Union member states the same level of protection and rights as 
their own citizens.  See also L. de Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 53, at p. 94. 
73 See I. Stamatoudi and P. Torremans EU Copyright Law, A Commentary (Cheltenham: Elgar, 
2014) p. 27. 
74 The panel of experts included legal academics, practitioners, rights groups representatives, 
politicians etc. See Duchemin Le Droit de Suite des Artistes (1948) p. 255 as cited by Ricketson 
& Ginsburg supra note 15 at p. 674. 
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sculpture, engraving and drawings “a droit de suite” in the price of resale of their 
works’.75 The right was personal, inalienable and transmissible to heirs only post 
mortem.76 Other procedural elements were to be left to national legislators to 
determine, these included the duration of protection, the method of collection, 
the amount and the means of safeguarding the right.77 Finally, the proposed 
convention was to be open to present and future Berne Union members.78 
 
The Samaden project, as outlined above, was abandoned after the outbreak of 
World War II. In a renewed programme in 1948 – the Brussels Conference – the 
annexation of the droit de suite as a neighbouring right was replaced with the 
incorporation of the right as a copyright. This centring of the droit de suite within 
copyright rather than within ‘neighbouring rights’ was significant because it 
recognises the right as an author’s right rather than as a related right of producers 
and performers. Indeed, the Berne Convention’s ultimate recognition of the right 
as a copyright rather than as a related or neighbouring right arguably justifies the 
exclusive and inalienable nature of the right as it now exists. Had the right been 
recognised as a related right, the justification of its personal nature would have 
been problematic and potentially paradoxical.. In any event, the right continued 
to face strident criticism from some Union member states,79 accordingly a further 
paragraph was added to the Belgian proposal providing that the droit de suite 
could only be claimed in those countries whose legislation provided for it and 
                                                           
75 Ibid. at p. 675. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid. See ‘Draft Text’, Art. 6 & 7. 
78 Ibid. See ‘Draft Text’, Art. 9. 
79 Notably, Austria, Norway, Finland, Britain and the Netherlands. For further details see 
Ricketson and Ginsburg, supra note 15, see also de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 53, at p. 95. 
 35 
this should be on the basis of reciprocity.80 No objection was raised to this, and 
the final provision adopted by the Conference as article 14bis reads as follows: 
 
(1) The author, or after his death, the persons or institutions authorized by 
national legislation, shall, in respect of original works of art and original 
manuscripts of writers and composers, enjoy the inalienable right to an 
interest in any sale of the work subsequent to the first disposal of the 
work by the author. 
(2) The protection provided by the preceding paragraph may be claimed 
in a country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which the 
author belongs so permits, and to the degree permitted by the country 
where this protection is claimed. 
(3) The procedure for collection and the amounts shall be a matter for 
determination by national legislation. 
 
While the droit de suite was successfully incorporated as a copyright under the 
Berne Convention, it was only optional and at the time of the Brussels 
Conference it was clear that there was limited support for the right. In subsequent 
years there were no further proposals to amend Article 14 bis, and therefore apart 
for some minor technical changes the provision remains largely unchanged.81 
Finally, while the French droit de suite predominantly influenced this facet of the 
Berne Convention there was a noticeable absence in the discourse related to the 
social character of the droit de suite. The right was instead cast strictly as an 
                                                           
80 See Berne Convention Documents 1948 (1951) p. 367. 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=12802> (date accessed: 8 July 2017).  
81 The minor technical changes include: a) the article is now renumbered as article 14ter, and b) 
the word ‘transfer’ was substituted for ‘disposal’ in paragraph (1) and ‘extent’ for ‘degree’ in 
paragraph (2). 
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economic right. This omission undoubtedly shaped the discourse concerning the 
nature of the droit de suite and the artists’ resale right for decades to come. 
 
1.3 The Development of the European Union’s Intellectual Property Rights 
Framework 
 
The EU’s influence on member state’s intellectual property (IP) regimes has 
been significant.82 In amending their domestic laws, member states have 
conferred broad powers to EU institutions so that the Union’s common 
objectives can be achieved.83 This is particularly evident in the area of 
intellectual property where the EU has harmonised laws on trademarks,84 
design,85 copyright86 and neighbouring rights87, database rights,88 plant variety 
                                                           
82 See G. Triton Intellectual Property in Europe 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) p. 7; 
and Seville supra note 1 at p. 23.  
83  See Article 1 of the Treaty on the European Union [hereinafter TEU] and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [hereinafter TFEU] OJ C83/01.  
84 Trade Marks, Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community 
Trademark [1994] OJ L011; Directive No. 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to Trade 
Marks L336/1; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1431 of 18 May 2017 laying 
down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
207/2009 on the European Union Trade Mark, L205/39; Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 Of The 
European Parliament And Of The Council of 16 December 2015 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 on the Community Trade Mark and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 
2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, and 
repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
85 Community Designs, Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on 
Community designs: [2002] OJ L3/1; Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 supra note 84. 
86 See for example; The Information Society Directive, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ L 167 [hereinafter InfoSoc 
Directive]. 
87 For example, Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art [2001] 
OJ L 272/32 [hereinafter Artists’ Resale Right Directive]; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 
September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to 
copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission [1993] OJ L 248.  
88 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the 
legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 077. 
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rights,89 and more recently the Unity Patent.90 Despite this, many commentators 
have argued that the harmonization of EU IP law has been ‘incoherent’,91 
‘fragmented’92 and ‘reactionary’.93 Section 1.5 analyses these criticisms, which 
in turn inform the understanding of how the Artists’ Resale Right Directive came 
into existence and why it took its current form. Before considering these 
criticisms, the following section will outline the history of the EU’s IP 
harmonization initiative. This will provide context for the forthcoming analysis. 
 
1.4 Background to EU Intellectual Property Harmonization 
 
The EU’s original reliance on the internal market rationale as a legal basis for 
harmonization is key to understanding the scope and content of the current EU IP 
framework as well as understanding more recent developments.94 This in turn 
informs the understanding of the legislative context in which the EU Artists’ 
Resale Right Directive developed. This goes some way to explaining the nature 
and scope of the Artists’ Resale Right Directive as well as providing a basis for 
further analysis.95 
                                                           
89 Council Regulations (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community plant variety rights 
[1994] OJ L 227. 
90 EU Regulation No. 1257/2012 (OJ EPO 2013, 111) creates a ‘European patent with unitary 
effect’, commonly referred to as ‘Unitary Patent’ <http://www.epo.org/law-
practice/unitary/unitary-patent.html> (date accessed: 8 July 2017).  
91 C. Geiger Constructing European Intellectual Property (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2013) p. 5 - 23. 
92 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Single Market 
for Intellectual Property Rights Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, 
high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe COM (2011) 287 final, Brussels, 
24.5.2011 p. 6. 
93 Supra note 91.  
94 See Article 118, which provides an IP ‘legal basis’ for EU harmonisation. The Lisbon Treaty 
2001 OJ C 306 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty] incorporated Article 118 into the Treaty. Prior to the 
introduction of Article 118, the preferred means of harmonising EU IP law was by means of the 
‘internal market’ rationale - Article 26 (TFEU) (formerly Article 7(a) EEC).  
95 Directive 2001/84/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 
on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art [2001] OJ L 272/32. 
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The roots of EU IP harmonization can be traced back to the late 1950s when the 
six original member states, under the initiative of the Commission, began work 
on creating a European Patent;96 followed in the 1960’s by the development of a 
European Trade Mark97 and the adoption of Conventions in both these areas in 
the 1970s.98 Progress was slow primarily due to the fact that the economies of 
Europe at that time were strong and the benefits of integration were not fully 
realised.99 However the 1970s threw the Community into a ‘state of crisis’;100 the 
Community faced successive monetary crises, a rise in commodity prices and 
increases in energy costs. In addition, at this time the process of ‘EU 
enlargement’101 brought with it additional challenges102 and it was feared that if 
member states did not coordinate their activities more fully the Community 
would be in jeopardy.103 Not withstanding these myriad challenges, these events 
created an awareness among member states of the potential benefits of a united 
Europe.104 In light of this growing awareness the Commission responded 
                                                           
96 See European Parliament Resolution in the Seventh General Report of 30 of May 1974 on the 
activities of the Communities in 1973 [1974] OJ C 62 p. 146; see also EU Regulation No. 
1257/2012 (OJ EPO 2013, 111) creating a ‘European patent with unitary effect’, commonly 
referred to as ‘Unitary Patent’ < http://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary/unitary-patent.html> 
(date accessed: 8 July 2017). 
97 Ibid. European Parliament Resolution in the Seventh General Report at p. 147; see also the 
Trade Mark Directive and the Community Trade Mark Regulation. National trademark 
registration in the EU Member States has been harmonized for almost 20 years and the 
Community trademark was established 15 years ago. See Directive 2008/95/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trade marks, [2008] OJ L 299, p. 25 and Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 
February 2009 on the Community trade mark, [2009] OJ L78, p. 1 [hereinafter Trademark 
framework]. 
98 Ibid. at p. 146. 
99 Ibid. see ‘introduction’ p. xvi – xxvi. 
100 Ibid. at p. xvi. 
101 EU Membership grew during the 1970s: Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the 
EU in 1973.  
102 The addition of new Member States to the Community further challenged the EEC’s 
institutional decision making and the overall operative structure of the EEC. 
103 Supra note 96, at p. xix. 
104 Ibid. at p. xxii, advantages in terms of market efficiency and trading with international 
partners as a unified trading bloc.  
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affirmatively,105 adopting a number of ‘common policies’ in diverse areas 
including energy, economics, agriculture, competition, social and the 
environment.106 As part of these ‘common policies’ and their focus on a 
convergence of law and policy the internal market and its objective of 
harmonization featured prominently. While it was originally thought that 
intellectual property rights did not directly affect the free movement of goods,107 
they were considered ‘… essential to the creation and maintenance of [the 
internal market]’.108 In the 1970s the EU broadened its IP focus from IPRs that 
had a strictly industrial focus109 to include IPRs relating to the cultural 
economy.110 In 1975 the European Commission published a plan for ‘priority 
action’ which focused on the approximation of laws on copyright and 
neighbouring rights, including the resale right.111 In 1976 a working document 
entitled ‘Community Action in the Cultural Sector’ highlighted the need to 
harmonise many areas of copyright law.112 The Commission saw the 
Community’s unique cultural heritage as being of intrinsic value and as such 
recognised the importance of supporting its cultural workers by providing ‘just 
and adequate’ reward for their endeavours. This would be achieved by creating a 
legal framework of rights which would in turn provide financial support for 
cultural workers: composers, authors, visual artists, performer etc. However the 
                                                           
105 Ibid. at p. xvi. See address by Mr. Carlo Scarascia Mugnozz, Vice-President of the 
Commission of the European Communities, to the European Parliament on 12 February 1974. 
106 See Council Resolution of 22 March 1971 OJ C 28 p. 1. See also supra note 94, at p. 8 and p. 
173 - 440, the Commission had set 1980 as the deadline for the development of a European 
Economic and Monetary Union.   
107 Supra note 96, at p. 146. The Commission is now of the view the IP directly affects the free 
movement of goods in the internal market. See Recital 6, of the InfoSoc Directive.  
108 Supra note 96, at p. 146. 
109 Such as trademarks and patents which directly affected industry and commerce. 
110 Supra note 96, at p. 5.  
111 European Commission, ‘Community Action in the Cultural Sector’, Bulletin of the European 
Communities Supplement 6/77 (1977) p. 24.  
112 See ‘Community Action in the Cultural Sector’ Commission Communication to the Council, 
22 November 1977 COM (77) p. 560.  
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process of harmonizing this tranche Community copyright law would take nearly 
two decades.113 A combination of legal, political and economic factors 
contributed to this rather protracted process; these factors will be discussed in 
section 1.6.  In the 1980s and 1990s the EU saw further developments in areas 
such as trademark law,114 the protection of plant varieties,115 registered and 
unregistered designs116 and once again specific areas of copyright law.117 The 
Commission’s renewed focus on copyright began in 1988 with a Green Paper 
entitled ‘Copyright and the Challenge of Technology’ [hereinafter Green 
Paper].118 The Commission argued that the protection of artistic and literary 
works was of growing importance due to the shift in economic activities of 
industrialised countries away from the production of tangible goods to intangible 
goods of a creative and technical nature.119 At a time when the ‘knowledge 
economy’ was only in its infancy this showed remarkable foresight on the part of 
the Commission.  The Commission regarded such industries as particularly 
vulnerable to damage through unauthorised copying and as such required 
                                                           
113 See InfoSoc Directive. Admittedly, this process of harmonization is ongoing. Furthermore, 
many ‘first generation’ IP harmonization proposals did not come to fruition until the mid 1990s 
and 2000s. The artists’ resale right is a case in point. While it was first proposed in the 1970s it 
did not become a directive until 2001. Other examples include the Database Directive 96/9/EC of 
11 March 1996, OJ L 77/20 [hereinafter Database Directive], Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 
November 1992 on lending and rental rights, OJ L 346 , replaced by Directive 2006/115/EC of 
12 December 2006, OJ L 376 28 [hereinafter Lending and Rental Rights Directive], Directive 
93/83 EEC of 27 September 1993, OJ L 248/15 on Cable and Satellite [hereinafter Cable and 
Satellite Directive], Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the term of protection OJ L 290, 
replaced by Directive 2011/77 of 27 September 2011 OJ l 265/1 [hereinafter Term Directive]. 
See further Stamatoudi and Torremans supra note 73, at p. 10.  
114 See Trademark framework, supra note 84. 
115 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2100/94 of 27 July 1994 on Community Plant Variety Rights 
[1994] OJ L 227/1.  
116 Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Designs [1998] OJ L 289/28, Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 
December 2001 on Community Designs [2001] OJ L 3/1. 
117 See European Commission ‘Follow-up to the Green Paper’ COM (90) 584 Final, Brussels, 17 
January 1991. [hereinafter Follow-Up Green Paper].  
118 Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology Com (88) 172 final, Brussels, 7 
June 1988. [hereinafter Green Paper] 
119 Ibid.  
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‘immediate action’.120 The first and arguably the most important Directive of this 
time was the Directive on Computer Programs.121 Subsequent directives were 
based on the four primary concerns outlined in the Commission’s 1988 Green 
Paper. First, the requirement of a single internal market meant that it was 
necessary to eliminate disparities in member states copyright laws.122 Second, the 
Community had to develop policies that would improve the competitiveness of 
its economy in relation to its global trade partners; a high level of IP protection 
was perceived to be the means to achieve this.123 Third, intellectual property 
resulting from creative efforts within the community needed to be protected from 
unfair exploitation from outside the Community.124 Finally, it was noted that in 
areas such as industrial design and computer software, copyright protection could 
have a restrictive effect on the market.125 The Commission accordingly identified 
certain issues that it regarded as requiring urgent attention at community level. 
These included: piracy, home copying of sound and audio-visual material; 
distribution and rental rights for certain classes of work (in particular, sound and 
video recordings); the protection of computer programs and databases; and the 
limitations on the protection available to Community right-holders in non-
member states.126 There was also a proposal127 that member states adhere to the 
                                                           
120 Supra note 82, at p. 487. 
121 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, 
OJ L 122/42, repealed by Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs [2009] OL L 111/16. For 
commentary see A. Lucas-Schloetter ‘Is there a Concept of European Copyright Law? History, 
Evolution, Policies and Politics and the Aquis Communautaire’ in Stamatoudi and Torremans 
eds. EU Copyright Law; A Commentary (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2014) p. 10,  “to protect computer 
programs as ‘literary works’ within the framework of copyright was a political decision in order 
to ensure the growth of a competitive and dynamic European software industry. Copyright as a 
whole lost thereby ‘something of its cultural specificity, but it gained considerably in political 
awareness’” – citing Cornish, ‘Copyright Across the Quarter-Century’, (1995) IIC, p. 806.  
122 See Green Paper at paras, 1.3.1. - 1.3.6. 
123 Ibid.  
124 Ibid.  
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid. at para 1.6.2.  
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Berne Convention.128 As already noted, the primary aim of the Berne Convention 
was to create an international agreement on the protection of literary and artistic 
copyright. At this point in the evolution of the EU’s IP framework, the Berne 
Convention was seen as an effective means of harmonizing EU copyright law, 
albeit to a modest standard.  The Commission stated that its approach in this area 
was not to be one of ‘wholesale’ harmonization.129 Furthermore it stated that 
Community legislation should be restricted to that which was necessary for the 
proper functioning of the Community and that it regarded many issues of 
copyright law as not requiring any specific action at Community level. The 
Green Paper therefore proposed the issuing of various directives on copyright 
law under Art 100a130 of the EC Treaty, (‘internal market’ rationale) which 
permits Community action in relation to matters that directly affect the 
functioning of the internal market.  
 
In 1990 the Commission published a subsequent Green Paper entitled ‘Follow up 
to the Green Paper’131 [hereinafter Follow-Up Paper] which built upon many of 
the issues highlighted in the previous Green Paper. Extensive consultations with 
the various industry stakeholders formed the basis of the Follow-Up Paper. 132 
Several additional areas of possible Community action were identified, including 
the duration of legal protection, moral rights, reprographic rights, artists’ resale 
                                                           
127 Ibid. at paras, 1.3.1. - 1.3.6. Note that because certain provisions of the Berne Convention 
were optional (i.e. the droit de suite) it did not serve to harmonize the laws of EU Member States.  
128 See Berne Convention (as amended on September 28, 1979).  
129 See Follow-Up Green Paper supra note 117 at p. 39. 
130 See Treaty on the Function of the European Union (Consolidated Version: 2012) C 326/47, 
(then Article 100a EEC, later Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU) <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12008E114&from=EN>  (date 
accessed: 8 June 2017).  
131 See Follow-Up Green Paper supra note 117. 
132 Ibid. see ‘introduction’. 
 43 
rights, and broadcasting rights.133 In an Appendix to the Follow-Up Paper a 
precise agenda of Community initiatives was set out. The agenda enumerated 
five proposals for Directives on rental rights, lending rights and certain 
neighbouring rights; on home copying, on database protection; on the term of 
protection; and on satellite and cable. It is important to note the omission of the 
resale right at this time; clearly the resale right was still not a priority for the 
Commission.  
 
In the short period of time between the publications of both green papers there 
was a significant policy shift. In the 1988 Green Paper the Commission stated 
that ‘Community legislation should be restricted to what is needed to carry out 
the tasks of the Community’134 and that because ‘all’ member states adhere to the 
Berne Convention ‘a certain level of convergence of laws had already 
occurred.’135 It regarded remaining differences as having no significant effect on 
the internal market. This signalled a more tentative approach to the 
harmonization of EU IP law. However in the 1990 Follow-Up Paper the 
Commission reversed its position noting that ‘… it must not confine itself to a 
few salient points but must try to tackle all the main aspects which might have 
implications for the creation of the single market in cultural goods and 
services.’136 In line with its more comprehensive policy approach the 
Commission revised its previous opinion on the suitability of the Berne 
Convention as an appropriate means of achieving copyright harmonisation within 
the EU Community.  The Commission observed that not all member states had 
                                                           
133 See generally Follow-Up Green Paper supra note 117. 
134 Green paper supra note 118, at para 1.4.9.  
135 Ibid. 
136 Follow-Up to the Green Paper supra note 117, at para 1.7.  
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fully complied with and acceded to the Berne Convention.137  In such 
circumstances the Commission concluded that the Berne Convention was 
insufficient as a means of harmonising member state’s IP laws and therefore a 
parallel, multilateral138 and Community effort was needed to secure the rights of 
copyright holders.139 This approach was to be achieved through the use of 
multiple directives, in many discrete areas of IP, in effect giving rise to the first 
generation of IP directives.140 
 
It is apparent that the Berne Convention was not an adequate tool for the 
harmonization of the EU’s IP framework for three reasons. Firstly, not all EU 
member states had acceded to the most recent revisions of the Berne 
Convention,141 creating an unequal legislative basis, with some signatory states 
agreeing to higher levels of protection than others. Secondly, the exceptions and 
limitation provided for by the Berne Convention allowed signatory state’s 
considerable scope, resulting in varying procedural and substantive standards 
across signatory state’s IP systems. For instance, in the case of the Artists’ 
Resale Right, Article 14ter of the Berne Convention included original 
                                                           
137 Ibid. at para 1.11.4 – 1.11.5 ‘… at present the majority of Member States are already party to 
the Berne Convention …’  however, ‘[i]n order to eliminate the distortions which exist and to 
clear the way for the large single market … the Commission is presenting to Council a proposal 
for a decision which would require all Member States to have acceded to and comply with the 
provisions of the Berne Convention … .’ 
138 Referring to an International effort. 
139 Follow-Up Green Paper supra note 117 at para 1.11.2. 
140 See Annex to Follow-Up Green, supra note 117 ‘Actions proposed in the field of copyright 
and neighbouring rights; Legislative action to be taken by 31 December 1992 (i) Proposal for a 
decision that the member States will, by 31 December 1992, ratify or adhere to as comply with 
the1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention of 26th October 1961. (ii) 
Proposals for a directive on rental rights lending and certain neighbouring rights. (iii) Proposals 
for a directive on home copying of sound and audiovisual recordings. (v) Proposals for a 
directive on the harmonisation of the legal protection of databases. (vi) Proposals for a directive 
on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and neighbouring rights applicable to 
satellite and cable broadcasting.” 
141 The 1971 Paris Conference of the Berne Convention. WIPO Publication 
No. 615(E).  
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manuscripts of author’s and composers as well as original works of art. Article 
14ter is also optional, so in the first instance there was no requirement for 
signatory states to provide for a resale right and in the second instance the scope 
of the right could vary considerably. Thirdly, the recognition of ‘Berne rights’ by 
signatory states was based on the principle of ‘national treatment’ however, 
many exceptions to this principle existed and rights such as the artists’ resale 
right were based on the principle of reciprocity. For a national of one signatory 
state to benefit from the right in another signatory state, his or her home country 
would have to recognise the right before extra territorial applications could be 
made. In addition, an author – in the case of the resale right, a visual artist – 
could only claim protection in a Berne Union state to the level of protection 
provided for in his or her home state. The corollary being, that the rights of 
authors originating from states providing high standards of protection would be 
limited to the extent of the protection provided by states adhering to lower 
standards of protection. While reciprocity is useful as a device to encourage 
signatory states to raise their level of IP protection to a ‘common standard’ – so 
as to benefit national interests – it also creates further disparities in the 
convergence of laws. In effect, the Berne Convention served as a semi-
normative, broad based tool for harmonization rather than as an agreed mandate 
towards a convergence of copyright law by signatory states.  In such 
circumstances the ‘soft law’ approach permitted for by the Berne Convention 
proved wholly inadequate as the foundations for the process of EU copyright 
harmonization.   
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Much of the Commission’s work programme as outlined in the 1988 Green 
Paper and the 1990 Follow-Up Paper has since come into effect. The ‘first 
generation’ of harmonization comprises six Directives including, computer 
programs142 rental and lending rights143 satellite broadcasting and cable 
transmission rights,144 the duration of copyright and related rights145, the 
protection of databases146, and the artists’ resale right.147 The second generation 
of harmonization148 began with the Information Society Directive149 the 
Enforcement Directive150, the Orphan Works Directive151 and the Collective 
Rights Management Directive152.  
 
Triton notes that in all these areas the Commission’s position on harmonization 
has been to ‘harmonize up’.153 This process results in rights holders being 
accorded additional rights that did not previously exist in their member state but 
existed in other member states. This is the opposite of ‘harmonizing down’ 
where an approximation of member states’ laws is achieved by removing 
                                                           
142 Supra note 121.  
143 Rental Rights Directive, supra note 113. 
144 Satellite and Broadcasting Directive, supra note 113. 
145 See Directive 93/98/EEC of the Council of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of 
protection of copyright and certain related rights [1998] OJ L 290/9 repealed by Directive 
2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the term of protection of 
copyright and certain related rights [2006] OJ 372/12, as amended by Directive 2011/77/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 
2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights [2011] OJ L 265/1 
[hereinafter Term Directive]. 
146 See Database Directive supra note 113.  
147 See Resale Rights’ Directive supra note 87.  
148 On the distinction between first and second generation rights see Seville supra note 1, at p. 7 - 
69.  
149 See InfoSoc Directive supra note 86. 
150 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 195/16 [hereinafter IPR Enforcement Directive]. 
151 Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
certain permitted uses of orphan works [2012] OJ L 299/5 [hereinafter Orphan Works Directive]. 
152 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in 
musical works for online use in the internal market, OJ L 84/72 [hereinafter Collective 
Management Directive]. 
153 Supra note 82, at p. 488. 
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rights.154 Jacob notes that ‘[i]t is much easier to harmonise intellectual property 
rights up than down. No one minds being given more rights than they had before, 
whereas people are apt to complain very seriously – raising cries of destruction 
of property without compensation – if their rights are cut down’.155 Curiously 
however, the social provisions of the German ARR regime, which provided a 
form of social assistance for visual artists, were ignored.156 The Directive instead 
provided a base line upon which member states could expand upon.  
 
1.5 A Patchwork of Rights 
 
As noted above, the EU’s harmonization of copyright and more broadly 
intellectual property has been characterised as incoherent,157 fragmented158 and 
reactionary.159 Often legislative action in this area took decades to come to 
fruition,160 resulting in EU legislation that was limited in both scope and in its 
ability to achieve its stated policy objective.161 Geiger, cites three underlying 
causes for these deficiencies: firstly, the EU lacked competence in the field of 
                                                           
154 See L. J. R. Jacob ‘Industrial Property – Industry’s Enemy’ (1997) 1 Intellectual Property 
Quarterly pp. 3 - 15.  
155 Ibid. 
156 For further see Chapter 5, Section 5.4, p. 303 - 308.  
157 Supra note 91, at p. 5 - 23. 
158 See also Montagnani and Borghi ‘Promises and Pitfalls of the European Copyright Law 
Harmonization Process’ in D. Ward’s ed. The European Union and the Culture Industries: 
Regulation and Public Interest (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008) p. 230; and B. Hugenholtz 
‘Copyright without Frontiers: the problem of territoriality in European copyright law’ in E. 
Derclaye (eds.) Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2009). 
159 Supra note 91, at p. 5 - 23. 
160 For instance, regarding the droit de suite, legislative action in this area was first recognised by 
the EU Commission (formerly the EC/EEC) supra note 111, at p. 16. It took just over three and 
half decades before the Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC came into full effect.  
161 For instance, in the case of the Artists’ Resale Right, Article 4 (1) of the Directive places a cap 
on the total amount of the royalty that can be earned. This is an exception in the area of copyright 
and related rights and brings into question whether the Directive achieves one of its primary aims 
– to create equivalence between visual artists and other creators, see Recital 3 of the Artists’ 
Resale Right Directive.  
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intellectual property; 162 secondly, an excessively active European Commission 
proved reactionary and easily influenced by sectoral interest groups; and thirdly, 
a judicially active European Court of Justice (ECJ, now CJEU) continually 
pushed the boundaries of harmonization.163 Geiger’s explanation of how the 
EU’s IP framework developed is useful because it incorporates social, political 
and legal factors in its analysis. This is not to say that Geiger’s arguments fully 
explain the patchwork of EU IP rights evident today but these arguments prove 
useful in providing an analytical framework in which to view the development of 
the modern EU IP rights system and more specifically EU copyright law. 
 
The following sections takes each of Geiger’s criticisms in turn, assessing 
whether they contributed to the current framework of rights. It should be noted 
that while Geiger’s criticisms focus on intellectual property rights broadly, they 
equally apply to the development of copyright and specifically to the artists’ 
resale right.  
 
1.5.1 Lack of EU Competence 
 
Within the broader framework of IPRs the EU Commission’s choice of ‘legal 
basis’ (internal market) undoubtedly influenced the nature and scope of the 
artists’ resale right. Conceivably, a more general IP legal basis would have 
resulted in a more coherent framework of rights. Alternatively, the choice of 
                                                           
162 Intellectual property rights were mentioned only in Article 36 of the European Community 
(E.C.) Treaty which provided an exception to the fundamental principle of free movement of 
goods. This was not changed by either the Single European Act (SEA)1986 OJ L 169 or the 
Maastricht Treaty on a European Union (TEU) 1992 OJ C 191. It was not until the Lisbon Treaty 
that a legal basis for IP became part of the Treaty, supra note 94.   
163 Supra note 91 at p. 5 - 23.  
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legal basis merely served as a formal hurdle – a threshold – that EU legislators 
were required to overcome before drafting began and therefore may not have 
defined the nature and scope of these rights.  The following sections question 
whether the internal market rationale, as a legal basis for IP harmonization, 
affected the framework of rights that exist today, or on the contrary, merely 
reflected a tentative approach by EU legislators to the challenges presented by 
technological advances and the advent of the ‘information age’.  
 
On this point Geiger argues that until recently the EU lacked competence in the 
area of intellectual property, which in turn prevented the coherent development 
of an EU IP framework.164 The EU is based on the rule of law,165 in that its 
subject matter jurisdiction derives its authority from the founding Treaties of the 
EU.166 Therefore, legislative intervention must be based on an authorising 
provision of the Treaty; this is known as the legislative ‘legal basis’ requirement. 
The Commission cannot legislate within a given policy area unless provided for 
in the Treaty.167 Every EU treaty is approved voluntarily and democratically by 
each member state and thus represent the agreed upon capacities of the EU’s 
interaction with member states’ sovereign rights. Without such a mechanism and 
safeguards, the institutions of the EU could conceivably err in the performance of 
their duties. The treaties therefore ensure that member states adhere to their 
member state obligations whilst simultaneously preventing EU institutions from 
                                                           
164 Supra note 91 at p. 213. 
165 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/13 (TFEU) 
166 The Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(TEEC), 1957.  
167 See TFEU supra note 165, Article 5(1) ‘The limits of Union competences are governed by the 
principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.’ And 5(2) ‘Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act 
only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties 
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties 
remain with the Member States.’ 
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acting ultra vires their political and legislative mandate. Arguably the defining 
feature of the EU’s supranational structure is this delicate balancing of EU and 
member state sovereignty.  
 
The Treaty of Rome168  – which established the European Economic Community 
in its original format – did not encompass a provision that explicitly conferred a 
competence on the European Economic Community  (EEC) (as it then was) to 
deal with IP issues.169 In fact there appeared to be little appetite for Community 
(EEC and EC) interference in the general national property systems of member 
states. For instance, Article 222 EEC (later Article 295 EC and now Article 345 
TFEU)170 states that the ‘… Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in member 
states governing the system of property ownership.’171 While this is not in 
dispute, it is not clear whether Article 222 EEC applied more generally to 
intellectual property rights. Even if a broad interpretation was adopted, it did not 
prevent the Community from using other Treaty provisions to directly and 
indirectly affect Community IP policy. The primary Treaty provisions172 used in 
this field were Articles 100a  (later Article 95 EC, now Article 114 TFEU) and 
Article 235 (later Article 308 EC, now Article 352 EEC) of the European 
                                                           
168 Treaty of Rome 1957, The Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (TEEC), is an international agreement that led to the founding of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1958. It was signed on 25 March 1957 by 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. 
169 See InfoSoc Directive, supra note 86.  
170 See B. Akkermans and E. Ramaekers ‘Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 EC), Its Meanings 
and Interpretations’ (2010) 16 (3) European Law Journal: Review of European Law in Context p. 
292  <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2010.00509.x/abstract> (date 
accessed: 10 August 2017).  
171 Treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated version); now Article 
345 TFEU. 
172 Other provisions included Article 37 ECT (now Article 43 TFEU on the Common 
Agricultural Policy which was used as the main legal basis in the field of geographical 
indications and appellations of origin, and Articles 47(2) and 55 ECT concerning the free 
movement of services. These articles amongst others served as an indirect legal basis for the 
harmonization of IPRs including copyright and neighbouring/related rights.  
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Community Treaty (EC Treaty).173 Article 100a permitted the EC to act in order 
to approximate legislation where such action brought about the ‘establishment 
and functioning of the internal market.’174 As IPRs are recognised as having a 
direct impact on the functioning of the internal market,175 Article 100a served as 
the primary ‘legal basis’ for the majority of directives in the field of IP and more 
specifically copyright.176 However, Article 100a was limited in its application. 
Prior to the enactment of the Single European Act in 1986, the greatest difficulty 
in utilising Article 100a as a ‘legal basis’ was that it required unanimity from the 
Council before harmonizing directives could be implemented.177  
 
The second Treaty provision to be used as a basis for harmonization was Article 
235. Article 235 permits the EU to legislate where it is required to act in order to 
achieve one of its objectives but where no explicit power has been granted.178 
However, the application of Article 235 in this context was limited in three 
respects: firstly, as a ‘legal basis of last resort’179 Council unanimity was 
required, secondly; it was subject to a negative condition in that the existence of 
other legal bases precluded its use; and thirdly, a positive requirement that the 
                                                           
173 Now Article 114 TEU and 352 TFEU.  
174 TFEU, Part three: Union Policies and Internal Actions - Title VII: Common Rules On 
Competition, Taxation and approximation of Laws - Chapter 3: Approximation of laws - Article 
114 (ex Article 95 TEC) OJ 115. 
175 Supra note 118. 
176 See InfoSoc Directive supra note 86 and Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') OJ L 
178. 
177 K. St. Clair Bradley ‘Powers and Procedures in the EU Constitution: Legal Bases and the 
Court’ in Craig & De Búrca 2nd eds. The Evolution of EU Law p. 95. 
178 Article 352 TFEU (ex Article 308 TEC) ‘If action by the Union should prove necessary, 
within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out 
in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by 
the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.’  
179 See P. Craig ‘Institutions, Power, and Institutional Balance’ in Craig and De Búrca 2nd ed. The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011). p. 53. 
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Council measure had to seek to attain a Community objective within the 
operation of the common market.180  
 
During the 1970s and early 1980s the use of these two ‘legal bases’ resulted in 
the enactment of harmonization directives that were extremely limited in terms 
of their scope and application.181 The Council tended to legislate for specific 
problems rather than employing a broader principle based approach.182 The 
effects of such a narrow approach to harmonization were compounded by the fast 
pace of technological advances at this time.183 As Craig and de Burca note, as 
soon as the Council had legislated for one technical problem another emerged.184 
Craig correctly points out that this narrow approach to harmonization reflected 
the limitations associated with EU institutional procedures; specifically the 
member states’ right in Council to veto proposals.185 Where legislative proposals 
had a wide application they were more likely to be subject to objections from 
individual member states whose national interests were negatively affected by 
the proposal.  In such circumstances member states were more likely to utilise 
their right to veto.186 This obstacle was removed by the introduction of the Single 
                                                           
180 Under the Lisbon Treaty the latter ‘common market’ formulation has been replaced with the 
formulation: necessary within ‘the framework of the Union’s Policies’. This gives Article 352 (ex 
308) much broader scope in terms of its application as a harmonization tool. Treaty of Lisbon 
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing The European Community, 
OJ 2007/C 306/01. 
181 Craig, supra note 179.  
182 Craig & De Búrca EU Law Text, Cases and Materials 5th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p. 583; e.g. 
Council Directive 87/54/EC of 16 December 1986 on the legal protection of topographies of 
semiconductor products OJ L24. 
183 Technological advances included copying/piracy devices, the internet, online databases, 
biotech advances etc. Indeed, the challenges presented by advances in technology are ever 
present, supra note 92, at p. 9 ‘Technology, the fast evolving nature of digital business models 
and the growing autonomy of online consumers, all call for a constant assessment as to whether 
current copyright rules set the right incentives and enable right holders, users of rights and 
consumers to take advantage of the opportunities that modern technologies provide.’  
184 Craig & De Búrca, supra note 182, at p. 583. 
185 Ibid.  
186 Ibid.  
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European Act 1986  (SEA),187 and its ‘internal market’ legal basis188 which 
loosened the Council’s voting requirement to a qualified majority and brought 
the EU Parliament more fully into the legislative process.189 However, while 
Article 100a EEC reduced the power of the individual member state’s veto, 
thereby broadening the potential scope of proposed legislation,190 it did not 
remove the continued limited role that EU legislators adopted in relation to the 
harmonization of EU IP law. EU legislators were still required under Article 
100a to base harmonization initiatives within the narrow scope of eliminating 
trade distortion within the internal market. Furthermore, where national IP 
systems did not have the effect of distorting the internal market, national 
legislators were left to determine the shape and character of their national IP 
systems. However, where distortions arose EU legislators were required to 
intervene. Thus Geiger notes that, developing an EU IP framework based on the 
‘internal market’ rationale directly contributed to the EU’s fragmented and 
incoherent approach to IP harmonization because the EU was only required to 
legislate where market distortion arose. This resulted in certain IP areas requiring 
attention while others remained untouched,191 hence the incoherent character of 
EU IP rights during this period.192 Geiger’s argument offers a compelling insight 
into the development of the EU’s IP framework. However, these observations 
                                                           
187 Supra note 162, the Single European Act (SEA) revises the Treaties of Rome in order to add 
new momentum to European integration and to complete the internal market. It amends the rules 
governing the operation of the European institutions and expands Community powers, notably in 
the field of research and development, the environment and common foreign policy. 
188 Previously Article 100a EEC, now Article 114 TFEU. 
189 Previous to the SEA the Parliament’s legislative role was largely tokenistic. Subsequent to the 
SEA the Parliament became fully integrated into the legislative process.  
190 The reduced power of the veto allowed legislators to be bolder with the scope of subsequent 
directives.  
191 The artists’ resale right is a case in point.  
192 Infra note 193, this period ended with the ECJ’s decision in Phil Collins v. Imtrat 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Case C-92/92) which required a broader – horizontal – approach to 
harmonization.  
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must be viewed against such cases as Rewe-Zenntral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [hereinafter Casis de Dijon]193 and 
Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH [hereinafter Phil Collins]194 
which effectively raised the capacity for harmonization; requiring the 
Commission to act in a host of areas including the artists’ resale right that it 
previously did not consider within its purview. Whether Casis de Dijon and Phil 
Collins actually compounded the fragmented IP framework or brought about a 
more unified approach to IP harmonization is considered in section 1.5.3. For 
now, it is submitted that harmonizing through the ‘back-door’ (internal market 
rationale) as it were, certainly limited the effectiveness of EU IP harmonization. 
 
For an alternative viewpoint, Hugenholtz proffers another explanation for the 
Commission’s minimalist and thereby inconsistent approach.195  He notes that 
while the process of harmonization successfully removed many market 
distortions, the process left intact a much more serious obstacle to the creation of 
the internal market: the territorial nature of copyright and related rights.196 
Hugenholtz maintains that by ‘[b]asing its harmonization agenda primarily on 
                                                           
193 Rewe-Zenntral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Case 120/78) [1979] ECR 
649. In this case the ECJ, relying on Article 258 TFEU193 (failure to fulfil a Treaty obligation) 
and direct effect, interpreted the Treaty as to promote the internal market. Importantly the Court 
invalidated trade barriers that were not technically discriminatory in nature. By adopting a 
purposive approach the Court broadened its definition of requirements that amounted to a barrier 
to trade.  In this case, the Member State’s product specifications for the packaging of products, 
which could not be justified on limited grounds such as health and safety, were held to obstruct 
trade. 
194 Phil Collins v. Imtrat Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Case C-92/92) & Patricia Im-und Export 
Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH and Another v. EMI Electrola GmbH (Case C-326/92). [hereinafter 
Phil Collins case] In this case the performer Phil Collins was prevented from exercising rights 
available to nationals of the member State in question on the grounds of his nationality. These 
discriminatory provisions were viewed by the ECJ as creating distortions to trade within the 
internal market and as such were contra the Treaties. The case adopted a purposive approach to 
what constituted ‘discrimination’ and as a result required the Commission to take action in a host 
of areas – including the artists resale right – which it did previously see as creating market 
distortions.  
195 Hugenholtz, supra note 158 at p. 18.  
196 Ibid. 
 55 
disparities between national laws, the European legislature has been aiming, as it 
would seem, at the wrong target.’197 Once the territorial nature of copyright and 
related rights were left intact, harmonization could achieve relatively little.198 
Hugenholtz highlights the paradoxical effect that eliminating trade distortions 
had on the internal market in circumstances where the territorial nature of 
copyright law was left in place. For instance, the approximation of member 
state’s IP laws in the areas of trademark, patent and copyright is of limited effect 
in circumstances where substantive rights and procedures vary from member 
state to member state. Furthermore, the InfoSoc Directive allows members states 
up to twenty optional exceptions to their copyright regimes.199 It may be 
observed that within the broader IP context, applying for patents and trademarks 
in each member state, with varying applicable registration procedures clearly 
created barriers to trade and distorted the internal market.200  
 
While Geiger and Hugenholtz analysis of EU IP Harmonization is informative, 
they must be viewed against the historical and political context in which the 
EU’s legislative basis developed. As Geiger notes, EU legislators lacked an 
express competence to legislate in this field and as a result, in terms of the level 
of harmonization that could be achieved, were limited by the confines of the 
‘internal market’ rationale. Prior to the SEA, legislative proposals were further 
limited by the unanimity requirement, however subsequent to the SEA, 
legislation with a broader policy objective still required a qualified majority from 
                                                           
197 Ibid.  
198 Ibid. 
199 Supra note 86.  
200 For example, the prolonged absence of a unified patent system in the EU increased users 
reliance on the European Patent Convention (EPC).  
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the Council to take effect.201 Historically and more broadly, the harmonization of 
EU member states’ law has been a slow and arduous process where multiple 
national interests are balanced in various policy areas in order to achieve 
agreement. Indeed, member state’s historical reluctance to cede sovereignty to 
the EU, in many policy areas, abated the harmonization process.202 Ultimately 
while Hugenholtz is correct in his contention that allowing copyright laws to be 
drawn along national borders created distortions within the internal market, the 
comprehensive unification of copyright laws at an EU level was until recently 
beyond the competency of the Union.203  
 
The Lisbon Treaty has largely addressed this issue, Article 118 TFEU provides a 
specific ‘legal basis’ for the creation of European intellectual property rights:204  
 
‘In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the 
setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation, coordination and 
supervision arrangements.’205 
 
                                                           
201 Supra note 179, at p. 95.  
202 See the failure of EU Member States to reach agreement on a Constitution for Europe. For 
comments see K. Tuori ‘The failure of the EU’s constitutional project’ (June: 2007) No 
Foundation Journal, p. 39 <http://www.helsinki.fi/nofo/NoFo3Tuori.pdf> date accessed 8 July 
2017).  




Indeed, Article 118 may present a solution to both Geiger and Hugenholtz 
critiques of the EU’s approach to IP harmonization to date. Basing 
harmonization initiatives on Article 118 provides a more holistic approach to EU 
IP harmonization by removing the territorial nature of IP rights and by allowing 
EU legislators to escape the confines of the ‘internal market’ rationale as a tool 
for IP harmonization. Furthermore, member states willingness to employ Article 
118 – thus removing the issue of territoriality – is evident from recent progress 
towards the completion of the Unity Patent and proposals for a unitary 
copyright.206 In light of these moves towards EU IP unification it is submitted 
that Article 118, as a legal basis, may bring the EU one step closer to a fully 
harmonised single market thus resolving historical impediments.207 Nevertheless, 
Article 118 may not present the necessary legal basis for a socially orientated 
ARR Directive, the issue of which will be returned to in Chapter 5.  
 
1.5.2 EU Commission Activism 
 
The following section presents an overview of the second part of Geiger’s thesis: 
that an active and responsive Commission to sectoral interests directly resulted in 
an incoherent and fragmented EU IP framework.  
 
Geiger characterises the EU Commission’s legislative history in the area of IP as 
excessively active with a willingness to bow to pressure from sectoral 
interests.208 Furthermore, he is of the opinion that the process of ‘harmonizing 
                                                           
206 Supra note 91, at p. 11. 
207 Unitery Patent, supra note 96, preamble 2 ‘[h]aving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union and in particular the first paragraph of Article 118 thereof, …’  
208 Supra note 91, at p. 12. 
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up’ has far exceeded the minimum level of protection required by international 
agreements such as the Berne and Rome Conventions.209 Indeed this triumvirate 
of activism, harmonizing rights above internationally agreed standards and 
responding too easily to sectoral interests has the potential to create an 
incoherent legislative framework of rights. These criticisms could be easily 
allayed in circumstances where legislation is based upon sound preliminary 
empirical research that objectively challenges the necessity and utility of the 
proposed legislation. However, Geiger purports that ‘… little economic analysis 
is done by the European legislator…’ to support legislative action.210  He 
contends that priority was given to ‘… quantity over quality without checking 
the usefulness of the legislative activity.’211 Geiger substantiates his claim 
regarding a lack of economic analysis with three examples. Firstly, he makes 
reference to the legal protection of databases, which resulted in legislation which 
by the Commission’s own admission had ‘… no proven impact … .’ 212 
Secondly, regarding copyright and specifically the Information Society 
Directive,213 Geiger suggests that ‘… rapid action was taken in order to protect 
exclusive rights and technical protection measures, without taking sufficient 
account of exceptions and limitations to those right … .’214 Thirdly, he argues 
that the Directive extending the term of neighbouring rights from 50 to 70 
                                                           
209 Ibid.  
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 See the Commission’s evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases 
published by the European Commission on 12 December 2005. DG Internal Market and Services 
Working Paper First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of databases, p. 5 
‘The economic impact of the “sui generis” right on database production is unproven. Introduced 
to stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the new instrument has had no proven impact 
on the production of databases.’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf> (date 
accessed: 9 June 2017). 
213 InfoSoc Directive supra note 86.  
214 Supra note 91, at p. 12. 
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years215 was not based on any independent economic study.216 Arguably, in the 
context of the ARR Directive, Geiger’s observations are equally relevant. Prior 
to the enactment of the ARR Directive, the Commission carried out a number of 
consultation exercises based on questionnaires and public hearings.217 In addition 
it conducted studies into the economic and legal aspects of the international art 
market.218 However, despite this, the Commission vastly over estimated the 
number of artists who would benefit from the resale right at 250,000.219 Based on 
current figures the artists’ resale right benefits less than a tenth of that 
estimated.220 This would appear to substantiate Geiger’s criticism that the 
Commission repeatedly drafted IP legislation without performing ‘serious’ 
economic research of the requisite quality.  
 
                                                           
215 InfoSoc Directive supra note 86.  
216 Supra note 91, at p. 12, see also A.C. Emilianides ‘The author revived: harmonisation without 
justification’ European Intellectual Property Review (2004) 26 (12), 538 - 541 ‘The Term 
Directive is, undeniably, an important step forward in the harmonisation process of intellectual 
property laws in the European Union. However, it failed to pursue the significant policy issue of 
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protection and the revival of copyright protection were considered as a “self-evident good that 
needed little explanation.”’ Citing S. Ricketson, “The Copyright Term” (1992) 6 IIC.  p. 778. 
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219 See Commission MEMO/99/68 ‘Proposed Directive on artists’ resale right – clarification’ 
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figure compared to €14,4 million royalties distributed to 7,107 artists and their heirs in 2007. 
Around half of the royalties were collected in France alone. Collecting societies in four Member 
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distributions between living and deceased artists for 2006-2010. In these four Member States 
22% of royalties by value and 41% of royalties by volume were distributed to living artists over 
the period.’; see also Kusin and McAndrew report to The European Fine Art Foundation TEFAF 
Art Market Study 2005 (London: TEFAF, 2005); R. Towse A handbook of cultural economics 
(Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing, 2011) p. 396. 
 60 
There also appears to be some support for Geiger’s point concerning the 
influence of sectoral interests on the Commission’s legislative output. 
Montagnani & Borghi question the degree to which the EU policy towards a 
‘progressive empowering of rights holders’ was the result of informed political 
choice or the effect of lobbying by interest groups.221 Furthermore, the UK’s 
Hargreaves Report states that the development of IP systems ought to be driven 
as far as possible by ‘objective evidence’222 and not, by implication, by the stated 
positions of various interest groups. In addition, former EU Commissioner Fritz 
Bolkenstein when commenting on the European Parliament’s approval of the 
Information Society Directive, recalled the ‘unprecedented lobbying onslaught’ 
to which the Parliament was subjected during these negotiations.223  Finally on 
this point and in relation to the artists’ resale right it has been said that the 
impetus for that Directive came from a group of wealthy French artists and their 
heirs who petitioned the Commission to introduce an EU wide resale right so that 
they could benefit from the resale of works in foreign markets.224 Whether the 
formation of the Directive was so influenced is difficult to substantiate, however 
it is evident from the foregoing that EU legislators do not operate in a vacuum 
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and are as susceptible to lobbying as national legislators. If and where EU 
legislators are responding to sectorial interests, the legislative output may lack a 
sufficiently objective and comprehensive character thus proving to be largely 
reactionary; resulting in an incoherent and fragmented system of rights.225 
However, it should be noted that the Commission does not operate in isolation. 
While the Commission is tasked with proposing and drafting legislation, it is the 
Council and the Parliament who temper the ‘quality and quantity’ of that 
legislation. Prior to the SEA, if member states did not agree with the 
Commission that there was a need for harmonization in a given policy area they 
could invoke their veto. Post SEA, a qualified majority from Council is required 
to pass legislation. It is submitted that Geiger’s assertion concerning over-
activism must be viewed against the required consent of member state’s 
representatives in Council and Parliament on the need for such legislative 
measures.  Notwithstanding this oversight, the focus of such ‘activism’ whether 
warranted or not, has the potential to significantly affect the development of a 
coherent or incoherent framework of rights. Furthermore, a Commission 
influenced by sectoral interests, combined with a lack of economic analysis into 
the effects of legislation in a given policy area, has the potential to undermine the 
integrity and transparency of EU harmonization. Indeed, relating to the artists’ 
resale right, there was a lack of debate on the merits of the resale right by EU 
legislators and as highlighted above the Commission’s economic research into 
                                                           
225 Compare B. Hugenholtz et al ‘The Recasting of Copyright & Related Rights for the 
Knowledge Economy’ 
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the potential number of beneficiaries is questionable. It was generally assumed 
that the right was ‘a good thing’ and that the primary challenge was in 
determining the scope and character of the right. This lack of debate and 
analytical rigour has resulted in a resale right that is an anomaly within the field 
of copyright and related rights.  The extent of this anomaly is the subject of 
Chapters 2 and 3.   
 
If Geiger’s argument regarding sectorial influence on the Commission is 
expanded to include other actors such as the Parliament and Council that enjoy 
an indirect right of legislative initiative (Article 225 and 241 TFEU), then his 
argument gains some momentum. As noted often by Noam Chomsky, wealthy 
and organised business interest groups continually and effectively exert influence 
throughout the political system.226 Indeed, it is clear from Fritz Bolkenstein’s 
comments on the drafting of the InfoSoc Directive, lobbying at the supranational 
level is a reality. Nevertheless, it is not the only means of exerting influence on 
EU institutions. While influence at the supranational level embodies a ‘top 
down’ approach, EU policy can be driven by the national policy preferences of 
member states, which in turn lobby their counterparts in Parliament and Council 
to achieve a qualified majority, thus representing a ‘bottom-up’ approach.  
Concluding on this point, the effects of sectorial interests may be ingrained 
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1.5.3 Judicial Activism 
 
Geiger’s third point outlines the contributory effect of a judicially active CJEU 
on the formation of a fragmented EU IP framework. Geiger states that the 
CJEU’s creative interpretation of the acquis communautaire, in the field of 
intellectual property, significantly contributed to its lack of coherency. Under 
Article 267 TFEU (preliminary rulings), where national courts refer a question 
regarding the interpretation of EU law to the CJEU, they are subsequently bound 
by this interpretation.227 Broadly speaking, this has allowed the CJEU aid the 
approximation of member state’s laws and ensure insofar as is possible, a 
harmonised interpretation of EU provisions. In many cases this  ‘… pushe[d] the 
dynamics of harmonization, the CJEU being able to succeed in areas where the 
Union’s legislature ha[d] failed.’228  
 
1.5.3.1 Casis de Dijon 
 
Arguably, the CJEU’s most seminal contribution in this area was its ruling in 
Cassis de Dijon.229 The ECJ (as it then was), relying on Article 258 TFEU230 
(failure to fulfil a Treaty obligation) and the principle of direct effect, interpreted 
                                                           
227 Article 267 TFEU; see also Europa ‘Summaries of EU Legislation’ 
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the Treaty as a means to promote the internal market.231 Importantly the Court 
invalidated trade barriers that were not technically discriminatory in nature.232 By 
adopting a purposive approach – mutual recognition of standards in different EU 
countries – the Court broadened its interpretation of what might be perceived as 
constituting state measures that amount to barriers to trade.   
 
In that case, the plaintiff, a French producer of liqueur, applied to the German 
authority233 for an import licence.  The German authority refused permission on 
the grounds that for the product to be marketed as a liqueur in Germany, it 
required a minimum alcohol content of 25%. The French liqueur had an alcohol 
content of 16%. The plaintiff was of the view that rules such as this constituted a 
restriction on the free movement of goods; amounting to a measure having an 
effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports contrary to Article 30 
EEC (free movement of goods). The Court was of the opinion that:  
 
‘… obstacles to movement within the community resulting from 
disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the 
products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may 
be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal 
                                                           
231 Supra note 182 at p. 583. 
232 Previously, the Court’s Jurisprudence had focused on trade restrictions which were 
quantitative in effect, placing restrictions on the quantity of goods that could be imported, or 
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233 The Bundesmonopolverwaltung (Federal Monopoly Administration for Spirits) 
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supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.’234 (Emphasis added) 
 
The Court continued that: 
 
‘It is clear from the foregoing that the requirements relating to the 
minimum alcohol content of alcoholic beverages do not serve a purpose 
which is in the general interest and such as to take precedence over the 
requirements of the free movement of goods, which constitutes one of the 
fundamental rules of the community.’235  
 
 
Evidently, member state’s product specifications for the packaging of products, 
which could not be justified on limited grounds, i.e., mandatory requirements 
such as health and safety, were held to obstruct trade.236 In this context, the Court 
unilaterally developed the doctrines of mutual recognition and equivalence of 
national regulations and standards. These doctrines take as a starting point that 
member state’s regulations and standards pursue the same objectives albeit by 
differing means, the rationale being that member states will pursue regulatory 
objectives in a given policy area that are largely equivalent to the standards set 
by other member states in that area. It provides that member states could 
however object to the import of goods subject to certain exceptions known as 
‘mandatory requirements.’ These mandatory requirements included amongst 
                                                           
234 Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979. - Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
für Branntwein. - Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hessisches Finanzgericht - Germany. - 
Measures heaving an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. - Case 120/78. 
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others, public health, safety, consumer protection and the environment. Where 
member states determine that identified goods conflict with national policies 
concerning issues such as public safety, it can objectively and legitimately justify 
a ban on the importation of those goods. However, where the ban cannot be so 
objectively justifiable, such action would contravene internal market rules and 
thus be vulnerable to a legal challenge. On balance these mandatory requirement 
provide an adequate balance between the needs of member states to protect 
national interests on identified grounds with the EU’s aim to create a single 
internal market without barriers.  
 
Craig notes that the Casis de Dijon decision ‘evinces [the Court’s] determination 
to catch discriminatory state action, in whatever form, which impeded the free 
movement of goods … .’237 The decision in Casis de Dijon laid the foundations 
for what Geiger describes as the Court’s creative interpretation of the acquis 
communautaire and its subsequent activism. Indeed, it may be observed that the 
case proved pivotal in harmonizing member state’s IP laws as it made possible 
future rulings such as the Phil Collins & Ors case, which prevented 
discriminatory treatment based on the grounds of nationality.238  
 
1.5.3.2 The Phil Collins Case 
 
Previous to the Phil Collins & Ors case it was not clear whether the principle of 
non-discrimination also applied to copyright in the EU territory.239 The case 
brought sharply into focus the differing levels of IP protection offered by 
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member states to the enlarged EU citizenry. This decision and subsequent 
cases240 enabled the CJEU to state unequivocally that discrimination on grounds 
of nationality, irrespective of the providence of the legal dispute, was contrary to 
EU law. The decision considerably widened the scope of national treatment as 
defined by Article 7 (now Article 6) of the Treaty. More precisely, it removed 
the ability of member states to rely on reciprocity clauses to deny nationals of 
other member states rights conferred on national authors.241 
 
While the joined cases of Phil Collins C-92/92 and EMI v. Patricia Im-und C-
326/92242 were not directly concerned with the resale right the significance of 
these cases in relation to the Commission’s decision to harmonise the resale right 
is clear. In both the Commission’s 1996243 and 1998244 proposals for a Directive 
on the resale right, Article 7a of the EC Treaty (now Article 26 TFEU), Article 
100a (now Article 114 TFEU) and the Phil Collins case are cited as the grounds 
for harmonising the resale right.245 Considering the impact of these cases, the 
following section explores both cases. 
 
In the Phil Collins case246 (Case C-92/92) the questions submitted by the 
Landgericht Munchen (Regional Court, Munich) had arisen during proceedings 
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between Phil Collins, a singer and composer of British nationality and Imtrat, a 
producer and distributor of phonograms, relating to the distribution in Germany 
of a ‘live’ US concert recording without the consent of the singer.247 Under the 
relevant provisions of the Urheberrechtsgesetz (law on copyright and related 
rights) [hereinafter UrhG ]248 non-German artists could not rely on provisions 
that prohibited the distribution of unauthorised reproductions of performances 
given outside Germany. Collins argued that by virtue of Article 7a he was 
entitled to the same protection as a German national. 
 
In the joined case of Patricia Im (Case C-326/92) questions had arisen during 
litigation between EMI Electrola GmbH, which held exclusive rights for the 
distribution in Germany of recordings of performances by Cliff Richard, a 
British singer, and the defendant company and its manager in relation to the 
distribution in Germany of phonograms containing recordings of performances 
given by Cliff Richard in Great Britain during 1958 and 1959.249 On appeal, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court), which was aware of the questions 
submitted to the CJEU by the Landgericht Munchen (Phil Collins case), 
expressed the view that copyright and related rights did not appear to it to fall 
within the scope of application of Community law and, more particularly of 
Article 7 of the EEC Treaty.250 
 
                                                           
247 See IPPT Case Report, IPPT19931020, ECJ, Phil Collins, < 
http://www.ippt.eu/files/1993/IPPT19931020_ECJ_Phil_Collins.pdf> (date accessed: 9 July 
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The question referred to the CJEU therefore concerned the interpretation of 
Article 7 of the EEC Treaty. In response to the question referred by the German 
Courts in the joined cases of Phil Collins & Patricia Im the European Court of 
Justice held as follows: In proceedings under Article 234 EC (formerly article 
177 EEC Treaty – now Article 267 TFEU), the Court cannot rule on the 
interpretation of national laws and regulations or on the conformity of such 
measures with Community law.251 Consequently, it could not interpret the 
provisions of the UrhG. The Court could however provide the national court with 
the criteria for interpretation based on Community law which would enable that 
court to solve the legal problem with which it was faced.252 
 
Firstly the Court was required to deal with the question of whether copyright and 
related rights fell within the scope of Article 7a of the EEC Treaty and whether 
the general principle of non-discrimination was applicable to those rights. The 
specific subject-matter of those rights, as governed by national legislation, was to 
ensure the protection of moral and economic rights for their holders.  The Court 
held that:  
 
Like other industrial or commercial property rights, exclusive rights 
conferred by literary and artistic property were likely to affect trade in 
goods and services as well as competitive relationships within the 
Community. For that reason those rights, although governed by national 
legislation, were subject to the requirements of the Treaty and therefore 
fell within its scope. It followed that copyright and related rights, which, 
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because of their effect on intra-Community trade in goods and services, 
fell within the scope of application of the Treaty, were necessarily subject 
to the general principle of non-discrimination laid down in the first 
paragraph of article 7 of the Treaty, without it being necessary to make 
specific references to articles 30, 36, 59 and 66 of the Treaty.253 
 
It was then necessary to determine whether Article 7 prevented member states 
from discriminating in such matters on the ground of nationality. The Court was 
of the view that member states were precluded from discriminating on the 
grounds of nationality. 254  
 
Finally it was necessary for the Court to consider whether Article 7 was directly 
applicable by citizens of a member states before their national court. The Court 
held that the right to equal treatment laid down by Article 7a of the Treaty was 
conferred directly by Community law: 
 
‘That right may, therefore, be relied upon before a national court as the 
basis for a request that it disapply the discriminatory provisions of a 
national law which denies to nationals of other Member States the 
protection which they accord to nationals of the State concerned.’ 255 
 
Within the sphere of copyright the repercussions of the decision were felt widely, 
resulting directly and indirectly in the first generation of harmonization 
directives. In relation to the artists’ resale right the Commission viewed the 
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outcome as inescapable,256 in effect leaving EU legislators with little choice 
other than to begin harmonising EU copyright law. In its 1996 proposal for a 
Directive on the resale right257 the Commission concluded that the Phil Collins & 
Ors judgment, with its application of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, when coupled with the prohibition on applying the principle of 
reciprocity, would have a significant impact on the European Union.  Subsequent 
to this decision the Commission opined that ‘[h]enceforth, private or public art 
dealers will have to pay royalties on works by nationals of certain Member States 
even if the Countries concerned do not recognize the artist’s resale right.’258 As a 
solution to this problem, the Commission proposed that member states could 
repeal their laws introducing the artists’ resale right.259 However a majority of 
member states were unwilling to contemplate this option and concluded ‘… that 
a generalized application of the artist’s resale right would put an end to the 
inequality of treatment of contemporary artists in the various member states 
while promoting a harmonious development of the art market.260  The 
Commission observed in its report that ‘[most] Member States therefore came 
out in favour of a Commission initiative aimed at harmonizing the right.’261  
 
Dreier notes that the Phil Collins decision was ‘… a decisive and determined 
step forward in the process of ‘rounding up’ the body of Community law 
regulating copyright and of integrating the common market.262 Indeed the 
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decision proved to be the basis of many subsequent and sometimes unexpected 
reforms in the area of EU Copyright law.263 However, Geiger’s characterisation 
of the decisions in Casis de Dijon and Phil Collins & Ors as representing 
excessive judicial activism must be viewed against their historical context. As 
previously noted, the 1970s and early 1980s were a period of ‘legislative 
malaise’264 in which member states right to veto proposals significantly 
undermined the Council’s ability to legislate.265 In addition, prior to the Single 
European Act (SEA), the member states capacity to veto resulted in detailed 
Directives of limited scope and repeatedly raised questions concerning the 
Community’s ability to fulfil its primary objective; of creating a single ‘internal 
market’. Characterised as the ‘dark ages’ of the Community,266 it was against this 
background of legislative ‘immobility’267 that the CJEU, through the doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy, ensured the continued development of Community 
law and indeed maintained the relevance and strength of the Community.268 In 
this light it can be argued that the CJEU’s activism was simply a necessary 
response to the existing EU institutional shortcomings and a creative 
interpretation of the acquis communautaire was justified in order to protect the 
Community from atrophy. In addition to the ‘legislative malaise’ at this time 
there was also a palpable fear that the EU as a union would regress if action was 
not taken. As noted in Section 1.4 above, the Commission responded to these 
fears by adopting a number of ‘common policies’ in diverse areas. However, as 
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already stated, the existing institutional shortcomings hampered the required 
legislative action to bring these policies to fruition. Furthermore, legislation that 
did pass under ‘the shadow of the veto’269 proved to be of very narrow 
application,270 whereas principles of law derived from the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU had a much broader application. Principles such as ‘mutual recognition’ as 
espoused in Casis de Dijon permeated the EU’s legal architecture, affecting 
diverse policy areas such as the environment, consumer protection and the 
internal market. This was therefore more effective as an instrument of 
harmonization than legislative measures at this time.  While Geiger notes that not 
all the Court’s rulings were as clear and useful as the Casis de Dijon decision and 
were in some cases contradictory,271 in the main the process gradually brought 
about a certain level of coherence.272 Thus while the CJEU’s preliminary 
reference rulings may ostensibly appear limited in application – due to the fact 
specific nature of the question referred – the principles derived from these cases 
have had broad application and were on reflection more effective in 
approximating the laws of member states than legislative measures alone. In fact, 
it is telling that many of the principles derived from cases such as Casis de Dijon 
were later enshrined in the Treaty articles.273 In addition, these cases mandated 
member state’s courts to apply EU law above national rules. Concluding on this 
point, Geiger’s thesis that the preliminary reference procedure brought about 
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more incoherence than coherence in the area of IP is open to challenge. Rather, 
the Court developed principles of mutual recognition and direct effect had a 
more cohesive effect on the EU’s legal framework and played a pivotal role in 




The chapter began by presenting an overview of the international origins of the 
artists’ resale right: namely the Berne Convention. It was observed that within 
the context of EU copyright law, the Berne Convention served as a semi-
normative, broad based tool for harmonization rather than as an agreed upon 
mandate for the convergence of copyright law by signatory states. Accordingly, 
the ‘soft law’ approach allowed for by the Berne Convention proved wholly 
inadequate towards the process of EU copyright harmonization. This required the 
EU to take more direct action than relying on international conventions alone, 
and as noted it was the CJEU rather than EU legislators who took up the mantle 
in this regard. Nonetheless, this resulted in a more comprehensive approach to 
EU IP harmonization by the Commission and brought into being many ‘first 
generation’ directives including the Artists’ Resale Right Directive.   
 
Subsequent to considering international developments the chapter progressed to 
consider the effect that the process of EU harmonization had on creating a 
framework of EU IP rights. This chapter analysed three factors which Geiger 
purports affected the process of harmonization. These include, an EU 
constitutional and legislative vacuum (lack of ‘legal basis’), an easily influenced 
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and reactionary EU Commission and finally a judicially active CJEU. While 
these observations provided a useful point of analysis, they were not always 
entirely persuasive or complete and as such the author was able to build upon 
these observations in certain respects.  
 
Regarding the legislative vacuum, section 1.5.1 concluded that while historically 
the EU lacked a legal basis from which to harmonise effectively in the broad area 
of IP, the Lisbon Treaty, via Article 118, remedied this situation. Article 118 
provides EU legislators with an effective means of creating a unified EU IP 
framework – and by default a unified copyright framework – by providing 
legislators with a firm IP ‘legal basis’ from which to legislate. This in turn 
remedies the EU’s historically ‘piecemeal’ and territorial approach to IP 
harmonization.  
 
Section 1.5.2 then accessed whether the EU Commission contributed to the 
fragmented process of EU IP harmonization by responding too easily to sectoral 
interests, which in turn resulted in needless harmonization initiatives. On this 
point it was concluded that the influence of sectoral interest groups is exerted 
throughout the EU and not just at an institutional level. Furthermore, to view the 
Commission as being more responsive to sectoral interests than national and 
supranational actors is to take too narrow a view. Therefore such a view ignores 
the intricate and complex interrelationships of individual state and institutional 
actors throughout the legislative process.   
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Section 1.5.3 questioned the degree to which the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
compounded the fragmented nature of EU IP law. On this point the author 
concluded that the jurisprudence of the CJEU had the opposite effect of that 
purported by Geiger and in fact had the widest and most significant impact on 
EU IP harmonization. CJEU case law effectively filled the vacuum left by EU 
institutional and legislative shortcomings. Principles derived from individual 
cases were not limited to the facts of individual cases but to the contrary were of 
broad application in multiple policy areas.  
 
In conclusion the EU’s ‘internal market’ rationale as developed by the CJEU had 
the greatest impact on the harmonization of EU IPRs and by default the Artists’ 
Resale Right Directive.274 Whether an alternative choice of ‘legal basis’ would 
have changed the nature and scope of the Artists’ Resale Right Directive is 
difficult to gauge but basing the right on the ‘internal market’ rationale squarely 
framed the right as an economic right and prevented any social elements from 
being incorporated. Indeed, while the Commission was aware that a ‘resale right 
welfare model’ existed historically in France, and currently in Germany and 
Norway, the inclusion of a welfare element into the EU model was seldom 
discussed and never in detail.  Arguably the already protracted drafting and 
enactment of the Directive – almost 16 years – would have been further 
exacerbated by the inclusion of a welfare entitlement for struggling artists. Most 
probably, this would have rung the death knell for an already contentious right.  
 
                                                           
274 For arguments against the use of Article 114 (ex. Art. 95 EC and 101a EEC)  to harmonise the 
droit de suite see J. Wuenschel ‘Article 95 EC revisited: is the Artist’s Resale Right Directive a 
Community Act beyond EC competence’ (2009) 4(2) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice; D. L. Booton ‘A Critical Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposal for a 
Directive Harmonising the Droit de Suite’ (1998) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly.   
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Finally, this chapter provides background context to the development of the ARR 
Directive and in doing so serves the function of providing the basis for later 




























The purpose of this chapter is to outline the form and content of the ARR 
Directive while also questioning whether it achieves its intended purpose. 
Establishing whether the ARR Directive functions in practice and not just in 
principle is a necessary pre-requisite to answering this thesis’s central research 
question; whether visual artists would be better served under a socially oriented 
ARR rubric. This chapter begins by discussing the central objectives of the 
Artists’ Resale Right Directive 2001/84/EC; namely the removal of sales 
displacement, market distortion, and the provision of financial parity for visual 
artists. In this regard three pre-directive cases are considered: The Joseph Beuys 
Case, Société d’auteurs S v. Hotel des Ventes Mosan and the Sammlung Ahlers 
Case. Before questioning whether the aforementioned objectives have been 
realised, the constituent elements of the ARR Directive are outlined. In doing so, 
a thorough understanding of the ARR Directive and its working is achieved. The 
analysis progresses to consider recent CJEU rulings (Dalí and Christies Cases) 
and academic commentary providing an important critique of the ARR Directive. 
Accordingly, two primary conclusions emerge; firstly, sales displacement 
continues, although at the international level; and secondly, a wider dispersion of 
visual artists benefit from the ARR Directive than previously supposed. These 
observations validate the efficacy of the ARR Directive, which in turn supports 
calls for the development of an international ARR framework.  While the latter 
finding is not relevant to the current thesis the former observation, regarding the 
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efficacy of the right, has some interesting implications for Chapter 6, which 
proposes the inclusion of a social provision in the form of an income 
maintenance provision within the Directive.   
 
2.1 Context – Rationale 
 
The ARR Directive is based on two primary objectives: firstly, that visual artists 
may share in the economic success of their work to the same extent as other 
creators; and secondly, to eliminate anti-competitive practices and market 
distortions that result in the displacement of sales to member states that did not 
previously recognise the right.1 One of the most high profile instances of sales 
displacement involved the Rene Gaffe collection in 2002. A collection of 
impressionist and contemporary works, valued at around €50 million, was 
auctioned in New York at the request of the beneficiary, UNICEF – allegedly to 
avoid resale charges in Paris.2 The works were sold in New York to the loss of 
the EU art market and the estates of artists covered by the ARR. While some 
commentators argue that this evidences a reduction in the competitiveness of the 
                                                           
1 Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on 
the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art [2001] OJ L 272/32, Recital 
9 [hereinafter ARR Directive]. See also EU Commission Report ‘Proposal for A European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original 
work of art’ COM (96) 97 final 96/085 (COD) p. 4 [hereinafter Proposal for an ARR Directive] 
citing OECD statistics on data concerning imports/exports of paintings, drawings, engravings and 
sculptures for 1992; works of art originating in the Belgian, French, German and Spanish markets 
were sold mainly in Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Table 1); Study 
entitled “Le droit de suite dans L’Union Européenne, Analysis Juridique, Elements 
Economiques”, Brussels 1995, p. 112 (Study carried out by the Commission).  
2 K. Graddy, N. Horowitz and S. Szymanski ‘A Study into the effect on the UK Art Market of the 
introduction of the Artist’s Resale Right’ (London: IP Instititues, 2008) p. 49 citing V. Ginsburg 
2005; K. Graddy, and S. Szymanski ‘Scoping study: Artist’s resale right.’ Prepared by the 
Intellectual Property Institute on behalf of the UK Patent Office. (London: Intellectual Property 
Institute, 2005); See also W. Bennett 2001 ‘EU Art Levy helps New York to land sale of the 
century’, The Telegraph July 25th 2001. 
 80 
EU art market,3 others recognise the complexity of such decisions which cannot 
simply be explained with reference to the ARR.4 Amongst the many factors that 
a seller may consider when choosing the location of a sale include: the 
implications from VAT, corporation taxes, capital acquisition taxes and 
concessions, shipping costs, insurance, currency exchange rates, the ARR and 
above all the location in which the sale will achieve the highest price.5 In 
support, Collins contends that a rational seller will also take non-fiscal factors 
into account, including the number of potential customers, time constraints and 
the expertise of art market intermediaries in a given market.6  
 
As already noted, the EU Commission, cognitive of the threat of sales 
displacement, implemented a tapered percentage rate to discourage vendors from 
selling works outside of the EU.7  Previously, jurisdictions that recognised the 
right often applied a 5% blanket rate, which resulted in the displacement of sales 
away from these countries to neighbouring jurisdiction that did not recognise the 
                                                           
3 See Anthony Browne of BAMF as cited by Susan Adams for Forbes 20/06/2005 and ‘Bad for 
all Art Markets – and the Artist it is meant to help,’ The Art Newspaper, no.157, April 2006 p. 30 
as cited by Graddy et al, supra note 2.  
4 Ibid. at p. 49. 
5 See L. Becker, P. Huber and E. Kronjager (Project Leader: Marlies Hummel) The Droit de Suite 
Report Commissioned by the French Authors’ Society ADAGP, The German Authors’ BILD-
Kunst and the Groupement Européen des Sociétés d’Auteiurs et Compositeurs (GESAC) 
(Munich: IFO Institut, 1995) p. 17. Furthermore, McAndrew and Dallas-Conte found that a EU 
seller who wished to sell in New York would only benefit where the sale price fetched over 
€500,000. C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte ‘Implementing Droit de Suite (artists’ resale right) 
in England’ Report prepared for the Arts Council of England, (London: The Arts Council of 
England, 2002),  p. 23, 
<http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/media/uploads/documents/publications/325.pdf.> (date accessed: 
10 July 2017); see also J. Van Haeften Briefing Document: Droit de Suite (London: British Art 
market Federation, 2000) p. 2, C. Murphy ‘How the French killed their art market’ (1999) 140 
(12) Fortune, p. 63. 
6 J. Collins ‘Droit de suite: an artistic stroke of genius? A critical exploration of the European 
Directive and its resultant effects’ (2012) 34 (5) European Intellectual Property Review, p. 6. 
7 See ‘Proposal for an ARR Directive’ supra note 1, at p. 14, ‘At Community level, there is a 
noticeable shifting of sales of works of art towards countries where no royalties are collected or 
where taxes are lower. … [t]he available data show that works of art coming from the Belgian, 
French, German and Spanish markets are sold primarily in the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Switzerland.’  
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right.8 It was the intention of legislators to limit, if not eradicate the financial 
benefits derived from this practice. However, within the context of the global art 
market, the UK Collective Management Organisation (hereinafter CMO), The 
Design and Copyright Society [hereinafter DACS] have questioned the 
effectiveness of this measure, and contend that international auction houses and 
on-line art markets are particularly well placed and resourced to propagate 
further sales displacement from ARR compliant jurisdictions to non-ARR 
jurisdictions.9 In light of these practices, Ricketson’s 2015 proposal for a global 
ARR is both necessary and timely.10 A global solution is however not the focus 
of this thesis, the focus here relates to the question of whether the EU ARR 
Directive can encompass a social objective redolent of the German and 
Norwegian models.   
 
The following section, in an effort to evaluate the degree to which market 
distortion and sales displacement occurred in the EU prior to the implementation 
of the Directive, reviews some of the primary reported decisions of national 
courts across the EU.   
 
 
                                                           
8 Details of the tapered percentage rate can be found below, in section 2.2.3 p. 99.  
9 DACS Report Ten Years of the Artist’s Resale Right Giving Artists their Fair Share (2016) p. 
15, [hereinafter DACS Report (2016)]; See also Becker et al p. 116 – 117. The authors also note 
that at the time of writing the report, interviews held by the IFO institute  ‘showed that a large 
international auction house [had] recently stopped holding auctions of 20th – century art in 
Germany, whereas the relevant exports (1993: approx. 8 million DM) from Germany have in the 
meantime clearly exceeded the figure reached by auction in Germany at the beginning of the 
nineties (1989/90: an average of 6 million DM in each case).’ The EU Commission was also 
aware of this practice, see ‘Proposal for an ARR Directive’ supra note 1, at p.15, para. 8. 
10 S. Ricketson ‘Proposed international treaty on droit de suite/resale royalty rights for visual 
artists’ (2015) SG15-0565, see also DACS Report (2016) supra note 9, at p. 16; A. Schten, ‘No 
More Starving Artists: Why the Art Market Needs a Universal Artist Resale Royalty Right.’ 
(2017) 7 (1) Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law. 
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2.1.1 The Joseph Beuys Case 
 
In the Joseph Beuys case the Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court)11 
applied the principle of territoriality in deciding that works by deceased German 
artist Joseph Beuys were not subject to the German resale right in circumstances 
where they were auctioned in London. Here a series of works by Joseph Beuys 
were sold through an art gallery in the UK. The plaintiff, the performing rights 
society Bild-Kunst, sought a 5 percent share in the proceeds of the sale.12 The 
plaintiff argued that the defendant, a German national resident in Germany, and 
the owner of three of Beuys works, was liable for the German resale royalty 
irrespective of where the auction took place.13 It was alleged that the works had 
been brought to the UK with the intention of avoiding the 5% resale royalty 
under German Law, which in this case amounted to €64,000.14 In deciding that 
the action was unfounded the Court relied on section 26, as it then was, of the 
German Copyright Act, which provided that where an original artistic work is 
resold and where an art market intermediary is involved as purchaser, vendor or 
agent, the vendor must pay 5 per cent of the sale proceeds to the author.15 Section 
26 of the Copyright Act applied where the sale took place at least partly within 
                                                           
11 Joseph Beuys, BGH Judgment of June 16, 1991 I ZR 24/92 [1994] GRUR 798, < 
https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/BGH/1994-06-16/I-ZR-24_92> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). See 
also ‘Proposal for an ARR Directive’ supra note 1, at p. 14.  
12 Marcel Schulze, Federal Court Judgment of 16 June 1994 on Resale Rights (droit de suite) in 
respect of a German Artist's Work Auctioned in the UK, IRIS 1995-8:8/19. < 
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/1995/8/article19.en.html> (date accessed: 10 July 2017) The 
collecting society was appointed by the widow and heiress of Joseph Beuys, who died on 23 
January 1986. The Collecting Society was to collect all royalties due from the sale and licensing 
of the artist’s work.  
13 The Auction was held in London on the 29th of June 1989.  
14 See J. Erauw Conflict of Laws with ‘Folgerecht’ (‘Droit de suite’) on the Sale of Works of Art 
in and Out of Europe – After the EC Directive No 2001/84, in L. Amicorum K. Siehr, K. Boele-
Woelki, T. Einhorn, D. Girsberger & S. Symeonides eds., Convergence and Divergence in 
Private International Law (Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2010). 
15 K. Pilny ‘Germany: copyright – application of the droit de suite of an artist against the vendor 
requires that the sale took place at least partly in Germany’ Case Comment (1995) 17(4) 
European Intellectual Property Review, pp. 94 - 95.  
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its geographical area of application. This requirement was not met since the sale, 
according to the Bundesgerichtshof, was entirely executed in the United 
Kingdom. The Court held that copyright is guided by the principle of 
territoriality and that the protection of rights can only be claimed where rights 
have been breached within the relevant jurisdiction.16 Therefore, under this 
interpretation, section 26 of the German Copyright Act, as it then was, could 
only be violated by a resale taking place at least partially in Germany. The Court 
observed that not only was the sale concluded in the UK but that the disputed 
works were also located in a foreign jurisdiction.17 In addition, the Court stated 
that the resale rights were not recognised in all EU member states and that, in the 
absence of harmonisation, the international legal rules on incorporeal rights 
applied.18 This interpretation of section 26 meant that the effects of national law 
were restricted to the country concerned. As a result, the Bundesgerichtshof held 
that the German resale right (Folgerecht) did not apply.19 Pilny notes that  ‘[t]he 
concentration of the Supreme Court on the final act of the auction, disregarding 
preparatory actions like the delivery of the artistic works and negotiations with 
the local subsidiary of an international auction house, can be seen as appropriate 
in coming to the right decision.’20 However, in the circumstances it is submitted 
that the Court adopted too narrow a focus in determining the constituent 
elements of the final sale. Had the Court applied the principles of contract 
formation, in particular offer and acceptance, they may have found that the 
contract was concluded on German soil, thereby coming under the auspices of 
section 26. Indeed, the signing of contracts by the seller in German could have 
                                                           
16 Ibid. 
17 See Erauw, supra note 14, at p. 787. 
18 The Principle of Territoriality. See. Pilny, supra note 15, at p.  94 - 95. 
19 See Erauw, supra note 14, at p. 787. 
20 Pilny, supra note 15, at p.  94 - 95. 
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been interpreted by the court as forming part of the sale. Interestingly, the works 
in question had been with a German collector since the 1950s and subsequently 
returned to a private collection in Germany.21 Furthermore, it appears that the 
avoidance of the resale right by large auction houses is not isolated to the works 
of individual artists. In May of 1993 Christies held a ‘German’ auction in 
London, the auction house recorded sales of almost €12,000,000; had the sales 
occurred in Germany, a blanket royalty of 5% would have applied to all 
contemporary works,22 possibly creating an additional financial burden of 
€600,000.23 It is clear from the foregoing that the pre-Directive blanket 5% 
royalty in France and Germany almost certainly incentivised the placement of 
high value art sales in jurisdictions that not only enjoyed experienced and 
reputable art market professionals (hereinafter AMPs), but lacked an artists’ 




                                                           
21 Becker et al, supra note 5, at p. 117; EU Commission, ‘Report on the Implementation and 
Effect of the Resale Right Directive (2001/84/EC)’, COM (2011) 878 final. p. 10, [hereinafter 
Report on the Implementation and Effect of the ARR Directive]. 
22 Ibid. at p. 117, Becker notes that Germany enjoys one of the most buoyant contemporary art 
markets in Europe largely because older works were destroyed in World War II. The EU 
Commission defines contemporary works as works of living artists and deceased artists within 70 
years of sale.  
23 Assuming that the ARR applied to all works sold, see Report on the Implementation and Effect 
of the ARR Directive p. 4, para. 2.2. 
24 L. Becker et al, supra note 5 at p. 118, Table 28, report that ‘… German and French dealers 
and auctioneers observed clear indications when talking to sellers, mediators and collectors of art 
that works or art are brought especially to England because of the droit de suite. This particularly 
concerned works of art that fetched high prices. They estimated that between ten and twenty 
percent of the turnover on the French and German art markets is affected by this movement.’ 
While this is nothing more than anecdotal the estimation is supported by an analysis carried out 
by the French author’s society. It examined the London auction catalogue of Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s and found that most of the works sold in 1993 were created by primarily French and 
secondly German artists. There is however a problem with this assertion, the fact that more 
French art is sold in England than in France does not automatically mean that the owners of that 
art are also French. As indicated previously in Becker’s report, wealthy French families have 
been moving and selling art by French artists to Britain since the aristocracy’s escape from 
France following the French Revolution. Belgian auctioneers report a similar experience. 
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2.1.2 Société d’Auteurs S v. Hotel des Ventes Mosan 
 
In the case of Société d’auteurs S v Hotel des Ventes Mosan,25 a Belgian firm of 
auctioneers held an auction in Liége, Belgium, of three paintings which were 
located at the time of the auction in Luxembourg. The works of art were 
broadcast and displayed on a television screen to the audience attending the 
auction in Liége. A Belgian artists’ collecting society claimed payment of the 
Belgian resale right over the sale proceeds of the three paintings sold in 
Luxembourg. Four years later, when the dispute was finally tried, the Belgian 
court held that the Belgian resale right was payable on the sale price of the three 
paintings because they formed part of an auction organised in Belgium and the 
connection with Luxembourg was ‘artificial’.26 In this instance the court 
followed a ‘place of sale’ test rather than a test based solely on the location of the 
goods. Valentin notes that when courts are asked to determine the territoriality of 
a sale, issues such as where the offer and acceptance took place, the effect of the 
postal rule, conveyance, transfer of title, transfer of property and payment all 
impact upon a court’s final decision.27 The issue becomes increasingly more 
complicated when the multiple parties involved in the sales contract – seller, 
buyer, and intermediary – reside in different jurisdictions and the aforementioned 
factors or stages in the sales process are spread across these jurisdictions. While 
the case was heard almost two decades ago, the issue has not yet been 
conclusively determined. In its 2016 report DACS note that there continues to be  
‘…  a lack of clarity over what factors are required for the law to apply, and 
                                                           
25 Société d’Auteurs S v Hotel des Ventes Mosan, Be. Civ. Brussels, April 30, 1999.  
26 See P. Valentin ‘The Droit de Suite’ 2006 (28) European Intellectual Property Review p. 271 - 
275. 
27 Ibid. at  p. 271 - 275. However, it is not clear from the Société d’auteurs S v. Hotel des Ventes 
Mosan case report that this level of analysis formed part of the judgment.  
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whether location of the goods or one of the parties can give rise to ARR 
liability.’28  
 
2.1.3 The Sammlung Ahlers Case 
 
More recently,29 the Bundesgerichtshof was asked to resolve a conflict of law 
issue resulting from a section of the German resale right provisions that was in 
force prior to the enactment of ARR Directive.30 Here, Alfred Ahlers 
Aktiengesellschaft, a public limited company incorporated under German law, 
amassed a substantial collection of works by German expressionists including 
several works by Ernst Ludwig Kirchner31 and Franz Marc.32 In 2001, the 
company decided to sell the collection of more than 100 works.33 The collection 
was bought by a joint venture involving a former managing director of Sotheby’s 
Germany and art market consultant, Chris Douglas, and a former manager with 
Sotheby’s USA, Davis Nash.34 The Douglas-Nash partnership was incorporated 
in New York and it has been alleged by Weller that the partnership purchased the 
collection privately rather than by auction to avoid publicity, pricing 
transparency and ultimately the resale royalty.35 In addition, the works were 
                                                           
28 DACS Report (2016) supra note 9, at p. 15. Furthermore the problem may not be limited to 
works of art and may represent a broader jurisdictional issue arising in cross boarder cases 
generally. Further investigation into this point is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
29 17 July 2008, see J. Erauw, supra note 14, at p. 787. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Kirchner died in 1938 therefore the term of the resale right, as defined by the Term Directive 
93/98/EEC would have expired in 2008.  
32 Christian Herchenršder, Die Sammlung Ahlers steht zum Verkauf - Marktdiskretion statt 
Publizitþt, Handelsblatt, 2. February 2001[hereinafter Sammlung Ahlers Case], case citation from 
M. Weller ‘The Applicable Law in Cross-Border Resales of Works of Art under Directive 
2001/84/EC’ (2007) 12 Uniform law Review p. 335. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., citing U. Hansen, Capital 9/2001, S. 98. Interestingly, at that time in Germany, and 
unlike the current ARR Directive, both public and private sales were subject to the Folgerecht. 
See K. Lubina, H.E.G.S. Schneider, B. Demarsin, E.J.H. Schrage, B. Tilleman, A. Verbeke, ‘One 
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stored in a warehouse in Switzerland, a jurisdiction that does not recognise the 
ARR. The German collecting society – Bild-Kunst – learned about this deal from 
the media and initiated legal proceedings under the then applicable sections of 
the German Copyright Act – section 26(3) and 26(4).36 The society requested the 
provision of information regarding any resale in 2001 in which the buyers were 
involved and secondly, for the disclosure of the name and address of subsequent 
buyers, as well as the resale price, of any transaction identified under the first 
claim. The defendants argued that there was not a close and sufficient connection 
between the seller’s signature in Germany and the extraterritorial sale. 
Employing conflict of law rules, the claimant argued that the German resale right 
was applicable as soon as a significant part of the resale transaction took place in 
Germany and that the relevant resale transaction should be understood as 
comprising both the conclusion of the sales contract as well as the transfer of 
title.37  The Bundesgerichtshof held that there was an obligation on the 
defendants to provide information, having found sufficient connection with 
Germany.38 In the Court’s opinion, the obligation to inform is based on the 
principle of territoriality meaning that for it to arise at least part of the sale had to 
have taken place in Germany.39 The Court found the ‘requisite in-land 
                                                           
Year and Millions of Euros Later: Taking Stock of the Implementation of the European Directive 
2001/84/EC on Droit de Suite, in B. Demarsin, E. Schrage, B. Tilleman and A. Verbeke (eds.), 
Art & Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 307. 
36 (DE) Copyright Act of 9 September 1965 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1273), as last amended by 
Article 1 of the Act of 20 December 2016 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 3037) Under the new 
implementation legislation, now section 26 (4) and (5) of the German Copyright Act: ‘[s](4) The 
author is entitled, vis-à-vis any art dealer or auctioneer, to obtain information on whether, and if 
so, which works of art by the author had been sold under participation of the dealer or auctioneer 
within the last three years prior to the raising of the claim for information. (5) The author is 
entitled to obtain, if necessary for the enforcement of his claim for resale royalty, from the art 
dealer or auctioneer the name and the address of the seller as well as the resale price. The dealer 
or auctioneer may refuse to disclose name and address if he himself pays the resale royalty due 
according the resale price.’ 
37 Erauw, supra note 14, at p. 788.   
38 Ibid. at p. 788,  citing paras. 17 - 26 of the Ahlers Judgment. 
39 Ibid. at p. 788, citing para. 29 of the Ahlers Judgment.  
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connection’ in the transfer of the Ahlers Collection to satisfy the principle of 
territoriality.40 As to the contract to sell the artwork, the Court noted that the 
claimant had alleged that the parties’ consensus concerning the transfer of title 
was present when the agreement was signed in Germany; and it found that the 
defendant had the secondary burden to disprove this allegation and did not do so 
adequately.41 The Court therefore found that the conclusion of the contract had 
occurred on German soil and it did not matter that the artworks were located at 
the pertinent time in Switzerland.42 The Court concluded that where either the 
completion of the sales contract or the transfer of title occurred in Germany, 
German law applied.43 The Sammlung Ahlers case arguably demonstrates an 
evolution in the German court’s understanding of the resale right and the 
willingness of reluctant sellers to avoid paying the resale royalty. Subsequent to 
the introduction and implementation of the ARR Directive these jurisdictional 
issues, at least within the EU, have been removed. That is not to ignore member 
states’ discretion concerning certain aspects of the ARR. Nevertheless, as the 
above cases indicate, determined market professionals need only conduct the sale 
in its entirety outside of the EU to avoid paying the resale royalty.44  In contrast  
                                                           
40 Ibid. at p. 788, para. 32 of the Ahlers Judgment. ‘This was the development: German law 
knows a dual system for the transfer of title in property, with a conceptual split between a 
personal contractual obligation to deliver title in property (as ‘Kausalgeschaft’) and the in rem 
transaction that conveys a proprietary right (‘dinglicheVerfugugsgeschaft’). The Court held with 
support in doctrine, that the notion of ‘resale’ in the terms that impose folgerecht comprise both 
of these legal aspects [para. 31]. It covers the contractual obligation and the property right. The 
Court reasoned that neither of those elements alone constituted the ‘resale’ that was taxed in the 
law. But then, seeing that the notion covers the one aspect as well as the other aspect of duality, 
one can have in-land connection when either has a link with Germany.  
41 Ibid. at p. 788.   
42 Ibid. See also J. A. L. Sterling World Copyright Law 3rd ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) Ch. 3; 
M. Gaber, ‘The Resale Right Directive: A Comparative Analysis of Its Implementation in 
Germany and the United Kingdom’ p. 303, in V. Vadi and H.E.G.S. Schneider (eds.), Art, 
Cultural Heritage and the Market (Maastricht: Springer, 2014). 
43 Erauw, supra note 14, at p. 788. 
44 The EU Commission adopted this view in their 1996 proposal for an ARR Directive. See 
Proposal for an ARR Directive supra note 1, at p. 22 para. 11, ‘Some interests concerned have 
accordingly proposed that royalties be imposed on exports to non-Community countries to 
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where AMPs both have their place-of-business and conduct preliminary 
contractual relations within the EU, the CJEU may in future cases follow the 
German court’s ruling and apply the principle of territoriality. While there is 
certainly scope within the Directive for the inclusion of such an interpretation, it 
is not clear that the Directive represents the most appropriate forum for such 
direction. Guidance may be better sought from the private international law 
arena.45 Be that as it may, an analysis of private international law is beyond the 
remit of the thesis.46  
 
2.2 The Solution? – EU ARR Directive 2001/84/EC 
 
Having come into effect in 2006 the ARR Directive sets out the legal framework 
to which EU member state’s national regimes must comply. The following 
                                                           
prevent people from evading payment when a work is sold. Apart from the practical problems 
involved in policing exports, such an approach conflicts with the principle of the territoriality of 
the artist’s resale right. Royalties cannot therefore be charged on sales in third countries.’ 
45 See for example Hague Conference on Private International Law ‘Hague Principles on Choice 
of Law in International Commercial Contracts’ (2015) < 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135> (date accessed: 13 
February 2017). 
46 See further S. Ricketson and J. C. Ginsburg International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: 
The Berne Convention and Beyond VII (Oxford: OUP 2015) p. 1297 - 1327; G. Dinwoodie ‘New 
Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create Global Norms’ (2000) 149 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review p. 469 – 580; J. C. Ginsburg, Private International law Aspects of the 
protection of Works and objects of Related Rights transmitted Through Digital Networks 39, 
WIPO Doc. GCPIC/2 (1998). Professor Ginsburg has implied that in light of the purpose of the 
Berne Convention (articulating the purpose of the Convention as ‘to protect, in as effective and 
uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.), choice of 
law determination in treaty countries ‘should be guided by the principle of favor auctoris: when 
in doubt, follow the conflicts analysis that will yield an author-favourable outcome.’ See also 
Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of The European Parliament And of The Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations, L177/6 (Rome I); (includes uniform conflict of 
laws rules dealing with cross-border contracts) and Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of The 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007, on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations L199/40 (Rome II), (includes uniform  conflict of laws rules dealing with cross-
border liability cases.) European private international law offer the advantage of uniformity in 
that the relevant rules are identical in all member states. Hence, in principle, a situation having 
links with two or more member states will be treated exactly the same way in those two states. 
However in practice, and specifically in the area of IPRs this is not always borne out. For further 
see P. Wautelet ‘Private International law: An Overview’ 
<http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/204641> (date accessed: 1 September 2017).  
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section describes the substance of the EU ARR Directive. The Directive 
encompasses 14 Articles concerning issues such as subject matter, works 
protected, threshold and rates, basis of calculating the royalty, persons entitled to 
receive royalties, third-country nationals entitled to receive royalties, the term of 
protection, the right to obtain information, application in time, a revision and 
review clause, member state implementation and entry into force.  
 
2.2.1 Works protected  
 
Article 2 provides a non-exhaustive list of protected works which includes ‘… 
pictures, collages, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, lithographs, 
sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware and photographs, provided they are 
made by the artist himself or are copies considered to be original works of art.’47 
The criteria for determining whether works not listed fall within the remit of the 
Directive is determined by the originality requirement. Under the Directive the 
term ‘original’ has a very specific meaning and relates to works of graphic or 
plastic art such as pictures, collages, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints etc. 
The French CMO ADAGP notes that the Directive’s originality requirement is 
not the same as the one on which copyright protection is dependent.48 In this 
context ‘original’ refers to specific classes of work and not the creativity or effort 
expended by the author in creating the work.49 ‘Originality’, in the traditional 
sense, refers to the test that courts apply in determining whether a work is 
                                                           
47 Article 2, ARR Directive.  
48 The originality requirement, as per Article 2 of the Directive is transposed into French 
Copyright law by Article L. 122-8 Amended by Act No. 2006-961 of August 1, 2006 - art. 48 
JORF August 3, 2006. As per article L. 122-8 [3], original works are ‘the works created by the 
artist him/herself and the copies produced in a limited quantity by the artist him/herself or under 
his/her control.’  
49 Regarding Copyright Law see Infopaq Int. v. Danske Dagblades Forenings C-5/08 (2009) 
[hereinafter Infopaq Case].  
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protected by copyright. While traditionally the common law test was one of 
‘labour, skill, judgment and effort’,50 the current EU test requires the ‘author’s 
own intellectual creation’.51 Slavishly reproducing another’s work will not confer 
copyright protection. In the context of the ARR Directive, a visual artist might 
breach another’s copyright by meticulously replicating the work and continue to 
be eligible for a resale royalty.52 Gravells makes a similar point in relation to the 
recording of speeches in that while the owner of the record of the speech may 
exercise the full range of exclusive rights under copyright law, ‘… in practice he 
would be unable to exploit those rights without the licence of the owner of 
copyright in the speech.’53 Article 2 lists what appears to be a non-exhaustive list 
of such works,54 subsection 2 goes further by broadening the scope of the 
originality definition to include copies of the artist’s work which have been made 
                                                           
50 Football Dataco Ltd and others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others, 1 March 2012 (Case C-604/10); 
Ladbroke v. William Hill [1964] 1 All ER465, 469 per lord Reid; University of London press v. 
University Tutorial Press [1916] 2 ch 601; see also A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK copyright 
law: The old ‘skill and labour’ doctrine under pressure’ [2013] International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law. 
51 The copyright protection of ‘works’ has been harmonized by The Information Society 
Directive, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L 167 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. Copyright is liable to apply only in relation to a 
subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual creation. See 
also Infopaq Case where the court notes at para. 51 that what constitutes the expression of the 
intellectual creation of the author is for national courts to decide.  
52 The question is whether a court might consider the creation of an original work of art under EU 
Copyright Law (which demands a ‘creative act’ and not just ‘sweat of the brow’) as a prerequisite 
to claiming the benefit of original works as defined by the ARR Directive.  
53 N. P. Gravells ‘Authorship and Originality: the Persistent Influence of Water v Lane’ 
Intellectual Property Quarterly (2007) 3 p. 292.  
54 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 2 uses the phrase ‘such as’ before listing various types of 
works including photos, sculptures, paintings etc. This would appear to infer that other types of 
graphic and plastic art such as architectural drawings, serigraphy, calligraphy, typography, 
computer graphics (created by graphic designers as opposed to computer programs) etc., would 
also be covered by the provision. Whether jewellery, furniture and other such examples of 
applied art (art with an aesthetic as well as practical function) come within the definition will be a 
matter of classification For a more general reflection on the definition of works of art from a 
legal point of view see Case 7/68  (Re Arts Treasures) [1968] ECR 42 [1969] CMLR 1. P. 
Gerstenblith Art Cultural Heritage, and the law, Cases and Materials 3rd ed. (Carolina: Carolina 
Academic Press 2012).  
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in limited numbers, signed or duly authorised by the artist.55 EU legislators 
debated the issue of whether the number of ‘original copies’ should be limited, 
ultimately; the matter fell to be determined by standards of professional usage,56  
the result being that the authors of graphic and plastic art can create ‘original 
copies’ – to which the resale right would apply – numbering in the hundreds, if 
not thousands.57 Given the foregoing a case might be made out against any 
further expansion of the scope of Article 2. During the drafting of the Directive 
there was however a further option open to the Commission when considering 
the types of works protected. Under Article 14ter of the Berne Convention – 
which sets out an international framework for the ARR – member states are 
provided with the option of including manuscripts of composers and writers in its 
definition.58 During the Directive’s drafting process it was decided to exclude 
these types of works because they were considered to be a means-to-an-end 
rather than an end in themselves.59 This exclusion was further justified on the 
basis that ‘[t]he resale right helps to redress the balance between the economic 
situation of authors of graphic and plastic works of art and that of other creators 
                                                           
55 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 2(2) ‘Copies of works of art covered by this Directive, 
which have been made in limited numbers by the artist himself or under his authority, shall be 
considered to be original works of art for the purposes of this Directive. Such copies will 
normally have been numbered, signed or otherwise duly authorised by the artist.’ 
56 ‘Proposal for an ARR Directive’ supra note 1, at p. 3.  
57 See R. Plaisant, French law on Proceeds Right, ss 26 - 32 1967 (UCLA Unpublished Article) 
as cited by M. E.  Price ‘Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The Case of the 
Droit de Suite’ (1968) 77 (7) Yale Law Journal p. 1339. He notes that a copy of a painting can 
itself be a work of art; for sculpture, the droit de suite is assessed not only on the original work, 
but on bronze reproductions when they are signed and numbered (there seems to be a limitation 
based on some informal sense of the proper size of an edition).  
58 Article 14 ter, Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24 
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne]. 
59 See Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I A4-0030/97 PE217.568/fin, Justification of the 
main Amendments, p. 19. The Committee on Legal Affairs observed ‘… that manuscripts are 
intended for subsequent use via reproduction; they are, in reality, simply the original support for 
a work which, by its very nature, is to be published or performed, unlike those works of art which 
are intended to be contemplated, and which therefore embody the essence of uniqueness.’   
 93 
who benefit from successive exploitations of their works.’60 Accordingly, the 
Commission viewed the inclusion of manuscripts as antithetical to the very 
nature of the resale right – contradicting its very raison d’être.61 Indeed it is 
difficult to justify a resale royalty for literary authors on the same grounds as 
visual artists in circumstances where the work enjoys a healthy primary market 
and continued exploitation. In light of these arguments it is submitted that the 
Commission determined the matter appropriately.  
 
 
2.2.2 The subject matter of the resale right – who pays/receives? 
 
Sub-section 1 of Article 1 defines the subject matter as a resale right that is 
inalienable and cannot be waived. Recital 2 also describes the subject matter as 
the physical work, ‘… the medium in which the protected work is 
incorporated.’62 This apparent contradiction is an unfortunate drafting error but 
not detrimental. Given the precedence that an article naturally takes over a 
recital, the subject matter of the Directive is therefore a resale right for the 
benefit of authors of original works of art. Arguably, Recital 2 merely builds 
upon this, specifying the subject matter of the resale right – the physical work – a 
list of which is provided in Article 2. The Directive progresses to define the 
                                                           
60 ***III REPORT on the joint text approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European 
Parliament and Council directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original 
work of art (C5-0220/2001 - 1996/0085(COD)) European Parliament delegation to the 
Conciliation Committee Rapporteur: Jürgen Zimmerling. A5-0235/2001 final, 22nd June 2001. 
61 See Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I A4-0030/97, supra note 59, justification for the 
main Amendments, p. 20 – ‘The exclusion of manuscripts from resale right also follows from the 
concept of this right itself. The justification for resale right is not the possibility of speculation in 
an artist's works, but, rather, the need to compensate the author of works intended for 
contemplation which, by the way in which they are created, do not qualify for protection under 
the better-known forms of author's rights (reproduction and performance rights).’ 
62 ARR Directive supra note 1, Recital 2.  
 94 
scope of the resale right. Article 6(1) of the Directive states that; ‘The royalty ... 
shall be payable to the author of the work and, subject to Article 8(2), after his 
death to those entitled under him/her.’63 The term of protection corresponds to 
the term laid down in Article 1 of Directive 93/98/EEC: life plus 70 years.64 The 
right is inalienable and cannot be waived, even in lieu of an advance payment.65 
The right applies to all public sales of the work conducted through an art market 
professional whether acting as a buyer, seller or intermediary.66 Accordingly, 
private sales have been excluded from the remit of the legislation.67 There are a 
number of exceptions to the application of the right: firstly, the right does not 
apply to the first sale of the work,68 it only applies to subsequent sales; secondly, 
                                                           
63 Ibid. Art 6(1). Furthermore Article 8(2) states that those member states which did not allow for 
the resale right at the time of implementation of the Directive, ‘... shall not be required, for a 
period expiring not later than 1 January 2010, to apply the resale right for the benefit of those 
entitled under the artist after his/her death.’ Article 8(3) extends this period for a further two 
years where such time is needed for reasons of ‘economic viability’ and to allow the Member 
State ‘... adapt gradually to the resale right.’ In Ireland SI 312/2006 – European Communities 
(Artist’s Resale Right) Regulations 2006, enforced the right for living artists, and on the 1st of 
January 2012, the Regulations were amended by SI 709/2011 which extended the right to the 
estates of deceased artists. Ireland took the longest time possible to fulfil its requirements but did 
not limit the transmission of the right solely for the benefit of the heirs of the artist. The resale 
right is for the life-time of the artist plus 70 years. 
64 While the ARR Directive was signed in September 2001, implementation followed in January 
of 2002. Member states had a further 4 years to implement the right and where member states did 
not previously recognise the right, they could optionally limit the application of the right to living 
artists – ie. excluding their heirs – until January of 2010. States could further apply for an 
additional two years where necessary; it was January 1st 2012 before Ireland fully implemented 
the ARR Directive. 
65 Directive 2001/84, Article 1(1). See Proposed Directive 96/0085, Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original 
work of art Section V ‘Particular Provisions’ (3) p 21. Here the Commission stated that ‘[t]he 
effectiveness of the artist's resale right [was] necessarily conditional on the right's inalienability 
and the impossibility of waiving it.’  
66 ARR Directive supra note 1, Article 1(2) ‘The right referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to all 
acts of resale involving as sellers, buyers or intermediaries art market professionals, such as 
salesrooms, art galleries and, in general, any dealers in works of art.’ Italy represents one of the 
few countries which tried to implement the right against private sales (pre-directive), however the 
abject failure to implement this served as a warning to the EU in attempting a similar approach. 
For further see Proposal for an ARR Directive, supra note 1, p. 8.  
67 Ibid. Recital 18. See also Lubina et al, supra note 35 at p. 296, noting that ‘Only a sale between 
two private parties without any professional third party intervention is excluded from the 
application of the droit de suite regime. The reason for this exception is pragmatic: sales between 
private parties are too difficult to monitor.’ 
68 ARR Directive supra note 1, this exception underlines the rationale of the AAR Directive in 
that the royalty derives from subsequent exploitation of the work (re-sales) and not the first sale 
where the visual artists has in the main been remunerated.   
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acts of resale by persons acting in their private capacity to museums which are 
not for profit and which are open to the public are excluded;69 thirdly, member 
states may exclude acts of resale where the seller has acquired the work directly 
from the author in the previous three years and where the work is sold for less 
than €10,000.70 The latter exception is however optional. According to Lubina et 
al: 
 
‘[t]he rationale for this exemption is to allow artists to consign their work 
to an art dealer or gallery who then acts as agent on their behalf for the 
purposes of exhibition and sale. The sale of newly created works of art 
under consignment agreements is one of the predominant means of 
making artists’ newly created works available to the primary market.’71  
 
The exception relating to museums is less easily justified in circumstances where 
the seller benefits from the sale. Why a distinction is drawn based upon the 
nature of the buyer is not clear. Perhaps the Commission, mindful that these 
museums are publicly funded did not wish to create an additional burden on the 
exchequer in circumstances where museums accepted liability to pay.  
 
In principle the ARR royalty is payable by the seller but member states may 
provide that any other art market professional involved in the transaction may be 
liable solely or severally with the seller.72 While the majority of member states 
                                                           
69 Ibid. Recital 18.  
70 Ibid. Article 1(3). 
71 Lubina et al, supra note 35 at p. 297.  
72 ARR Directive supra note 1, Article 1(4) ‘The royalty shall be payable by the seller. Member 
States may provide that one of the natural or legal persons referred to in paragraph 2 other than 
the seller shall alone be liable or shall share liability with the seller for payment of the royalty.’ 
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have applied the former construction, in that the seller pays, the UK has allowed 
for the latter construction73 thus in certain situations, creating some unintended 
anomalies such as the ‘cascade effect’.74 The cascade effect, which will be 
discussed subsequently, results in some art market intermediaries being liable for 
the ARR royalty both at the time of purchase and at the point of sale. This occurs 
where AMPs use contractual provisions to transfer liability to pay the ARR 
royalty to buyers in circumstances where national implementation measures 
provide for such an option or create a default situation of seller liability.75 It was 
not contemplated by the Commission that the royalty would be payable twice by 
the same person on the same work or art.76 The Commission released a 
Communication in 2014 outlining their awareness of the practice but did not 
comment on the practice or propose amendments to the Directive to deter this 
practice.77 Instead the report recommended that the Commission study the effect 
                                                           
73 See UK Artists’ Resale Right Regulations 2006, No. 346, Regulation 13,  ‘Liability to pay 
resale royalty’ ‘13(1) The following shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the resale royalty 
due in respect of a sale— (a) the seller; and (b) the relevant person (within the meaning of 
paragraph (2)). 
(2) The relevant person is a person who satisfies the condition mentioned in regulation 12(3)(a) 
[art market professional] and who is—(a) the agent of the seller; or (b)where there is no such 
agent, the agent of the buyer; or (c) where there are no such agents, the buyer. (3) Liability shall 
arise on the completion of the sale; however, a person who is liable may withhold payment until 
evidence of entitlement to be paid the royalty is produced. (4) Any liability to pay resale royalty 
in respect of a resale right which belongs to two or more persons as owners in common is 
discharged by a payment of the total amount of royalty to one of those persons.’ 
74 See EU Commission ‘Key Principles and Recommendations on the management of the Author 
Resale Right’ p. 5. <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/resale/140214-resale-
right-key-principles-and-recommendations_en.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July 2017) [hereinafter 
Key Principles and Recommendations Report]. ‘For example if an Art Market Professional 
[hereinafter AMP] buys at a UK auction (where the buyer usually pays) and sells at a French 
auction (where the seller usually pays) he would be obliged to pay the resale right twice because 
of the different approach to who is liable to pay the resale right in the two countries.  
75 The latter situation can be circumvented via contract. The legality of such clauses was 
confirmed by the CJEU in Christie’s France SNC v Syndicat National des Antiquaires (Case C-
41/14) [hereinafter Christies case]. The following is an outline of the ‘cascade effect’ by the EU 
Commission in its 2011 Report: ‘In Member States where not only the seller but also the buyer 
can be obliged to pay the royalty, an art dealer involved in two consecutive transactions may pay 
the royalty two times in a row for the same work of art (first as a buyer and then as a seller).’ 
76 This fact was stated by the EU Commission in its ‘Key Principles and Recommendations 
Report’, supra note 74. 
77 The Key Principle and Recommendations Report was the result of a Stakeholder Dialogue 
(hereinafter “the Dialogue”) which was launched at the beginning of 2013. Four one-day 
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of the phenomenon and report on it in its 2015 report pertaining to the 
implementation and effectiveness of the artists’ resale right.78 The report by the 
Commission is still pending.  
 
The provisions of the ARR Directive are not limited to just EU visual artists: for 
non-EU visual artists to qualify the third country in question must provide for the 
artists’ resale right in their national legislation and operate a system of 
reciprocity.79 The wording of Article 7 also makes clear that where a third 
country provides for a limited form of resale right – that for example does not 
make the right available to author’s successors in title – the rights made available 
to third country visual artists in member states will be correspondingly limited.80 
To support this objective, the Commission is obliged, on the basis of information 
supplied by member states, to publish a list of qualifying third countries.81 In 
addition, member states may deem third country nationals, who have their 




                                                           
meetings took place in Brussels on 30 January, 2 May, 1 July and 6 November during 2013. The 
Dialogue brought together representatives of CMOs and visual artists (rightholders’ community) 
as well as representatives of art market professionals (dealers and auctioneers). The aim of the 
Dialogue was to discuss practical solutions to problems faced by those involved in the payment 
and the administration of the resale right. < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/resale/140214-resale-right-key-principles-
and-recommendations_en.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July 2017).  
78 ‘Key Principles and Recommendations Report’, supra note 74 at p. 6. 
79 ARR Directive supra note 1, Recital 29 and Article 7. For signatory states of the Berne 
Convention the system of reciprocity is governed by Article 14ter of the Convention. 
80 Ibid. Article 7(1) Member States shall provide that authors who are nationals of third countries 
and, subject to Article 8(2), their successors in title shall enjoy the resale right in accordance with 
this Directive and the legislation of the Member State concerned only if legislation in the country 
of which the author or his/her successor in title is a national permits resale right protection in that 
country for authors from the Member States and their successors in title [emphasis added]. 
81 Ibid. Article 7(2). 
82 This is non-mandatory and at the discretion of each member state. 
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2.2.3 Threshold & Rates 
 
Regarding the threshold at which the ARR becomes active, the Directive allows 
member states to set a minimum sale price after which the royalty shall apply, 
providing however that amount does not exceed €3,000.83 During the drafting 
process various threshold amounts were proposed with the debates focusing on 
the effect of too high and too low a threshold. Too high a threshold and nascent 
career artists would be excluded,84 too low and the royalty yield would be 
miniscule or worse, consumed by the costs of administering the right.85 Arguably 
member states such as Ireland, which adopted the highest possible threshold of 
€3,000, now exclude many visual artists from the royalty schema, whereas 
jurisdictions such as France and Germany, which initially set a token threshold 
amount – €15 and €51 respectively – created an administrative burden rather 
than any real economic benefit for visual artists whose work does not command 
substantial resale royalties.86 Since the introduction of the Directive both France 
and Germany have revised their threshold amount upwards to €750 and €400 
respectively.87 Clearly, there is a delicate balance to be struck between setting a 
threshold that, on the one hand, benefits the greatest number of artists, and on the 
other, results in a valuable and not inconsequential royalty for the artist.  
                                                           
83 Ibid. Article 3(2). 
84 Rapporteur Zimmerling, during Parliamentary debates stated that most sales in Europe took 
place in the price band below this amount [€4,000 as proposed by Parliament] and therefore such 
a high threshold would have an unduly prejudicial effect on the market. See Debate in Parliament 
12/12/2000. 
85 Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I supra note 59, pp. 18 - 19 ‘… it must be set at a level 
at which exercise of the right is viable, since otherwise, in extreme cases, the fixed costs of 
administering the right could exceed the sum payable.’ 
86 €15 and €51 respectively, see Report on the Implementation and Effect of the ARR Directive, 
supra note 21, p. 8. 
87 See S. 26 of the German Author Rights Act (Urheberrechtgesetz), amended by the fifth 
Authors Rights Act Amendment Act (Funftes Gesetz zur Anderung des Urheberrechtgesetzes) of 
10 November 2006, official Journal (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2006 I, S. 2487), entered into force on 
16 November 2006. As for France, see (FR) Intellectual Property Code Article R122-5 as 
amended by Decree No. 2008-1391 of 19 December 2008 - s. 2. 
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Article 4 establishes a tapered royalty percentage rate; as the value of the sale 
increases in price, the applicable percentage rate decreases. During the drafting 
process this provision proved to be most contentious.88 Legislators faced two 
significant challenges: firstly, they were obliged to provide adequate 
remuneration for visual artists; and secondly, they were required to balance this 
against the challenge that too high a royalty would displace sales to jurisdictions 
outside of the EU.89 The agreed upon scheme is as follows:  
  (a)  4 % for the portion of the sale price up to €50,000;  
  (b)  3 % for the portion of the sale price from €50,000.01 to €200,000;  
  (c)  1 % for the portion of the sale price from €200,000.01 to €350,000;  
(d) 0.5 % for the portion of the sale €350,000,01 to €500,000; 
 (e) 0.25 % for the portion of the sale price exceeding €500,000. 
 
                                                           
88 See EU Parliament Minutes of proceedings of the sitting of Wednesday, 9 April 1997 (97/C 
132/03) OJ C 132/65 p. 25 and Council’s Common Position adopted by the council with a view 
to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the resale right 
for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, draft statement of the Council’s reasons. 5 
June 2000, (PI 21 Culture 19 Codec 245) p. 6. See also Amended proposal for A Resale Right 
COM(1998) 78 final p 3. Explanatory Memorandum S4(d). See also Council’s Common Position 
adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, statement 
of the Council’s reasons. 5 June (draft) & 26th September 2000, (PI 21 Culture 19 Codec 245) p. 
6. 
89 See Debate in Parliament 12/12/2000 - During debates in Parliament, MEP McCarthy 
questioned how the Commission arrived at such an arbitrary threshold of €1,000. See also 
Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I supra note 60, p. 18 & 19 - The Committee on Legal 
Affairs were concerned that where the resale right threshold was set too high by Member States, 
it would have the effect of excluding new and lesser-known artists. See Proposal for an ARR 
Directive, supra note 1, Section V ‘Particular Provisions’, p. 22 paras. 9 - 10. 
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To help determine the appropriate price bands to be applied the Commission 
analysed the cost of transporting works of art to other jurisdictions, factoring in 
transportation costs, insurance, import levies, sales tax etc.90 Given that the 
Commission overestimated the total amount of ARR beneficiaries in its 
preliminary reports91 and given the difficulties that other researchers have 
observed in collecting reliable art-market data,92 the accuracy of the 
Commission’s findings, regarding the determined price bands, are somewhat 
questionable. Indeed, the UNESCO Copyright Committee consider the 
prescribed royalty rate as not constituting a model of best practice due to the 
relative lack of reliable data upon which the supporting research was based.93  
 
In addition to the rates outlined above, the Directive allows member states a 
discretion regarding the first royalty band; instead of a 4% percentage rate, 
member states may raise the percentage rate to 5%.94 The rates are net of tax95 
                                                           
90 See Proposal for an ARR Directive supra note 1, pp. 16 - 18. Again, the Commission were not 
of the opinion that the blanket rate of 5% applied in France and Germany represented a model of 
best practice. In fact they were of the view that the blanket rate increased the likelihood of sales 
displacement.  
91 See EU Commission MEMO 99/68 which estimated the number of EU artists that would 
benefit from the EU ARR Directive at 250,000. 
92 See Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I A4-0030/97 supra note 59, p. 21. See also N. 
Kawashima ‘The Artist’s Resale Right Revisited: A New Perspective’ (2008) International 
Journal of Cultural Policy p. 303, Kawashima notes that there has traditionally been a lack of 
empirical research and therefore reliable data concerning the beneficiaries of the droit de suite 
and its successor the ARR. 
93 See UNESCO Copyright Committee  ‘Practical aspects of the exercise of the droit de suite, 
including in the digital environment, and its effects on developments in the international art 
market and on the improvement of the protection of visual artists’ IGC(1971)/XII/6 Paris, 27 
March 2001, section 5.4 - arguing that the EU’s tapered price band structure was in no way a 
model of best practice. See Committee on Legal Affairs Report ***I A4-0030/97 supra note 59, 
p. 21 - The Committee on Legal Affairs were of the view that to effectively determine the 
appropriate resale rate, a study, ‘based on unassailable data’, should have been carried out on the 
art market over a relatively long period of time. It was also the rapporteur’s [Committee on Legal 
Affairs] impression that no reliable harmonised data existed at that time. 
94 Reasons for percentage variance: See Gaber, supra note 42, p. 303 - The Council also proposed 
allowing member states the option of altering the percentage rate of 4% at the first band to 5%. 
This was justified on the basis that firstly, the higher rate of 5% would reflect the resale amount 
implemented by member states who previously recognised the right. See also Council’s Common 
Position adopted by the council with a view to the adoption of a directive of the European 
parliament and of the council on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work 
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and are applied on a cumulative basis so where a work of art, for example, sells 
for €1,000,000, the final royalty is made up of all the above royalty rates. If on 
the other hand the sale’s value amounts to €200,000 then the final royalty is 
comprised of band (a) and (b) only.96 It is also important to note that the 
threshold amount does not affect the royalty calculation. For example, where a 
work of art is sold for €50,000 the percentage royalty rate of 4% is paid on the 
full amount and not just the amount that exceeds the threshold.97  Previous to the 
introduction of the Directive, countries such as France and Germany that had 
already recognised the resale right did not cap the royalty amount; the higher the 
sales value, the higher the royalty amount.98 However, EU Legislators were of 
the opinion that an uncapped amount would displace sales to outside of the EU; 
as a result the Directive sets a ceiling of €12,500.99 It is noteworthy that this cap 
is unique within copyright law.100 
 
The final sub-section of Article 4 appears to allow for a further discretion; where 
a member state sets the minimum sale price below €3,000, thereby creating a 
new and separate price band, member states may alter the royalty rate for this 
                                                           
of art, statement of the council’s reasons. 5 June (draft) & 26th September 2000, (PI 21 Culture 19 
Codec 245) p. 7; a 1% variance at this lower price band would not substantially distort the 
market. 
95 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 5. Neither the Directive nor the Irish Regulations say 
whether the basis of calculation includes art market intermediaries’ commission. In the UK, the 
patent office suggests that the basis of calculation should be the hammer price or ticket price 
however that interpretation is not binding. See Valentin, supra note 26, p. 269.  
96 i.e. 4% on the amount from €0 to €50,0000 and 3% on the amount €50,000.01 - €200,000.  
97 i.e. not just the difference - €47,000. Also member states may set this threshold below €3,000.  
98 See L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, The Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property, A 
Comparative Law Study (Louise-Martin Valiquette Translation), (New York: Columbia 
University, 1991) pp. 115 - 118. 
99 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 4(1) – ‘However, the total amount of the royalty may not 
exceed EUR 12 500.’ 
100 J. Gaster, ‘The Resale Right Directive’ in I. Stamatoudi and P. Torremans (eds.) EU 
Copyright Law, A Commentary (Cheltenham: Elgar Publishings, 2014) pp. 355 - 394.  
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new price band.101 For instance, a member state could in theory set the threshold 
at €1,000 and simultaneously create a novel royalty price band between the new 
threshold of €1,000 and the highest allowed threshold of €3,000. Under Article 
4(3) of the Directive, the resale royalty rate for the portion of the sale between 
€1,000 and €3,000 could be set at any percentage rate.  The only condition is that 
the rate may not be lower than 4%.102 Therefore, in principle, there is no limit to 
how high this percentage rate may be set thus presenting the possibility for 
member states to create a generous royalty band for visual artists who’s work 
sells at the lower end of the price spectrum. Member states such as Ireland, 
which adopted the highest threshold amount of €3,000 are bound to apply the 
rate adopted at band (a).103 
 
2.2.4 Right to obtain information. 
 
Article 9 obliges AMPs to supply authors and their heirs104 with information 
pertaining to the resale for a period of three years after said sale.105 Lubina et al 
describe this provision as ‘crucial’ to the effective enforcement of the resale 
right, noting that ‘… knowledge of the resale of a modern or contemporary work 
of art is a necessary condition for the collection of the royalty.’106 The Directive 
                                                           
101 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 4 ‘If the minimum sale price set should be lower than 
EUR 3 000, the Member State shall also determine the rate applicable to the portion of the sale 
price up to EUR 3 000; this rate may not be lower than 4%.’ 
102 Ibid. Article 4(3) If the minimum sale price set should be lower than EUR 3 000, the Member 
State shall also determine the rate applicable to the portion of the sale price up to EUR 3 000; this 
rate may not be lower than 4 %. 
103 Whether that be 4% or 5% as required by Article 4. 
104 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Article 9 (1). 
105 Ibid. – ‘Member States shall provide for a period of there years after the resale that the person 
entitled under Article 6 may require from any art market professional mentioned in Article 1(2) 
to furnish any information that may be necessary in order to secure payment of royalties in 
respect of the resale.’ 
106 Lubina et al., supra note 35, at p. 298.  
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states that access to information is predicated upon the information being 
‘necessary’ to securing a royalty payment and not a general request for 
information.107 In this way the requirement balances the privacy rights of buyers 
and sellers with the rights of authors to receive payment, while preventing 
nuisance enquiries.108 Lubina et al are of the opinion that ‘ … it will cost the art 
market professional much less time and administrative effort to inform a default 
collecting society of the details of a resale than it costs a collecting society (or 
worse still, the artists) to monitor the art market for relevant transaction.’109 The 
authors endorse a close and synergistic relationship between AMPS and CMOs. 
How member states apply this right not only affects the distribution of costs in 
retrieving this information but also how effective the right is in practice.  
 
2.3 The Directive – Developing and Perceived Problems – Case Law and 
Commentary 
 
The following section analyses relevant case law and academic commentary 
concerning the ARR Directive and in doing so presents a critique of the Directive 
which analyses the merits of the Directive, its failings and whether there is room 
within the current model for a social component reflective of the right’s origins. 
 
Following the implementation of the Directive two primary questions arose 
through the case law of the CJEU: the first concerned the effect of the Directive 
                                                           
107 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Recital 30. 
108 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Recital 30 states that: ‘Appropriate procedures for monitoring 
transactions should be effectively applied by Member States. This implies also a right on the part 
of the author or his authorised representative to obtain any necessary information from the natural 
or legal person liable for payment of royalties. Member States which provide for collective 
management of the resale right may also provide that the bodies responsible for that collective 
management should alone be entitled to obtain information.’ 
109 Lubina et al., supra note 35, at p. 299.  
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on member states’ laws of succession – the Dali Case – while the second 
concerned the effect of a contractual clause which purported to over-ride member 
state’s national implementation measurements – the Christies Case.  It is to these 
questions that the analysis now turns.  
 
 
2.3.1 The Dali Case and Succession 
 
Salvador Dalí died in Figueras, Spain in 1989 leaving behind five heirs at law,110 
however in his will he appointed the Spanish State as sole legatee.111 
Accordingly the Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí [hereinafter the Dalí 
Foundation] administers all rights associated with the intellectual property in his 
estate.112 
 
In 1997 the Dalí Foundation granted the Spanish collecting society, Visual 
Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos [hereinafter VEGAP], an exclusive 
worldwide mandate to manage and exercise copyright over the works of 
Salvador Dalí.113 VEGAP in turn licensed the French collecting society, Auteurs 
dans les Arts Graphiques et Plastiques [hereinafter ADAGP] to manage the 
                                                           
110 Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP, Judgment of The Court (Third Chamber) 15 
April 2010. Case C-518/08, REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from 
the Tribunal de grande instance de Paris (France), made by decision of 29 October 2008, received 
at the Court on 27 November 2008, in the proceedings Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí, Visual 
Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos (VEGAP) Société des auteurs dans les arts graphiques et 
plastiques (ADAGP) [hereinafter Dali case]. Note that recently Dali’s body was exhumed for 
DNA tests to verify the legitimacy of a claim by a potential heir. 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40677828> (date accessed: 12 August 2017).  
111 Ibid. at paras. 13 - 14.  
112 Dali case, supra note 110, para. 13, Dalí established the foundation under Spanish law in 
1983. 
113 Ibid. at para. 14.  
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estate’s copyright in France.114 ADAGP collected amounts in respect of the 
exploitation of Salvador Dalí’s works, which were transferred by VEGAP to the 
Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí.115 However those amounts in relation to the 
resale right were retained by ADAGP. Under French law and pursuant to the 
provisions of Article L. 123-7 FIPC, the benefit of the resale right divests to the 
heirs of the visual artists alone.116 Non-familial legatees and successors in title 
are not legally entitled to receive the resale royalty. Contrary to the artist’s will, 
ADAGP paid all collected resale royalties directly to Salvador Dalí’s heirs and 
not to the Dalí Foundation.117 
 
VEGAP summonsed ADAGP before the Tribunale de grande instance de Paris 
[hereinafter the Paris Regional Court] on 28 December 2005 to secure an order 
for payment of those royalties. In light of the conflict of laws and the lack of 
guidance on this issue within the Directive, the Paris Regional Court stayed the 
proceedings and referred the following questions to the European Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling: 
 
1) Can [the French Republic], subsequent to Directive [2001/84], retain a 
resale right allowed only to heirs to the exclusion of legatees or 
successors in title?118 
 
2) Do the transitional provisions of Article 8(2) and (3) of Directive 
[2001/84] allow [the French Republic] to have a derogation?’119 
                                                           
114 Ibid. at para. 15. 
115 Ibid. at para. 16.  
116 Ibid. at para. 16.  
117 Ibid. at para. 16.  
118 Ibid. at para. 18. 
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As to the first question the French court asked whether Article 6(1) of the 
Directive must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as 
Article L. 123-7 of the FIPC, which reserves the benefit of the resale right to the 
artist’s heirs at law alone, to the exclusion of testamentary legatees.  The ECJ, as 
it then was, noted that according to its settled case law, 120 in interpreting a 
provision of Community law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but 
also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the legislation 
of which it is part.121 Regarding the context and the objectives to be pursued the 
wording of the Directive gives no guidance as to the intended meaning of ‘those 
entitled’ under Article 6(1).122 The Court concluded that ‘[i]n the absence of any 
express definition of that concept, the objectives which governed the adoption of 
Directive 2001/84 must be examined.’123  
 
The ARR Directive is based on two primary objectives: firstly, that visual artists 
may share in the economic success of their work to the same extent as other 
creators;124 and secondly, to eliminate anti-competitive practices and market 
distortions that result in the displacement of sales to member states that did not 
previously recognise the right.125 The first objective seeks to ensure a certain 
level of remuneration for visual artists. For that reason, Article 1(1) of Directive 
2001/84 provides that the resale right is to be defined as inalienable and not to be 
                                                           
119 Ibid. at para. 18. 
120 See Case 292/82 Merck [1983] ECR 3781, at para. 12; Case C-223/98 Adidas [1999] ECR I-
7081, at para. 23; Case C-17/03 VEMW and Others [2005] ECR I-4983, at para. 41; and Case C-
199/08 Eschig [2009] ECR I-8295, at para. 38. 
121 Dali case, supra note 110, at para. 25. 
122 Ibid. at para. 26. 
123 Ibid. at para. 26. 
124 Directive 2001/84/EC, Recital 3 - 4. 
125 Directive 2001/84/EC, Recital 9 - 10. This was confirmed in the Christies case.  
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subject to an advance waiver. The Court determined that the attainment of the 
first objective was in no way achieved by the transfer of the royalty post mortem 
to heirs and legatees alike as this was merely ‘ancillary’ to the broader 
objective.126 The second objective focuses on the harmonisation of the artists’ 
resale right across EU member states. Recital 13 of the Directive mandates that 
existing differences between the laws of member states ‘… should be eliminated 
where they have a distorting effect on the functioning of the internal market’.127 
Recitals 13 and 15 go further and place a qualification on this objective, stating 
that ‘there is no need to eliminate differences between national laws which 
cannot be expected to affect the functioning of the internal market … .’128 
Furthermore the Court was of the opinion that Recital 27 of the Directive 
supported this analysis as it makes clear that in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, member states’ laws of succession should not be affected by the 
Directive.129 The Court’s opinion clearly reflects the Commission’s intention to 
avoid law reform for its own sake.130 The Court concluded that as such it was up 
to member states to determine to whom the resale right would divest post 
mortem.131  
 
In addition and relating to the conflict of laws question the Court concluded that:   
 
                                                           
126 Dali case, supra note 110, para., 29.  
127 AAR Directive, Recital 13. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Dali case, supra note 110, at para. 32. 
130 Commission of the European Communities Com (88) 172 Final Brussels 7 June 1988, Green 
Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology – Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate 
Attention (Communication from the Commission) Chapter 1, Section 4, Para 9 (1.4.9), p. 8 para., 
1.4.10. 
131 Dali case, supra note 110, at para. 23. 
 108 
‘… there is nothing in the Directive 2001/84 to indicate that the European 
Union legislature intended to rule out the application of rules governing 
coordination between the various national laws relating to succession, in 
particular those of private international law which are intended to govern 
a conflict of laws such as that arising in the dispute in the main 
proceedings.’132 
 
The Court also concluded that it was up to the national court to take account of 
all the relevant rules for the resolution of conflicts of laws relating to the transfer 
on succession of the resale right.133 The Court held that there was nothing 
precluding a provision of national law that qualified the remit of those benefiting 
under the resale right.134 However, it was up to the national court to apply the ‘… 
relevant rules for the resolution of conflicts of laws relating to the transfer on 
succession of the resale right.’135 Based on the preceding analysis the Court did 
not consider it necessary to reply to the second question.  
 
In light of the CJEU ruling, the Tribunal de Grande Instance reconvened on July 
8, 2011.136 The first issue before the French Court was a matter of classification; 
whether the beneficiaries of the resale right post mortem was a matter of 
                                                           
132 Ibid. at para. 34. 
133 Ibid. See also, S. Stokes ‘Artists Resale Right (Droit de Suite): UK Law and Practice (3rd ed.) 
(Builth Wells: Institute of Art and Law, 2017) pp. 54 - 55. 
134 Dali case, supra note 110, at para. 36. ‘In those circumstances, the answer to the first question 
is that Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/84 must be interpreted as not precluding a provision of 
national law, such as the provision at issue in the main proceedings, which reserves the benefit of 
the resale right to the artist’s heirs at law alone, to the exclusion of testamentary legatees.’ 
135 Ibid., ‘That being so, it is for the referring court, for the purposes of applying the national 
provision transposing Article 6(1) of Directive 2001/84, to take due account of all the relevant 
rules for the resolution of conflicts of laws relating to the transfer on succession of the resale 
right.’ 
136 Fundació Gala-Salvador Dalí v ADAGP No. RG:10/11343, Jugement du Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Paris, p. 8 as cited and translated by A. Cukier, Case Comment ‘Dali gives greater 
clarity to the Resale Directive’ (2013) 35 (11) European Intellectual Property Review, p. 8. 
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copyright law or the law of succession.137 If the court found that the question fell 
within the purview of copyright law then it is likely the law of the member state 
where the work was sold would apply.138 On the other hand if the French Court 
adjudicated the matter to be governed by the law of succession, the applicable 
law – whether French or Spanish succession law – ought to be determined by the 
private international law rules governing succession.139 In the view of the court, 
the governing law was one of succession: the resale right is established – in 
relation to legatees and heirs – ‘on the day that succession begins’, and the law 
governing that succession will determine the right holders, ‘irrespective of any 
country where the works might one day be resold, which is unknown at the 
moment that succession commences.’140  
 
Looking then to French choice-of-law rules, and noting that France had not 
ratified the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the 
Estates of Deceased Persons,141 the court stated that the law governing the 
succession of movable property is that of the last domicile of the deceased – in 
this case Spanish law.142 In accordance with Article 1 of L. 22/1987 of the 
Spanish intellectual property code,143 the Dalí Foundation was deemed 
                                                           
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.  
139 See The EU Succession Regulation (Regulation (EU) No.650/2012), also known as Brussels 
IV, Official Journal of the European Union L. 201/107. 27/07/2012, REGULATION (EU) No 
650/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and 
enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European 
Certificate of Succession. 
140 Cukier, supra note 136 at, p. 8. 
141 Ibid. p. 8. ‘This convention is one of many operating under the umbrella of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, which seeks to progressively harmonise the rules of 
private international law. There are currently 71 members of the Hague Conference. Since France 
was not a signatory to this particular Convention, the court was obliged to look to French law 
governing the succession of movable property.’ 
142 Cukier, supra note 136, p. 8. 
143 Ibid. 
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beneficiary of all resale royalties issuing from the resale of his works in 
France.144 The French Court ordered ADAGP to pay to VEGAP all moneys 
issuing from the sale of works by Dalí realised in France since October 17, 
1997.145 It is submitted that in light of Recital 27 and in the absence of EU 
harmonization on the laws of succession the Court determined the matter 
appropriately.  Importantly, subsequent to the Dalí case the EU Parliament and 
Council introduced an EU Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition 
and enforcement of authentic instruments in matter of succession and on the 
creation of a European Certificate of Succession. 146  These rules are applicable to 
the succession of persons deceased on or after 17 August 2015. Denmark, Ireland 
and the UK have an option to participate in the Regulation. 147 
 
2.3.2 The Christie’s Case and the Right to Assign Liability  
 
In 2014 the French Supreme Court referred a question to the CJEU regarding the 
legality of a contractual clause that transfers the burden to pay the resale royalty 
from the seller of a work of art to the buyer even where national legislation 
mandates the former. The issue presented itself in two cases and resulted in the 
Paris Court of Appeal reaching opposing decisions in both cases. In the first case, 
Syndicat National des Antiquaires (SNA) v. Christie’s France SNC (2012),148 a 
trade association representing French antique dealers took an action against the 
                                                           
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 2012.  
147 Ibid. 
148 Syndicat National des Antiquaires (SNA) v. Christie’s France SNC (2012) (Fr) Court of 
Appeal of Paris 4th Chamber 12 December 2012, Case No. 11/11606 [hereinafter SNA v. 
Christies] ; see also SNA Press Release, December 14, 2012 <http://www.sna-france.com/Droit-
de-suite-procs-contre-Christies-N=c1721977-f080-4964-9570-a240d042e09b-L=FR.aspx> (date 
accessed: 8 July 2017).  
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French division of the UK auction house Christies.149 While the SNA were not 
party to the dispute they were allowed to bring the claim on public policy 
grounds and specifically in respect of the functioning of the internal market. At 
dispute was the inclusion by the auction house of a term in its conditions of sale 
requiring the buyer to pay an ‘amount equal to the resale right’.150 The SNA 
claimed that such clauses were unenforceable because they were in conflict with 
the wording of the Directive and national implementation measures.151 At first 
instance the Paris Regional Court declared the action as inadmissible and 
dismissed the SNA’s claim because it did not consider such contractual clauses 
to impinge upon national implementation measures. The SNA appealed the 
decision to the Paris Court of Appeal whereupon the decision of the court of first 
instance was reversed.152 The Court found the clause to derogate from the 
provisions of Article L.122-8 of the French Intellectual Property Code (FIPC) 
thereby infringing it.153 Christie’s France conditions of sale clause154 was 
accordingly declared null and void.155  
 
                                                           
149 The action followed the sale of the Saint-Laurent-Bergé collection. 
150 See Christies terms of sale – ‘Each time you bid on a lot covered by the ARR, you agree to 
pay an amount equal to the resale royalty, if you are the successful bidder. This amount will be 
added to your invoice.’ <http://www.christies.com/home/features/guides/buying-guide/related-
information/droit-de-suite/introduction> (date accessed: 10 July 2017) & 
<http://www.christies.com/features/guides/buying-guide/related-information/droit-de-
suite/faq/?sc_lang=en> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
151 Supra note 148. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Article L.122-8 of the French intellectual Property code defines the resale right as ‘a non-
transferable right to participate in the proceeds of any sale of a work after the first sale by the 
artist or his/her beneficiaries, when an art market professional is involved as seller, buyer or 
broker.’  
154 See <http://www.christies.com/home/features/guides/buying-guide/related-information/droit-
de-suite/introduction> (date accessed: 10 July 2017) & 
<http://www.christies.com/features/guides/buying-guide/related-information/droit-de-
suite/faq/?sc_lang=en> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
155 Supra note 148.  
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In the second case, Comite Professionel des Galeries d’art (CPGA) v Christie’s 
France SNC,156 another trade association representing art dealers claimed that 
Christie’s practices – regarding the burden to pay – were anti-competitive and 
therefore interfered with the functioning of the internal market.157 In this case 
however the Court held that there was nothing in French law that prevented such 
an agreement between parties.158 The Court relied on Article 1 of the Directive 
which states that, with regard to payment of the resale right, member states may 
provide that sellers, buyers, and/or AMPs are liable severally or jointly.159 The 
Court observed that in practice, while the seller may be liable to pay, it is often 
the AMP as agent who ‘actually pays’.160 It was noted that in practice AMPs 
receive payment for the work of art from the buyer, subsequent to which they 
transfer an amount, less the resale royalty amount, to the seller with the 
remaining royalty amount going to the artist, or his/her heir or an intermediary 
collecting society.161 Valentin describes this distinction as the seller’s ‘burden to 
pay’ as against the AMP’s ‘liability to pay’. Or in other words, contracting 
parties decide upon the mechanics of payment – who pays – and at whose 
expense. Based on this distinction the Court concluded that the seller and buyer 
could contractually ‘agree’ to whom liability to pay would fall.162   
                                                           
156 Comite Professionel des Galeries d’art (CPGA) v Christie’s France SNC, (Fr) Paris Court of 
Appeal, 5th Pole, 4th Chamber, 3 July 2013, Case No. 11/20697 [hereinafter CPGA v. Christies]. 
See also Brad Spitz ‘Artist’s Resale Rights: French preliminary question to the ECJ’ Kluwer 
Copyright Blog 17 March 2014. <http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2014/03/17/artists-resale-
rights-french-preliminary-question-to-the-ecj/> (date accessed: 10 July 2017), see also Brad Spitz 
‘ECJ: Auction houses may transfer cost of artist’s resale royalties to the buyer’ 
<http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/02/27/ecj-auction-houses-may-transfer-cost-of-artists-
resale-royalties-to-the-buyer/> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
157 P. Valentin ‘Artist’s Resale Right In France: The Economic Burden Revisited’ Art@Law 
21/02/2014 <http://www.artatlaw.com/archives/archives-2014-jan-dec/artists-resale-right-in-








Within the context of both these cases Christie’s France appealed the Court’s 
decision in the former case163 whereupon the French Supreme Court referred the 
following preliminary question to the CJEU: 
 
‘Must the rule laid down by Article 1(4) of Directive 2001/84/EC on the 
resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, which 
makes the seller responsible for payment of the royalty, be interpreted as 
meaning that the seller is required definitively to bear the cost thereof 
without any derogation by agreement being possible?’164  
 
The preliminary reference under Article 267 TFEU was delivered on the 26th of 
February 2015.165 The CJEU held that Article 1(4) does allow for such an 
agreement as the provision in question: 
 
‘… must be interpreted as not precluding the person by whom the 
resale royally is payable, designated as such by national law, 
whether that is the seller or an art market professional involved in 
the transaction, from agreeing with any other person, including 
                                                           
163 (Fr) Supreme Court, Civil, Civil Division 1 22 January 2014, Case No. 13-12675. < 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT0
00028514344&fastReqId=184391313&fastPos=1> (date accessed: 10 July 2017).  
164 Christie’s France SNC v Syndicat National des Antiquaires (Case C-41/14) (2014/C 102/28) 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62014CN0041&from=EN> 
(date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
165 See Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour de Cassation (France) lodged on 27 
January 2014 — Christie’s France SNC v Syndicat National des Antiquaires (Case C-41/14) 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d5c53b5665d2d0417
193e0d3e78ce36f20.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyKax50?text=&docid=162539&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=814143>  (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
See also EU Law Radar - Monitoring References to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
<http://eulawradar.com/case-c-4114-christies-france-the-single-market-in-reselling-art-works-
going-going-gone/> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
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the buyer, that that other person will definitely bear, in whole or 
in part, the cost of the royalty, provided that a contractual 
arrangement of that kind does not affect the obligations and 
liability which the person by whom the royalty is payable has 
towards the author.’166 
 
The Court supported its finding with reference to the primary objectives of the 
ARR Directive, firstly, ‘… to ensure that authors of graphic and plastic works of 
art share in the economic success of their original works of art.’167, secondly to 
‘… eliminate differences between laws which lead, inter alia, to unequal 
treatment between artists depending on where their works are sold.’168 The Court 
continued that this is why Article 1(1) of Directive 2001/84 provides for an 
inalienable right for artists to receive a certain level of remuneration,169 which 
must actually be paid.170 Accordingly it is for member states alone to decide who 
is responsible for payment of the royalty to the author.171 This would suggest that 
AMPs are precluded from unilaterally amending the default position. However, 
the Court noted that some language versions of Article 1(4) could be understood 
as drawing a distinction between, on the one hand, the person who is liable for 
payment to the author and, on the other, the person who must definitively bear 
the cost of the royalty, while other versions do not.172 The Court noted that where 
there is such a divergence a teleological approach must to be adopted.173 In this 
                                                           
166 Christie’s France SNC v Syndicat National des Antiquaires (Case C-41/14) para. 33. 
167 Ibid. at para. 15, citing ARR Directive Recitals 3 and 4. In this regard the Court referenced its 
previous decision in the Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and VEGAP C‑518/08, para. 27. 
168 Ibid. at para. 15, citing ARR Directive Recitals 13 and 14.  
169 Ibid. at para. 17. 
170 Ibid. at para. 18. 
171 Ibid. at paras. 19 and 24. 
172 Ibid. at para. 25. 
173 Ibid. at para. 26. 
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regard the Court, relying on recitals 9, 10 and 25 of the ARR Directive, stated 
that: 
 
‘… although the Directive makes provision about certain matters 
relating to the works covered, the persons entitled to receive 
royalties, the rates applied, the transactions subject to payment of 
a royalty, and the basis of calculation, as well as about certain 
matters relating to the person to whom the royalty is payable, it is 
silent about the identity of the person who must definitively bear 
the cost of the royalty due to the author in respect of the resale 
right.’174 
 
In light of this apparent ‘silence’ the Court was left with the task of identifying 
the parties liable. Relying on recitals 13 and 15, which circumscribe the extent of 
market harmonisation, the Court found that  ‘… there is no need to eliminate 
differences between national laws which cannot be expected to affect the 
functioning of the internal market and that, in order to leave as much scope for 
national decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit the harmonisation exercise to 
those domestic provisions that have the most direct impact on the functioning of 
the internal market.’175 Continuing, the Court stated that:  
 
‘[f]or the purpose of achieving the aforementioned objective, thus 
circumscribed, it is necessary that provision be made as to the person 
liable for payment of the royalty vis-à-vis the author and as to the rules 
                                                           
174 Ibid. at para. 27.  
175 Ibid. at para. 29. 
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for establishing the amount of the royalty. However, such provision is not 
necessary with regard to the question as to who, definitively, will bear the 
cost of the royalty.’176  
 
Again the distinction rests upon the ‘liability to pay’ as defined by national 
implementation measures and who will ultimately accept the ‘burden to pay’, the 
latter of which the Court found to be inconsequential to the functioning of the 
ARR Directive and the internal market. Admittedly the Court recognised that the 
aforementioned ‘… may to some extent have a distorting effect on the 
functioning of the internal market …’ but concluded that such an effect was only 
indirect ‘… since it arises as a result of contractual arrangements that are 
independent of the payment of the royalty to the author, for which the person by 
whom the royalty is payable remains liable.’177 
 
From the foregoing it would appear that in each case both claimants (the SNA & 
the CPGA) had a legitimate case to make out, namely that Christie’s France 
practice of allocating liability to pay the resale right by contract distorted the 
functioning of the internal market. However, that effect was found to be indirect 
and as such not significant enough to warrant intervention. In light of the 
purposive interpretation that the Court adopted here and evidenced in the Casis 
de Dijon Case – relating to measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative 
restriction – it is not entirely clear from the Court’s reasoning when a measure 
that indirectly affects the functioning of the internal market will be significant 
enough to warrant intervention. The EU Commission is currently investigating 
                                                           
176 Ibid. at para. 30. 
177 Ibid. at para. 31. 
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the effect of this market distortion, otherwise known as the ‘cascade effect’. In 
the current context if the Commission were to find significant market distortion 
resulting from this practice then that fact would undoubtedly have some 
interesting results for the above CJEU line of authority. In addition, the Court’s 
reasoning implies that both parties to an agreement to transfer the burden to pay 
the ARR royalty operate from a symmetrical bargaining position.  
 
2.3.3 Criticism of the Artists’ Resale Right 
 
While the previous section outlined two legal issues that have come before the 
courts since the introduction of the ARR Directive, the developing literature on 
the topic has identified a number of regulatory and principle based concerns that 
bring the validity and functioning of the ARR Directive into question. These 
concerns revolve around the beneficiaries of the Directive, the distribution of 
royalties, sales displacement and the administration of the right.  While many of 
these issues have been discussed at length in the related literature, the full 
implementation of the ARR Directive provides fresh insight into the validity and 
extent of these concerns.  It is to this that the following section now turns.  
 
2.3.4 Beneficiaries: Actual Reward  
 
A pertinent question specific to the ARR Directive is whether it provides actual 
rewards for visual artists? McAndrew and Dallas-Conte contend that the ARR 
‘…  discourages artistic production and does not support needy (rising) artists 
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but rather increases the incomes of already established artists.’178 In practice, 
royalties collected by national CMO’s from the ARR are not insignificant. The 
EU Commission in its 2011 ‘Report on the Implementation and Effect of the 
Artists’ Resale Right Directive’179 states that in 2010, €14 million in royalties 
were distributed to 6,631 artists and their heirs within the EU.180 This compared 
less favourably to figures collected by CMOs in 2007 which show royalties of 
€14.4 million distributed to 7,107 artists.181 Conceivably the global financial 
crisis in 2008 contributed to this reduction.182 These figures can be broken down 
further for select individual member states: France, in 2010 collected €6,848,000 
and distributed to 2054 artists/heirs; Germany, for the same year collected 
€3,427,000, distributing to 1021 artists/heirs; while the UK, collected €2,696,000 
distributing to 966 artists. Interestingly the UK, which at that time had not yet 
extended the right to the heirs of deceased artists, collected amounts similar to 
that of Germany for the same period.183 These figures can be compared to more 
recent research conducted by Ricketson who reports that in France, in 2013, the 
collecting society ADAGP collected €12,433,901 from 24,293 transactions 
affecting 1,938 artists of whom 45% were still living.184 In the UK in 2013, 
DACS collects and distributed almost €10,000,000185 in ARR Royalties to over 
1,400 artists and their estates.186 Assuming the veracity of these figures, 
                                                           
178 C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte supra note 5, at p. 19.   
179 Supra note 21.  
180 Ibid. at p. 14 Table 3. 
181 Ibid. 
182 The Economist ‘Investing in Art: A study in red and black’ 4 April 2015 < 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21647633-global-art-market-booming-
treacherous-study-red-and-black> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
183 Presumably this reflects the comparative size of the UK and German markets – the UK being 
significantly greater than Germany.  
184 Ricketson supra note 10, at p. 20; see Also C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte, supra note 5, 
valuing the French resale royalty market in 1998 at €2,300,000.  
185 The figure cited by Ricketson is in sterling rather than euro - £8.4 million.  
186 Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS), Annual Review 2013 p. 10 & 13. The figure is 
greater when distributed royalties by ACS (Artists Collecting Society) are included: a reported 
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significant growth in EU ARR royalties may be observed despite the depressed 
economic climate of this period.187 A possible contributing factor to this growth 
may be related to the cessation of the Directive’s exemption period in 2012 for 
member states that did not previously extend the ARR to the estates of deceased 
artists.188 This fact alone might explain the significant growth in UK ARR 
royalties but presumably not in France and Germany where the exemption period 
did not apply.189 Considering the consistent growth in ARR royalties across all 
three jurisdictions the impact of the exemption period’s cessation is perhaps not 
as significant a factor as one might have first thought.    
 
More significantly, there is evidence to suggest that wider macro economic 
factors were at play and that investors at this time began to diversify investment 
portfolios away from riskier asset classes such as equities and unsecured bonds 
towards traditionally more secure asset classes, such as commodities but also 
fine-art which suggest that art is a relatively quantifiable and predictable 
investment.190 This can be corroborated by reports from industry analysts who 
report increased sales since the financial crises.191 This diversification in asset 
class may explain the significant growth in art sales and related ARR royalties 
during this period, however both the EU Commission and Ricketson’s reports 
                                                           
£1,144,895.69 for 2013 (See ACS Annual Report 2014 p. 5). Italy collected €6,088, 771 in 2013; 
see also Societa Italiana degli Autore ed Editori Report on Transparency – 2013 p. 13. 
187 It ought to be borne in mind that ADAGP are not the only collecting society in France, 
although it is the largest, therefore a comparison of Frances’s total market – as compiled by the 
EU Commission – and that of a single collecting society (ADAGP) – Ricketson’s report – is 
informative but not conclusive. 
188 ARR Directive, supra 1, Article 8(2) & 8(3). 
189 It will be remembered that the exemption period only applied to member states that did not 
previously recognise the ARR. 
190 Supra note 182.  
191 Ibid. See also ArtTactic website: <http://arttactic.com/product/global-art-market-outlook-
2016/> (date accessed: 10 July 2017) and <http://arttactic.com/product/latin-america-auction-
analysis-july-2016/> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
 120 
indicate a significant gap in knowledge/data relating to the EU’s art market and 
therefore the effects of the ARR Directive. In support of this observation, 
McAndrew and Dallas-Conte note that art market sales data is on the whole 
‘plagued by inconsistencies’.192 This is largely due to the fact that there is no 
standardised category of ‘art sales’, some reports include antique furniture, 
jewellery, multi-media, to which the ARR typically does not apply, while others 
do not.193 Furthermore, reported figures may be net of tax, sales premiums, the 
ARR and vice versa.194  Accordingly, it is impossible to ascertain the full size 
and scale of the EU’s art market to which the ARR Directive applies. Therefore 
the follow-up report by the EU Commission on the implementation and effect of 
the ARR, which was due in 2015 (but not yet published), is imperative to this 
discussion and any further analysis.195 When this report is eventually published it 
will represent the Commission’s first opportunity to assess the effects of the 
ARR since its full implementation.196 On this point, Lubina et al question the 
meaningfulness of the Commission’s 2011 report on the implementation and 
                                                           
192 C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte supra note 5: ‘It is worth noting here that the data on art 
sales are plagued by inconsistencies. The primary source of data in this report are Market 
Tracking International Company (MTIC) (2000) estimates which are the only estimates available 
for dealer sales and are regarded as the best available by experts in the art market. Using MTIC 
estimates, however a 78% fall would imply a drop of just under £3,000 million, rather than £60 
million as reported above in the BAMF statement. The differences in reporting stem from what 
each source classifies as a ‘work of fine art’. MTI (2000) classify ‘fine art’ as: paintings, works 
on paper, decorative art, antiques and others. The Art Sales Index (ASI) and other sources use a 
narrower classification in reporting auction sales; for example ASI (2000) refer only to: 
paintings, works on paper, prints, sculptures/miniatures and photographs). Another important 
difference is that ASI data do not include buy-ins, yet these are included as part of auction-house 
turnover in the MTIC estimates. Although these may explain some of difference it is unlikely to 
be the sole attributable cause and inconsistencies in reporting sales do exist. The problems of art-
trade data are discussed in detail in McAndrew (2001).’ 
193 C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte supra note 5; see also supra note 5, at p. 4, the Report 
conflates the size of the global fine-art and antiques market, ‘The global art and antiques market, 
including both fine and decorative art, was worth €43 billion in 2010… .’  
194 C. McAndrew and L. Dallas-Conte supra note 5. 
195 Supra note 21, it is perhaps worth noting that the Commission recommended in its 2011 report 
that this follow-up report be conducted in 2014. As of the time of thesis submission the report 
remained outstanding.  
196 It will be remembered that the EU Commission’s last report in 2011 was conducted at a time 
when member states such as Ireland and UK had not extended the right to estates of deceased 
artists.  
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effect of the artists’ resale right.197 While it is clear from the foregoing that the 
ARR provides real financial rewards for visuals artists, McAndrew and Dallas-
Conte’s assertions regarding the distribution of these royalties to a privileged few 




2.3.5 Distribution of Royalties  
 
A further long standing criticism of the ARR is that it only benefits wealthy and 
successful artists and not the modern day ‘starving artist’.199 This has been 
largely corroborated by two studies, which found that in France between 1993 
and 1995, just 2 – 3% of artists received 43% of the droit de suite200 and that in 
the UK between 2006 and 2007 just 14% of sales accounted for 69% of 
payments by value.201 While these reports are not directly comparable, they do 
                                                           
197 Lubina et al, supra note 35, at p. 313. 
198 Supra note 5, at p. 19. 
199 See for example B. W. Bolch, W.W. Damon and C. E. Hinshaw ‘Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1987: A Case of Misguided Legislation’ (1988) 8 Cato Journal; J. H. Merryman ‘The Wrath of 
Robert Rauschenberg’ (1993) 41 American Journal of Comparative Law; J. D. Tepper ‘Le Droit 
de Suite: An Unartistic Approach to Law (2007) ExpressO - Selected Works 
<http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_tepper/1> (date accessed: 10 July 2017); J. C. Wu ‘Art 
Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: A follow-Up Study’ (1999) 46 Journal of the 
Copyright Society; A. Bussey ‘The Incompatibility of Droit de Suite with Common Law Theories 
of Copyright’ (2013) 23(3) Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal.  
200 Supra note 5, at p. 34, the authors derived these figures from a report by Deputé Douyere to 
the Assembleé Nationale in late 1999. 
201 Supra note 2, at p. 47, ‘In the period 15 February 2006 - 31 July 2007 surveyed in our 
research, 86% of ARR [Artist Resale Right] liable sales commanded just 31% of ARR payments 
by value; the remaining 14% of sales accounted for 69% of payments by value. Indeed, this 
distribution is even more extreme if one considers that while close to one third of all ARR 
eligible art occurred in the lowest price band (€1,000 – €3,000), this represented only 
approximately 1% of all eligible art by value; in stark contrast to this, 47% of ARR eligible sales 
by value were accounted for in only 72 artworks, or 2% of eligible art by volume.’ See also T. 
Froschauer The Impact of the Artists Resale Right in the United Kingdom (London: UK Antiques 
Trade Gazette, 2008) ‘In the first 19 months since the implementation of ARR in the UK just 
over 1,000 artists benefited from royalty payments. Of these only half were British. Just under 
one third of all artists benefited exclusively from lowering the qualifying threshold from €3,000 
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indicate that high value sales emanate from a small number of artists and their 
work.  It will be remembered that for some of the early proponents of the resale 
right it was its maintenance function that defined it.202 However, Abel Ferry ‘… 
made clear that he founded the proposed droit de suite on the rationale that the 
artist was ill-protected under general copyright law simply because of the nature 
of his product … .’203 The maintenance element for Ferry was accordingly less 
‘alms for the poor’ and more an attempt to create parity between the creative 
classes. That being said, Ferry and his contemporaries were not attempting to 
provide a boon for already wealthy artists but rather those who faced economic 
uncertainty.204 The pressing question in this regard is to what degree Ferry and 
later legislators achieved this result? Since its inception commentators have been 
divided on this issue.205 Hudson & Waller describe the resale right and its 
supposed equalisation of the creative classes, at least in financial terms, as a 
‘pyrrhic victory’ with most artists receiving no economic benefit from the 
right.206 Reddy on the other hand argues that the ARR should not be discounted 
on the basis that those who are the most successful benefit the most.207  
                                                           
to €1,000. Of all the British artists who benefited, only 41% did so by lowering the threshold, less 
than half of those suggested by supporters of the levy. 20% by number and 40% by value of 
royalty payments were paid to the top 20 artists, 12 of which are British. The estimated cost to 
the British art market to administer ARR is between 3% and 5% of the overall royalties 
collected.’ 
202 R. Plaisant – ‘The Droit de Suite’ General Studies - Copyright (1969):  Monthly Review of the 
United Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) pp. 159 - 160. For a further 
discussion see Chapter 3, Section 3.6, p. 183.  
203 R. Hauser ‘The French Droit de Suite The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged 
Artist under the Copyright Law’ (1962) 11 Copyright Law Symposium, p. 4. 
204 Supra note 98, at p. 1 - 6.  
205 For a selection of proponents see: R. Hauser (1962), R. Plaisant (1962 & 1969) L. de 
Pierredon-Fawcett (1991). For a selection of opponents see: Price (1968), J.H. Merryman (1993), 
B. W. Bolch,  W. W. Damon and C. E Hinshaw (1978), R.K. Filer (1984), L.S. Karp and J.M.  
Perloff (1993), V. Ginsburgh (2005), the latter providing economic models, the merit of which 
are in this author’s opinion open to challenge.    
206 E. Hudson and S. Waller ‘Droit de Suite Down Under: Should Australia Introduce a Resale 
Royalties Scheme for Visual Artists?’ (2004) Melbourne Law School Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 115. p. 25; Bussey, supra note 199, at p. 1088, contends that the ARR fails to protect 
video artists and performance artists. 
207 M.B. Reddy ‘The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists should have the right to a Resale 
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Merryman, describes this allocation of royalties to wealthy artists as the right’s 
greatest failing; 208 a ‘Robin hood in reverse’; taking from the poor and giving to 
the rich.209 Ricketson, disagreeing with Merryman, contends that the resale right 
performs just like any other reproduction right in that it rewards those creators 
which society deems to be of value.210 However, the ‘Robin Hood’ analogy is not 
quite right; the ARR and its French predecessor the droit de suite ‘take’ from art 
market professionals and distribute royalties to artists, irrespective of their social 
or financial position. As a further challenge to Merryman’s position, Kawashima 
recognises that while it is reasonable to assume that the majority of artists do not 
enjoy a secondary market for their work, it is inappropriate to assume that ‘big 
name’ artists dominate the secondary market.211 Merryman’s objection to the 
then-current proposal for a EU ARR is largely based on a study conducted by 
Camp in 1980.212 This study focused on the sales record of Sotheby’s (New 
York) between 1973 and 1977. Camp found that during this period sales of 
contemporary art were highly concentrated with the top five artists enjoying one-
third of the sale value of all works.213 A follow-up study by Wu in 1999 reached 
similar conclusions.214 Kawashima is critical of these studies noting that the 
                                                           
Royalty (1995) 15 Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal p. 531. 
208 J. H. Merryman, The Proposed Generalisation of the droit de suite in the European 
Communities (1997) Intellectual Property Quarterly p. 20.  
209 Merryman, supra note 199, at p. 253.  
210 Ricketson, supra note 10, at p. 5; ‘… this is the case for all categories of literary and artistic 
work: the grant of exclusive rights provides no guarantee of reward or continuing income, but 
simply the prospect of receiving some share of the proceeds of the exploitation of the work if it 
subsequently receives public recognition and demand. In this regard, the [ARR] simply reflects 
the particular character of visual works of art and their form of exploitation, but it does not differ 
in kind from the reproduction right which will only be of benefit to the struggling author in the 
event that his or her manuscript is chosen for publication out of thousands that cross the desk of 
the publisher daily.’ 
211 Kawashima, supra note 93, at p. 303. 
212 T. R. Camp ‘Art Resale Rights and the Art Resale Market: An Empirical Study’ (1980) 28 The 
Bulletin of the Copyright Society of the USA. 
213 Ibid. p. 152 - 153.  
214 Ibid.; see also J. H. Merryman, and A. E Elsen, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts 4th eds. 
(London: Kluwer Law International, 2002) p. 484, fn 48; Kawashima supra note 92, p. 303. 
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Camp study in particular, focused on high end contemporary sales in New York 
during the 1970s, and is therefore not representative of the art market and only 
represents ‘… one aspect of the market, which has other layers at international, 
national, and regional/local levels’.215 Based on two comparatively broader 
studies by Graddy & Szymanski (2005) and Kusin & Co. (2005), Kawashima 
presents a challenge to Merryman’s assumptions regarding the beneficiaries of 
the ARR and concludes that a larger number of artists ought to benefit from the 
ARR albeit to a lesser value. Kawashima’s analysis focuses predominantly on 
the Kusin & Co. report which grounds its findings solely on auction-house data 
collected before the ARR Directive came into effect. Therefore much of 
Kawashima’s argument is based on ‘hypothetical calculations’ that assume that 
the ARR is universal and not limited in application.216 Nevertheless, Kawashima, 
by extrapolating from these ‘hypothetical calculations’ and drawing on studies 
conducted in jurisdictions with established ARR regimes, concludes that not just 
wealthy artists benefit from the ARR but many nascent career artists.217  In 
addition, Kawashima contends that if the ARR enjoyed universal application 
then the lower ARR royalty price bands – up to €50,000 and €50,000 to 
€200,000 – would capture nearly 8,000 artists globally and amount to ‘… over 
half of the value of the global market.’218 This number increases further when 
thresholds of less than €3,000 are applied and the analysis incorporates sales by 
not just auction houses but all AMPs, as is the case with the EU ARR 
Directive.219 Kawashima further supports these findings with reference to 
                                                           
215 For further see I. Robertson ‘International Art Markets’ in I. Robertson, eds., Understanding 
International Art Markets and Management. (London: Routledge, 2005) p. 26.  
216 Ibid. p. 304. 




Ramonbordes’ reporting of ADAGP’s distribution of droit de suite royalties in 
1997.220 In that year ADAGP distributed droit de suite royalties to 2,650 
recipients, of whom 39 beneficiaries shared 30% of the royalties by value, 270 
beneficiaries shared the next 30% by value between them with the remaining 
2341 recipients sharing 40% by value. These figures represent a far wider 
dispersion of droit de suite royalties than proffered by Merryman and others. 
Furthermore, in 2016 DACS reported that on average between 2011 and 2013 
(UK), 43% of all artists receiving ARR royalties sold work in the price category 
of €1,000 - €3,000. This indicates that not only established and successful artists 
benefit from the ARR but also nascent career artist whose works sell for lesser 
amounts.221 In determining whether burgeoning talent benefited from the ARR, 
DACS report that on average it paid out royalties to 21 new artists each month in 
2015.222 This study highlights the benefits that a low ARR threshold has for 
visual artists at the early stages of their career. 
 
In addition to the challenge that the ARR only benefits wealthy visual artists 
there is also the contention that the distribution of royalties to the estates of 
deceased artists far outweighs the benefits accruing to living artists. Ginsburgh 
contends that 85% of droit de suite payments collected in France in 2003 went to 
the heirs of deceased artists and that this number increases to 95.2% when the 
analysis focuses on the top fifty visual artists.223 Kawashima, while 
acknowledging that the majority of sales by value relate to the estates of 
                                                           
220 C. Ramonbordes ‘Economic Impact of the European Directive on the Artist’s Resale Right or  
Droit de Suite’ (2000) xxxiv(2), Copyright Bulletin, p. 28 - 29. 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001225/122513eo.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
221 Supra note 9, at p. 11; ‘It is fair to assume that a lot of works in this category are by less-
established and emerging artists.’ 
222 Ibid.  
223 V. Ginsburgh ‘The Economic Consequences of the droit de suite’ (2005) 35(1&2) Economic 
Analysis & Policy, p. 66. 
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deceased artists224 notes that in France in 1997,225 80% of the royalties collected 
by volume went to living artists rather than their estates.226 More recently, in 
2011 the EU Commission conducted a similar survey and found that in four 
member states – Belgium, Denmark, France and Slovakia – between 2006 and 
2010, 78% of royalties by value and 59% of royalties by volume were distributed 
to the estates of deceased artist over that period.227 This leaves living artists with 
22% of royalties by value and 41% by volume. A comparison of these findings – 
Kawashima v. EU Commission – reveals a clear symmetry between the 
distribution of royalties by value but not the distribution of royalties by 
volume.228 Nevertheless, the data does indicate that not just the estates of 
deceased artists benefit from the ARR. 
 
As noted throughout this thesis, the Commission’s pending report on the 
implementation and effect of the ARR is long over due. Perhaps, the single most 
important contribution from Kawashima’s analysis is that a higher proportion of 
nascent career artists benefit from the ARR than previously recognised.229 When 
the analysis moves away from the value of ARR transactions to the volume of 
ARR transactions the efficacy of the ARR is less in dispute. This point is further 
strengthened if the proposition can be accepted that at least some low value work 
                                                           
224 Kawashima, supra note 92, at p. 304, citing the Kusin and Co. Report (2005) at p. 12, 
‘Admittedly, the majority of sales eligible for the resale right by value (80% in 2003, Kusin & 
Co. 2005, p. 12) relates to deceased artists … .’ 
225 See C. Ramonbordes ‘Economic Impact of the European Directive on the Artist’s Resale 
Right or Droit de Suite’ (2000) xxxiv(2), Copyright Bulletin, p. 28 – 29. 
<http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001225/122513eo.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
226 Kawashima, supra note 92, at p. 305. This figure is supported by the testimony of ADAGP’s 
General Manager, Mr. Gutton, in the New York hearing for the US Copyright Office in 1990.  
227 Supra note 21, at p. 10.  
228 For example, the percentage of royalties benefiting living artists: 80% (Kawashima) versus 
41% (EU Commission). Furthermore, this discrepancy may result from regional divergence. 
Indeed, comparing the data of one jurisdiction to that of four jurisdictions is unlikely to withstand 
any empirical scrutiny and is not representative of best practice in data analysis. Accordingly an 
analysis of all EU member-states ARR systems is necessitated.  
229 Indeed the DACS 2016 Report, supra note 9, supports this position.  
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matures into the high value category over time. A longitudinal study into the 
application of the ARR will be possible when the Directive is in place for a 
significant period of time, until then it will remain somewhat speculative.  
 
2.3.6 Sales Displacement  
 
A further concern with the introduction of the ARR across the EU is that it would 
result in sales displacement to jurisdictions outside of the EU which do not 
recognise the ARR.230 In 2011, the European Commission’s report on the ARR 
concluded that ‘… no clear patterns can be established to link the loss of the 
EU’s share in the global market for modern and contemporary art with the 
harmonisation of provisions relating to the application of the resale right in the 
EU on 1 January 2006.’231 Similarly, in their 2016 report, DACS purport that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the ARR has resulted in the diversion of sales 
to non-ARR markets.232 However, as previously noted, the sale of the Rene 
Gaffe collection in New York points to a contrary conclusion. The ARR 
contributes to higher sales costs in the EU than in jurisdictions that do not 
recognise the ARR, a factor that must motivate at least some sellers to sell in 
jurisdictions that are less costly.233 Furthermore, subsequent to the 
implementation of the Directive in 2006, the Commission observed a decrease in 
the EU’s share of global fine art auction sales while China’s share increased.234 
                                                           
230 V. Ginsburgh, supra note 223, at pp. 9 -10; and EU Com. supra note 21, at p. 6.  
231 Supra note 21. 
232 Supra note 9, at p. 8 
233 Supra note 21, at pp. 6 - 7. Indeed the Commission recognises that ‘… sellers will rationally 
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that between half and two thirds of high end sales are never completed: see G. Bowley and D. 
Barboza ‘A Culture of Bidding: An Art Power Rises in China, Posing Issue for Reform’ The New 
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Whether this can be directly attributed to the introduction of the ARR in the EU 
or represents a complex of unrelated issues may be answered by the fact that the 
US, where there is no ARR, experienced a similar decrease for the same 
period.235 If the displacement of sales was a significant factor in the fall of the 
EU’s market share then it would be reasonable to presume that jurisdictions 
bordering the EU, which did not recognise the ARR, would have seen a similar 
or greater increase in their market share.236 Switzerland which borders the EU, 
and does not recognise the ARR, is a likely beneficiary, however, the EU 
Commission observed in its 2011 report that Switzerland experienced an increase 
in auction sales of just 0.2% between the period 2005 – 2010,237 perhaps 
indicating that the introduction of the ARR during this period did not in fact 
result in the displacement of auction sales.  Commentators including Collins238 
and Ricketson,239 among others come to a similar conclusion.240 There is 
however one obvious flaw with the Commission’s analysis; it focuses 
specifically and narrowly upon auction house sales only and not the full gambit 
of art market professionals. Ignoring the impact of sales conducted through 
AMPs such as galleries and dealers brings into question the value of these 
findings and the degree to which jurisdictions such as Switzerland benefit from 
works of art originating from within the EU. For instance, there is anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that UK investment funds in art are locating to 
                                                           
York Times December 16th  2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/china-poly-auction/> 
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235 Supra note 21, at p. 5. 
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237 Ibid. at p. 5.  
238 Supra note 6, at p. 6.   
239 Supra note 10, at p. 20, para. 18. 
240 C. Banternghansa and K. Graddy ‘The Impact of the Droit de Suite in the UK: An Empirical 
Analysis’ (2011) 35 Journal of Cultural Economics, p. 81 -100.  
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Switzerland.241 Jean-Rene Saillard, sales director for the British Art Fund Group, 
which is a UK based art investment partnership, reports that most of the art 
owned by the fund is located in Switzerland.242 The art is located in what are 
known as ‘free-ports’, which allow investors to defer payment of VAT, excise 
duties, as well as excluding the ARR entirely,243 until works of art find a final 
destination outside the jurisdiction. In practice the art in these free-ports may be 
bought and sold multiple times before the final buyer takes possession of the art 
and pays the attendant duties. However, the duties are only paid on the final 
transaction. Where art is bought and sold regularly, the lack of taxes and resale 
royalties is of significant value to investors.244 The apparent popularity of these 
free-ports with investors and their attendant savings bring into question 
Ricketson’s observation that the Swiss art-market is not benefiting from the 
introduction of the EU ARR Directive.245 In this light Ginsburgh’s observation 
that the introduction of the ARR would merely shift internal EU trade distortions 






                                                           
241 M. Laird ‘Booming Art Market Bolstered by Swiss Free Ports’ in SWI article, available at 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/warehouse-turnstiles-_booming-art-market-bolstered-by-swiss-free-
ports/33088718 (date accessed: 10 July 2017). 
242 Ibid. 
243 Switzerland is a non-compliant ARR jurisdiction.  
244 Becker et al. supra note 5, at p. 62, noting that ‘[i]n Switzerland, generous import and export 
regulations have supported the development of the art trade – in both legal and illegal ways. 
Switzerland therefore often acts as a country of transit for works of art. Many works do not enter 
the country’s internal art trade.’ 
245 Supra note 10, at p. 21 para. 18.  
246 Supra note 223. See also A. O’Dwyer, A. ‘The Droit de suite, an analysis across two 
jurisdictions: Cross fertilisation towards inclusivity’ 2013 (12) Cork On-Line Law Review. 
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2.3.7 Administrative Costs  
 
Another concern with the ARR is that there are significant administrative costs 
and burdens attached in collecting and distributing these royalties.247 Becker et 
al’s analysis indicates that before the implementation of the ARR Directive, 
administration costs varied across Europe, from 40% of collected royalties in 
Denmark to 20% in France, 10% in Germany and just 7.5% in Belgium.248  This 
is the case with all royalty systems and the ARR is no exception. The EU 
Commission’s 2011 report indicates that collecting societies in France and 
Germany and now the UK have built up considerable experience in collecting 
and distributing ARR royalties.249 The Commission reported that the costs of 
administering the ARR have been estimated by AMPs to be up to €50 per 
transaction.250  Considering that eligible sales in the price bracket below €3,000 
attract a royalty of up to €150, the aforementioned transaction costs are 
significant.251 By contrast Ireland does not have a designated Collection 
Management Organisation (CMO) and as such Irish visual artists face greater 
challenges in obtaining sales related information. This creates an information gap 
that is costly and time consuming for individual visual artists to overcome.  
Furthermore, DACS, commenting 10 years after the implementation of the ARR 
Directive, highlight the issue of non-compliance and contend that some AMPs do 
not declare sales, thereby depriving artists of their royalties, and accordingly 
                                                           
247 Supra note 201, Froschauer contends that the estimated cost to the British art market to 
administer the ARR is between 3% and 5% of the overall royalties collected. Ricketson, supra 
note 10, at p. 46. 
248 Becker et al. supra note 5, at pp. 33 and 125. 
249 Supra note 21. 
250 Ibid. at p. 8. 
251 Ibid. at p. 10. 
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recommend the creation of a UK Compliance Ombudsman.252 It is proposed that 
the Ombudsman would in effect create a power of referral for CMOs in respect 
of non-compliant art market professionals. While this proposal represents one 
option the other would be to include this procedure within the implementation 
regulations of the Collective Rights Management Directive 2014/26/EU. 
Nevertheless, the EU Commission has observed that the experience in other 
jurisdictions indicates that CMOs present a cost efficient and timely method for 
collecting and distributing resale royalties.253 Ginsburgh and others however are 
less optimistic, citing several instances of fraud by French CMOs and high 
administrative costs.254 For instance the French copyright society SPADEM 
faced a financial crisis in 1996 and was placed under court-ordered 
administration in circumstances where the society’s administration costs could 
only be paid for if money was drawn from funds collected on behalf of its 
members.255 Accordingly the EU Commission has recommended that ‘… 
collecting societies should operate to a high standard of governance and 
transparency with regard to their members and to commercial users … .’256 No 
doubt the EU Collective Rights Management Directive 2014/26/EU will provide 
much needed governance in this area.257 Regarding the ARR Directive’s over 
arching aim of ensuring visual artists a share in the economic success of their 
                                                           
252 Supra note 9.  
253 Supra note 21, at p. 8. 
254 Supra note 222, at p. 65.  
255 Ibid.  
256 Supra note 21, at p. 10. In this regard the Commission was due to publish a list of 
recommendations in 2012.  
257 In Ireland The European Union (Collective Rights Management) (Directive 2014/26/EU) 
Regulations S.I. 156 of 2016 as amended by S.I. 616 2016 were signed into law by Minister 
Richard Bruton TD on 8 April 2016, coming into effect on 10 April 2016. Regarding the UK 
Regulations see; S. Stokes ‘Artists Resale Right (Droit de Suite): UK Law and Practice (3rd ed.) 
(Builth Wells: Institute of Art and Law, 2017) pp. 32 – 33. Directive 2014/26/EU provides 
guidance on issues such as membership, transparency, governance, distribution, licensing, 
enforcement, complaints procedure, alternative dispute resolution procedures and non-
compliance. 
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work, where member states do not recognise a national CMO, it is questionable 
whether their Directive obligations have been satisfied.258 Where member states 
neglect to provide and implement the necessary regulatory architecture the ARR 
lacks the necessary mechanisms to ensure its adequate and proper functioning. 
Accordingly, visual artists lose out on a valuable and much needed source of 
income. In this regard there is a need for legal equivalence vis-a-vis the rights of 
visual artists and other creators. Similarly to writers and composers, visual artists 
ought to be able to avail of the extant legal architecture in a meaningful way. 
Accordingly, the inclusion of a mandatory state CMO to the text of the ARR 
Directive would ensure that the rights available under the Directive are not 




Since the full implementation of the Directive in 2012 two cases have come 
before the CJEU: the Dalí case and the Christies case. While the former resolved 
the issue of the ARR and member state’s law of succession, the latter left the 
issue of the ‘cascade effect’ unanswered. It will be remembered that in the 
Christies case the Court considered whether a contractual clause could be 
employed by AMPs to transfer the burden to pay the resale royalty from the 
seller to the buyer even where national legislation mandated the former. While 
the court found no obstacle to such arrangements the effect is that where AMPs 
buy works of art in jurisdictions where the buyer is liable and sell in jurisdictions 
where the seller is liable (and vice versa) they must pay the incumbent royalty on 
                                                           
258 ARR Directive, supra note 1, Recital 3. 
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both transactions. The ‘cascade effect’ is not limited to cross border transactions 
and can affect parties based in the same member state but where contractual 
clauses vary between the sale and purchase of the work in question. This 
‘double-exposure’ may result in AMPs avoiding cross-jurisdictional sales 
thereby creating further market distortions. In circumstances where the cascade 
effect becomes more concentrated, it is foreseeable that affected AMPs will 
intensify efforts to subvert the proper functioning of the Directive. The issue was 
brought to the attention of the EU Commission during ‘Stakeholder Dialogues’ 
in 2013.259 The Commission subsequently considered the issue in its 2014 report 
‘Key Principles and Recommendations on the Management of the Author Resale 
Right’.260 At that time trade association representatives informed the EU 
Commission that the issue affected ‘a significant number of dealers’ transactions 
… .’261 The report recommended that in the Commission’s subsequent report on 
the implementation and the effect of the Directive, to be published in 2015, the 
Commission studies the extent to which successive sales occur between AMPs 
and the frequency with which AMPs pay the resale right twice in respect of the 
same art work and the amounts of the resale right paid. The report has not yet 
been published, therefore, the extent of the problem is largely unknown. 
 
Perhaps the most concerning development that the foregoing analysis has 
revealed is the growing use of Swiss free-ports by EU AMPs.262 Accordingly 
Ginsburgh’s observation that the ARR Directive would merely shift internal EU 
                                                           
259 See ‘the Dialogue’ supra note 77.  
260 ‘Key Principles’ supra note 74.  
261 Ibid. at p. 5 - 6.  
262 Supra note 241.  
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trade distortions to the international market was perhaps prescient.263 It is now 
clear that rather than resolving the problem of sales displacement the ARR 
Directive has instead elevated it to the international arena and now, more than 
ever, an international approach is necessitated. However, until such time as an 
international approach comes to bear, the CJEU will be required to determine 
when international sales with a EU connection are subject to the ARR Directive. 
In circumstances where preliminary contractual relations take place within the 
EU or where either party’s place of business is located within the EU, the CJEU 
may follow the Ahlers precedent and apply the principle of territoriality. 
Alternatively, the CJEU may determine some other more appropriate criterion of 
jurisdiction. While there is certainly scope within the Directive for the inclusion 
of a criterion of jurisdiction, it is not clear that the Directive represents the most 
appropriate forum for such direction. Guidance may be better placed in the 
private international law arena.264 Be that as it may, an analysis of private 
international law is beyond the remit of the thesis.  
 
Regarding the question of whether the ARR Directive primarily benefits wealthy 
and established artists, it is encouraging to note that a higher proportion of 
emerging visual artists benefit from the ARR than previously recognised.265 
When the analysis moves away from the value of ARR transactions to the 
volume of ARR transactions the efficacy of the ARR is less in dispute. As 
previously noted, this point is further strengthened if the proposition can be 
accepted that at least some low value work matures into the high value category 
over time. That being said, the foregoing analysis is limited by the fact that the 
                                                           
263 Ginsburgh, supra note 223. 
264 Supra note 45.  
265 Indeed the DACS 2016 Report, supra note 9, supports this position.  
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EU Commission has yet to conduct an in-depth analysis into the effects and the 
implementation of the ARR Directive since it came into full effect in 2012. 
Without reliable and unassailable data such as this, detailed analysis of the ARR 
Directive is impossible. 
 
Finally, when comparing the success of the ARR Directive in member states that 
recognise a national CMO, to member-states that do not, it is clear that visual 
artists are more likely to benefit from ARR royalties where a statutorily 






















Having presented a critique of the ARR Directive the thesis now considers the 
artists’ resale right within an historical context and in doing so considers the 
social origins as well as the legal nature of the ARR Directive’s predecessor, the 
historic droit de suite. When the resale right was first legislated for in early 20th 
Century France it was as much a social right as it was an economic right, 
rewarding not only successful visual artists but also the proverbial ‘starving 
artist’. The liminality of the historic droit de suite as both a social and economic 
right reflects the collective and communitarian socio-political culture from which 
the right evolved. The French republican brand of communitarianism that 
influenced social, political and legal actors to campaign for an exception to the 
French Author-rights system in the late 19th and early 20th century is explored in 
Chapter 5. A combination of the theoretical development in Chapter 4 and the 
social policy considerations explored in Chapter 5 serves to inform the nature of 
the reform proposals of Chapter 6.  
 
A central theme that this chapter explores is the notion that society values art but 
not necessarily the creator of that art. This has been evidenced throughout history 
by the manner in which society has tended to treat its visual artists. In ancient 
times, the visual artist was nothing more than a slave, fulfilling the aesthetic 
desires of his master, and while this relationship evolved over several millennia, 
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it was not until the Renaissance that society began to appreciate the importance 
of visual artists as a source of culture. Up until then, society valued the work 
created by visual artists but not necessarily the person creating the work, 
accordingly visual artists largely remained anonymous.  
 
Another related theme in the literature centres upon the observation that the vast 
majority of visual artists are unable to make an adequate living from their 
profession. This point has been evidenced by the findings of a number of studies 
which indicate that the majority of visual artists must supplement their income 
by engaging in non-art related endeavours or leave the profession.1 For many 
commentators this problem stems from two separate issues: firstly, visual artists 
cannot benefit from copyright protection to the same degree and manner as other 
creators; and secondly, at the point of sale they are unable to exact the true value 
inherent in their work.2  
 
A third theme focuses upon the binary and dependent relationship between the 
artist and his society. Historically, society has depended upon the artist to 
produce great works of beauty as a source of culture and in turn the artist has 
                                                           
1 See C. McAndrew & L. Dallas-Conte ‘Implementing Droit de Suite (artists’ resale right) in 
England’ (London: The Arts Council of England, 2002); C. McAndrew & C. McKimm ‘The 
Living and working conditions of artists in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (ROI 
Version) (Dublin: The Arts Council of Ireland, 2010), 
<http://www.artscouncil.ie/uploadedFiles/LWCA_Study_-_Final_2010.pdf> (date accessed: 10 
July 2017); Arts Council of Ireland Report (Prepared by Leigh-Doyle & Associates) ‘Joint 
Research Project into the living and Working Conditions of Artists in Ireland (2008); IGBK ‘The 
value of artistic work: Working Conditions, Rights and Demands of Visual Artists in Europe’ 
(Berlin: IGBK, 2012); see also D. Throsby and A. Zednik Do you really expect to be paid? An 
Economic Study of Professional Artists in Australia (Sydney: Australia Council for the Arts, 
2010); S. Ricketson Proposed International Treaty on Droit de Suite/Resale Royalty Right for 
Visual Artists (2015) CISAC Report SG 15-0565 p. 12; US Copyright Report: Resale Rights an 
Updated Analysis (2013) p. 31 - 36; for further analysis of these studies see Chapter 5, Section 
5.3, p. 293 - 303.  
2 It has been said that this situation results from the fact that art market intermediaries enjoy a 
stronger bargaining position than visual artists. This issue is explored below in sections 3.3 and 
3.4.  
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relied upon society to sustain him financially. However, this relationship has not 
always been fairly balanced. Even today, society’s apparently insatiable appetite 
for interesting and compelling ‘experiences’ – cultural goods – often leaves the 
creators of these experiences with little or no financial reward.3 This chapter 
explores these themes, questioning whether traditional copyright architecture 
disadvantages visual artists as compared to writers and composers, and if so, 
whether the introduction of the historic droit de suite and today’s ARR Directive 
effectively readjusts this imbalance thereby recognising the importance of the 
artist in society and the need for society to support these creators of culture.   
 
Within the context of the overall thesis, the chapter ultimately considers whether 
the ARR Directive has the capacity to perform a social function by analysing the 
nature and character of the droit de suite. 
 
 
3.1 An Outline of the Social Position of Visual Artists in Society Through the 
Ages 
 
Whether attention is focused on the artist of ancient antiquity, the middle ages, 
the Renaissance or modernity, one theme perpetuates throughout, and that is the 
binary and dependent relationship between the artist and his society. Historically, 
society supported art through the patronage of wealthy merchants, the aristocracy 
and the church. Today, however, patrons take the form of art market 
intermediaries, the state and more generally the free market. For Arnold Hauser 
                                                           
3 See generally, R. Levine Free Ride: How the Internet is destroying the culture business and 
how it can fight back (London: Vintage Books, 2011).  
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it is axiomatic to the creation of great art that society supports its artists, without 
this financial support the artist’s exploits would be inevitably confined to that of 
the dilettante.4 
 
Throughout history, society has valued art but not always its creator.5 Indeed the 
artists’ talents have been used as much as a socio-political tool6 as they have 
been for aesthetic pleasure.7 Visual artists were merely servants and therefore 
their artistic aspirations were suppressed by the aesthetic desires of their patron.8 
These works venerated the gods or served nobles in elevating their status among 
the plebiscite.9 The artist’s individuality and desire for self-expression was 
subordinate to that of the work.10 Arnold Hauser notes that unlike the poet, who 
                                                           
4 A. Hauser The Social History of Art Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1957) p. 22; see also, 
H. Read Art and Society 2nd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), Chapters 1 & 2; A.P. Elkin ‘The 
Secret Life of the Australian Aborigines’ (1932) 3 (2) Oceana p. 210; T.E. Scrutton The Laws of 
Literary Property – An examination of the principles which should regulate literary and artistic 
property in England and other countries (London: John Murray, 1882) (London: Clowes & Sons, 
1884) p. 11. 
5 A. Hauser supra note 4, at p. 15. From an economic standpoint the same could be said of 
composer, writers and musicians.  
6 Often used as an agent for change or to maintain the status quo. For instance Bansky’s graffiti is 
arguably the greatest use of art as a political tool. See T. Adorno Minima Moralia Reflections on 
a Damaged Life (1951) p. 110 - 111 ‘… every work of art is an uncommitted crime’.  
7 A. Hauser supra note 4, at p. 31 notes that ‘… it is highly probable that the priests were the first 
regular employers of artists, the first to give them commissions; the kings will have merely 
followed their example … the priests allowed the kings to be regarded as gods so as to draw them 
into their own sphere of authority, and the kings allowed temples to be built for the gods and 
priests so as to increase their own fame. Each wanted to profit from the prestige of the other; each 
sought to enlist the help of the artist in the fight for preservation of royal and priestly power. 
Under such circumstances there could be no more question of an autonomous art, created from 
purely aesthetic motives and for purely aesthetic purposes … .’  
8 L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, The Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property, A Comparative 
Law Study (Louise-Martin Valiquette Translation), (New York: Columbia University, 1991) p. 1. 
See also A. Hauser supra note 4, at p. 31. 
9 See generally A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 and 2. 
10 A. Hauser supra note 4, at p. 31, This phenomenon can be traced back to the Egyptians where 
despite the clear value placed on art as a means of honouring the gods, ‘… the person of the artist 
himself disappears almost entirely behind his work. The painter and sculptor remained 
anonymous craftsmen, in no way obtruding their own personalities.’ J.H. Breasted A History of 
Egypt (1909) p. 102 and A. Erman Life in Ancient Egypt  (1894) p. 414; P. Frank Prebles’ 
Artforms 11th ed. (NY: Pearson, 2013), pp. 256 and 280.  
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enjoyed elevated social status throughout history,11 the visual artist was not held 
in the same esteem despite the grandeur and symbolic significance of his work.12 
An unusual separation existed in the minds of the public in respect of the value 
that they placed on art and the creator of that art. The incongruity of this system 
of values – valuing the work of art but not the artist – can be traced back to 
ancient Greece and the ruling classes distaste for manual labour.13 Hauser 
observes that in the ancient world, manual labourers, including artists14 were 
slaves and therefore the link between slavery and manual labour significantly 
influenced societies view of these workers.15 While literary men could create 
their work without employing their physical attributes, the artist could not and 
was therefore relegated to the status of the common labourer.16 Ancient society’s 
distaste for manual labour did not fully carry through to the middle-ages, indeed 
the Romans did not share these views with their Greek forefathers.17  From the 
early middle-ages on, manual labour was viewed in a more positive light by the 
                                                           
11 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 at p. 113. During the Greco-Roman epoch the poet enjoyed ‘ … 
a quite peculiar esteem as seer and prophet, bestower of fame and interpreter of myths; the plastic 
or graphic artist is and remains a banausic artisan who, with his wage, gets all that he is entitled 
to get.’  
12 ‘In classical Athens … [a]rt was still looked upon as a mere handicraft, and the artist as an 
ordinary artisan with no part or lot in the spiritual value of knowledge or education.’ A. Hauser 
supra note 4, Vol. 1 at p. 116, citing B. Schweitzer Der bildende Kuenstler p. 47. For a further 
insight into the observed disparity between visual and art and poetry in the 18th Century see J. 
Reynolds Discourses on Art (1778) (Discourse VIII) ‘Poetry, having a more extensive power 
than our art, exerts its influence over almost all the passions; … [t]he painter's art is more 
confined, and has nothing that corresponds … [w]hat is done by painting must be done at one 
blow; curiosity has received at once all the satisfaction it can ever have.’ 
13 See A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 at pp. 113 - 120. Hauser notes that: ‘For the Greek ruling 
class and its philosophers, fullness of leisure is the precondition of all that is good and beautiful – 
it is the priceless possession which alone makes life worth living. See Th. Veblen The Theory of 
the Leisure Class (1899). <moglen.law.columbia.edu/LCS/theoryleisureclass.pdf> (date 
accessed: 11, July 2017). 
14 P. Frank Prebles’ Artforms 11th ed. (2013) pp. 279 - 302.  
15 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 at. p. 54. 
16 Ludwig Borchardt Der Portraetkopf der Koenigin Teje, (1911), as cited by A. Hauser The 
Social History of Art Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1957) p. 32 Fn. 5. 
17 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 at p. 118. 
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bourgeoisie,18 this was initially evidenced by the production of art in medieval 
monasteries where the monks themselves were members of the aristocracy.19 
This however did not emancipate the artist from a life of servitude and arguably 
the acceptance of the monastic artist had more to do with its religious rather than 
artistic provenance. Indeed, the work performed by monks in the monasteries 
was regarded as ‘a penance and a punishment.’20 Furthermore, the middle-ages 
‘…did not lay the emphasis on the personal genius of the artist but on the 
craftsmanship involved in artistic creation…  .’21 Art was the product of the 
collective rather than a product of a single intellectual genius.22 
 
It was not until the rise of an intellectual elite23 in Europe during the 15th century 
that visual artists gained recognition as a class of intellectual worker.24 These 
literati viewed the visual artist as their contemporaries and used their social 
                                                           
18 Ibid. at pp. 116 and 169 ‘… the contempt for manual labour still remains widespread even in 
the Middle Ages, and the idea of power still continues to be associated with that of an idle 
existence, but it is unmistakably evident that now, in contrast to classical antiquity, alongside the 
life of the seigneur, which is associated with unlimited leisure, the industrious life acquires a 
more positive evaluation and this new relationship to work is connected, amongst other things, 
with the popularity of monastic life.’ 
19 Ibid. at p. 168 citing A. Schulte Der Adel und die deutsche Kirche im Mittelalter (1910) notes 
that aristocrats were in the majority in the early medieval monasteries, and certain monasteries 
were in fact almost exclusively reserved for them. 
20 Ibid. at p. 169, citing E. Troeltsch Die Soziallehren der christl. Kirchen und Gruppen (1912) p. 
118. 
21 Ibid. at p. 267. 
22 R. Baldwin ‘History Painting as an Artistic System: The Legacy of Renaissance Art’ p.1 < 
http://www.socialhistoryofart.com/essaysthematicphdthesis.htm> (date accessed: 11 July 2017). 
23 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 2 at p. 62; see also E. Zilsel ‘The Methods of Humanism’ in D. 
Raven, W. Krohn, R. Cohen and S. Robert (eds.) Social Origins of Modern Science (London: 
Spinger, 2003) 
<http://www.compilerpress.ca/Competitiveness/Anno/Anno%20Zilsel%20Humanism.htm> (date 
accessed: 11 July 2017); L.  Martines The Social World of the Florintine Humanist 1390 – 1460 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); J.V. Field and Frank A. J. L. James eds. 
Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, Craftsmen, and Natural Philosophers in 
Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Baldwin ‘An Outline of 
Renaissance Humanism (1400-1700)’ Social History of Art 
<http://www.socialhistoryofart.com/essaysbyperiod.htm> (date accessed: 11 July 2017)  
24 Supra note 22, at p. 1; In the 15th Century the artist gained recognition as an ‘original thinker.’ 
< http://www.socialhistoryofart.com/essaysthematicphdthesis.htm> (date accessed: 5 March 
2016). A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 2 at p. 62, notes that the relationship between the literati or 
humanists and artist of this period was equally beneficial, each raising the status of the other. 
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position to elevate the status of the artist from that of the common labourer.25 In 
conjunction the assent of a wealthy merchant class across Europe aided this 
process of recognition.26 This merchant class valued the artist’s exploits as a 
means of validating their own prestige and self-importance.27 However, despite 
this growing recognition, visual artists were still subject to the control of their 
guild. Guilds were associations of craftsmen within a specific craft; each 
occupational group having their own guild.28 The guilds controlled the output 
and quantity of masters and thereby regulated the market in what would now be 
considered an anti-competitive manner. In addition the guilds also performed a 
social function in that they took care of sick members, provided education for 
fatherless children and helped widows who were not able to support 
themselves.29 By the late 16th Century artists began to break free from the 
confines of the guild system,30 and its anonymity.31 This resulted in visual artists 
signing their work which in turn increased their notoriety and prestige. De 
Pierredon-Fawcett observes that ‘the Renaissance restored the importance of 
Man as an individual and thus completely transformed the artist’s status.’32 Great 
works were for the first time associated with the name of the artist who produced 
                                                           
25 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 2 at p. 62. 
26 D. Rosen ‘Artists’ Moral Rights: A European Evolution. An American Revolution’ (1983) 2 
Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, p. 181 notes that while Europeans had a long 
tradition of art and artisans, England did not which in turn altered the ‘cultural fabric of society ‘ 
and its resulting laws.  
27 A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 2 at p. 62. 
28 T. M. Sichelman and S. M. O’ Connor ‘Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild 
Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic’ (2012) 49 San Diego Law Review pp. 1267 - 
1282. The guild system can be traced back to the Venetian Republic of the 12th century where 
guilds such as the arti were granted a state monopoly on ‘mechanical trades’ such as wool-
working, glass making, ship building etc. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Supra note 22 at p. 1; Baldwin notes that this was  ‘… in contrast to the Middle Ages where 
anonymous, humble craftsman produced objects glorifying religious, moral, and courtly themes, 
< http://www.socialhistoryofart.com/essaysthematicphdthesis.htm> (date accessed: 11 July 
2017). 
32 Supra note 8, at p 1. See also A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 2 at pp. 56 - 57; G. Duby Art and 
Society in the middle Ages J. Birrell trans. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
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them.33 Wealthy merchants and princes alike, intent on increasing their own 
social status and reputation, sought out and commissioned these artists. The artist 
had in many ways usurped the guilds,34 it was now the artist’s name and not that 
of the guild which society recognised and valued.  
 
Over time this transformation resulted in the adoption of new legal rules which 
recognised and protected the artist’s personality through his work.35 Throughout 
Europe, these legal rules initially came in the form of state privileges.36 The 
privilege offered trade protection for the publishers37 and a right of censorship.38 
                                                           
33 B. Sherman & L. Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual Property law: The British 
Experience 1760 – 1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) p. 38; While there was 
a shift in the 18th century towards the recognition of the importance of the individuality of the 
author, this did not mean that the author was seen a genius creating in isolation, the interpersonal 
or ‘intertextuality of creation’ was used as argument against perpetual copyright.  
34 See A. Hauser supra note 4, Vol. 1 at p. 116, citing A. Dresdner Die Entstehung der 
Kunstkritik (1915) pp. 86 - 87. Referring to the case of Giovanni Battista Poggi: ‘The year 1590, 
in which this case took place and which brought the fundamental decision that the guild statutes 
were not binding on artists who did not keep an open shop, brings to a close a development of 
nearly two hundred years.’ 
35 Supra note 8, at p 1. See also Michaélides-Nouaros: Le droit moral de L’auteur. (Paris: 1935), 
p. 3, cited by Z. Radojkovic ‘The Historical Developments of Moral Rights’ (1966) 2 Copyright 
(Series), p. 169 – noting that the lawyer Marion spoke passionately to the French Parliament in 
1586 in relation to the right of paternity. ‘He stressed the fact that any creator or inventor must be 
the master of what he does, invents and creates.’ See also, F. Rideau ‘Nineteenth Century 
Controversies Relating to the Protection of Artistic property in France’ in R. Deazley, M. 
Kretschmer and L. Bently eds. Privilege and Property Essays on the History of Copyright 
(Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2010) pp. 241 - 242; A. Moore Intellectual Property & 
Information Control: Philosophic Foundations and Contemporary Issues (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 2001) p. 12; noting that until the Statute of Anne (1709), there were few true 
copyrights granted – most were grants, privileges, and monopolies conferred upon individuals 
rather than on a class of creator. However Bugbee notes that in Venice ‘… a crude form of 
copyright law …’ existed in the decree of 1544-1545, see B. Bugbee Genesis of American Patent 
and Copyright Law (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1967). Moore at p. 13 also notes that 
cases such as Miller v. Taylor (1769) and Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) mark the beginning of 
authors’ right being recognised.  
36 For more of state privileges throughout Europe see E. Armstrong, Before Copyright: The 
French Book-Privilege System, 1498-1526 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and 
S. Teilman British and French Copyright: A Historical Study of Aesthetic Implications (Thesis: 
University of Southern Denmark, 2004) pp. 15 - 27 available at < 
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//Files/Om_SDU/Fakulteterne/Humaniora/Phd/afhandlinger/2005/0
_teilmann%20pdf.pdf> (date accessed: 10 July 2017); J. Loewenstein, The Author's Due: 
Printing and the Prehistory of Copyright (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 
37 M. Rose ‘The Author as Proprietor: Donaldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern 
Authorship’ (1988) 23 Representations p. 31; The idea of the author was primarily used to further 
the interests of the London booksellers.  
38 See E. Adeney, ‘The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers – An International and 
Comparative Analysis’ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 13, see also E. Armstrong, 
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Later these privileges were replaced with statutes,39 which conferred limited 
rights upon a broad class of creator.40 Privileges continued to exist in Britain 
until the second half of the 18th century,41 in France until 178942 and in Germany 
until 1870.43 Britain recognised a copyright in literary works in 170944 and to a 
limited degree in the visual arts in 173545 whereas in Europe, the French 
revolutionary laws of 179146 and 179347 signalled the beginning of a European 
copyright regime.48  
                                                           
supra note 36, at pp. 2 - 11 citing the first instance of a European book privilege as deriving from 
Germany in 1479, then Italy in 1488, followed by France and Spain in 1498, Portugal in 1501, 
Poland in 1505, Scotland in 1507, Sweden in 1510, England in 1518 and Denmark in 1519. B. 
Zorina Khan’ An Economic History of Copyright in Europe and the United States’ available at 
<https://eh.net/encyclopedia/an-economic-history-of-copyright-in-europe-and-the-united-states/>  
(date accessed 11 July 2017). 
39 See F. Kawohl, ‘Commentary on Leopold Josef Neustetel, The Reprinting of 
Books (Heidelberg, 1824), in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.) Primary Sources on Copyright 
(1450-1900), < 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_d_1824> (date 
accessed: 12 July 2017). Kawohl states that the decline of the privilege system was largely due to 
the fact that a privilege was granted by a state sovereign and as such protection did not extend 
past state boundaries. In addition the idea of natural rights inhering in the author as opposed to 
rights emanating from the state began to gain acceptance.  
40 In the UK the first of these acts came in the form of the Engraving Copyright Act 1734. In 
France, the rights of the artist was recognised by Royal Decree in 1777. ‘Royal Decree on 
Sculpture and Painting  (1777), as cited in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.) Primary Sources 
of Copyright (1450 – 1900), available at < http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/index.php> 
(date accessed: 11 July 2017). 
41 Rose notes that ‘… in 1775 the Court of Common Please decided in Stationers v Caravan that 
the crown did not have the authority to grant the Stationers’ company the exclusive right to print 
almanacs’. M. Rose, Authors and Owners (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1993) p. 25. 
42 Adeney, supra note 38, at p. 14. 
43 Deazley et al,  supra note 35.  
44 ‘An Act for the Encouragement of Learning’ 8 Anne c. 19 (1710) otherwise known as the 
Statute of Anne 1709. 
45 See, An Act for the Encouragement of the Arts of Designing, Engraving and Etchings 
Historical and Other Prints, by vesting the Properties thereof in Inventors and Engravers during 
the Time therein Mentioned 8 Geo. II c. 13, otherwise known as the The Engravers Act (1735). 
See also the 1742 Act for Securing to John Byrom, Master of Arts, the Sole Right of Publishing 
for a Certain Term of Years the Art and Method of Shorthand as cited in J. Hancox The Queens 
Chameleon: The Life of John Byron (London: Jonathan Cape, 1994), ch. 10. See also the 
Sculpture Copyright Act (1798) An Act for Encouraging the Art of Making New Models and 
Casts of Busts, and other Things therein Mentioned, 38 Geo. III c. 71 (1798), cited in Sherman & 
Bently supra note 33, at p. 17. 
46 French Literary and Artistic Property Act, Paris (1793) in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.) 
Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900),  < 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_f_1793> (date 
accessed: 11 July 2017) Source: Archives nationales : BB/34/1/46 (document conservé aux 




Despite this cultural shift towards the recognition of the importance of the 
intellectual worker, the visual artist was still at a distinct disadvantage to his 
contemporaries. This was primarily due to his mode of exploitation, while other 
creators could exploit the intangible element of their work ad infinitum, the 
visual artist was limited to the first sale of their work.49  At a time when the 
patronage system had long since disappeared visual artists relied upon the free-
market to provide them with a source of income. However, due to their weak 
bargaining position visual artists were often forced to sell their works for very 
little money. The literature is full of such examples: Degas reportedly sold a 
painting for 500 francs, which later sold for 436,000 francs.50 Millet’s Angelus 
purchased for 70,000 francs was resold only a few years later for over a million 
francs51 and a portrait by Duval De l’Epinay, bought for 5,210 francs in 1903, 
subsequently sold for 660,000 francs in 1912.52 De Pierredon-Fawcett notes that 
                                                           
47 Prior to the enactment of the Revolutionary Laws of 1791 and 1793 French law protected the 
rights of artists and sculptors by royal decree - see for example Decree of the Council containing 
prohibitions on the copying and casting of works of sculpture from the Academy (1676), see also 
the 1714 Decree on Fine Arts and the 1777 Royal Declaration on sculpture and Painting - these 
decrees however were in fact limited privileges conferred upon national guilds. See further: 
‘Decree on Sculptures, Paris (1676)’ in L. Bently and M. Kretschmer (eds.) Primary Sources on 
Copyright (1450-1900) 
<www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord.php?id=record_f_1676> (date 
accessed: 11 July 2017).   
48 Bugbee, supra note 35 at p. 47. For other works tracing the historical foundations of 
intellectual property see, N. S. Shaler, Thoughts on the Nature of Intellectual Property and Its 
Importance to the State (Cambridge, MA: Welch Bigelow, and Company, 1877); F. D. Prager, ‘A 
History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787’ Journal of the Patent Office Society, XXVI 
(November 1944) and ‘The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property’ Journal of the 
Patent Office Society, 
XXVII (February 1952); W. S. Holdsworth A History of English Law (London, Methuen 
Company, 1903). 
49 Infra. Section 3.4. The concept of the nature of the work and the manner in which it may be 
economically exploited will be discussed in detail therein. 
50 See L. de Pierredon-Fawcett p. 149 fn 4. See also the Max-Planck-Institut ‘The Droit de Suite 
in German Law’ in M. Nimmer eds. Legal Rights of the Artists (California: Nimmer, 1971) 
chapter VI p. 6 - 12.  
51 Supra note 8, at p. 149 fn 4. 
52 See A. Vaunois, ‘La Loi Francaise du Mai 1920 et le droit des artistes sur les ventes publique 
de leurs oeuvres’ (1920) 33 Droit d’Auteur pp. 101 - 102, as cited by de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra 
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at this time, the work of art underwent a transformation in terms of social utility, 
being transformed from an object of aesthetic pleasure to an object of 
speculation.53 Indeed, today the value of art, as a commodity to be invested in 
and traded has grown exponentially54 which in many ways reinforces the view 
that society values art but not the artist.   Even in circumstances where the artist 
makes the ‘big money’ sale, it is questionable whether the buyer is in fact 
rewarding the artist for his exploits or merely securing a valuable investment.  
 
A repeating narrative which continues to emerge from the literature describes the 
artist’s absence from this equation; he toils and labours only to be forced by 
economic circumstance to sell at a mere pittance.55 This resulted in a movement 
in France during the latter part of the 19th Century which aimed to provide visual 
artists with the opportunity to participate in the increased value of their art.56 
This movement recognised that visual artists were unable to make a living from 
their art and that copyright generally favoured authors and composers over visual 
artists. This was because traditional rights of reproduction, performance and 
distribution did not provide visual artists with adequate compensation.57 
Colombet captured this perfectly: 
 
                                                           
note 8  p. 149 fn. 4. The Author also cites F. Jourdain, Feuilles mortes et fleurs fancées (1931) for 
examples of the miserable condition which the heirs of famous French artists lived.  
53 Supra note 8, p. 2. 
54 In 1980 Robert Hughes wondered at how a ‘spiralling market’ had made for ‘a brutalized 
culture of unfulfillable desire,’ producing auction prices that had seen ‘a mediocre Picasso from 
1923’ sell for $3 million (US) in 1977. In June of 2015 that same ‘mediocre Picasso’ sold for 
$179 million. See Adam Gopnik ‘Art and Money’  June 1st 2015 issue, The New Yorker. ‘The 
intertwining of art and money has even been part of the positive character of the modern age, 
when artists fought free of princely and church commissions, and began to paint pictures 
intended for sale in a free market of collectors.’ 
55 M. E. Price ‘Government Policy and Economic Security for Artists: The case for the Droit de 
Suite’ (1967 – 1968) 77 Yale Law Journal, p. 1335.  
56 Supra note 8, at pp. 1 - 4. 
57 C. Colombet Major Principles of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in the World: A 
Comparative Law Approach (Paris: UNESCO, 1987) UNESCO/PRS/CPY/CME.I/4 p. 59. 
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‘The fact is that a literary or musical work will often be exploited by the 
reproduction of copies or public performances which will be a substantial 
source of profit to the author, but there is no such system as regards 
works of fine art, and a painter, for example, can only be remunerated for 
his labour on selling his works. Artists will often sell cheaply, especially 
at the beginning of their careers, and when they become better known 
their works often greatly increases in value. It is only fair that not just art 
collectors and dealers but creators, too, should have their share of the 
increased value; whence (sic) the idea of associating them with the profits 
derived from the price in crease by creating a right which take effect one 
works are resold (sic).’ 
 
Before exploring the first legislative enactment of the droit de suite in France, 
the following section will consider the legal landscape which provided the basis 
for this evolution in artists rights.  
 
3.2 Moral rights and the Origins of the Droit de Suite  
 
As previously noted the Renaissance changed the perception and status of the 
artist by recognising the importance of the individual creative spirit.58 Artists 
began to sign their work and the law began to develop rules which protected 
                                                           
58 Supra note 8, at pp. 1 - 4, see also Adeney, supra note 38, at p. 22; In 1741 Hanov 
distinguished between ‘iura personalia’ (non-transferable rights) and ‘iura communicablica’ 
(rights capable of being transferred to others in whole or in part).  Within ‘iura personalia’, 
Hanov, identified rights that we know today as attribution/paternity and integrity and thought of 
these rights as personal to the author and therefore non-transferable.  Adeney regards this as a 
clear foreshadowing of moral rights based on property concepts as they were to develop late in 
the 19th century. 
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artistic expression.59 The French revolutionary laws of 179160 and 179361 
signalled the beginning of the French system of author’s rights.62 In the years to 
follow the French courts expanded upon these economic rights by recognising 
rights that were non-economic in nature,63 thereby proving valuable to artists in 
terms of protecting their work and their reputation.64 These rights recognised that 
creative works were fundamentally different from other forms of property 
because they embodied the artist’s personality.65 Works of art and literature 
therefore possessed a ‘special character’ which differentiated them from 
                                                           
59 Supra note 8, at pp. 1 - 4, see also Radojkovic supra note 35; citing the lawyer Marion ‘… any 
creator or inventor must be the master of what he does, invents and creates.’ At p. 174 
Radojkovic notes that almost two hundred years after Marion’s passionate plea, Hell (1791) 
presented the principle of the protection of personal (moral) rights to the French Constituent 
Assembly.  ‘In this he stressed the principle of property in scientific and literary works. Although 
counterfeiters had deformed and altered the precision and the meaning of literary works, he 
declared, they had deprived authors of their honour.’ But like Marion, Hell’s principle was not 
legislated for and it was the courts that pioneered these rights until legislative enactment in 1957  
60 (Fr.) The Decree of January 13 – 19, 1791 reprinted in de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at 
p.1 - fn. 1. 
61 (Fr.) The Decree of January 19, 1793 reprinted in de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p.1 - 
fn. 1 
62 Copyright Act of March 11, 1957 (Fr.). R. J. Dasilva ‘Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: 
A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 1980-1981 28 Bull. Copyright 
Society U.S.A.) p. 3 ‘[t]he French droit d’auteur is a concept far broader than American 
copyright, so broad, in fact that French scholars dispute whether it really can be called a property 
right at all [see e.g. Debois, Cours de Propriete Litteraire, Artistique et Industrielle (1961)] While 
United States copyright seeks to protect primarily the author’s pecuniary and exploitative 
interests, as well. The French law of droit d’auteur, therefore protects not only the artist’s 
pecuniary rights (droits patrimoniaux), but also his moral right (droit moral).’  
63 M. Biagioli ‘Genius Against Copyright: Revisiting Fichte’s Proof of The Illegality of Printing’ 
(2011) 86(5) Notre Dame Law Review p. 1855, in 1793 Fichte made distinctions between the 
physical work of the author and its intellectual contents.  Instead of justifying the work by 
analogy to real property, he asked the question whether there was something inalienable in the 
work and if this existed, then it was to be considered property, perpetual in nature. Furthermore, 
Biagioli noted that for Fichte ‘what mattered … was that such property be inalienable, not 
whether it was tangible or intangible, nor how it might have been produced. His argument was 
structured like a test: if there is something in a book that could not be in any way alienated from 
its owner, then that something must qualify as property—perpetual property—no matter what 
kind of thing it may turn out to be.’  
64 Radojkovic, supra note 35, at p. 174, see also Adeney supra note 38, at p. 27. 
65 R. Hauser ‘The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged 
Artist under the Copyright Law’ (1962) 11 Copyright Law Symposium, p. 14, see Adeney supra 
note 38, at p. 27. See also I. Kant, Von der Unrechtmabigkeit des Buchernachdruckes’ in Arthur 
Buchenau and Ernst Cassirers (eds), Immanual Kants Werke (Hildensheim Gerstenberg, 1973) 
vol 4, p. 213. F. Kawohl ‘Commentary on Kant's essay On the Injustice of Reprinting Books 
(1785)', (2008) in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450 - 1900), eds. L. Bently & M. Kretschmer 
<www.copyrighthistory.org> (date accessed: 11 July 2018). Kawohl notes that for Kant the 
author has ‘… an inherent right in his own person, namely a right to prevent another making him 
address the public without his consent.’ 
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industrial products.66 The work of art was not merely an object but ‘the 
embodiment of the creator’s thoughts and personality.67 Accordingly, the French 
courts recognised the permanent relationship between the artist and his work,68 
which in turn provided the legal basis for moral rights.   
 
Moral rights allow creators to control works no longer in their possession and 
therefore represent an exception to the concept of exclusive ownership and the 
transferability of rights.69 These moral rights included the right of paternity,70 the 
right of integrity,71 the right of disclosure72 and the right of withdrawal.73 The 
right of paternity gives an author the right to be recognised as the creator of the 
work.74 The right of integrity protects the author from modifications and 
                                                           
66 See L. Becker, P. Huber and E. Kronjager (Project Leader: Marlies Hummel) The Droit de 
Suite Report Commissioned by the French Authors’ Society ADAGP, The German Authors’ 
BILD-Kunst and the Groupement Européen des Sociétés d’Auteiurs et Compositeurs (GESAC) 
(Munich: IFO Institut, 1995) p. 31.   
67 M. Reddy ‘The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should have the right to a resale 
royalty’ Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment law Review, p. 513. See also R. Hauser supra note 
65, at p. 14; ‘It bears his spirit, embodies his reputation, and reflects his views; the personality of 
the creator remains permanently a part of the work.’ 
68 R. Hauser supra note 65.  
69 Ibid. at p. 15 ‘… moral right permits the creator to survey, control, and even suppress the use 
of his product no longer in his ownership. It is, thus correctly characterized as a complete 
derogation from the basic rules of exclusive ownership of property, and for this reason several 
French jurists have suggested the dropping of the rubric "property" to denominate intellectual 
creations.’  
70 Ibid. at p. 14 citing Fortin v. Prevost-Blondel, Cour de Paris, July 4, 1865 (1865), Dalloz 
Periodique 2, at p. 243. 
71 Ibid. at p. 14 citing Sorel v. Fayard Freres, Tribunal civil de la Seine, March 20, 1895 (1898), 
Dalloz Periodique 2. 465; aff’d, Cour de Paris, Dec. 2, 1897, Cour de Cassation, March 14, 1900.  
72 The right of disclosure allows the creator of the work to decide when the work is released and 
to withhold the work from release or publication until completion. Supra note 62, DaSilva 
describes it as ‘… the right of the author to have complete authority over the decision to publish, 
sell, unveil, or by any other means make his work public.’ See also R. Sarraute ‘Current Theory 
on the Moral Rights of Authors and Artists under French Law’ (1968) 16(4) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law p. 477 - ‘Since the promulgation of the French law of 1957 no one 
has ever exercised the right.’ Further, see the French cases of Camion et Syndicate de la 
Propriete artistique v. Francis Carco, Aubry, Belattre et Zborowski, Trib. Civ.de la Seine, 15 
November 1927, DP.1928.2.89. Confirmed in Carco et autres v. Camoin et Syndicat de la 
propriété artistique, Cour d’appel de Paris 6 March 1931, D.P.1931.2.88, cited by Sarraute at p. 
468. 
73 Pourchet v. Rosa Bonheur, Cour de Paris, July 4, 1865 (1865), Dalloz Periodique 2, p. 201.  
74 See C. Chinni ‘Droit D’Auteur Versus the Economics of Copyright: Implications for American 
Law of Accession to the Berne Convention’ (1992) 14(2) Western New England Law Review, pp. 
153 - 154.  
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distortions that are prejudicial to his honour and reputation. And the right of 
disclosure grants creators the right to determine when a work may be made 
public. The right of withdrawal, which arguably represent the greatest 
infringement to the property rights of subsequent purchasers,75 grants creators the 
right to take back or retract their work.76  
 
Moral rights enjoy some international recognition under Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention (1971)77 however, as of the four rights mentioned,78 the Convention 
only recognises the right of paternity and integrity. Accordingly the right of 
disclosure and withdrawal are not recognised by the Berne Convention.79 
Furthermore, the Berne Convention’s moral rights provisions are specifically 
excluded under Article 9 of the TRIPS agreement.80 Historically, the civil law 
tradition viewed these rights as personal and perpetual81 and therefore could not 
be waived. Today, the Berne Convention allows member states to shape these 
                                                           
75 DaSilva, supra note 62, at p. 24, notes that these rights place ‘… tremendous practical 
difficulties, and readily could place an unrealistic burden on publishers and distributors of literary 
and artistic works.’ 
76 However, it must be noted that in France the application of the right of withdrawal has proved 
extremely limited. In addition it is not recognised under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 
For further see Sarraute supra note 72; ‘Since the promulgation of the French law of 1957 no one 
has ever exercised the right.’ 
77 Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24 1971, 1161 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
78 In Ireland under the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 s. 107 – 119, moral rights also 
include the right of privacy in photographic works – s. 114, and the right of false attribution – s. 
113. Other EU Member States including the UK also recognise such rights.  
79 Moral rights are set in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. The right of paternity and 
integrity are recognised only: ‘Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation 
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor (sic)or reputation.’ 
80 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 9 ‘ … Members shall not 
have rights or obligations under this agreement in respect of the rights conferred under art 6bis of 
that convention or of the rights derived therefrom.’ 
81 See Z. Radojkovic ‘Article 6 of the Berne Convention (Moral Rights)’ (1966) General Studies 
- Copyright, p. 14 - 15.  
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rights to reflect the nuances of their legal traditions.82 Accordingly, the majority 
of jurisdictions that recognise these rights allow them to be waived and limit the 
term of protection to that of copyright – life of the author plus 70 years. 83 
 
Moral rights, while not providing a direct economic return for artists84, evidenced 
a change in societal attitudes towards the creative classes by recognising the 
‘special character’ of their work. While today, the droit de suite and moral rights 
are not seen as one and the same,85 historically these rights were perceived to be 
strongly connected. This in turn foreshadowed a legal and socio-political 
landscape in which the droit de suite could not only be suggested but be 
legislated for.  
 
3.3 Outline of the Legislative Beginnings of the Droit de Suite in 20th Century 
France 
 
The droit de suite was mentioned for the first time in an article published by 
Albert Vaunois in 1893.86 The term droit de suite derives from mortgages and 
                                                           
82 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L 167 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive].  Recital 19 - ‘The moral rights of rightholders 
should be exercised according to the legislation of the Member States and the provisions of the 
Berne Convention. The Berne Convention as amended (Paris) 1971, Article 6bis (3)  ‘The means 
of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation 
of the country where protection is claimed.’ 
83 For instance in Ireland, moral rights may be waived. See s. 116 of the Copyright and Related 
Rights Act 2000. A similar provision exists in the UK, under section 87 of the Copyright, Design 
and Patent Act 1988. The only expression of moral rights in US legislation is contained in the 
Visual Artists Rights Act 1990, which introduced a section to the Copyright Act. (Copyright Act 
[USA] s. 106A). 
84 Arguably these rights provide indirect economic gains for creators by ensuring that the creator 
is identified.  
85 Ricketson, supra note 1, at p. 17.  
86 J. L. Duchemin Le Droit de suite des Artistes (1948) (Thesis, Paris) p. 35. The term ‘ droit de 
suite’ is used widely to describe the artists’ resale right but other nation references to the right 
include ‘Folgerecht’ (Germany), ‘Direito de Sequencia’ (Portugal), with Italy using a much more 
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real property rights; ‘it is one of the prerogatives attached to the enjoyment of 
real property, enabling the holder of the right to seize the property which is the 
object of the right, even in the hands of a third party.’87 The application of this 
right in the context of artists’ rights is noticeably dissimilar; the ARR is designed 
to allow the artist to participate in the increase in value of his work but not to 
allow the artist to dispossess the current owner of his property, as allowed under 
the ‘real property’ right. Indeed, the first draft proposals by Ibels and Théry in 
1903 and 1904 did not attempt to include a right to any degree composite of the 
literal translation.88 Instead the droit de suite and the artist’s participation in the 
sale price of the work of art was justified as a means of authentication.  The draft 
legislation envisaged a resale right that compensated the artist for authenticating 
their work and by providing the purchaser with a certificate of authenticity. The 
system, which was in the main premised upon the assumption that purchasers 
would value a certificate of authentication would have also required an official 
register of sales, which would have proved difficult and expensive to maintain, 
accordingly it was quickly abandoned.89  
 
In 1903, the Société des Amis du Luxemburg90 joined the campaign for a resale 
right. This was followed in 1905 by a public campaign to generate awareness 
among the French public concerning the importance of the rights of artists. The 
                                                           
descriptive phraseology ‘Diritti dell’autore sull’aumento di valore delle opere delle arti 
figurative’ which means the author’s right to the increase in value of his works, See Fawcett at p. 
151.  
87 L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 3.  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
90 The Société, which is a Non-Governmental Organisation, was founded in 1903 for a number of 
purposes: 1) to obtain the reconstruction of the Luxemburg Museum; 2) to support modern art; 
and 3) to promote the recognition of the droit de suite. The Société continues to operate today as 
a charity and was renamed in 1947: Law Société des Amis du Musée national d’art Moderne. For 
further see <http://amisdumusee.centrepompidou.fr/fr/page/historical> (date accessed: 10 July 
2017). 
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campaign, which itself centred around a particular drawing, featured the sale of a 
painting by the artist Forain.91 The drawing depicts an auctioneer bringing down 
the hammer while saying ‘100,000’ francs! In the foreground are two children in 
rags, one exclaims to the other ‘look, one of Papa’s paintings!’92 Such a poignant 
insight into the plight of the visual artist galvanised French public opinion on the 
matter: ‘…the public conscience was aroused by the shocking disparity between 
the poverty of the creators of genius and the enrichment of those who traded in 
their works…’93 By 1909 the campaign had built momentum and after a protest 
in Paris by a thousand artists, the French Government created a ‘Permanent 
Committee on Authors’ Rights for Artists’ to investigate the issue.94 
Subsequently, André Hesse drafted a Bill which called for the granting of a right 
to artists that would guarantee them a share of subsequent sales. The Bill was 
submitted to the Chambre des Députés in 1914 and Abel Ferry was appointed the 
lead legislator. The advent of WWI however interrupted the debates and the 
proposal was not addressed again until 1918.  Abel Ferry, who had been killed 
during the war, was replaced by Léon Bérard who successfully oversaw the 
                                                           
91 See lithograph by Jean-Louis Forain on the opening page of J. Farchy Le droit de suite est-il 
soluble dans le analyse économique? March 2011. See further C. M. Vickers ‘The Applicability 
of the Droit de Suite in the United States’ (1980) 3 Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review, p. 438. 
92 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 3, fn. 14. A similar, but not identical, story about 
Millet’s granddaughter is recounted by Price supra note 55, at pp. 1333 - 1366. For similar 
stories see D.B. Schuler ‘Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a Proposed 
Enactment for the United States’ Northwestern University Law Review (1967) 61 pp. 19 - 45, S. 
Hochfield ‘Legislating Royalties for Artists.’ ARTnews (1976) 75, pp. 52 - 54, and R. K. Filer ‘A 
Theoretical Analysis of the Economic Impact of Artists' Resale Royalties Legislation.’ Journal of 
Cultural Economics (1984) 8 pp. 1 - 28.  
93 L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p 3. 
94 ‘Commission permanente du droit d’auteur aux artistes’ L. de Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, 
at p. 4. ‘Another society named Le Droit d’Auteur aux artistes (Author’s Rights for Artists) was 
organised in 1909, under the presidency of the painter Willette, for a similar purpose. 
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passing of the Bill through parliament, the Bill was entitled: ‘a law granting 
artists a right of participation in public sales of works of art.95 
 
France thus became the first country to recognise the droit de suite. The right 
entitled visual artists to a percentage of the sale price of their work which was to 
be paid by the seller, the right applied to public auctions only.96 De Pierredon-
Fawcett notes that the legal recognition of the droit de suite was a product of 
changing social and cultural attitudes rather than as a product of judicial 
evolution.97  This change in public opinion also created an awareness of the 
important contributions that visual artists made to French culture and society. 
This in turn created an environment in which advocacy for a droit de suite 
became possible. The kernel of this movement centred upon remedying two 
economic inequalities; firstly, between that of the artist and other intellectual 
workers (writers & composers) and secondly; between the artist and subsequent 
purchasers of art.  The droit de suite was therefore premised upon the idea that 
artists had been unfairly treated; the corollary being that writers and composers 
enjoyed preferential treatment, both in terms of the protection and rewards 
offered by copyright law, and their social status within society. Arguably this 
signalled an evolution in society’s estimation of the artist. However, the victory 
                                                           
95 Supra note 8, at p. 4 citing A. Vaunois, ‘La Loi Francaise du Mai 1920 et le droit des artistes 
sur les ventes publique de leurs oeuvres’ (1920) 33 Droit d’Auteur, p. 103  ‘The bill was adopted 
by the Chambre des Députés on September 19, 1919 and by the Sénat, without debate and after 
declaration of an emergency, during the session of April 30th 1920. The statute was signed by the 
Président of the Republique on May 20, 1920.  
96 This limitation was said to reflect the practical difficulties of monitoring private sales.  
97 L. de Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at p. 4, fn 21.  
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was short lived as commentators immediately questioned the rigour of the right98 
and art market professions resisted its practical implementation.99 
 
3.4 The legal Nature of Artistic Copyright and the Historic Droit de Suite 
 
In order to fully understand the nature of the ARR, it is important to view the 
ARR within the wider context of copyright and the types of rights that this rubric 
allows. Prior to its incorporation into the Berne Convention the droit de suite was 
not considered internationally to be an ‘author’s right’ as it did not relate to the 
exploitation of a work.100 Indeed today the artist’s resale right is often described 
as a related or neighbouring right,101 a sui generis right,102 a moral right,103 and 
                                                           
98 See US Register of Copyright Report ‘Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty’ (1992) pp. 
10 - 29. 
99 Ibid.   
100 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 27; citing the opinion of the British delegation at the 
Rome Conference [to revise the Berne Convention] in 1928. Actes, Confrence de Rome, No. 282. 
See also L. de Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at p. 25; citing ‘le Projet de Loi Austro-Allemand 
sur le droit d’auteur at la critique (1933) 46 Droit d’Auteur p. 57, in 1933 the International 
Bureau of Berne debated whether or not the droit de suite was an author’s right, they concluded 
that the droit de suite and authors’ rights were mutually exclusive. The two primary arguments 
that were employed to support this conclusion were firstly; that the droit de suite merely 
concerned the sale price of the tangible object embodying the work; and secondly, it was not 
employed in the exploitation of the work in a similar manner to the right of production or 
performance.  
101 Supra note 98, at p. 92; Regarding the Kennedy-Markey Proposal for a US resale right, 
Frederick Woolworth [US Art Dealers Association representative] described the right as a sui 
generis tax: ‘While it will provide additional income to the very small group of already highly 
successful artists who have a secondary market, it is ultimately harmful to the interests of most 
artists. It is also unfair ... and a disincentive to collectors of art by living artists who are willing to 
support those artists by taking the risks involved in buying their works.’ 
102 Ibid. See also De Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at p. 25; K. Lubina and H. Schneider ‘One 
Year and Milllions of Euros Later: Taking Stock of the Implementation of the European 
Directive 2001/84/EC on Droit de Suite’ in B. Demarsin, E.J.H. Schrage, B. Tilleman & A. 
Verbeke (Eds.) Art & Law (Brugge: die Keure, 2008), p. 293.  
103 A. Schten, ‘No More Starving Artists: Why the Art Market Needs a Universal Artist Resale 
Royalty Right.’ (2017) 7(1) Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law; see also J. 
Pasharikov ‘Edvard Munch’s “The Scream” Screams for Droit de Suite: Why Congress Should 
enact a Federal Droit de Suite Statute Governing Artists’ Resale Rights in the United States’ 
(2015) 26 University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, p. 387; S. B. Turner ‘The 
Artist’s Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem’ (2012) 19 UCLA 
Entertainment Law Review, p. 335.  
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as a tax.104 While the droit de suite undoubtedly grew out of a legal culture 
immersed in moral rights doctrine it is questionable whether the right is itself a 
moral right as opposed to merely sharing certain characteristics. Recognising the 
true nature of the droit de suite has some important implications for two central 
research question of this thesis; firstly, whether the resale right can perform a 
social security function and secondly, if it is amenable to such a function, are 
there public policy grounds for the inclusion of a social welfare/income 
maintenance function under the current EU schema? The following section 
compares and contrasts the legal characteristics that define both moral and 
economic rights before concluding that the droit de suite is a form of economic 
right. Section 3.5 goes on to consider whether the right might be better framed as 
a tax and therefore perform a welfare function.  
 
3.4.1 The Historic Droit de Suite as a Moral Right 
 
Rita Hauser perhaps provides the most succinct exposition of the qualitative 
divergence between moral and economic rights: 
 
                                                           
104 J. Merryman ‘The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg’ Journal of the Copyright Society of the 
USA  (1992 -1993) p. 257; M. Asimow  ‘Economic Aspects of the Droit de Suite, in M. Nimmer 
(ed.) Legal Rights of the Artist (1971) Chapter III pp. 1 - 41; G. Rub ‘The Unconvincing Case for 
Resale Royalties (2014) 123 Yale Law Journal, p 5; G. S. Edelson ‘The Case Against an 
American Droit de suite’ (1989) 7 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal, p. 263; 
describing the classification of the right as an IPR as an ‘… Orwelian misuse of language… .’.  
See generally Lord Macaulay’s observations on copyright: ‘The principle of copyright is this. It 
is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers. The Tax is an exceedingly bad 
one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures … .’ Macaulay, 
Copyright (Speech in the House of Commons, 1841), in 8 works 195, 201 (Trevelyan ed., 1879); 
Ricketson supra note 1, at p. 17; ‘… under the “increase in value” approach …  the RRR [resale 
royalty right] moves away from authors’ rights, whether economic or moral, and assumes more 
of the character of a tax or levy that is levied on resales of artistic works. The appropriate legal 
resting place for RRR on this approach would therefore be within the national tax or even social 
welfare regime.’ 
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‘Les Droits moraux primarily protect what may be termed the spirit rather 
than the pocketbook of the creator. They permit the designation and 
perpetuation of the creator’s personality as embodied in the work, 
prohibit its distortion, and perhaps even its destruction. On the contrary, 
economic or pecuniary rights in an artistic product look to the protection 
of exploitation, give the author the power to prevent the use of the 
product without his consent, and … assure him some participation in the 
gain when he does so consent.’105 
 
For some commentators the droit de suite is an outgrowth of moral rights 
doctrine106 while for others it is strictly an economic right.107 For Ferry the droit 
de suite recognises the ‘invisible bonds’ in statute that exist between the artist 
and his work.108 While recognising this dichotomy, Plaisant defines it ‘… as a 
particular application of the copyright principle to works which cannot 
substantially exploit reproduction or performance rights.’109 Recht is critical of 
the view that the droit de suite is a moral right;110 moral rights are said to protect 
the ‘creative personality’111 – the spirit – whereas the droit de suite provides an 
economic reward for the artist – the pocketbook. However, Quadri takes the view 
                                                           
105 R. Hauser, supra note 65, at p.15. 
106 Pasharikov, supra note, at p. 387. 
107 V. Ginsburgh ‘The Economic Consequences of the droit de suite’ (2005) 35(1&2) Economic 
Analysis & Policy, p. 62; D. Schulder ‘Art Proceeds Act: A study of the droit de suite and a 
proposed enactment for the United States’ (1966 – 1967) North Western University Law Review, 
p. 22; ‘… though like the moral right in that it is inalienable, the droit de suite is more closely 
allied with the reproduction right in that it is a “pecuniary” right and is part of the author’s 
copyright.’ 
108 A. Ferry, Report, 1914 J.O. Chambre des Députés, Doc. Parl., annexe 3423, at 150 et seq., 2d 
Sess. of Jan 23, 1914; see also M. Clough ‘Legal Protection for the Moral Right of Visual Artists: 
A Growing Trend in State Legislation’  (1986) 36 US Copyright Law Symposium, p.108.  
109 R. Plaisant ‘The French Law on Proceeds Right, Analysis and Critic’ in M. Nimmer (ed.) 
Legal Rights of the Artist (1971) Chapter IV, p. 27.  
110 P. Recht ‘Le droit de suite est-il un droit d’auteur?’ (1950) 3 Bulletin du Droit d’Auteur 
[Copyright Bulletin] (UNESCO) p. 65, [English Translation]. p. 66.  
111 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 32. 
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that the droit de suite shares both moral and economic features in that it secures 
an economic return for artists while maintaining a moral rights dimension in that 
it is inalienable.112 Arguably Ruffini’s definition provides the most 
comprehensive encapsulation of the multi faceted nature of the droit de suite: ‘… 
a right in which personal, economic, moral and purely material elements 
intertwine and merge indissolubly, making up a unique whole.’113 
 
For those writers who view the droit de suite as a moral right, the kernel of their 
argument rests upon the analogy between the inalienability114 of both these 
rights.115 And while parallels can be easily drawn between the two, nevertheless, 
in the Irish and British116 context this argument has lost some of it potency 
because moral rights may be waived.117 A similar application of these rights can 
                                                           
112 S. Quadri ‘The Droit de suite in Latin America’ (1979) 102 R.I.D.A. p. 82. As cited by De 
Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 32. 
113 F. Ruffini, De la protection international des droits sur les oeuvres litéraires et artistique, 
(1926) 12 Recueil de Cours de L’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, p. 56, cited by De 
Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 30 - fn 141 (L. de Pierredon-Fawcett Trans.). 
114 Inalienability simply means that the right cannot be transferred. In the context of the droit de 
suite, the right is not transferable but it is transmissible to an heir, according to the rules of 
succession, upon the death of the artist. Moral rights, cannot be transferred but they may be 
waived. Waiver is effectively an abandonment of these rights and under Irish law this does not 
allow a third party to take up these rights and enforce them. In relation to moral rights see s. 118 
and 119 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 [hereinafter CRRA]. Within the EU 
context, Recital 19 of the InfoSoc Directive states that moral rights remain outside the scope of 
the Directive and moral rights should be exercised according to the legislation of Member States 
and the provisions of the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonogram Treaty. In the context of the moral rights of visual artists, 6bis(2) 
of the Berne Convention states that: ‘The rights granted to the author in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic 
rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the 
country where protection is claimed.’  In relation to the Artists’ Resale Right, in Ireland, S.I. 
312/2006 European Communities (Artist's Resale Right) Regulations 2006 No. 28 of 2000, 
states: s. 4(1) Resale right is an inalienable right and is not assignable, s. 4(2) A charge on a 
resale right is void, s. 4(3) A waiver of a resale right has no effect, s.4(4) An agreement to share 
or repay resale royalties is void. 
115 See generally Recht, supra note 110, at p. 65, [English Translation]; Hauser, supra note 65; 
Price, supra note 55.  
116 See UK Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988 Chapter IV. In the Irish context see Article 
116 CRRA 2000.  
117 See CRRA 2000, Article 116 (waiver).  
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be seen across Europe, thus diluting the ‘inalienability’ based analogy between 
moral rights and the droit de suite.118  
 
Furthermore, the focus on the inalienability of the droit de suite and moral rights 
ignores the divergent aims of both these legal institutions. Moral rights protect 
the author’s ‘honour and reputation’ – or for Hauser ‘the spirit’ of the creator – 
by preventing others from modifying the work without the author’s permission 
and by ensuring recognition of authorship.119 The droit de suite on the other hand 
is purely economic in nature – protecting the ‘pocketbook’ of the artist. The 
inalienability of the right does nothing to protect ‘the spirit’ of the artist or ensure 
the ‘designation’ or ‘perpetuation’ of the artist’s personality. Accordingly, 
Schulder views the droit de suite as more ‘closely allied’ with the reproduction 
right than moral rights.120 In fact the Artists’ Resale Right Directive 
acknowledges that were the right not inalienable it would be of little use to artists 
who would inevitably waive the right in lieu of recompense.121 The Directive 
therefore redefines the ‘inalienability’ characteristic as something other than a 
moral right.  
 
                                                           
118 For instance in France, where the moral rights are inalienable  [Fr. Code de la propriété 
intellectuelle, art L121-1)3)] waiver clauses are in principle prohibited but in practice precise and 
limited  clauses have been accepted by the courts. See J. Rocherieux ‘The Future of Moral 
Rights’ (Dissertation 2002) p. 5, citing Cass 1er Civ, 17/03/1958: JCP 61 1998,II,10148. 
119 Berne Convention, Article 6bis (1). 
120 Schulder, supra note 107, at p. 22. ‘… though like the moral right in that it is inalienable, the 
droit de suite is more closely allied with the reproduction right in that it is a “pecuniary” right and 
is part of the author’s copyright.’ 
121 In the US, in the 1970’s, a New York lawyer, Bob Projansky drafted an agreement for artists 
to secure a droit de suite royalty by contract. However there is little evidence to suggest that the 
contract proved popular. This perhaps reflects the weak bargaining position of artists as against 
art market intermediaries. For an example of the agreement see:< 
http://www.primaryinformation.org/the-artists-reserved-rights-transfer-and-sale-agreement-
1971/> (date accessed: 12 July 2017).  
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It may be observed that the inalienability of a legal right and it being a moral 
right are mutually exclusive: for instance, state welfare payments cannot be 
assigned to other individuals but that does not give them a moral rights 
dimension as understood in this context.122 Nevertheless, this is exactly the 
argument that some commentators forward.123 More accurately, the inalienability 
of the droit de suite simply guarantees the objective of the legislation – to 
provide artists, by virtue of their status as creator, with an additional source of 
income. This raises the important question of why visual artists would waive this 
right and potentially forego a future source of income?  
  
Bérard answers this question with the astute observation that ‘…the reason why 
artists occasionally sell their works at ridiculous prices could very well induce 
them to surrender the very right which is intended to enable them to remedy 
these disastrous transactions.’124 Bérard’s point highlights the potential circuity 
of the situation.125 It also brings to the fore the idea that visual artists have a right 
to receive fair-market-value for their work but for various reasons126 surrender 
this right and accept prices below market value. This leads Bérard to the 
conclusion that were the right not inalienable, visual artists would be equally as 
likely to surrender the droit de suite for immediate remuneration. Vaunois shares 
                                                           
122 Hauser supra note 65, at p. 17.  
123 Quadri, supra note 112, at p. 82. For a general analysis of this argument see De Pierredon-
Fawcett, supra note 8, at pp. 31 - 35. 
124 See F. Floquet, Le droit de suite en Europe (Paris: Thesis, 1971) p. 38, as cited by De 
Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at p. 159. 
125 Bérard’s point appears to be this; firstly, the artist has surrendered his right to receive the full 
value of his work, secondly, the droit de suite attempts to remedy this situation by providing 
future royalties based upon the resale of the work, thirdly, if the droit de suite could be waived or 
transferred then the artist is as likely to forego the right as he is to accept a below market value 
offer for his work.   
126 There are a whole host of reasons for this phenomenon including a lack of bargaining power, 
low self-esteem, the effects of continual poverty, an inability to identify the true market value of 
the work and so on.  
 161 
this sentiment; ‘[f]reedom of contract would have given the advantage to the 
dealers.’127 De Pierredon-Fawcett concludes that the protection guaranteed by 
legislators reflected the ‘character of the person’ holding the right, that being 
their weakness in economic bargaining power.128  
 
From the above analysis it is clear that the droit de suite does not align itself with 
moral rights for two reasons: firstly, moral rights are, in the main, capable of 
being waived; secondly, the inalienability of the droit de suite is a reflection of 
the weak bargaining position that artists find themselves in and not a wish by 
legislators to protect the personality of the artist.  
 
Therefore the droit de suite does not fit with Hauser’s description of moral rights 
as its primary focus is to provide an economic reward for the artist and not to 
protect his/her personality. Accordingly, it must be concluded that the droit de 
suite and its modern day equivalent – the Artists Resale Right – is an economic 
right, reshaped to take account of the artist’s weakness in economic bargaining. 
If the right was not inalienable then the situation which the original proponents 
of the droit de suite sought to correct would have perpetuated. To provide visual 
artists with the means to earn a living requires novel approaches to copyright 




                                                           
127 Vaunois, supra note 52. at  pp. 101 – 102.  
128 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 33. 
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3.4.2 The Historic Droit de Suite as an Economic Right 
 
This section tests Goetzl and Sutton’s thesis that the droit de suite, as an 
economic right, is more closely aligned with copyright’s right of performance 
than the right of reproduction. Again, determining the actual legal nature of the 
droit de suite – artists resale right  –  has important consequences for any reform 
proposals that this thesis might suggest. Before engaging with the author’s 
analysis it is necessary first to outline the nature of creative works. 
 
3.4.3 The Nature of Creative Works  
For Sherman a ‘creative work’ contains two elements, the original means of 
expression of the idea and the tangible medium through which it is 
communicated:129  
‘An author first communicates through a manuscript. The physical 
embodiment of the expression is the written word, and the intellectual 
process through which this is perceived is that of reading. The concept 
may be communicated as easily through the printed page as through the 
typewritten or handwritten page. Because of this fact, the physical object 
by means of which the author communicates ordinarily has little or no 
commercial value.  The situation is different in respect to an artistic 
creation. Here, the idea within the means of expression is originally 
                                                           
129 See R. Sherman ‘Incorporation of the Droit de Suite into United States Copyright Law’ (1970) 
18 Copyright Law Symposium (ASCAP) p. 82. 
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communicated through a canvas or other medium. The intellectual 
process through which the creator’s contribution is perceived is that of 
viewing. In the present state of art reproduction, the concept may not be 
communicated as easily or desirably through a photograph or other-
machine-made reproduction. As a result, it is the physical object by 
means of which the artist shows his form of expression that is of the 
greatest commercial value. 130 
 
Sherman’s analysis posits two important conceptual points. Firstly, unlike works 
of literature and musical compositions where the tangible and intangible 
elements of the work can be separated and exploited accordingly, the tangible 
and intangible elements of the artistic work are forever intertwined. This in turn 
limits the degree to which these works are susceptible to traditional modes of 
exploitation such as reproduction and performance. Secondly, the internalisation 
of these works by the public occurs through two very different mediums; for the 
art lover, the internalisation occurs through the viewing of the work in its 
original form of expression while for the literary lover, through the process of 
reading. Schmoll131 agrees that the act of viewing fine art is the equivalent of 
reading a novel, attending a theatrical performance or hearing a musical score.  
Therefore it is said that regardless of technical perfection, reproductions of works 
of art – i.e. copies – can never fully convey the visual artist’s message 
perfectly,132 accordingly the viewer’s internalisation of the artist’s message is 
                                                           
130 Ibid. at  p. 82 and p. 57.  
131 As cited by De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 28. Schmoll is first cited by J.L. 
Duchemin, supra note 86, at p. 126.  
132 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 28.  
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incomplete and unsatisfactory. Creators of literature and music on the other hand 
suffer no such impediment because the copy is capable of conveying the author’s 
full creative expression.133 The original work of art has an intrinsic value for the 
public that the original manuscript of the author and composer does not.134  
 
Returning to the resulting and divergent means of exploiting such works, Hauser 
notes that ‘[s]ales of the work constitute an exploitation … for which the droit de 
suite ensures a participation for the artist.’135 Vaunois wrote that ‘each public 
resale of the work is a pecuniary exploitation of the creation.’136 For these 
commentators the droit de suite is an author’s right that allows for an 
exploitation peculiar and unique to artistic work which is similar to the 
exploitation that writers and performers enjoy when their work is performed or 
reproduced. Plaisant is not convinced by this assessment and asserts that for the 
droit de suite to be an author’s right, there must be some element of consent.137 
While the writer and playwright are entitled to a royalty from the exploitation of 
their work, their consent presupposes any and all reproductions and 
performances. The droit de suite on the other hand does not require the consent 
                                                           
133 It may be observed that literature can be enjoyed equally through the auditory process of 
hearing the spoken word, whether read aloud in the manner of a live performance or an audio 
recording.  
134 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 28. However, that does not ignore the fact that 
original manuscripts have a value in their own right but this value does not represent the primary 
means of exploitation for the writer or composer. Interesting, Article 14ter of the Berne 
Convention provides a resale right for authiors.  
135 Hauser , supra note 65 at p. 18. 
136 Vaunois, supra note 52, at 102.   
137 The droit de suite is not a form of exploitation of the work resulting from the will of the 
author; it is a purely pecuniary ancillary right exercised by the author on the occurrence of 
actions of which the work is the object, but independent of the creator’s will – a public sale at the 
request of a third party owning the material object in which the work is embodied.’ See Floquet, 
supra note 124, at p. 285, (quoting R. Plaisant) as cited by De Pierredon-Fawcett p. 28 - 29.  
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of the author. For Plaisant, this distinguishes the droit de suite from other author 
rights.138   
 
3.4.4 The Droit de Suite and the Follow-Up Model 
 
Interestingly, the above analysis presents the droit de suite as a right separate and 
distinguishable from the right of performance and reproduction. Goetzl & Sutton, 
in their critique, develop upon the public’s process of internalising art and 
accordingly focus on the performative nature of the droit de suite.139 In their 
critique they succinctly outline the divergence between performance and 
reproduction rights, evidencing how the droit de suite has traditionally been 
more closely associated with the reproduction right than the performance right 
and that this may have resulted in certain doctrinal anomalies.  
 
The authors propose that both the reproduction and performance right fall under 
separate legal models, each conferring very distinctive modes of operation. The 
‘Gutenburg Model’140 is proposed to be the basis of the reproduction right while 
the performance right falls under the ‘Follow Up Model’.141 They contend that 
the failure to recognise these two distinct models has resulted in some confusion 
                                                           
138 While this is correct, Plaisant’s position ignores the case of compulsory licences and the 
doctrine of ‘fair dealing’ which allow users to utilise the work, albeit in a limited manner, free 
from the author’s express consent. See Article 5 of the Information Society Directive.  
139 T. Goetzl and S. Sutton ‘Copyright and The Visual Artist’s Display Right: A New Doctrinal 
Analysis’ (1984 – 1985) 9 Columbia VLA Journal of Law and Arts. 
140 See P. Goldstein Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2003) Goldstein contends that copyright law is a direct 
response to Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in 1450 which made it possible for many 
copies of written works to be reproduced. A. Moore Intellectual Property & Information Control: 
Philosophic Foundations and Contemporary Issues (London: Transaction  Publishers, 2001) p. 1. 
Moore equates the invention of the Gutenberg press with Darwin’s theory of evolution and 
Pasteur’s germ theory of disease.  
141 Goetzl and. Sutton, supra note 139.  
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concerning the droit de suite. Goetzl & Sutton state that the purpose of the 
‘Gutenberg Model’ was to protect the print industry by allowing publishers 
protect the revenues derived from print copies. The ‘Follow Up Model’ on the 
other hand protects the use of the ‘expression embodied in the work’, therefore 
attaching an economic value to the display and performance right. The authors 
note that: 
 
‘[d]istinct collateral bodies of law have evolved for each model as a 
result of the differing requirements, functions, and policy consideration of 
the two models. When these collateral principles are removed from the 
context of one model and are applied to the other model, disastrous 
consequences result.’  
 
In the context of the droit de suite the authors assert that by focusing on the 
resale of the original copy, commentators have inadvertently framed the resale of 
the work as a function of the Gutenberg Model, which has resulted in opponents 
concluding that the principle of exhaustion forecloses such a right.142 Instead the 
authors conceive of the droit de suite as a private display of a work of visual art 
and therefore a function of the Follow-Up Model.143 Before critically evaluating 
this proposition it is useful to understand the historical legal development of both 
these rights models.   
                                                           
142 See A. Bussey ‘The Incompatibility of Droit de Suite with Common Law Theories of 
Copyright’ Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal (2013) 23, p. 
1089; G. Robinson ‘Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants (1991) 
Columbia Law Review p. 568; Price, supra note 55; See also J. D. Stanford ‘Economic Analysis 
of the Droit de Suite – The Artist’s Resale Royalty’ (2003) 42 (4) Blackwell Australian Economic 
Papers, p. 389, ‘Whether the right creates an anomaly in copyright or is a use ‘proper’, changing 
the source of the royalty from a use/exploitation to a substitution in ownership ‘… extends 
copyright for visual artists well beyond anything available to other creators of copyrightable 
works.’ 
143 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 19.  
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From the formal inception of copyright under the charter of the Stationers’ 
Company in 1557144 until 1833145 when the UK146 granted playwrights a right of 
public performance, the nature of copyright was exclusively a publisher’s right to 
print. The system was designed to stabilize the English book trade and to guard 
against unfair competition.147 Its primary concern was to protect book publishers 
from the unauthorised reproduction of a manuscript to which they had acquired 
the rights.148 This focus on the protection of the ‘copy’ continued even after the 
author was granted copyright protection under the Statute of Anne in 1709.149  
 
The model was primarily influenced by the interests of publishers, which in turn 
limited the scope of rights afforded to authors.  For example, the publisher was 
not concerned with abridgements or translations150 of the work because these did 
not interfere with their exploitation of the ‘copy’. Protecting the publisher from 
                                                           
144 See C. Blagden The Stationers Company: A History, 1403 – 1959 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1960). 
145 See Dramatic Literary Property Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will.IV, c.15 ‘This piece of legislation 
marks the first occasion on which the legislature provided the author of a work, in this case the 
dramatic manuscript, with two exclusive economic rights - the reproduction right (conferred by 
previous legislation such as the Copyright Act 1814) and the public performance right (conferred 
by the 1833 Act). The Act also illustrates the influence of continental models for protecting 
dramatic performances, in particular French and Belgian, on developments in Britain. After the 
Act was passed, the first British copyright licensing agency, the Dramatic Authors Society, was 
established.’ See R. Deazley ‘Commentary on Dramatic Literary Property Act 1833’ (2008) in L. 
Bently and M. Kretschmer eds. Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900) 
www.copyrighthistory.org 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord?id=commentary_uk_1833> 
(date accessed: 11 July 2017).  
146 The Act of Union 1801.  
147 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 22. 
148 Ibid.   
149 Statute of Anne 1709, also known as the Copyright Act 1710, The act is numbered as 8 Ann. 
c. 21 in The Statutes of the Realm (published 1810–25), based on the original Parliament Rolls; 
but as 8 Ann. c. 19 in Ruffhead's Statutes at Large (published 1763–65; and later editions), based 
on the copies of acts enrolled in Chancery. 
150 For a brief discussion of early English cases that refused to extend protection to abridgements 
and translations see C. Wallace ‘Overlapping Interests in Derivative Works and Complilations’ 
(1984) 35 (1) Case Western Reserve Law Review p. 109 fn. 50; see also L. R. Patterson, ‘Private 
Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered’ (1975) 28 Vanderbilt Law 
Review, p. 1188. 
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unfair competition only required protection of the form which the original work 
took – the book – and not the content of the work; i.e. the expression of the 
author’s ideas in a set form.151 Therefore the author did not enjoy an exclusive 
right to control the exploitation of the work in all its forms. Since the publisher’s 
interest in the ‘copy’ was secured through the protection of its sale, the 
publisher’s interest naturally terminated upon sale.152 Control over the work after 
the first sale could not be justified within traditional notions of property law.153 
Exhausting the publisher’s interest after the first sale provided an adequate 
balance between the property rights of publishers and that of the public. Had the 
doctrine of ‘first sale’ or ‘exhaustion’154 not developed it would have proved 
impossible to effectively balance the competing rights of authors and society. 
Nimmer notes that ‘[a]t this point the policy favouring a copyright monopoly for 
authors gives way to the policy opposing restraint of trade and restraints on 
alienation.’155 The doctrine of exhaustion therefore had a significant influence on 
the application of the reproduction right to a wide variety of subject matter that 
fell under the copyright umbrella.   
 
For instance, the doctrine historically prevented many creators such as 
playwrights and composers from benefiting from the economic value that lay in 
                                                           
151 See for example Justice Aston in Millar v. Taylor, Eng. Rep. 44 [1769] at 226: ‘… I am of the 
opinion that the publication of a composition does not give away the property in the words; but 
the right of copy still remains in the author: and that no more passes to the public, from the free 
will and consent of the author, than an unlimited use of every advantage that the purchaser can 
reap from the doctrine and sentiments which the work contains. He may improve upon it, imitate 
it, translate it; oppose its sentiments: but he buys no right to publish the identical work. (emphasis 
added). 
152 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 24. 
153 Bussey, supra note 142, at p. 1089. 
154 The principle of exhaustion is an established international legal doctrine. It provides that a 
copyright owner’s right to control copies of their work ‘exhausts’ on its first sale by the copyright 
owner or with their consent. For further see Article 4, InfoSoc Directive.  
155 2 Nimmer on Copyright § 8.12[A] (1980).  
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the performance of their work. 156  In the theatrical arts when a playwright wrote 
a play, it was generally purchased outright by an acting company and became its 
exclusive property.157 Publication of the play in multiple copies for distribution 
was considered ‘bad box office’ by the companies and therefore an event to be 
avoided.158 At that time publishers registered works with the Stationer’s 
Company in order to secure an exclusive right of reproduction. Conversely, the 
theatre company’s registration of plays was not to reproduce and sell copies but 
to prevent others from distributing pirated copies that would adversely affect 
ticket sales.159 The first legislative enactment in Europe to protect a dramatic 
composition can be seen in the French Revolutionary laws of 1793 and in the UK 
and Ireland in 1833 under the Dramatic Literary Property Act.160 These Acts 
represented the first moves within copyright to protect the performance right. 
Goetzl & Sutton define the performance right as ‘the right to exploit the aesthetic 
use of the expression embodied in a work… .’ 161 In the UK and Ireland these 
rights of performance were extended to musical compositions in 1842.162 
 
                                                           
156 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at pp. 25 - 26. ‘Gutenberg Model ill-served the theatrical 
and visual arts … while particularly suited to the literary arts, (and to a lesser extent the musical 
arts) [it] proved either useless or of minimal value to those art forms whose economic potential 
lay in performance, or display or which adapt poorly to multiple reproduction.’ 
157 H. Gibson, The Shakespeare Claimants: A Critical Survey of the Four Principal Theories 
Concerning the Authorship of the Shakespearean Plays (London: Routledge, 1962) p. 265. A 
playwright could expect to be paid approximately six pounds for the manuscript of a new play. 
M. Marchette, Shakespeare of London (Canada: Dutton, 1949) p. 118.  
158 G. Harrison Introduction to Shakespeare (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Pelican 
Books, 1939) p. 205 - 206, see also A.W. Pollard and J. Dover Wilson Shakespeare Problems 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) p 36 – 37.  
159 A.W. Pollard and J. Dover Wilson Shakespeare Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967) p. 35.  
160 See Deazley, supra note 145. ‘This piece of legislation marks the first occasion on which the 
legislature provided the author of a work, in this case the dramatic manuscript, with two 
exclusive economic rights - the reproduction right (conferred by previous legislation such as the 
Copyright Act 1814) and the public performance right (conferred by the 1833 Act). The Act also 
illustrates the influence of continental models for protecting dramatic performances, in particular 
French and Belgian, on developments in Britain. 
161 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 27.  
162 See the Literary Copyright Act 1842. For further information see R. Clark and S. Smyth 
Intellectual Property Law in Ireland 3rd ed. (West Sussex: Tottel Publishing, 2005) p. 225.  
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This new departure from the ‘Gutenberg Model’ represented a significant shift in 
the scope of rights afforded to authors: 
 
‘From its beginning, the new follow-up right had one aspect that marked 
a total departure from the Gutenberg Model. The first sale doctrine was 
not applicable. The new right to exploit the use of the expression 
embodied in a specific copy of a work survived the sale of the copy. 
Thus, the economic value of the aesthetic use of the expression was 
effectively separated from the economic value of an individual copy in 
which that expression was embodied.’163 
 
It is evident from the foregoing that like the playwright of old, the reproduction 
right fails to provide visual artists with adequate reimbursement for their work. 
This is because, for this mode of expression, the intangible and tangible elements 
of the work are indissolubly linked. Goetzl & Sutton, posit that rather than 
viewing the droit de suite as a reproduction right, it should be viewed as a 
follow-up right which follows the display of the work to new audiences, similar 
to the performance of a play or musical composition.  
 
The authors distinguish the droit de suite as an exception to the Gutenberg Model 
and instead draw an analogy between it, as a display right, and the right of public 
performance. Similarly Katzenberg views the droit de suite as an exploitation of 
the work because ‘a new circle of users’ are provided with a ‘perfect enjoyment’ 
                                                           
163 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 28. 
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of the work which can only be accomplished through the resale.164 Sky contends 
that the transfer of ownership is a use in itself because a new audience is exposed 
to the work.165 Hauser also alludes to this distinction when she refers to the 
inherent value in the droit de suite lying in the process of perception and viewing 
rather than in the act of resale. By refocusing on the subsequent display of the 
work to new audiences rather than on the act of re-sale to a new buyer, Goetzl & 
Sutton have presented an alternative theoretical underpinning for the droit de 
suite which has the potential to present a more doctrinally sound link between 
theory and practice.  The droit de suite is therefore a response to the nature of the 
use. 
 
Goetzl & Sutton contend that many of the criticisms of the droit de suite are in 
fact based on a misconception of the right’s doctrinal basis: 
 
‘While the droit de suite is phrased in terms of the resale of the material 
copy, it is, in actuality, the private display of the work to a new 
purchaser, his or her family, and social acquaintances that is the 
commensurable event. The resale is merely a convenient measure of that 
event. As such, it both signals a new private display has begun and 
quantifies the value of that new experiential event. Thus, under the droit 
de suite, the purchaser of a work of visual art obtains two interests in the 
work: (1) absolute possession of the material object, and (2) a license for 
its private display. At the first sale, the license can be thought of as 
                                                           
164 P. Katzenberg ‘The Droit de Suite in Copyright Law’ (1973) 4 International Law Review of 
Industrial Property & Copyright, pp. 365 - 368.  
165 C. Sky ‘Report of the Register of Copyrights Concerning Droit de suite, the Artist's Resale 
Royalty: a Response (1993) 40 Journal of the Copyright Society U.S.A. pp. 315 - 316.  
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“implied” since the licensing fee is included in the purchase price. At the 
time of subsequent transfers, renewal of the display licence fee becomes 
due.166 
Conceptualising the droit de suite as a performance right does not generally fit 
with conventional performance based modes of expression – dance, theatre, film, 
opera etc. and contradicts many commentators who have traditionally viewed the 
droit de suite as an exception to the right of reproduction or performance, 
nevertheless conceptualising it as a private display right under the follow-up 
model is arguably more justifiable. The droit de suite simply ‘follows’ 
subsequent exploitations of the work similar to the performance right for 
playwrights. Conceiving of the right as such corresponds with Sherman’s view 
that the public comprehend and appreciate the visual arts through the medium of 
viewing as opposed to reading or listening. The public’s mode of internalisation 
is therefore the event that author’s rights ought to exploit. In a similar fashion to 
how authors and composers exploit the inherent value in their mode of 
expression, visual artists ought to be able to exploit the display of their work. 
Conceptualising the droit de suite as an economic right within the follow-up 
model certainly answers many of the criticisms faced by the droit de suite.167 In 
support of this view, De Pierredon-Fawcett argues that ‘… just as author’s rights 
enable a writer to exploit economically the process by which his work is most 
effectively communicated, i.e. reading, … the droit de suite, will allow the artist 
to exploit the best process for communicating his work, i.e. viewing.’168 De 
                                                           
166 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 51. 
167 See generally Chapter 3, Section 3.4, p. 155 - 173.  
168 De Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at 157 also recognises that this argument militates in 
favour of an exhibition fee. Quoting Schmoll: ‘It should be pointed out that there are basic 
differences between authors and artists. The right of the playwright is concerned with the hearing 
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Pierredon-Fawcett therefore concludes that ‘… the transfer of ownership of an 
original work of art is an exploitation of the work from the standpoint of author’s 
rights.’169  The transfer of the original work allows new audiences to experience 
the work in ‘…its most perfect expression’.170  
 
In addition, Goetzl and Sutton’s view that the droit de suite acts as a sort of 
implied licence presents an answer to Plaisant’s opinion that the droit de suite is 
unlike other authors’ rights in that it negates author consent which pre-disposes 
most acts of exploitation.  Conceiving of the right as an implied licence, granted 
at the point of first sale, provides a novel form of limited consent for future acts 
of resale. Furthermore, future royalties may be justified on the grounds that such 
a licence has been implicitly granted. The implicit grant of a licence is not 
unknown within EU copyright law, and for that matter exists in many other 
jurisdictions.171 For instance, private levies exist where it is understood that users 
will make private copies of the work for personal use. Similarly, under the 
display conceptualisation, the resale right acknowledges a private right to display 
the work and to allow others to view it. These licensing levies are an exception to 
the right of reproduction but from a policy perspective balance the rights of 
creators, to control the subsequent use of their work, with the rights of users to 
                                                           
or performance of his work and not with successive sales of the object conveying the idea. 
Authors of dramatic or lyric works delight the mind through the sense of hearing while painters 
and sculptors give pleasure through the sense of sight. An artist’s right, which corresponds 
exactly with an author’s right, would therefore be a right concerned exclusively with the viewing 
of the works, just as the authors have a right to the performance of their works. It could take the 
form of a percentage of the receipts at exhibitions.’ (De Pierredon-Fawcett Translation). 
169 Ibid. at p. 28. 
170 On this point, see J. Batta, Legal Director of the Artistic Fund of Hungary, Le droit de suite en 
Hongrie, CISAC Document, CJL/80/139 (Mar. 1980).  
171 See M. Kretschmer Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An empirical study of copyright 
levies in Europe (UK IPO Report) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-
copying-and-fair-compensation> (date accessed: 12 July 2017).  
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fully enjoy these works, and society’s right to access such works for purposes of 
education and criticism.172  
 
Concluding on this point, conceiving of the droit de suite – artists resale right – 
as a display right with an attached implied licence acknowledges the unique 
nature of art. Because the tangible and intangible elements of the work are 
indissolubly linked it is only logical that future users ought to seek consent from 
the artist for the use of his expression as embodied in the work. The resale right 
as an implied licence provides this consent. In this manner, Plaisant’s criticism 
that the droit de suite lacks the consent element of other author’s rights is 
answered. This results in a conceptual migration from tradition doctrine which 
views the resale right as a reproduction ‘type’ right which follows the physical 
work rather than the exploitation of the creative work.  Under the follow-up 
model the resale right follows the use of the artist’s artistic expression – i.e. its 
display.  From this perspective, the resale right enjoys a stronger legal basis than 
previous conceptions based on the reproduction model and clarifies the true 
exploitative nature of the resale right.   
 
3.5 Reviewing the Social Security Function of the Historic Droit de Suite 
 
As previously noted, a primary question that this thesis attempts to answer is 
whether a contemporary artists’ resale rights model is capable of performing a 
social welfare function? 
 
                                                           
172 Ibid.   
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At the ‘crux of the debate’ surrounding the droit de suite is the idea that it is a 
form of welfare.173 Becker is of the opinion that ‘… the droit de suite does not 
lend itself to being an instrument of social security …’ and ‘… is not suited to the 
function of wealth redistribution …’174 whereas for others, the resale right is 
defined by its ‘social character’.175 During the early 20th century proponents for 
the droit de suite, such as Hess and Ferry, were at pains to express that it was not 
‘alms for the poor’ that they sought but fair compensation.176  Nevertheless, the 
notion of the ‘starving artist’177 became forever entwined with the concept of the 
droit de suite, thus resulting in an implicit narrative within the discourse that 
suggests a right, which is part author’s right, part charity.178 Such a 
characterisation has provoked stringent criticisms from commentators179 who 
                                                           
173 Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 41. See also Ricketson supra note 1, at p. 12, ‘Much 
of the early argument in favour of RRR was presented simply in terms of a humanitarian concern 
for the plight of poor starving artists, seeing it as a means of securing for them and their families 
some form of social security during and after the artists’ lifetime.’ 
174 Becker et al, supra note 66, at p. 32; E. Hudson and S. Waller ‘Droit de Suite Down Under: 
Should Australia Introduce a Resale Royalties Scheme for Visual Artists?’ (2004) 115 University 
of Melbourne Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper, Media & Arts Law Review (2005) 
1(10) p. 15; Noting that copyright ‘… was never intended to act as a vehicle for the equitable 
redistribution of wealth.’ See also N. Kawashima ‘The droit de suite controversy revisited: 
context, effects and the price of art’ (2006) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly p. 226; citing the 
opponents of the right – ‘copyright law is … primarily concerned with the provision of economic 
incentives for the creation and dissemination of works, but not to serve as a social security 
measure for artists.’ 
175 Becker et al, supra note 66, at p. 32. 
176 De Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 8, at p. 19; citing Hess and A. Ferry Journal Officiel, 
Parliamentary Documents, Chamber of Deputies, Ordinary Session, second sitting of January 23, 
1914, Annex 3423 at 150.  ‘It is not alms we seek, but a property right.’  
177 For an alternative take on the concept of the starving artist see J. Goins Real Artists Don’t 
Starve: Timeless Strategies for Thriving in the New Creative Age (Nashville: Harper Collins, 
2017). 
178 See R. Plaisant – ‘The Droit de Suite’ General Studies - Copyright (1969):  Monthly Review of 
the United Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) pp. 159 – 160; Plaisant 
admits that the resale right may be ‘an historical phenomenon’ with no apparent justification in 
copyright theory. It was enacted to satisfy a specific need – the starving artist – and the resulting 
maintenance element of the right is perhaps its trump card and most legitimate raison d’être. And 
hence why it should be restricted to the author and his imminent relations. 
179 Ibid. at p. 169; ‘… the theoretical grounds for this right are debatable and its maintenance 
aspect is in the abstract, a disturbing factor.’ At p. 159 ‘The ambiguity embodied in the droit de 
suite arises out of the fact that on the one hand it is one aspect of the droit de d’Autuer and on the 
other hand it has traditionally provided a form of maintenance which explains its inalienability.’  
E. Alderman ‘Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien Concept’ 
(1992 – 1993) 40 J. Copyright Society U.S.A., p. 279; noting that royalties are an inappropriate 
mechanism to reallocate wealth to struggling artists. Goetzl and Sutton, supra note 139, at p. 258; 
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note that in situations where the right provides a welfare entitlement it functions 
more like a tax on property rights than as an author’s right.180 This in turn, has to 
some extent, undermined the legitimacy of the right.181  
 
Before questioning whether the artists’ resale right ought to provide some form 
of social security for visual artists it is instructive to review the French droit de 
suite which encompassed such a welfare function. Interestingly, France, the 
historical home of the droit de suite, has removed any welfare ideations from 
their resale rights model, transferring responsibility of this function to the 
national social security system. This evidences a complete evolution in the 
ideology and application of a right that was borne out of a social desire to aid 
needy artists. The removal of a welfare function from the French model supports 
Becker’s contention that the droit de suite is ill suited to this duality of purpose.  
 
3.5.1 The Droit de Suite and the Welfare State in 19th Century France 
 
As previously noted in section 3.3, the latter part of the 19th and early 20th 
century saw repeated attempts by advocates of the droit de suite to secure the 
enactment of the right into French Law. One such advocate, the Société des Amis 
du Luxemburg described the droit de suite as an ‘additional fee’ which would be 
levied against the sales of fine art.182 At that time both Schmoll183 and Bérard184 
                                                           
states that the droit de suite was never intended as welfare legislation. Kawashima supra note 
174; citing the opponents of the right – ‘copyright law is … primarily concerned with the 
provision of economic incentives for the creation and dissemination of works, but not to serve as 
a social security measure for artists,’ Ricketson, supra note 1; proffers that the right may be 
nothing more than ‘sentimentalism’. 
180 Price supra note 55, at p. 1336. 
181 Ibid. at p. 1335. 
182 Article 1 of that draft referred to the then pre-existing 10% levy, see France Avant-Projets de 
loi, Droit d’Author (1907), as cited by De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 21 fn. 91. 
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characterised this ‘additional fee’ as a tax on sales and notably this 
characterisation has been a recurring theme in the literature.185  However it is 
questionable whether the tax analogy fully fits the form that the droit de suite 
took under the 1920 Act. De Pierredon-Fawcett is critical of the tax 
characterisation and notes that early references to the droit de suite as a tax 
confuse the right with the old French ‘levy for the poor’ which taxed the ticket 
price of theatre seats.186  
 
To assess whether the droit de suite and the old French ‘levy for the poor’ fit the 
tax analogy it is useful to compare both to the characteristics of a tax. According 
to Recht, a tax is defined by the fact that it is ‘… collected by authority of the 
state and allocated to a public service.’187 In the case of the old French ‘Levy for 
the poor’, after the levy had been collected it was allocated specifically to 
charities established to benefit artists. The fundamental difference between the 
‘levy for the poor’ and the droit de suite is that the levy was used to form a social 
fund, which subsequently distributed funds to needy artists/entertainers.188 The 
droit de suite on the other hand was initially collected from auction house sales 
                                                           
183 M. Schmoll ‘la Lanterne’ August 8 (1909) as cited by L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, 
at p. 21, fn. 92. 
184 Bérard, 1919 J.O Chambre des Députés, Doc. Parl., NO. 2, annexe 6764, Session of 
September 2, 1919, ‘… if you sell that work in a public sale, and since you are giving a share to 
the State and another to the auctioneer, you will also provide a modest wage to the one who 
created the wealth that is in your hands. The artist will collect in the same fashion as the tax 
authorities.’ Cited by L. Malaplate, Le Droit d’Auteur 63 et seq (1931) (Thesis, Paris), 
Duchemin, supra note 86, at p. 126 ‘the law of 1920, under the head of the droit de suite, imposes 
a special tax on public sales of works of art’, cited by Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 21 - 
22.  
185 Price, supra note 55, at p. 1336; Merryman supra note 104, at p. 256. Asimow, supra note 
104, goes further calling it a ‘bad tax’ ‘… it interferes seriously with the market, produces 
negligible revenue, [and] is costly to administer … .’ 
186 De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 22 citing the French Law of ‘7 Frimaire V’. 
187 Recht, supra note 110, p. 65; See Also V. Ginsburgh ‘What is wrong with droit de suite: The 
economic arguments’ Universite Libre de Bruxelles and Center for Operations Research and 
Econometrics, Louvain August (1996) p. 3, Price, supra note 55, at p. 1336; Rub, supra note 104, 
at p. 5, Edelson, supra note 104, at p. 260. 
188 See De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 22. 
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and distributed to individual artists or their estate. Based on this definition the 
‘levy for the poor’ clearly operated as a tax, in that it served a public service by 
creating a social fund to benefit artists. The droit de suite on the other hand 
served a private function, sharing many of the characteristics of a royalty.189 This 
direct link between the exploitation of the work and the channelling of royalties 
back to the artist places the droit de suite squarely within the author’s rights 
rubric. Nevertheless, if the droit de suite was to be administered in such a 
manner that it served a public function – similar to the ‘levy for the poor’ – then 
that fact would certainly challenge this presumption.   
 
In 1957 the French legislature extended the droit de suite to include gallery 
sales,190 the market for which was estimated to be four times larger than that of 
auction sales.191 Despite this apparent victory for visual artists an implementation 
decree never followed and accordingly the droit de suite was never extended to 
gallery sales.192 Previously, these sales had been excluded because it was thought 
that their inclusion created ‘administrative challenges’ and presented a ‘risk of 
non-compliance’.193 Nimmer, to the contrary asserts that this failure was 
politically orientated and ‘… that the real difficulty [lay] not in administration 
                                                           
189 In that there being a direct link between the exploitation of the work and the artist’s reward. 
190 Fr. Copyright Statute: Law Number 57 - 298 of March 11, 1957, as amended by law Number 
85 - 660 of July 3, 1985, reprinted in L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8, at p. 225.  
191 The Register of Copyrights of the United States of America ‘The Droit de Suite: The Artist’s 
Resale Royalty’ (A Report of the Register of Copyrights), p. 22 citing a letter from Gérard 
Champin, President, Chambre Nationale des Comissaires Priseurs (September 30, 1992).  
192 Ibid. at p. 22 - 23; Plaisant, supra note 109, at p. 21. Plaisant notes that it was a deadlock 
between the French Parliament and Administration which prevented an implementation decree 
from being enacted. Apparently, the authors’ societies exerted influence, on this matter, over the 
Parliament while the ‘merchants’ representatives had influence over the Administration. This 
clearly shows just how political, rather than legal, the issue was for France.   
193 The Register of Copyrights of the United States of America, supra note 191. See also J. 
Merryman and A.E. Elsen Law Ethics and the Visual Arts 4th ed. (London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1987) p. 214 - ‘It has also been asserted that the French Executive opposes 
extension to dealer sales, and therefore refuses to issue regulations, while parliament favours 
authors and will not abrogate the extension.’ 
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but rather in the persuasiveness of the art dealers’ lobby.’194 If that were the end 
of the matter then the debate around the nature of the droit de suite, at least in 
this current context, may have quietened. However, subsequent to the signing 
into law of the 1957 bill a compromise was reached between the artists’ 
collecting societies and the art gallery representatives.195 This agreement 
stipulated that French galleries would pay an employer’s ‘social security 
subscription’ to the artist’s branch of the national social security fund196 – even 
though artists were not gallery employees. The subscription was not based upon 
qualifying droit de suite sales but instead upon a percentage of the gallery’s gross 
income.197 This represented a new departure for the droit de suite. While 
previously the right attached to the exploitation or use of a work, much like the 
right of reproduction or performance, this novel application moved the right ever 
closer to Recht’s description of a tax: ‘… collected by authority of the state and 
allocated to a public service.’ In this instance, the provision of funds to ‘needy 
artists’ represented a form of welfare entitlement and therefore satisfies Recht’s 
public service criterion. Despite this, Gutton, cautioned against confusing 
author’s rights with social security mechanisms, the ‘ … droit de suite is not a 
welfare measure, but a means of enabling artists to obtain their rightful share in 
the proceeds of resale.’198 This proposition however is open to challenge. Firstly, 
a welfare entitlement is generally characterised by a redistribution of resources 
from one section of society to another in order to address certain socio-economic 
                                                           
194 Nimmer, supra note 50, at p. 3. 
195 The Register of Copyrights of the United States of America, supra note 191, at p. 23. Note 
that McAndrew and Dallas-Conte ‘Implementing Droit de Suite (artists’ resale right) in England’ 
p. 33, state that this agreement was reached in 1954.  
196 The Register of Copyrights of the United States of America, supra note 191, at p. 23. 
197 Ibid. at p. 23 - fn 86, citing a telephone interview with Jean-Marc Gutton, Director General of 
ADAGP (Association for the Defence of Graphic and Plastic Arts) July 30, 1992.  
198 Ibid. at p. 23 - fn 87 (statement of Jean-Marc Gutton at a public hearing in New York, March 
6 1992, of the US Registry for Copyrights) ‘Droit de suite should not be considered as a capital 
gains tax, but as an artist’s right which it is normal for them to receive.’  
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inequalities.199 The redistribution of resources is usually performed via the 
mechanism of taxation. Much like ‘the levy for the poor’, the functioning of the 
droit de suite, as it related to gallery sales, served this redistributive function 
perfectly by taking a percentage of revenues from wealthy art market 
professionals (AMPs) trading in fine art – galleries – and redistributing these 
revenues to needy artists. In this limited context, the uncoupling of the 
exploitation of the work, from the derived financial reward of the artist, placed 
the droit de suite outside the strictures of the French authors’ rights system. The 
droit de suite as it applied to gallery sales, during this period, therefore fell 
squarely within Recht’s ‘public service’ criterion and accordingly acted as a form 
of social welfare.  
 
Ginsburgh notes that in such circumstances where the right provides any form of 
social security, it should no longer be classed as an intellectual property right. 
The levy enforced by resale rights systems ‘… may be socially desirable and its 
implementation loaded with good intentions, but it is no longer an intellectual 
[property] right, and intellectual [property] rights should not be taken as an 
excuse for social security contributions … .’ 200  
 
Nevertheless, it is not wholly clear whether the droit de suite as it applied to 
gallery sales at that time fully satisfies Recht’s first criterion; ‘collected by 
authority of the state.’ Arguably, this arrangement between the French collective 
                                                           
199 Although according to the US Supreme Court, ‘[a] tax, in the general understanding of the 
term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the government 
[and] has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from one group for the 
benefit of another. See United States v. Butler U.S. 1, 61 (1936). In Bus v. Sebelius 132 Supreme 
Court 2566, 2594 (2012) it was said that the ‘essential feature of any tax’ is that ‘it produce some 
revenues for the Government.’ These views do not necessarily reflect a European conception of 
tax.  
200 V. Ginsburgh, supra note 107, at p. 68. 
 181 
management organisations (CMOs) and the art dealer’s association was nothing 
more than a ‘gentleman’s agreement.’201 In circumstances where implementation 
measures had not been enacted the galleries were in effect making these 
contributions of their own volition. However, it must be remembered that the 
1957 amendment to the ‘French Copyright Act’ extended the application of the 
droit de suite to gallery sales.202 While the galleries de jure obligations were in 
utero, the galleries representatives seized the opportunity to negotiate a scheme 
of arrangement that appeased the CMO’s while securing terms for their members 
that were potentially less onerous than those about to come to fruition. It could 
be argued that the CMO’s compromise was a tacit acknowledgment of the ‘states 
authority’ and in this regard completes Recht’s concept of a tax.   
 
In any case, this analysis is perhaps moot because in 1965 the arrangement was 
enshrined in Law. Funds collected from the galleries were now recognised under 
legislation as forming a social security fund, management of which passed, under 
legislative authority, to Maison des Artistes.203 The Maison des Artistes, which is 
a social security society, continues to collect this welfare entitlement on behalf of 
qualifying artists.204 One important observation concerning the French system is 
that the visual artists’ welfare entitlement – which originated as a ‘tax’ on gallery 
sales in lieu of the droit de suite – is no longer connected to the French droit de 
                                                           
201 See Oxford Dictionary of English, Angus Stevenson ed. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) p. 722 ‘ An arrangement or understanding which is based upon the trust of both or 
all parties, rather than being legally binding.’  
202 Supra note 190.  
203 In 1965 a decree was passed by French legislators to allow the Maison des Artistes to manage 
the social security fund. See decree dated September 23, 1965 and March 30, 1978. The 
organisation was established in 1952. See <http://www.lamaisondesartistes.fr/site/la-maison-des-
artistes-2/> (date accessed: 12 July 2017).  
204 CPAM (Caisse Primaire d'Assurance Maladie) The primary French health insurer then 
distributes this money to visual arts. See author’s correspondence with Maison des Artistes 
February 2016.  
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suite, instead this entitlement is administered under the French social insurance 
system.205 The clear separation of the welfare function, from the IP function in 
France today is telling in that it may reflect over a century of steadfast opposition 
to the classification of the resale right as a tax,206 or perhaps in the alternative, 
the separation was simply a matter of practical convenience.207 Nevertheless, the 
policy choice to separate these divergent functions reflects Becker’s view that 
‘… the droit de suite does not lend itself to being an instrument of social 
security’, and that this function is the proper remit of social security systems.208 
On a related note, Ginsburgh questions whether the resale right is an ‘equitable’ 
means of redistributing income, and asks if there are other more viable and less 
disruptive alternatives?209 Indeed this separation perhaps comprises a more 
satisfactory and efficient realisation of the aims of the original proponents of the 
droit de suite. Perhaps the droit de suite was never capable of providing a social 
welfare net for visual artists and that this objective is correctly placed outside of 
authors’ rights circles and firmly within the purview of national social security 
institutions? A review of the German and Norwegian systems in Chapter 5 will 
inform this analysis.  
 
                                                           
205 Author’s correspondence with ADAGP and Maison des Artistes. 
206 Duchemin, supra note 86, at p. 271 as cited by De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 8 at p. 149 - 
fn 5.  J. Gutton as cited by US Register of Copyright Report (1992), supra note 1, at p. 24.  
207 Plaisant, supra note 109, writing in 1971, notes that the use of the droit de suite as a form of 
welfare was not a novel conception under French law: ‘The proceeds right (although quite 
different from the legal view point) can be compared with a new institution, the Caisse National 
des Lettres, or CNL (National fund for literature). The CNL has been established by a law of 25 
Feb. 1956. The most important revenue of the CNL is a tax, paid according to the rules applicable 
to fiscal taxes (purchase taxe, taxe a la valeur ajoutée). The rate is 10, 20%. This tax is paid by 
any editor whose turnover is over 100,000 frs. Most of this money is spent on paying old age 
pensions to writers, their husbands and widows, and their children. The law of 1920 was enacted 
when the general tendency was to protect people as individuals and not by collective means. It is 
possible to envisage a proceeds right in which monies are paid not to the individual artists but to 
a collective fund, which would disperse pensions, etc.’  
208 Becker et al. supra note 66, at p. 32; Plaisant, supra note 109, at p. 3.  
209 V. Ginsburgh, supra note 107, at p. 3. 
 183 
Today, French galleries continue to pay a percentage of their revenues to the 
Maison des Artistes.210 Under the Artists’ Resale Right Directive all re-sales 
involving ‘… sellers, buyers or intermediaries art market professionals, such as 
salesrooms, art galleries and, in general, any dealers in works of art’ are liable to 
pay. Accordingly, gallery sales in France are now subjected to a form of double 
taxation in the form of a social security contribution and an artists’ resale royalty. 
A review of EU member states social security systems is beyond the scope of 
this thesis however assuming that this is not the norm in other EU member states, 
this double taxation places French galleries at a distinct disadvantage in 
comparison to other art market intermediaries, while admittedly greatly 
enhancing the position of qualifying artists.  
 
3.6 Conclusion   
 
It can be concluded from the foregoing that when compared to writers and 
composers, copyright law traditionally disadvantages visual artists because of the 
nature of their work: the tangible and intangible elements being indissoluble. 
One of the purposes of the ARR Directive is to redress this imbalance. All things 
being equal – regarding member states implementation measures – the ARR 
Directive has the capacity to reduce the earnings disparity between these 
creators. However the current ARR Directive predominantly rewards successful 
artists and not emerging or struggling artists.211 While this concern, regarding 
who or what class of creator copyright rewards, does not form part of the 
                                                           
210 Author’s correspondence with the Maison des Artistes, 3 February 2016.  
211 See Chapter 2, p. 132. 
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accepted discourse on copyright law and policy it does form part of the 
underlying historical justification for the artists’ resale right.212  
 
A central question that this thesis addresses is whether the social security 
character engendered in the historic droit de suite has a place within the extant 
ARR Directive. Plaisant observed that the resale right was never at ease within 
traditional copyright rubrics; that it was a ‘historical phenomenon’ enacted to 
satisfy a specific need – the starving artist – and that its ‘maintenance element’ 
represented its most legitimate raison d’être.213 It is this social element that 
historically underpinned the right’s legitimacy and it is to this social focus that 
the ARR Directive ought to embody.  
 
Under a strict utilitarian interpretation of IPRs there is clearly no room for such 
an approach. IPRs reward those creators that society deems valuable and not the 
contrary. However, Waldron offers a less dogmatic approach and suggests that 
‘… in our legal culture, the defense (sic) of intellectual property is seldom cast in 
purely individualistic terms. Officially the justification is supposed to have more 
to do with the social good than with the individual natural rights of authors …’ 
(emphasis added).214 Arguably, by adhering to the strictures of extant EU IP law, 
the ARR Directive, places greater emphasis on ‘form over function’ and in doing 
so places greater importance on the character of the ARR Directive rather than 
focusing on the function that it ought to serve. The distinctly individualistic 
                                                           
212 On the historical justification see Price supra note 55. 
213 Plaisant, supra note 178, at pp. 159 -160. 
214 J. Waldron ‘From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual 
Property (1993) 68 (2) Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review p. 849. Here the author cites cases such as Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 2302, 98 Eng. 
Rep. 201 (1769) and Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burrows 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774) as 
authority for this statement.  
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character of the ARR Directive implicitly undermines the social basis of the 
historic droit de suite and in doing so undermines its raison d’être. If a social 
interpretation reflective of the historic droit de suite is adopted then there are 
potentially legitimate grounds for a social welfare, social security or income 
maintenance component with the extant ARR Directive. Under such a rubric the 
potential liminality of the ARR Directive is brought to the fore and the right may 
be understood as much a social right as an economic right. Framed accordingly 
the ARR Directive is capable of performing a redistributive function, channelling 
a portion of ARR royalties collected into a social fund which could in turn be 
distributed to less successful visual artists. Importantly, this form of 
redistribution is not the ‘Robin Hood in reverse’ that Price conceived of but an 
actual distribution of wealth from visual artists that society values, and therefore 
benefit from the ARR Directive, to visual artists that society has not yet had the 
opportunity to appreciate and arguably may never appreciate.  
 
Nevertheless, the current chapter presents a compelling counter argument to a 
socially oriented, redistributive ARR rubric. It will be remembered that while 
established and often wealthy visual artists receive the greatest share of ARR 
royalties by value, a modest coterie of visual artist benefit from the ARR by 
volume. This finding suggests that the ARR Directive functions efficiently and is 
not in need of reform.215 However, to leave the matter there would ignore the 
vast inequality in terms of distribution between established and nascent career 
visual artists. Again, a socially oriented ARR Directive with an ancillary 
redistributive element may ‘cure’ this shortcoming. Although a pertinent 
                                                           
215 For further see Chapter 2. 
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question in this regard is whether a concern for marginalised and potentially 
‘talentless’ visual artists is a function of the traditional copyright paradigm? 
After all, copyright is not social welfare. Nevertheless, it is this limited and 
contemporary view of copyright that this thesis challenges. Accordingly, Chapter 
4 provides a theoretical basis that supports a socially oriented ARR Directive that 
reflects a less individualistic and historic understanding of the role of copyright.   
 
As to the initial question of whether society values the creators of great works of 
art, it is proposed that an ARR regime that incorporates a social security function 
acknowledges the binary and dependent relationship between visual artists and 
society. The question of whether the inclusion of a social function under the 












                                                           
216 The majority of themes and arguments within this chapter have been published in: A. 
O’Dwyer, ‘The Nature of the Artists’ Resale Right – from antiquity to modernity’ (2017) 1 
Intellectual Property Quarterly. 
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Chapter 4 – Theoretical Framework 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
The content of a society’s law is the product of its political,1 social,2 cultural3 and 
economic institutions.4 Brierly asserts that the law ‘… is only a means to an end, 
and that end is to assist the problems of the society in and for which it exists.5 
For Dias ‘[t]o understand a rule one has to see which social interest gave rise to it 
                                                           
1 T. Hobbes Leviathan (1651) Richard Tuck ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
Hobbes viewed law as an instrument of political sovereignty; According to Cotterell, ‘An 
instrumentalist approach would argue that the determinants of judicial creativity derive from 
outside law or legal doctrine as such – in a variety of policy considerations, social pressures, 
political factors or economic imperatives.’ Here the author is drawing from R. Pound’s 
distinction between sociological and analytical jurisprudence. R. Cotterrell The Politics of 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (London: Butterworths, 1989) p. 156. 
Furthermore, Cotterell at p. 166 links the work of Pound and Dworkin, noting that for these 
authors the ‘hard cases’ (that is, one for which an answer is not given merely by logical 
application of existing rules) are decided by non-legal factors; S. Law ‘Legislation and Politics’ 
in D. Feldman ed. Law in Politics, Politics in Law (Oxford: Hart, 2013) p. 87; the author also 
notes at p. 94 that ‘… most legislation is only passed because those who promote it wish it to 
achieve an objective that has been set for political purposes and promoted in the political arena.’ 
G. Halisi, P. Kaiser and S. Ndegwam ‘Introduction: the multiple meanings of citizenship – rights, 
identity and social justice in Africa’ (1998) 45 (3-4) pp. 337 - 350, ‘… civil society creates 
pressures for political choices and legislatures.’ For Joseph Raz ‘… at the highest philosophical 
abstraction, the doctrine of the nature of law can and should be concerned with explaining law 
within the wider context of social and political institutions.’ See J. Raz Ethics in the Public 
Domain: Essays in the Morality of law and Politics (revised ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
p. 208. 
2 See generally, E. A. Posner Law and Social Norms (London: Harvard University Press, 2002); 
A. Marmor & A. Sarch ‘The Nature of Law’ (2015) Fall ed. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
< http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/lawphil-nature/ > (date accessed: 12 June, 
2017); See also Von Ihering Law as a Means to an End, I. Husik translation (Boston: Boston 
Book Company, 1968) p. 67. For Ihering, law was but an instrument to serve the needs of 
society. ‘Our whole life … [is] a working together for common purposes, in which everyone in 
acting for others acts also for himself, and in acting for himself acts also for other. … Human life 
and social life are synonymous’ See also S. L. Roach Anleu Law and Social Change 2nd ed. 
(London: Sage, 2010) p. 9; Dias notes that ‘[t]o understand a rule one has to see which social 
interest gave rise to it and how they were adjusted by the rule. Its interpretation and application 
should seek to ensure that those interests, which the law-maker preferred, shall prevail’ see Dias 
on the Tübingen School of legal philosophy. R.W.M. Dias Jurisprudence 4th ed. (London: 
Buttersworth, 1976) p. 595. 
3 R. Byrne and J.P. McCutcheon The Irish Legal System 4th ed. (Dublin: Tottel Publishing, 2007) 
p. 21.  
4 See generally R. A. Posner Economic Analysis of Law 1st ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1973). 
5 J. L. Brierly The Basis of Obligation in International Law: And Other Papers H. Lauterpacht 
and C. H. M. Waldock eds. (Oxford: Scientia, 1977) p. 72.  
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… .’6 The droit de suite, as it developed in 19th and 20th century France, is 
symptomatic of this interdependence; political impetus to legislate derived from 
a social concern for the plight of the ‘starving artist’.7 Arguably, the 
marginalization of these cultural creators not only threatened the principles of 
Liberté, Egalité and Fraternité, upon which the French Republic and French 
republicanism is built,8 but also the quality and character of French culture 
itself.9 Indeed at the heart of French republicanism lies a communitarian ideal 
that recognises societys obligation to protect its weakest members.10 In a society 
that adopts a more inclusive understanding of citizenship and community, visual 
artists undoubtedly faired better than contemporaries in neighbouring liberal 
jurisdictions where social inclusion was not a political aspiration.   
 
In the general field of copyright one of the most interesting points of analysis  
concerns the contrastive nature of common law copyright and civil law authors’ 
rights. Of specific interest is how these parallel systems developed such radically 
divergent concepts of the author. An example of this divergence is the 
development of moral rights in civil law countries such as France and Germany 
with no apparent historic corollary in common law countries such as Ireland and 
                                                           
6 Dias, supra note 2, at p. 595. 
7 R. Hauser ‘The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the Underprivileged Artist 
under the Copyright Law’ (1962) 11 Copyright Law Symposium, p. 1; R. Plaisant – ‘The Droit de 
Suite’ General Studies - Copyright (1969):  Monthly Review of the United Bureaux for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) pp. 150 - 160 ‘an historical phenomenon’.  For an 
alternative view challenging the idea of the ‘starving artist’ see R. Filer  ‘A Theoretical Analysis 
of the Economic Impact of Artists’ Resale Royalties Legislation’ (1994) 8(1) Journal of Cultural 
Economics, p. 1 - 28. 
8 I. Honohan ‘Freedom as Citizenship: The Republican Tradition in Political Theory’ (2001) 2 
The Republic – A Journal of Contemporary and Historical Debate: ‘The Common Good’ p.7.  
9 R. Filer ‘The ‘Starving Artist’ - Myth or Reality? Earnings of Artists in the United States 
Author(s)’ Journal of Political Economy (1986) 94(1) p. 57. Filer notes, albeit in a contemporary 
context, a general concern that without adequate income, artists might leave the market, thereby 
resulting in the overall impoverishment of society.  
10 H. Dean Social Rights and Human Welfare (London: Routledge, 2015) p. 10. 
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the UK.11 Indeed, it has long been observed that common law copyright 
primarily developed to protect the publisher whereas civil law author’s right 
developed to protect the author first and foremost.12 In this regard, a pertinent 
question concerns the why of this conceptual antithesis. Surely the author ought 
to form the basis of any system that purports to concern itself with the plight of 
the creator?13 This chapter investigates this divergence by looking at the political 
and social environment in which these systems developed: specifically the 
political traditions of liberalism and civic-republicanism.  
 
The chapter suggests that the concept and prominence of the author in civil law 
countries derived directly from the social and political environment in which it 
was conceived. It is proposed that in France the communitarian hue of civic-
republicanism and its apparently competing demands of individualism and 
community brought about rights that both protected the personality of the author 
as well as guaranteeing his place within society. This is in stark contra-
distinction to copy-centric systems borne out of free-market liberalism where the 
                                                           
11 Although the case of Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) EWHC Ch J20, would suggest otherwise. 
In this case the British courts recognised the right of disclosure in circumstances where the 
private letter of Prince Albert had been acquired and published by a publishing house. The Court 
held that the author of such letters had a right to determine if and when they might be published.  
12 See E. Adeney in The Moral Rights of Authors and Performers – An International and 
Comparative Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); see also L. R. Patterson 
Copyright in Historical Perspective’ (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) p. 228.  
13 Gómez-Arostegui states that history sets the ‘default basis’ for copyright –  in relation to 
authors he notes that if copyright originated as a common law right, this suggests that ‘the 
principal purpose was to protect authors’, whereas if it originated as a privilege created by 
statute, this indicates that copyright should principally benefit the public.’ See H. T. Gómez-
Arostegu ‘Copyright at Common Law in 1774’ CREATe Working Paper 2014/16 p. 1, originally 
published in Connecticut Law Review as Copyright at Common Law in 1774, (2014) 47 (1) 
Conneticut Law Review; See also B. Sherman and L. Bently The Making of Modern Intellectual 
Property Law: The British Experience 1760 - 1911 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003) p. 35 - 37, here the authors discuss the idea of the individual as creator and the use of this 
idea by London book sellers to further their ends – i.e. to extend copyright protection for their 
own benefit. In this way the author was portrayed as central to the burgeoning copyright 
paradigm but ultimately played second fiddle. Arguably, what is good for the goose is good for 
the gander and authors were not disadvantaged by the lobby influence of wealthy London 
publishers, irrespective of the limits this placed on their individual agency.  
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protection afforded creators is largely a by-product of commercialism and the 
lobby influence of market actors.14 In the context of creator rights, and 
specifically copyright, where industry actors influence the political and legal 
agenda the voice of the author is almost inevitably lost. This in turn creates a 
legal rights framework where commercialism is placed at the pinnacle of the 
creative rights rubric to the detriment of cultural workers. An underlying theme 
of this thesis is that the extant copyright framework of EU common law 
jurisdictions – such as Ireland and the UK – inadvertently marginalised creators, 
depriving them of the social protection available in other EU member states.  
 
In support of the aforementioned this chapter develops the link between, civic-
republicanism, communitarianism and social citizenship. The common thread 
that these political theories share is that individuals do not exist in isolation and 
are not wholly autonomous but must be seen as members of a socially and 
politically connected community that protects all its members from 
marginalisation. This theme of community, which is a recurring theme of this 
chapter, is explored in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
 
Section 4.4 considers social citizenship which in turn provides a theoretical 
framework through which to analyse the subject matter of section 4.7. That 
section explores three primary justifications for intellectual property rights 
(IPRs)15 as espoused by Locke, Bentham and Hegel. Section 4.6 provides a 
background to these justifications by considering the market failure that 
copyright law attempts to correct.  In the context of the artists’ resale right the 
                                                           
14 See Sherman and Bently supra note 13, at p. 35 - 37. 
15 And by default the artists’ resale right. 
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aforementioned justifications largely prove wanting when viewed in isolation, it 
is therefore argued that a dialectical approach is warranted. Each justification is 
therefore analysed through the framework of social citizenship. A synthesis of 
the aforementioned theories and social citizenship provides a more thorough-
going justification for the artists’ resale right than previously espoused and in 
doing so presents a novel but rigorous theoretical grounding for reform 
proposals.  This dialectic draws heavily from the civil law’s tradition of civic-
republicanism and communitarianism. This is not to say however that this 
dialectical justification is in conflict with the current liberal construction of 
copyright that exists in common law jurisdictions such as Ireland and the UK. 
Indeed, both these legal jurisdictions operate within the context of a ‘mixed 
economy’ or welfare state. Accordingly a ‘mixed’ or combined understanding of 
copyright as both a free-market tool and as a tool of a larger social policy agenda 
is not without merit and is not unprecedented.16 Furthermore, an understanding 
of the artists’ resale right as both an economic right and as a social right is a 
theme returned to throughout this thesis.  
 
Within the overall context of this thesis, Chapter 4 provides a theoretical basis to 
the observations made in Chapter 3 that historically, the historic droit de suite 
provided a form of income security for visual artists. This theoretical framework 
is based upon the dialectic of social citizenship and Hegel’s personality theory, 
which in turn provide the framework upon which the reform proposals of 
Chapter 6 are based. 
 
                                                           
16 For instance, throughout Europe artist tax exemptions and government funding (via Arts 
Councils) fulfil many of the socio-economic deficiencies of the extant copyright rubric. 
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4.1 The Droit de Suite – an Instrument of Social Welfare? 
 
At the crux of the debate surrounding the droit de suite is the idea that it is a 
form of welfare.17 Again, Becker asserts that ‘… the droit de suite does not lend 
itself to being an instrument of social security …’ and ‘… is not suited to the 
function of wealth redistribution.’18 Indeed, the provenance of intellectual 
property rights in common law jurisdictions does not suggest such a link.19 The 
same, however, cannot be said of the droit de suite, the French pre-cursor to 
today’s Artists’ Resale Rights Directive. The socio-political ideologies20 of 19th 
and 20th century France imbued the droit de suite with social values which 
challenged the liberal individualism of the free-market.21 And while the droit de 
suite does not represent nor constitute the character of civil law intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) in their entirety, it does suppose a legal and political 
environment that supports the use of IPRs as a means of achieving social goals.22 
                                                           
17 T. M. Goetzl and S. A. Sutton ‘The Visual Artist’s Display Right’ (1984) 9 (15) Columbia 
Journal of Art and the Law, p. 41.  
18 L. Becker, P. Huber and E. Kronjager (Project Leader: Marlies Hummel) The Droit de Suite 
Report Commissioned by the French Authors’ Society ADAGP, The German Authors’ BILD-
Kunst and the Groupement Européen des Sociétés d’Auteiurs et Compositeurs (GESAC) 
(Munich: IFO Institut, 1995) p. 32; E. Hudson and S. Waller ‘Droit de Suite Down Under: 
Should Australia Introduce a Resale Royalties Scheme for Visual Artists?’ (2004) 115 University 
of Melbourne Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper, Media & Arts Law Review (2005) 
1(10) p. 15 noting that copyright ‘… was never intended to act as a vehicle for the equitable 
redistribution of wealth.’ 
19 See generally, Sherman and Bently supra note 13.  
20 Dion defines political ideology as a ‘… a more or less integrated system of values and norms, 
rooted in society, which individuals and groups project on the political plane in order to promote 
the aspirations and ideals they have come to value in social life.’ See L. Dion ‘Political Ideology 
as a Tool of Functional Analysis in Socio-Political Dynamics – An Hypothesis’ (1959) 25 (1) 
The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue canadienne d'Economique et 
de Science politique, p. 49. 
21 See R. Nozick Anarchy State and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) p. ix. In contrast, 
Biagini notes that for ‘advanced Liberals’ ‘community’ was a crucial concept. See E. F. Biagini 
Citizenship and Community: Liberals, Radicals and Collective Identities in the British Isles, 1865 
- 1931 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) p. 1. 
22 For Durkheim, the prevailing type of law is an indication of the type of society, and changes in 
law signal the nature and type of social change. Accordingly, in this context, the droit de suite 
represented a social concern juxtaposed to early liberal ideology. See S. L. Roach Amleu Law 
and Social Change 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 2010) p. 4. 
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That is not to say that the use of IPRs as a social and political tool is unknown in 
common law jurisdictions. Patents, trademarks, copyright and design rights, all 
attempt to strike a balance between the needs of individual creators and society.23 
The distinction however may be drawn in terms of each of these system’s 
grounding social and political ideologies. Traditionally, this has been presented 
as the struggle between republicanism and liberalism as ideological alternatives. 
These apparently disparate political ideologies undoubtedly informed the 
character and content of common law copyright and civil law authors’ rights 
systems.24 The question therefore is whether, in France, republican ideology 
created a political, social and legal environment in which IPRs such as the droit 
de suite functioned as a tool of social policy? If this is the case then Becker’s 
comments may prove wanting. To address this question, it is necessary to 
explore these alternative ideologies.  
 
The following section explores the competing political ideologies of liberalism 
and civic-republicanism in an attempt to discover whether these ideologies 
influenced the nature and scope of the forebear to the Artists’ Resale Right the 
droit de suite. Based upon these observations the thesis builds the argument for a 
socially constructed artists’ resale right (ARR) regime reflective of its civil law 
origins.  
 
                                                           
23‘Intellectual property as regulation situates intellectual property law beyond the domain of 
individual decision-making and control. Patents, copyrights, trade marks and the other species of 
intellectual property are understood to have a social dimension. They are the means to a social 
end beyond the protection of individual self-interest.’ S. Ghosh, ‘When Property is Something 
Else: Understanding Intellectual Property through the Lens of Regulatory Justice’ in A. 
Gosseries, A. Marciano, and A. Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2008) p. 114. 
24 Raz is acutely aware of the effect that external forces can exert on the internal nature of law; 
‘… because the law thrives in a variety of political and cultural environments, it can have very 
different meanings and moral justifications from country to country.’ Raz, supra note 1, at p. 370. 
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4.2 Two Traditions of Thought: Civic-Republicanism and Liberalism 
 
Tushnet, who cites Locke and Mill, amongst others, as representative of liberal 
political theory defines liberalism as a  
 
‘… psychology [which] posits a world of autonomous individuals, each 
guided by his or her idiosyncratic values and goals, none of which can be 
adjudged more or less legitimate than those held by others. In such a 
world, people exist as isolated islands of individuality who choose to 
enter into relations that can metaphorically be characterized as foreign 
affairs … . In a world of liberal individualism … if one person’s values 
impel that person, for example, to seize the property of another, the 
victim cannot appeal to some supervening principle to which the assailant 
must be committed.’25  
 
Dworkin disagrees with this definition and notes that ‘liberals … are normally 
interested in one another’s fates’ and to suggest that liberals cannot appeal to a 
principle of justice is ‘absurd’.26 Developing upon Dworkin’s objection, Sandel 
defines contemporary liberalism as an ideal which defends a strong notion of 
individual rights, but also demands of its citizens a high measure of mutual 
engagement. It insists on the ‘plurality and distinctness of individuals,’ but also 
requires that we ‘share one another’s fate,’ and view our natural talents as 
common assets.27 Tushnet and Sandel’s definitions arguably represent opposite 
                                                           
25 M. Tushnet ‘Following the Rule Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral 
Principles’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review p. 783. 
26 R. Dworkin Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) pp. 440 - 441.  
27 J. Rawls A Theory of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1971) pp. 101 - 102. 
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ends of the liberal spectrum; Tushnet adopting a very right leaning, 
individualistic view of liberalism while Sandel’s account supposes a liberalism 
cognisant of the importance of the community and not just of the individual.28  
 
In contradistinction to the Anglo-American liberalism upon which the free 
market is said to be based, ‘France continues … to construct a polity around the 
idea of the citizen rather than the consumer.’29 For Arendt, republicans are 
concerned with the ‘liberties of the ancients’ – participation in political 
governance – rather than liberals’ emphasis upon the ‘liberties of the moderns’ – 
personal attachments and projects.30 Fitzpatrick describes republicanism as a 
political philosophy based upon citizenship which is concerned with the ‘public 
good’ and civic virtue rather than private interest.31 Under this political 
philosophy there is a sense of community in which citizens are not just private 
individuals.  
 
According to Honohan: 
 
‘... all republican arguments seem to spring from a sense of the 
ineluctable interdependence of human beings, whose survival and 
flourishing depends on the kind of social frameworks they inhabit, and 
                                                           
28 Biagini, supra note 21, at p. 1; for ‘advanced Liberals’ ‘community’ was a crucial concept. 
29 J. Livesey ‘The Culture and History of French Republicanism: Terror or Utopia? (2001) 2 The 
Republic – A Journal of Contemporary and Historical Debate: ‘The Common Good’ p. 48, 
‘French republicanism has not just been institutionally and culturally successful: after the demise 
of socialism, it is the major, if not the only, intellectual alternative to Anglo-American 
liberalism.’  
30 H. Arendt The Human Condition (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1958). See also T. 
Fitzpatrick Welfare Theory: An introduction to the theoretical debates in social policy 2nd ed. 
(Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) p. 78. See also Benjamin Constant’s contrast between 
‘the liberty of the ancients’ (participation in public power) and the ‘liberty of the moderns’ 
(private enjoyment of independence), B. Constant Political Writings (Cambridge: CUP, 1988). 
31 T. Fitzpatrick New Theories of Welfare (Basingstroke: Palgrave, 2005) p. 13 - 15.  
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who have common, as well as separate and conflicting, interests. The 
political question with which republicans are concerned is what kind of 
freedom is possible in the light of this interdependence, and how it may 
be realised.’32  
 
For Honohan this ‘freedom’ requires political equality and rests on two 
dimensions of active citizenship – civic virtue and political participation – 
citizenship therefore entails responsibilities as well as rights.33 While there are 
many varying conceptions of the republican ideal,34 the focus here will be on the 
French construction as it developed after the French revolution of 1789.35 This 
form of political thought, often referred to as ‘civic-republicanism’, precedes the 
French construction and stretches back to ancient Greece and Rome.36 
 
                                                           
32 Honohan, supra note 8, at p. 7. 
33 Ibid. at p. 8. 
34 Ibid. at p. 7, ‘… there are almost as many hues of republican thought as there are of liberalism, 
socialism or conservatism.’ See also F. O’Ferrall ‘Civic-Republican Citizenship and Voluntary 
Action’ (2001) 2 The Republic – A Journal of Contemporary and Historical Debate: ‘The 
Common Good’ p. 126. ‘Aristotle’s Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics are seminal texts 
originating a body of thought about the citizen and the citizen’s relation to the common good (the 
res publica) and about the republic (or polis) as a community of values. From Aristotle, we can 
trace this body of thought as it develops (and changes with the context) through Cicero in Roman 
times, to the civic humanists and Machiavelli in the Renaissance, to Harrington in the 
seventeenth century, to Rousseau, Montesquieu and Paine in the eighteenth century, down to 
modern civic-republican thought as expressed by Hannah Arendt and, more recently, by Oldfield, 
Dagger and Pettit. Central to this civic republican tradition is the doctrine of ‘uno vivere civile e 
politico’, to use a phrase of Machiavelli, meaning a particular political and civil way of life based 
upon the practice of active citizenship. See also Livesey supra note 29, at p. 51; ‘French 
republicanism was a total departure from the ‘classical’ variety … [c]lassical republicanism was 
not an egalitarian creed. Citizens in the classical tradition were differentiated by their capacity for 
virtu or public service. There was no contradiction between the tenets of classical republicanism 
and the adherence of many of the founding fathers of the United States, including Jefferson, to 
slave-holding. Classical republicanism derived political function from social position. The key 
text of the Atlantic republican tradition, James Harrington’s Oceana, identified the land-holding 
barons as the backbone of the republic. Their material circumstances made them independent and 
incorruptible, therefore they were uniquely suited to the duties of citizenship.’ 
35 See Livesey supra note 29, at p. 48; In this context Livesey notes that ‘[w]ith the notable 
intermission of Vichy, France has remained a republic since 1871 and the political form has 
provided the context for impressive sets of reforms … French republicanism has not just been 
institutionally and culturally successful: after the demise of socialism, it is the major, if not the 
only, intellectual alternative to Anglo-American liberalism.’  
36 Honohan, supra note 8, at p. 7. 
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According to Livesey;  
 
‘[t]he central institution of the French revolution was that, despite the 
obvious social, economic and cultural inequalities generated by modern 
commercial societies, men should be politically equal. Citizenship was 
not to be derived from social function; citizenship would rescue men 
from their alienation from one another in society. The French revolution 
committed itself to the most untrammelled version of individualism, it 
promised that man could be regenerated, that is returned to his authentic 
self, through his commitment to the common good.’37  
 
Interestingly, Livesey’s construction of republicanism, and its emphasis on 
individualism, points towards a form of liberalism, while Sandel’s definition of 
liberalism, and its emphasis on community, shares many of the republican ideals. 
For two apparently competing philosophies there is a clear cross pollination in 
terms of norms and values. It may be observed that liberalism can mean more 
than absolute individualism, in the face of the community, while republicanism, 
can allow for a form of individuality which does not exclude community 
participation.38 Indeed, Skinner has observed that republicanism did not emerge 
as an anti-liberal theory, but as a pre-liberal theory.39 Accordingly, a more fluid 
interpretation of these ideologies may be inferred. The importance of drawing 
upon these parallels is that while the droit de suite may have derived from a 
                                                           
37 Livesey, supra note 29, at p. 51.  
38 Q. Skinner, ‘The Republican Idea of Political Liberty', in G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli 
(eds), Machiavelli and Republicanism, (Cambridge: CUP, 1990) p. 302. For a systematic 
discussion of the relation between ‘republicanism’ and ‘liberalism’ see D. T . Rodgers, 
‘Republicanism: the Career of a Concept’, The Journal of American History, (1992) 79 (1), p. 11 
- 38. 
39 Ibid. Skinner, at p. 309.  
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civic-republican ideology, it is not incompatible with the liberal tradition as both 
liberalism and republicanism exist on the one spectrum. This point will be 
returned to when presenting the argument for a socially orientated EU ARR 
regime.  
 
As already noted, French republicanism constructs a polity around the idea of the 
citizen rather than the consumer.40 It is this concept of the ‘citizen’ as opposed to 
the ‘consumer’ which defines the early social character of the droit de suite. 
Shifting the emphasis from the property rights of the purchaser/consumer to the 
social rights of the citizen confers certain duties and obligations in addition to 
rights and privileges.41 However, the notion of a strict consumer-citizenship 
binarism does not enjoy widespread support. For Dean, the idea of citizenship is 
as much a part of the liberal tradition as it is a part of the republican tradition.42 
Nevertheless, the liberal citizenship tradition has tended towards a formal or 
procedural approach to equality while the civic-republican tradition adopts a 
more substantive approach.43 Under the former construction, formal equality – 
equality of opportunity – takes precedence, thus potentially perpetrating social 
disadvantage. Anatole France’s aphorism arguably encapsulates the deficiencies 
of the procedural approach: ‘The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as 
well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.’44 
Therefore, while in theory citizens are all equal, in practice, one’s socio-
economic status, education, environment and so forth determines the content of 
                                                           
40 Livesey, supra note 29, p. 48. 
41 For more on these ‘jural relations’ see W. N. Hohfeld Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Surrey: Aldershot, 2001). 
42 Dean, supra note 10, at p. 10. 
43 Ibid.  
44 A. France Le Lys Rouge (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1849). 
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that equality. Nevertheless, the question remains, how is substantive equality 
achieved without depriving man of his liberty? The following section explores 
communitarian theory, and its focus on inclusion. 
 
4.3 Communitarianism  
 
An important feature of the communitarian theory is that it extends the principle 
of responsibility for harm and compensation beyond the market liberal 
conception. For Dean, ‘[c]ommunitarian versions of the civic-republican 
tradition emphasise equality of belonging, inclusion and respect rather than strict 
material equality.’45 It acknowledges individuals’ debt to others for their own 
achievements. It acknowledges that individuals do not exist in isolation and 
where one sub-section of a society benefits from the market economy while 
another is marginalised46 a redistribution of resources is required.47 This 
redistribution of resources is based on the concept of compensation. The 
principle of compensation or damages as a remedy for loss or harm is no stranger 
                                                           
45 Dean, supra note 10, at p. 10;  ‘… though social democratic derivations of the tradition support 
broad equality of material outcomes.’ 
46 P. Townsend Poverty in the United Kingdom (London: Penguin, 1979) p. 57; Townsend 
believes that ‘… as resources for any individual or family are diminished there is a point at which 
there occurs a sudden withdrawal from participation in the customs and activities sanctioned by 
the culture’ D. Harris Justifying State Welfare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p. 51; that 
‘[b]eyond a certain point, lack of resources entails exclusion; individuals are “in” but not “of” the 
community.’ 
47 Honohan supra note 8, at p. 9, noting that early Greek republicanism acknowledged the 
function of wealth redistribution: ‘Aristotle also saw that socio-economic conditions affect the 
success of the polis. Small states in which citizens know one another will be better able to 
generate common concern and accountability. Inequalities between citizens tend to undermine 
their political equality and destabilise the polis. So he endorsed redistributive measures to 
counteract this, such as public provision of land or employment, and payment for participating in 
the assembly and serving in office.’ Furthermore, James Harrington’s conception of classic 
republicanism guaranteed the political equality of citizens by limiting economic inequality. 
Independence from the will of others was a pre-cursor to citizenship. J. Harrington The 
Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1992). On economic inequality, Rousseau adopts a similar position ‘No citizen should be so rich 
as to buy another, and none so poor that he is constrained to sell himself.’ J.J. Rousseau The 
Social Contract (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1968), p. 96. 
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to legal theory. The concept can be seen is various areas of the law, including 
contract law,48 copyright law,49 tort law50 and to a lesser degree, criminal law.51 
The principle of compensation is generally based on the concepts of duty, 
breach, loss and harm.52 In other words there must be a duty owed, a harm 
caused, subsequent loss, a causal relationship between the two parties and where 
fault is found, provided it is not too remote, an award of damages.53 From an 
economic perspective the market liberal understanding of compensation is quite 
narrow, and rightly so, it limits the potential class of individuals to which one 
may owe a duty. Therefore, the law draws a line regarding the amount of liability 
to which any one person may be reasonably exposed.54   
 
Nevertheless, within the social policy sphere a strong case has been made for a 
wider conception of the compensation principle.55 This is a break from the 
narrow conception of responsibility as put forward by market liberals who insist 
on a general duty of non-interference where there are no special relationships.56 
In jurisdictions where a progressive social policy agenda is pursued, a broader 
conception of responsibility and compensation impacts upon the normative 
                                                           
48 E. A. Posner, supra note 2, at pp. 829 - 880. 
49 See Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
[2001] OJ L 167 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]; Recital 35 ‘In certain cases of exceptions or 
limitations, rightholders should receive fair compensation to compensate them adequately for the 
use made of their protected work or subject matter.’ 
50 See generally M. Geistfeld ‘Compensation as a Tort Norm’ in John Oberdiek, ed. 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
51 Ibid., See also A. Duff ‘Theories of Criminal law’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/criminal-law/> (date accessed: 12 July 2017).  
52 See K. S. Abraham The Forms and Functions of Tort Law 4th ed. (St. Paul: Foundation Press, 
2002), Abraham’s argument identifies and focuses on the four conceptual elements, common to 
all torts: duty, breach, causation and harm; see also S. Hedley Tort 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 2008). 
53 Ibid. Abraham’s argument identifies and focuses on the four conceptual elements, common to 
all torts: duty, breach, causation and harm; see also S. Hedley, supra note 52.  
54 Ibid. Hedley, at p. 21 - 31.  
55 Harris, supra note 46, at p. 34. 
56 Ibid. 
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function as well as the positive character of the law.57  Within social policy and 
welfare theory the compensation principle implicitly invokes notions-of-fairness 
and well-being.58 The principle also forms part of a communitarian 
understanding of society as opposed to an individualistic approach inferred by 
market liberals.59 The compensation argument is most clearly suggested by 
Titmuss, who argues those who are to be compensated are members of a class, or 
group who are making a contribution to the well-being of another class or 
group.60 Those who receive the benefits of the social process are therefore under 
a duty to compensate.61  
    
The foundation of the compensation principle can be seen from two perspectives: 
a) contribution, and b) a right not to be harmed. Firstly, where one person’s 
losses are a necessary condition of another person’s gain – i.e. there has been a 
contribution – the former is entitled to recompense from the latter.62 
Alternatively, the foundation of the principle trades on a right not to be harmed. 
This does not suggest that the harm caused constitutes a contribution to the 
welfare of others.63 Under this construction, to justify compensation, it is 
necessary only to demonstrate the harm caused. There is no further requirement 
                                                           
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 H. O. de Boor, ‘Der NSJ-Entwurf und die Urheberrechtsreform’, UFITA 1934, p. 413. Comp. 
G. Michaélides-Nouares, le droit moral de l’auteur (Arthur Roinsseau: Paris, 1935). Grosheide, 
citing De Boor (1934) states that ‘on the continent the emergence of communal thinking led to 
polarization between French and German doctrine… .’ ‘The nationalist Socialist notion of law 
takes as its starting point the people as a whole. (…) All private law, including the law of 
authors’ rights, becomes socially concerned law. Here lies the basic difference between the 
German and the French concepts of law, the French concept taking as its starting point the right 
of the individual.  
60 See Harris supra note 46, at p. 35; R. M. Titmuss Commitment to Welfare (NY: Pantheon 
Books, 1968). 
61 Ibid.  
62 See Harris, supra note 46, at p. 35. Theorists such as Marshall and Titmus based much of their 
work on the social change which Britain experienced after WWII. 
63 Ibid. at p. 36. 
 202 
to show that the harm caused and loss suffered made some form of contribution. 
Harris notes that from a moral point of view, the contribution formula has a 
definite appeal.64 Indeed, in the context of the ARR it is far more appealing to 
think of the visual artist’s right to further resale royalties as deriving from his/her 
contribution to the purchaser’s future financial gain rather than compensation for 
harm endured.   
 
Irrespective of which formula is adopted, Harris notes that the compensation 
principle as understood in this context is too broad and would result in some 
unusual and unintended results. 65  One way of narrowing the compensation 
principle is through the application of citizenship theory.66  The following 
section outlines three theories of citizenship before focusing on Harris’s theory 
of social citizenship.  
 
4.4 Citizenship Theory/Social Citizenship 
 
According to Isin and Turner, ‘[c]itizenship is both a legal status that confers an 
identity on persons and a social status that determines how economic and cultural 
capital are redistributed and recognized within society.’67 The work of T.H. 
                                                           
64 Harris, supra note 46, at p. 36; ‘Not only is there responsibility for the harm caused, but one is 
claiming that it is repugnant to profit at someone else’s expense. So stated the principle captures 
intuitions of the injustice of exploitation.’  
65 Ibid. Harris expands upon this idea in the following example: Susan and Sally are neighbours. 
Both enjoy gardens. Only Sally likes to Garden. From her bedroom window Susan has an 
uninterrupted view of Sally’s garden and spends many hours admiring it. Sally notices this and 
asks Susan to pay her some part of the cost of the garden. The external benefit of the garden is 
surely not one for which Susan is under any duty to pay, even if there is nothing to stop Sally 
building a wall, blocking the view and then charging a price to remove it. 
66 E. Jones and J. Javenta ‘Concepts of Citizenship: A Review’ (2002) Institute of Development 
Studies, Development Bibliography 19; M. Sandel Liberalism and the Limits of Social Justice 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1998). 
67 E. Isin and B. Turner ‘Investigating Citizenship’s An Agenda for Citizenship Studies’ (2007) 
11(1) Citizenship Studies at p. 14. 
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Marshall, remains the key point of departure for any discussion on citizenship, 
for Ellison it  
 
‘… stands as the quintessential expression of [UK] post-war optimism 
about the capacity of the modern nation-state to act as a force for social 
cohesion, defining the relationship between state and individual citizen-
members in terms of the institutionalised paternalism of state welfare.’68  
 
Nevertheless, this form of citizenship has been criticized for conceiving of the 
nation-state as somehow ‘… unaffected by power politics and manipulation by 
dominant elites.’69 For some, the greatest failing of Marshall’s construct was that 
he did not consider that an imperfect state might propagate existing social and 
political divisions.70 Others such as Offe criticise Marshall’s inattentiveness to 
the accumulation requisites of capitalism71 and the limitations that this places on 
the welfare state.72 This aside, Marshall’s tripartite construction of citizenship – 
civil, political and social – with its focus on social rights is paradigmatic of the 
                                                           
68 N. Ellison ‘Towards a New Social Politics: Citizenship and Reflexivity in Late Modernity’ 
(1997) 31(4) Sociology, p. 698. It should be noted that Marshall’s work primarily focused on post 
WWII Britain. 
69 Ibid. at p. 699. 
70 See generally M. Mann ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’ in M. Bulmer and A.M. Rees 
(eds.) Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall (London: UCL Press, 
1996); Ellison, supra note 68, at p. 700 ‘He consequently underestimated the potential for 
democratic dissent as citizens came to question the motives behind the state’s role as provider 
and protector of social rights.’ Furthermore P. Kivisto and T. Faist Citizenship: Discourse, 
Theory and Transnational Prospects (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009) pp. 65 - 66; noting 
that Marshall’s optimistic view that once in place, the three types of citizenship – civil, political 
and social – would become institutionalized and would not be subject to reversal has not held true 
in many advanced industrial nations and that in the past three decades social rights have been 
rolled back and inequality has grown. 
71 Ibid. at pp. 65 - 66  ‘At the economic level, the problematic nature of the relationship between 
the capitalist economy and the state is contained in the reality that the latter both facilitates 
capital accumulation when it invests in the promotion of economic development, but it 
simultaneously retards accumulation insofar as it siphons off capital to make possible social 
Service delivery’  
72 C. Offe Contradictions of the Welfare State (MA: MIT 1984); C. Offe Disorganised 
Capitalism (MA: MIT 1984); For a useful synopsis of the criticisms of the welfare state, see 
Kivisto and Faist  supra note 70, at p. 58 - 66. 
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citizenship which this thesis engages with rather than the ‘boundary conscious’ 
approach adopted by scholars in such areas as immigration law and the law of 
conflict.73 Under the former conception the discourse is concerned with the 
substantive nature of citizen rights and what this may encompass in divergent 
political environments, whereas the latter is strictly concerned with procedural 
formalism concerning the point of access and inclusion within a citizenry as 
dictated by a nation-state.74 Jones and Javenta identify three primary traditions in 
citizenship thought: ‘citizenship in liberal thought’, ‘citizenship in 
communitarian thought’ and ‘citizenship in civic-republican thought’.75 The 
authors are careful to highlight that these categorisations represent groupings of 
ideas with commonalities rather than strict categories of citizenship per se.76 
Indeed, this chapter adopts a view of citizenship which incorporates elements of 
all three constructs thereby adopting a pluralistic understanding of citizenship.77  
 
                                                           
73 L. Bosniak The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006) p. 1 - 36. See also P. Dwyer Understanding Social Citizenship: 
Themes and perspectives for policy and practice 2nd ed. (Bristol: Policy Press, 2010) p. 3. Dwyer 
notes that ‘as a legal term, citizenship is often interchangeable with nationality … The core right 
of citizenship in this legal sense is that of abode. If a person is a legal citizen of a country in 
international law that person cannot be expelled from that country, and can expect to be able to 
… freely return. Citizenship of a particular nation-state also carries with it duties to the state and 
rights, beyond the right of abode, which the individual can claim from the state … .’ See also G. 
Procacci ‘Poor Citizens: Social Citizenship versus Individualization of Welfare in C. Crouch, E. 
Klaus and D. Tambini (eds.) Citizenship, Markets and the State (Oxford: OUP, 2004) p. 49; ‘The 
strength of T.H. Marshall’s (1963a) model of the development of citizenship – the evolution of 
citizenship rights from civil to political and social – is that it theorizes the dynamic nature of 
citizenship beyond rigid legal definitions of membership. … [l]egal theorists … tend to favour a 
rigid definition in its original meaning of membership of a political community, overlooking the 
fact that the modification of rights is a social, not merely a legal process. 
74 For an excellent discussion on defining citizenship see L. Bosniak The Citizen and the Alien: 
Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) p. 17 - 
36. 
75 Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 2 - 5.  
76 Ellison supra note 68, at p. 698; Ellison proposes three alternative accounts of citizenship: 
state-centred, pluralist and post structuralist, but argues that none of these offer an entirely 
convincing understanding of citizenship in light of ‘… the fragmented condition of contemporary 
social politics.’  
77 In the context of African citizenship experiences and colonial histories, Halisi et al. supra note 
1, at p. 337 - 350.  
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4.4.1 Citizenship in Liberal Thought 
 
Traditional liberal theory conceives of citizenship as a legal status, which entitles 
members of a community to a specific set of state granted universal rights.78 
Central to liberal thought is the notion that individual citizens act ‘rationally’ to 
advance their own interests, and that the role of the state is to protect citizens in 
the exercise of these rights.79 In this protectionist rather than paternal role, liberty 
is seen in the negative sense, as the right to be left alone80 – non-interference –  
thus inferring a Lockean form of limited government.81 Equality, in this regard, 
is achieved by removing social status, gender, race, political influence and 
economic power as a prerequisite to rights claims.82 Accordingly, the exercise of 
rights is seen as a prerogative of the citizen. Crucially, this conceptualisation 
ignores that not all citizens possess the necessary resources and opportunities to 
claim those rights.83 As previously noted, under this construction equality is 
therefore a right to claim rights – procedural equality – rather than a right to 
material outcomes. Despite his liberal stance Marshall did however recognise 
that citizens were entitled to a minimum level of social and economic provision 
but did not argue for the absolute elimination of equality.84 Marshall was more 
                                                           
78 Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 3; P. Dwyer, supra note 73, at p. 20 - 24. 
79 P. Dwyer, supra note 73, at p. 22; Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 3.  
80 Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 2; P. Dwyer, supra note 73, at p. 20 - 24. 
81 J. Locke Second Treatise of Government (London: Whitmore and Fenn, 1821), Originally 
published by the Library of Alexandria in 1689. 
82 Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 3. 
83 Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at p. 70, ‘To insist that what is wrong with society is that people, 
especially the poorest, have too many rights, is to overlook the effects that systematic inequalities 
of socioeconomic power have upon our talents and opportunities. It should be said that duties 
correlate not to rights but to powers, i.e. one’s ownership of resources and property. A right is 
merely a claim; it is the actual power those claims do or do not confer which really counts’. 
84 Jones and Javenta, supra note 66, at p. 3. For Jones & Javenta, T. H  Marshall ‘might be 
considered a civic liberal’. Marshall argued that citizens have a right to their minimal social and 
economic needs, and that this security should be provided by the state. As with most liberal 
thinkers, he argued not for an elimination or inequalities, but a reduction in the risks associated 
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concerned with ‘class abatement’ and reducing the risks associated with 
capitalism.85  
 
4.4.2 Citizenship in Communitarian Thought 
 
Sandel argues that an individual’s sense of identity is produced only through 
relations with others in the community of which she or he is a part.86 
Communitarian thought therefore centres on the notion of the ‘socially-
embedded citizen’, that is, an individual with a sense of community belonging.87 
The individual develops this sense of community belonging by becoming an 
‘active citizen’. Active citizenship requires public service and the prioritisation 
of the ‘common good’ above individual interests.88 The counterpoint to active 
citizenship is ‘passive citizenship’, in which a contribution to society is not a pre-
requisite to receiving social rights such as education, health care and welfare 
support.89 For communitarians, citizenship develops and is defined by particular 
                                                           
with capitalism for the poorest citizens. This, in Marshalls’s view would lead to an overarching 
sense of community and social cohesion. 
85 Kivisto and Faist, supra note 70, at p. 73; for Marshall, the use of the term ‘class abatement’  
meant first ‘… that inequality would not be overcome entirely, but instead a legitimate functional 
form of inequality would replace an illegitimate, dysfunctional form. Second, although Marshall 
did not develop this line of argument in any detail, if citizenship was actually going to make 
equals of people in their role as citizen it would have to ensure policies of redistribution that 
prevented unacceptable levels of economic and social inequality to exist. In other words, the 
assumption underpinning Marshall’s thesis is that although inequality does not disappear, there is 
a level of inequality that is unacceptable because once a society moves beyond that level, the 
equality of citizens is jeopardized.’  
86  Sandel, supra note 66.  
87 A. Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary (London: Routledge, 1998) 
p. 117. 
88 Ibid. at p. 118. 
89 K. Ketscher ‘Contrasting Legal Concepts of Active Citizenship: Europe and Nordic Countries’ 
in B Hvinden and H. Johansson (eds.) Citizenship in Nordic Welfare States: Dynamics of choice, 
duties and participation in a changing Europe (London: Routledge, 2007) p. 143, here the author 
refers to the principle of ‘self-support’ as a ‘common ground.’ ‘Common ground’ may also be 
understood as the ‘common good’. Ketscher notes that ‘The legal notion of active citizenship is 
above all connected to situations where an individual for various reasons is not able to earn an 
income because of social or personal circumstances (e.g. unemployment, health or family 
problems). Nevertheless public cash support is subsidiary to the importance of self-support. The 
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‘civic virtues’ such as respect for others and recognition of the importance of 
public service.90 Thus in contrast to much liberal thought which ‘… dismiss[es] 
the possibility of assigning any political or legal meaning to group rights, 
communitarians assert the group as the defining centre of identity… .’91 
 
4.4.3 Citizenship in Civic-Republican Thought 
 
Ellison defines the civic-republican tradition as both statist and 
‘communitarian’.92 As Oldfield has written, ‘… it stresses not that which 
differentiates individuals from each other and from the community, but rather 
what they share with other individuals, and what integrates them into the 
community.’93 Underpinning this ‘shared sense of belonging’ is an emphasis on 
individual duty and obligations to the community.94 Unlike civil-liberalism, 
civic-republicanism places emphasis on the community and not the individual.95 
For Isin and Wood, civic-republican thought attempts to incorporate the liberal 
notion of the self-interested individuals within the communitarian framework of 
egalitarianism and community belonging.96 In many ways, the communitarian 
and civic-republican concepts of citizenship share many commonalities. This 
raises the question of whether there is in fact any real difference between the 
                                                           
welfare state is under no obligation to support a person who can provide for herself or himself. 
The citizen has a duty not to be a burden on the social benefit system or on society in general. 
This socially understood obligation expresses a basic aspect of active citizenship within the 
framework of the self-support principle in the Nordic countries.’  
90 Smith, supra note 87, at p. 118. 
91 E. Isin and P. Wood Citizenship and Identity (London: Sage, 1999) p. 2.  
92 Ellison, supra note 68, at p. 700. 
93 A. Oldfield Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World (London: 
Routledge, 1990) p. 145.  
94 Dwyer supra note 73, pp. 24 - 25.  
95 Ellison, supra note 68, at p. 700.  
96 Isin and Wood, supra note 91, at p. 8. 
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two? Jones and Javent outline one primary distinction in that communitarianism 
emphasises that which binds citizens together into a community, civic-
republicanism, on the other hand is concerned with the citizens’ obligations to 
sustain the community.97 However, there is nothing preventing civic-republican 
constructs of citizenship from combining statist and communitarian values, as 
Ellison inferred, the two are not mutually exclusive.98 Another way of viewing 
the relationship between these two theories of citizenship is to think of civic-
republicanism as a vertical relationship between the citizen and the state whereas 
communitarianism stresses the horizontal relationship between the individual and 
his community. In the former the citizen owes a duty to the state whereas in the 
latter the duty is owed to other citizens. Civic-republican writers, such as 
Habermas99 and Miller100 argue that citizenship should be understood as a 
common civic citizenship, shaped by a common public culture. For Ellison, this 
conceptualisation of citizenship, incorporates the classical communitarian 
emphasis on belonging with recognition that ‘… modern societies are likely to 
contain a far greater diversity of interests than their classical forbears.’101 Miller 
advocates for a form of citizenship where citizens set aside sectional interests 
and instead focused on ‘… fairness between different sections of the community 
and the pursuit of common ends.’102 Again, the ‘common ends’ may be framed 
as a vertical duty to the state rather than to individual citizens or sections of the 
community.  
                                                           
97 Oldfield, supra note 93, at p. 145.  
98 Ellison, supra note 68. 
99 J. Habermas ‘The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and 
Citizenship’ (1998) 10 (2) Public Culture p. 397 - 416.  
100 D. Miller ‘Citizenship and Pluralism’ (1995) 43 (3) Political Studies pp. 432 - 450; D. Miller 
Market, State and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989). 
101 Ellison, supra note 68, at p. 701. 
102 Miller (1989), supra note 100, at p. 284.  
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Relying on Harris’s theory of social citizenship the following section adopts a 
pluralistic approach to citizenship, combining elements of the communitarian 
and civic-republican tradition.  
 
4.5 Citizenship as a Communitarian Theory of Civic-Republicanism 
 
The model of citizenship adopted in this chapter is Harris’s model of social 
citizenship. This model combines both communitarian and civic-republican 
concepts of citizenship. For Harris, citizenship forms part of a communitarian 
theory of civic-republicanism. Under this construction Harris:  
 
‘…  acknowledges that public authority must be deployed according to 
moral principles. The appeal to community is an appeal to values to 
constrain self-interest. The goal is a political system in which citizens 
take an expansive view of their obligations to their fellows; a system in 
which the social order is not conceived purely instrumentally as a 
mechanism to be exploited for personal gain. Citizens are not expected to 
hold the community to ransom by extracting the highest price possible as 
a condition of their providing services. The community belongs to 
everyone equally, though not everyone is in the same position 
individually to derive advantages from it. Social justice requires that the 
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benefits of social cooperation be fairly distributed, that those who are 
excluded be included.’103   
 
The theory focuses on certain types of social ‘dis-services’ which are peculiarly 
likely to compromise the status of individuals as full and participating members 
of the community. Harris gives the example of employment, and society’s view 
of employment as a prized activity where the failure to hold or find a job is a 
reflection of personal failure. Not only does unemployment mean loss of income 
in the absence of income maintenance programmes but it also results in a 
lowering of self-esteem. For Harris, 
 
‘[e]mployment is a good because it is a source of the wherewithal to 
participate in a community way of life; to engage in the consumption 
activities of one’s society. A lack of resources leads to exclusion. But so 
too does a lack of self-respect, and there is considerable sociological 
evidence cataloguing the consequences of long-term unemployment: the 
unemployed lose a sense of self-esteem, become withdrawn and 
apathetic, and live at the margin of society. In a society in which what 
you are is bound up closely with what you do, work is [a] source of self-
definition. To be effectively deprived of an opportunity to work is to be 
cruelly handicapped. Compensation therefore is required where social 
processes operate in ways which prejudice one’s standing as a full 
member of the community. This is true whether the foundation of the 
principle is contribution or simply a right not to be harmed. Although the 
                                                           
103 Harris, supra note 46, at pp. 35 - 36. 
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claim to be compensated for bearing the costs of the progress of others is 
free-standing, it must be satisfied only where not to do so undercuts one’s 
community membership. Thus the argument presupposes a theory of 
rights radically different from the property rights theory of market 
liberals. It suggests the existence of a right to have one’s status as a full 
member of the community protected by social rights in the name of 
citizenship.’104 
 
Compensating community members suggests that these members have been 
harmed and thus made worse-off than would otherwise have been the case, or 
alternatively, these members have made a contribution, in some form, to the 
community.105 Under Harris’s model of citizenship, compensation can only 
follow where a) the social process which caused the harm can be identified; b)  
the agent who bears the responsibility for the harm can be identified and c) the 
individual or group who are to benefit can be identified.106 If these three 
elements cannot be satisfied then compensation cannot occur.  
 
While the form of liberalism upon which the free-market is based requires a 
general duty of non-interference where there are no special relationships, social 
citizenship asserts a general duty to aid where one’s status as a member of the 
community has been undermined.107 
                                                           
104 Ibid. at p. 38; ‘The suggestion that property rights and private trading on the basis of those 
rights is sufficient to protect that status is rejected.’ 
105 Isin and Wood, supra note 91, at p. 16 argue that ‘… past contributions to the community 
become the basis of legitimate claims on the “commonwealth.” In this respect they can see or 
experience a clear connection between effort, reward and virtue.’ 
106 Harris, supra note 46, at p. 30; Harris acknowledges that some social policies are not 
responses to harm, for example medical care and education.  
107 Harris, supra note 46, at p. 40, ‘the basis of the duty to aid is the right of each individual to 
have his status as a full member of the community protected.’ 
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Under Harris’s definition of social citizenship, 
  
‘the moral foundation for interfering with market outcomes is most 
secure where citizenship theorists can press the argument that 
intervention is required by a contribution-based compensation principle. 
In defending compensation, satisfactory account of the social processes 
that benefit some by imposing costs on others is required. If that is 
provided, it is easier to argue that by accepting these benefits one 
assumes on obligation to compensate the victim, even though one has not 
acted unjustly toward any specific person. The injustice inheres in the 
social process itself and in the failure to recognise the unfairness of any 
claim to keep full control of the use and disposition of resources so 
derived. It is not simply that one is not entitled to everything one earns 
because one does not deserve it on the grounds of effort or desert; one’s 
lack of entitlement is a consequence of the price which some must pay to 
make earnings possible.’108  
 
Harris’s definition of social citizenship provides an adequate justification for a 
socially orientated ARR. However, the thesis does not propose to recast 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) or the ARR as exclusively social constructs. 
Instead, social citizenship is employed as a means of softening some of the 
inequities that these systems propagate, specifically in relation to visual artists. 
Before turning to the theoretical justifications for intellectual property examined 
                                                           
108 Ibid.  
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in this chapter, the following section briefly addresses the ‘market failure’, which 
IPRs attempt to resolve. An understanding of these market failures helps frame 
the requirements of IPRs and indeed the ARR which in turn informs many of the 
reforms that this thesis proposes.  
 
 
4.6 Market Failure: The Need for intellectual Property Rights 
 
Taking copyright as an example, Gordon states that copyright creates rights in 
intellectual property, with the primary aim of generating monetary incentives for 
the production of creative works:  
 
‘If the creators of intellectual productions were given no rights to control 
the use made of their works, they might receive few revenues and thus 
would lack an appropriate level of incentive to create. Fewer resources 
would be devoted to intellectual productions than their social merit would 
warrant.’109 
 
Gordon’s analysis reflects A. Hauser’s comments regarding the 
professionalization of the creative arts.110 The market failure to which 
economists and lawyers alike refer to is premised upon the ‘public goods’ 
character of intellectual property. This theory, as outlined below supposes that 
these goods are non-rivalrous and that they are non-excludable. For Toynbee the 
‘non-rivalrous’ quality is intrinsic to most IPRs because the work can be used by 
                                                           
109 W. Gordon ‘Fair Use and Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors’ (1982) 82 (8) Columbia Law Review p. 1610. 
110 See Chapter 3, section 3.1, p. 138 - 146.  
 214 
one user without excluding or preventing its use by other users. The subject 
matter of intellectual property such as the ‘film’, ‘song’, ‘novel’ and so on, do 
not degrade with use or become ‘exhausted’ in a manner similar to tangible 
goods. Secondly, intellectual property is non-excludable in that it is difficult for 
creators to prevent would-be users from exploiting these goods.111 While the user 
may prevent another person from using or reading a book that he has purchased, 
the original author cannot prevent that user from making copies and distributing 
them. Dworkin defines these ‘public goods’ as products  
 
‘… whose production cannot efficiently be left to the market because it is 
impossible (or very difficult or expensive) to exclude those who do not 
pay from receiving the benefit and so riding free. People have no 
incentive to pay for what they will receive anyway if others buy it.’112  
 
The ‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ nature of intellectual property prevents 
creators of cultural goods from realising the full economic value of their work in 
a conventional market place. For Toynbee, ‘… [i]n this situation the function of 
copyright law is to extend property rights beyond the first copy to any and every 
copy over a specified term.’113 Toynbee’s analysis implicitly includes derivative 
works or adaptations, which create copies albeit in a medium, separate from the 
original. Copyright therefore corrects a market failure to compensate creators for 
                                                           
111 J. Toynbee ‘Creativity and Intellectual Property Rights’ in H. Anheier and Y. R. Isar (eds.) 
Cultural Expression, Creativity and Innovation (London: Sage, 2010) p. 90 ‘… cinema 
exhibition enables a high degree of excludability – ushers will check your ticket before you go in 
– whereas it is impossible to exclude anyone from listening to a conventional radio broadcast 
once they have access to a receiver.’ 
112 R. Dworkin A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Clarendon, 2001) ‘Can a Liberal State Support 
Art?’ p. 223, for an exploration of the concept of ‘free riding’, culture and internet see R. Levine 
Free Ride (London: Vintage Books, 2011).  
113 Toynbee, supra note 111, at p. 90.  
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their work by conferring property type rights which in turn allows creators to be 
compensated for their work thus creating an incentive to create.   
 
As intimated earlier, the three primary theoretical justifications for intellectual 
property derive from property law theory, utilitarianism, and 
personhood/personality theory.114 These theories acknowledge a dichotomy of 
interests which is often expressed on the one hand, in terms of the creator’s 
ability to determine how their body of work is utilised, and on the other hand, the 
right of the general public to access and enjoy these socially beneficial works. 
Under this construction legislators are required to create laws that balance these 
competing interests. The primary tenets of each of these theories will be analysed 
in turn by drawing on the writings of their leading theorists. In addition, each of 
these theories will be assessed in light of their compatibility with Harris’s theory 
of citizenship.  
 
4.7 Theoretical Justifications for Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Throughout its legislative history the artists’ resale right has been classified 
under a number of IP and non-IP related constructs.115 As previously noted, the 
                                                           
114 Fisher identifies a fourth theoretical underpinning: Social Planning Theory. As this theory is 
of less established providence it will not be discussed further here. W. Fisher ‘Theories of 
Intellectual Property’ in S. Munzer (ed.) New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of 
Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001). The Journal of Intellectual Law and Practice 
describes it as ‘inadequate’ because it lacks agreed upon goals. 
<http://jiplp.blogspot.ie/2014/03/theories-of-intellectual-property-is-it.html> (dates accessed: 13 
July 2017.)  
115 See L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, The Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property, A 
Comparative Law Study (Louise-Martin Valiquette Translation), (New York: Columbia 
University, 1991). See also Chapter 3.   
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resale right has been described as a related or neighbouring right,116 a sui generis 
right,117 a moral right,118 and a tax.119 This has led to some confusion in the 
literature, bringing into question the very nature of the resale right. Accordingly, 
an assessment of the theoretical underpinnings of the ARR is necessitated. This 
assessment will result in a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of 
the right, thereby presenting a sound theoretical and legal foundation upon which 
future reforms may be based.  
 
While many theories have been proffered as a basis for IPRs and more 
specifically copyright120 – of which the ARR belongs – the primary justifications 
fall within three broad categories. These include the Lockean property rights 
justification, Bentham’s utilitarianism and the personhood or personality theory 
as espoused by Hegel.121 Arguably none of these theories fully engender the 
nature of copyright in its totality, nevertheless, these theories provide an 
analytical framework through which to consider the normative function of the 
ARR, as well as grounds for reform proposals.  The aim of the following section 
is to review these primary theoretical justifications and by default determine the 
appropriate theoretical justification for reform of the ARR Directive.  
 
                                                           
116 See US Register of Copyright Report ‘Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty’ (1992) p. 
92. 
117 Ibid.  See also De Pierredon-Fawcett, supra note 115, at p. 25.  
118 J. Pasharikov ‘Edvard Munch’s “The Scream” Screams for Droit de Suite: Why Congress 
Should enact a Federal Droit de Suite Statute Governing Artists’ Resale Rights in the United 
States’ (2015) 26 University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy, p. 387. 
119 Chapter 3.  
120 Fisher, supra note 114, identifying four theories; D.B. Resnik ‘A Pluralist Account of 
Intellectual Property’ Journal of Business Ethics (2003) 46 (4) p. 322 - 330, identifying six 
theories; and S. Teilman-Lock British and French Copyright: A Historical Study of Aesthetic 
Implications (Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, 2009) p. 39, identifying ten theories.  
121 While many theorists could have been employed here to investigate the personality theory, 
Hegel presents a more complete model than theorists such as Kant.  
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4.7.1 The Lockean Theory of Property Rights 
 
Locke’s theory of property, as stated in his Second Treatise of Government122 is a 
natural law theory of property and comes in three parts: first, a general 
justification of property, second, a description of how man can appropriate assets 
that were previously held in common;123 and third, a negative requirement that 
one man’s appropriation does not disadvantage another man.  
 
In the Second Treatise of Government Locke concludes that there are certain 
individual rights that are so important that no government, even if democratically 
elected, can override. Those fundamental rights include a natural right to life, 
liberty and property. Furthermore, the right to property is not just the creation of 
government or law, it is a natural right that is pre-political, it is a right that 
attaches to individuals as human beings. Under the Lockean construction, for 
there to be ‘natural rights’ there must be a pre-political state of liberty which 
Locke refers to as the ‘state of nature’. Human beings are free and equal beings, 
there is no natural hierarchy, they are free and equal in the ‘state of nature’. 
However, there is a law of nature that constrains what man can do, and this law 
says that man cannot give up his natural rights, nor can he take them from others. 
These rights of life, liberty and property124 are inalienable.125  
 
                                                           
122 Locke, supra note 81.  
123 The ‘commons’ refers to a system of property where property is not exclusively owned by any 
one individual, instead the community, and the individual members that constitute that 
community are free to use the property as they see fit. One problem with the commons is that 
property may be overused and become valueless.   
124 Note that Locke uses the term ‘property’ generally to mean life liberty and property.  
125 Locke, supra note 81, Section 6. ‘For men, being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and 
infinitely wise maker, they are his property... .’ Under this construction, these rights are 
inalienable because these rights are not his own because man is the property of God. 
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Locke states that in the original ‘state of nature’ God gave the earth to mankind 
in common for their preservation and subsistence.126  He recognises however that 
to make use of the resources of nature there must be a means by which man can 
appropriate these resources.127 The challenge concerns how these goods can be 
removed from the commons in such a way that another man’s rights are 
legitimately extinguished. Locke suggests two means of legitimate appropriation; 
the first requires the consent of mankind to remove goods from the commons,128 
the second; and more practical method, states that man by mixing his labour with 
the commons, appropriates these goods or resources for himself.129  This 
appropriation is justified on the basis that:  
 
‘… every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any 
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, 
we may say, are properly his.’130 
 
Here Locke recognises that if individuals could not privatise common resources 
without the consent of all mankind, ‘man might have starved, notwithstanding 
the plenty God had given him.’131 Locke proposes that rather than owning one’s 
                                                           
126 Locke, supra note 81, Section 25 ‘Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that 
men, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and 
such other things as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account 
of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is very clear, that 
God, as King David says, Psalm cxv. 16. ‘has given the earth to the children of men;’ given it to 
mankind in common.’  
127 Locke, supra note 81, Section 26. 
128 Locke, supra note 81, Section 28. 
129 Ibid. Section 27. 
130 Ibid, Section 27. 
131 Ibid, Section 28.  
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self, one’s body, man owns his labour.132 Building on this he says that whatever 
man mixes his labour with, that is un-owned, becomes his property:  
 
‘Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature has provided, 
and left it in, he has mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that 
is his own, and thereby makes it his property.’133 
 
Locke substantiates this claim on the basis that: 
 
‘[f]or this labour being unquestionably the property of the labourer, no 
man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where 
there is enough, and as good left in common for others.’134 
 
For ‘Palmer’ this is the hinge of Locke’s theory.135 As Sterk notes ‘… the author 
more than most property claimants appears quite likely to satisfy the Lockean 
proviso.’136 The latter part of Locke’s quote places an important caveat or 
negative requirement on the amount of procurement man can enjoy, he must 
leave enough of what he claims for himself in common for others. The second 
negative requirement is that an individual can only appropriate; 
                                                           
132 Ibid. Section 27.  
133 Ibid. Section 27.  
134 Ibid. Section 27. 
135 T. G. Palmer ‘Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects. (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy p. 834. However, 
Palmer objects to Locke’s theory as a justification for IPRs ‘If one wishes to insist on the justice 
of intellectual property claims, ownership rights in ourselves would have to be rejected as a 
foundation for property and independent arguments offered for rewarding moral desert based on 
labour. This is a difficult task, and one that has not been adequately undertaken, for reasons that 
Hume, Kant and others have pointed out: desert has no principle, that is, no readily available and 
intersubjectively ascertainable measure. Such as inherently subjective standard provides a poor 
foundation for the abstract and general rules that guide conduct in a great society.’ 
136 S. Sterk, ‘Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law’ 94 (5) Michigan Law Review, 1996 p. 1235. 
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‘… [a]s much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before 
it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is 
beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.’137 
 
Locke’s concern for ‘the commons’ reflects Harris’s concept of citizenship. This 
form of citizenship, prevents individuals from amassing the resources of 
mankind to the detriment of the community and its members. Over consumption 
or exploitation negatively impacts upon ‘community membership’ and results in 
the marginalisation of certain members of the community.138 Locke asserts that 
‘[h]e that had as good left for his Improvements, (sic) as was already taken up, 
needed not complain.’139 The corollary being that where the community has not 
left enough behind for others, those individuals have been discriminated against. 
Where this occurs, social citizenship allows for a redistribution of wealth to the 
needy. In many ways the ARR recognises that visual artist’s ‘community 
membership’ is negatively affected in situations where they cannot realise the 
full value of their work. The ARR attempts to remedy this situation by allowing 
visual artists to participate in the profits of subsequent sales.  
 
                                                           
137 Locke, supra note 81, Section 31.  
138 D. Attas ‘Lockean Justifications of Intellectual property’ in A. Gosseries, A. Marciano and A. 
Strowel (eds.), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (Chippenham and Eastbourne: 
Palgrave & Macmillan, 2008) p. 46; Attas notes that Locke’s proviso against spoilage ‘is 
motivated not by the aesthetic of rotting fruit or the insult to the Creator, but by what is denied to 
other needy people. Thus it does not understand waste as the ruin or perishing of foodstuffs, but 
the non-use, abuse or misuse, that is to say, the criminally inefficient use, of resources’. 
139 J. Locke Two Treatises of Government (3rd ed. 1698) P. Lasett ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970) p. 333 (Alternative version/edition to heretofore cited Whitmore and 
Fenn ed.). 
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For Locke, like Hegel, the extent of man’s property rights, as well as the right to 
liberty and life, are limited by his interaction with government.140 The content 
and limits of rights that existed before government, in ‘the state of nature’ are 
altered when man enters into society.141 Locke states that man enters into society 
by consent and by an agreement to leave the ‘state of nature’ and to be governed 
by the majority.142 This does not mean that the laws of nature cease upon 
entering society, they merely adopt a known and declared character.143 
Government proceeds to make laws and these laws for Locke are only legitimate 
if they respect man’s natural inalienable rights.144 However, government can 
determine the content of these fundamental, inalienable rights and while Locke 
insists upon limited government, that is government limited by the end for which 
it was created, namely the preservation of property,145 what counts as property 
and what counts as respect for life and liberty is for government to define.146 
Conversely, it is these natural rights that limit government, government cannot 
legitimately and arbitrarily take man’s life, liberty or property without 
justification.147 Accordingly, this creates a tension between the natural rights of 
man and the prerogatives of government. To ascertain how Locke overcomes this 
dilemma the following section considers Locke’s theory of legitimate 
government.  
 
4.7.1.1 Locke’s Theory of Legitimate Government 
 
                                                           
140 Locke, supra note 81, Section 89. 
141 Ibid. Sections 96 - 99. 
142 Ibid. Section 15. 
143 Ibid. Section 95, 135 and 137.  
144 Ibid. Chapter XI.  
145 Ibid. Section 138.  
146 Ibid. Chapter IX.  
147 Ibid. Section 135 - 138.   
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Locke’s theory of legitimate government has some important implications for his 
theory of property. Locke believes in certain fundamental rights that constrain 
what government can do and he believes that those rights are natural rights, not 
rights that flow from law or from government. Locke also places great weight on 
the idea of consent. Consent is a familiar concept in moral and political 
philosophy. Locke says that legitimate government is government founded on 
consent and this consent arises when man decides to leave the condition that is 
the ‘state of nature’.148 Locke says that the main reason why man decides to 
leave ‘the state of nature’ is because it contains certain inconveniences.149 In the 
‘state of nature’ anyone can enforce the law of nature. Violations of the law of 
nature are acts of aggression which must be responded to. In the ‘state of nature’ 
where there are no police, judges or jury, every man is effectively the judge and 
jury in his own case.150 There is therefore no agreed upon punishment for 
varying acts of aggression and as such this gives rise to one of the 
inconveniences of the ‘state of nature’. Where there is no certainty as to the 
accepted degree of punishment for an act of aggression this infringes upon man’s 
enjoyment of his own inalienable rights to life, liberty and property. Perhaps one 
man steals an orange from another man and the other decides that death is a 
suitable response to this violation. For Locke, in the ‘state of nature’ such 
apparently unmeasured responses are acceptable, he says that: 
 
‘[o]ne may destroy a man who makes war upon him … for the same 
reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men … have no 
                                                           
148 Ibid. Section 14.  
149 Ibid. Section 13, 90.  
150 Ibid. Section 13.  
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other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts 
of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to 
destroy him, whenever he falls into their power.’151 
 
Seen from this perspective, the ‘state of nature’ is far from idyllic. What 
appeared to be a benign state where there is a law that respects people’s rights 
and those rights are so strong that they are inalienable, is in actual fact quite a 
violent and uncertain place. Locke says that this is why people leave the ‘state of 
nature’. The means of removing oneself from the ‘state of nature’ is consent. 
Man must give up his right to act as judge and jury and consent to creating a 
government and a legislature that will make laws based on what the majority 
decides. Those wishing to leave the ‘state of nature’ must agree or consent to 
whatever the majority decides.152  
 
Again it is important to remember why people leave the ‘state of nature’ and 
consent to be governed by the majority, thereby entering into a social contract of 
sorts. Man does this to protect his right to property. Accordingly Locke says that: 
 
‘the Supreme power [by which he means the legislature] cannot take from 
any man any part of his property without his own consent. For the 
preservation of property being the end of government and that for which 
men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that people 
should have property.’153  
 
                                                           
151 Ibid. Section 16. 
152 Ibid. Section 96.  
153 Ibid, Section 138. 
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After all, the protection of the right to property is the reason why people enter 
this social contract. Locke’s right to property is a natural right but then Locke 
states that; ‘[m]en therefore in society having property, they have such a right to 
the goods, which by the laws of the community are theirs… .’154 Sandel places 
emphasis on the latter part of this statement – laws of the community – which 
implies that the right to property is no longer a purely natural right but is now a 
right by convention, conferred by the government.155 However, at the end of this 
passage Locke says that ‘… it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative 
power … can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, 
or take any part of them at pleasure.’156 Yet, while the government cannot 
arbitrarily interfere with the property rights of the people, for government to exist 
and function it must be financed by the people:  
 
‘Government cannot be supported without great charge, and it is for 
everyone who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his 
estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his 
own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by 
themselves or their representatives chosen by them.’ 157  
 
This exposes the dual nature of property for Locke; it is at once a natural 
inalienable right and simultaneously a right defined by convention, by 
government, by the consent of the people. Therefore an arbitrary taking of 
property by the government would violate the laws of nature but what constitutes 
                                                           
154 Ibid.  
155 M. J. Sandel Justice: What’s the Right thing to do? (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2009) ch. 6, 
referring to Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, Section 119 and 120.  
156 Locke, supra note 81, Section 138. 
157 Ibid. Section 140. 
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property is defined by the government and may be limited to whatever extent is 
deemed necessary to fulfil the social contract which man has voluntarily entered 
into. Such a construction naturally leads one to understand Locke’s limited 
government as not being all that limited. However the veracity of natural rights 
under Lockean construction should not be under estimated. It is these natural and 
inalienable rights to property (and by property, Lock also means liberty and 
life)158 that creates the limits of legitimate government. It is not what man 
consents to that limits government, it is what he lacks the power to give away 
when he enters into a social contract, based on consent, that limits government: 
  
 ‘… for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in 
himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or 
over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property 
of another.’159 
 
Antecedent to entering the social contract is the implicit understanding that 
man’s natural right to property cannot be subjugated in its totality. This is the 
underlying premise of Lockean property theory. Finally, what counts as a 
violation of natural rights by limited government are arbitrary decisions by 
government.160 For any form of limited government to act legitimately it must 
treat all its citizens equally. Locke is against arbitrary acts by government but if 
there is a general law that is applied equally to the citizenry then that law does 
                                                           
158 Ibid. Section 6.  
159 Ibid. Section 135. Here, Locke draws on his contention that man owns his labour but not 
himself: that being the property of God.  
160 Ibid. Section 135. 
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not amount to a violation of the citizen’s natural rights. The primary limit on 
government is that it does not act arbitrarily.  
 
The following section considers whether Locke’s theory of property supports a 
property based justification of the artists’ resale right.  
 
4.7.1.2 Locke’s Theory of Property Rights and the Artists’ Resale Right 
 
The first challenge in relying on Locke’s theory of property as a justification for 
authors’ rights and thereby the artists’ resale right concerns the divergent 
‘commons’ of tangible and intangible assets. Attas makes the contentious 
argument that Locke’s theory of property cannot be used to justify intellectual 
property.161 Attas contends that tangible property and intellectual property are 
fundamentally different entities that cannot be reconciled under a theory of 
property. For instance, while tangible property is a right in perpetuity, 
intellectual property, as defined by ‘… the most common forms of 
institutionalised intellectual property, such as patents and copyrights … are 
limited in time.’162 Furthermore, ‘…a material conception of assets, seems 
unsuited to the sphere of ideas’163 Attas questions whether the intellectual 
commons refers to ‘… the historical basic knowledge available to all’164 and if 
so, asks how a property right under the Lockean construction is possible where 
new ideas draw heavily from the ‘historical basic knowledge’?165 As an answer 
                                                           
161 Attas, supra note 138, at p. 29.  
162 Ibid. at p. 30.  
163 Ibid. at p. 40. 
164 Ibid. 
165 See also H. Bloom The Anxiety of Influence: A theory of Poetry xiii 2nd ed (Oxford: OUP, 
1997) as cited in Gordon, supra note 109, at p. 76 fn. 2.  
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to this Gordon states that ‘[a]ll artists create using much they have not 
themselves created, both in terms of physical and human surroundings and in 
terms of cultural heritage. The holders of a common cultural tradition resemble 
the inhabitants of Locke’s state of nature: their riches are largely not of their 
making.’166 Furthermore, Gordon states that ‘… anyone can copy from the public 
domain, and claim copyright in what he has added, regardless of whether doing 
so will impair others’ use of the underlying domain that all inherited together’.167 
The latter part of this statement reflects the exclusive nature of intellectual 
property, however as noted earlier, the distinctive characteristic of intellectual 
property is that it is ‘… easily replicated and that enjoyment of these products by 
one person does not prevent enjoyment by others.’ 168 On this Sterk observes that 
‘… unlike land, intellectual property offers no potential for a tragedy of the 
commons. Once created, intellectual property is a public good, capable of 
enjoyment by millions … ,’169 therefore over use is not possible, at least not in 
the conventional sense.170 Whatever creators take from the ‘commons’ still 
remains in the ‘commons’ for others to repurpose and shape as they wish. In this 
light, Gordon’s ‘impairment’ or restriction of other’s use refers only to the 
property subsisting in the newly created work which is a combination of the 
intellectual commons plus the creator’s labour. 
 
Applying Gordon’s understanding of IP and Lockean theory to Attas’s remarks, 
it may be observed that Attas’s metaphysical argument, while compelling, 
                                                           
166 Gordon, supra note 109, at p. 78. 
167 W. J. Gordon ‘Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously’ (2004) 75 
University of Chicago Law Review p. 78. 
168 See M. Landes and R. A Posner The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property law 
(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
169 Sterk, supra note 136, at p. 1236.  
170 Over use may occur in the sense that society no longer values the good; similarly to society 
tiring of a pop song. 
 228 
ignores the fact that under the original Lockean construction, tangible matter – 
‘the common state of nature’171 – presupposed property rights. Man’s mixing of 
his labour required the soil of the earth to exist, as tangible matter, to complete 
his equation.172 The application of the Lockean theory to intellectual property 
therefore requires ‘something’ to presuppose these developed rights: ‘the historic 
basic knowledge’ or as more commonly known, the ‘commons’ or the ‘public 
domain’. What exists in the intellectual commons (the intellectual commons 
referring to the expression of ideas outside the protection of IP) is for present 
purposes analogous to the soil of the earth; the state of nature. Man may mix his 
labour with these previously expressed ideas and in doing so claim something of 
it as his own. And where these previously expressed ideas are still within one of 
the aforementioned regimes of protection173 he may seek a licence, permission to 
use these intangibles in the new work.174 He may not however acquire ‘… the 
benefits of another’s Pains which he had no right to, … ;175 meaning, in this 
context, that any infringement of established IPRs is precluded. Under this 
construction there is no perceivable obstacle to applying Locke’s theory to 
intangible property.176  
                                                           
171 Locke, supra note 81, Section 27. 
172 Ibid. ‘Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 
property in his own person. This no body has any right to but him. The labour of his body and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes from out of the 
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common state of nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it that excludes 
the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, 
no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and 
as good left in common for others.’ 
173 Copyright, Trademark, Patents etc.  
174 Gordon supra note 109, at p. 78, notes that excluding users from using the intellectual work of 
others does not make them any worse off and leaves them with ‘enough, and as good’ as the 
labourer herself possessed. ‘Denying them use of a work or making them pay for it simply 
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175 Locke, supra note 81, Section 34.  
176 Ghosh, supra note 23, at p. 47 - fn 71 ‘ tying ethics to intangibles in the Lockean framework is 
common both to those who are sympathetic to Locke in copyright’ see Gordon supra note 109. 
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Attas is not the only critic of Locke’s theory. Rawls rejects Locke’s theory that 
each person is entitled to the fruits of their labour and instead adopts a distinctly 
utilitarian position.177 While he acknowledges that natural talents should be 
rewarded, these rewards should only extend to  ‘… cover[ing] the costs of 
training and to encourage the efforts of learning, as well as to direct ability to 
where it best serves the common interest’178 Rawls’s ‘difference principle’ 
allows for the distribution of resources179 but only to the extent that ‘… 
rewarding the talented would improve the lot of the least fortunate.’180 For 
Rawls, rewarding authors is only justified on an incentive and therefore 
utilitarian basis. The libertarian, Robert Nozick counters the Rawlian position, 
adopting elements of the Lockean formula. He acknowledges that while man’s 
natural assets/abilities, from a moral position, have been allocated arbitrarily, 
man is nonetheless entitled to them and to what flows from them.181  
 
If the foregoing can be accepted as presenting a justification for IPRs based upon 
Lockean theory, the next task is to determine whether Locke’s theory provides a 
theoretical underpinning for the ARR. Clearly under the Lockean construction 
visual artists already own their ‘works of art’; they have mixed their labour with 
the raw materials of canvas and paint.182 Subsequent to the creation of the art the 
                                                           
And to those who critique Locke; see J. Craig ‘Locke’s Labor and Limiting the Author’s Right: 
A Warning Against a Lockean Approach to Copyright Law’ 28 Queen’s Law Journal 1 (2002).  
177 Rawls supra note 27, at pp. 311 - 312. 
178 Ibid.  
179 Ibid. 
180 Sterk, supra note 136, at p. 1237. 
181 Nozick, supra note 21, at p. 226. However, Nozick advocates for a society with minimal state 
interference and therefore in Nozick’s version of Utopia, intellectual property rights may not 
exist. 
182 S. Breyer ‘The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and 
Computer Programs’ (1970) 84 (2) Harvard Law Review p. 289 fn 29. Breyer questions why it is 
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artist then sells the work to a willing purchaser. Under the auspices of the EU 
ARR Directive, and unlike other spheres of copyright and related rights, visual 
artists are entitled to a subsequent royalty payment upon the re-sale of the 
original work.183 For authors and composers alike the doctrine of exhaustion 
prevents further compensation after the first-sale of a copy of the work.184  
 
In this regard, the question that arises is whether the ARR can be justified under 
a Lockean construction? Arguably under the Lockean formulation the artist’s 
entitlement has been exhausted by the first sale.185  
 
In a limited sense, the answer to this question is clearly no. Where labour secures 
the labourer with his just desert – property – so too does the sale of that property 
for monetary gain or fair exchange. Under a sale agreement the labourer’s 
property rights are exchanged for cash reward or a benefit in kind. In this event 
the labourer has given up or exhausted his property rights and cannot claim any 
further rights. Thus, an ARR under Lockean construction is impossible.  
 
However, this is not the end of the matter, where Locke’s theory of government 
is applied to the ARR an alternative result may be found. As noted above ‘… the 
Supreme power [the legislature] cannot take from any man any part of his 
                                                           
appropriate to deem the author’s creation his property and further questions why under the 
Lockean construction property in intellectual products ought to be created,  
183 A portion of the sale price is allocated to the artist in the form of a royalty, see Article 4, 
Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on 
the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art. OJ L 272/32. Note, 
however that not every resale results in a royalty payment. There are a number of exceptions 
under the Directive.  
184 In this regard, reference is being made to the rights that exist in each individual and tangible 
copy of the work and not the intangible body of work as a whole. In practical terms the author 
cannot claim compensation from a purchaser who goes on to sell his copy of the author’s work 
for a profit.  
185 For Further see, Sherman and Bently, supra note 13 at pp. 12 - 15, and pp. 151 - 153.  
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property without his own consent.’186 It may be presumed that given the choice, 
few purchasers of fine art would agree to additional taxes or royalties being 
levied against their purchases. Nevertheless, Locke’s ‘legitimate theory of 
government’ and in particular his reference to the ‘laws of the community’ 
allows the legislature to determine the nature and scope of property rights. 
Therefore just as an easement, or a profit-a-prendre, may attach to a parcel of 
land, a royalty may attach to a work of art.187 There are however two provisos in 
this context. Firstly, man cannot give up his inalienable rights to property in its 
entirety, and secondly, that any encumbrance is of universal application and that 
government may not act arbitrarily against any one man or section of society. It 
would appear to this author that the ARR satisfies both these requirements in that 
it does not deprive subsequent purchasers of their property rights in their entirety, 
and that the royalty is payable by a designated subsection of the art market: i.e. 
the re-sellers of visual art protected by copyright.  By applying the law 
universally, albeit to a discrete subsection of the community, the government has 
not acted arbitrarily. Once this is understood, Lockean theory can indeed provide 
a justification for the artists’ resale right.  
 
Concluding on this point, there is nothing within the Lockean construction that 
precludes the ARR Directive from being grounded in property law theory; the 
question however remains whether the reform proposals of Chapter 6 remain 
within the limits of Locke’s theory. That question is addressed therein.   
 
4.7.2 Utilitarianism and the Artists’ Resale Right 
                                                           
186 Locke, supra note 81, Section 138. 
187 Under the Lockean construction the legislature can legislate for these encumbrances.  
 232 
 
Sterk observes that ‘[s]ince the Statute of Anne, copyright rhetoric has focused 
both on economics and on “deserving” authors. The statute’s preamble deplored 
the growing tendency of printers and booksellers to reprint books “without the 
Consent of the Authors or Proprietors … to their great Detriment, and too often 
to the Ruin of them and their Families.”’188 According to the preamble, not only 
were these printers and booksellers usurping revenues from deserving authors, 
but copyright legislation was also needed “for the Encouragement of Learned 
Men to Compose and write useful Books.”189 Indeed, the statute was entitled “An 
Act for the Encouragement of Learning.”190 
 
Hettinger argues that in order to promote the creation of valuable intellectual 
works authors must be granted property right in these works: 
 
‘Without the copyright, patent, and trade secret property protections, 
adequate incentives for the creation of a socially optimal output of 
intellectual products would not exist. If competitors could simply copy 
books, movies, and records, and take one another’s inventions and 
business techniques, there would be no incentive to spend the vast 
amounts of time, energy, and money necessary to develop these products 
and techniques. It would be in each firm’s self-interest to let others 
develop products, and then mimic the result. No one would engage in 
original development, and consequently no new writings, inventions, or 
business techniques would be developed. To avoid this disastrous result, 
                                                           
188 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (Eng). 
189 Ibid.  
190 Ibid. 
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the argument claims, we must continue to grant intellectual property 
rights.’191 
 
From a utilitarian perspective, IPRs can be justified insofar as they promote the 
‘greatest good’ for society. These rights maximize social utility192 by providing 
authors with incentives and rewards, which in this sphere encourages the arts and 
its development.193 The utilitarian justification for intellectual property rights, 
including copyright, therefore posits that it is necessary to ‘… strike an optimal 
balance between, on the one hand, the power of exclusive rights to stimulate the 
creation of inventions and works of art and, on the other hand, the partially 
offsetting tendency of such rights to curtail widespread public enjoyment of 
those creations.’194 The dichotomy may be reduced to ‘incentive and ‘access’.  
 
There are a number of problems with the utilitarian justification for copyright. 
Firstly, utilitarianism assumes that without legal models of protection, such as 
copyright, creators would not create. Zemer notes that the ‘propagation of 
literary and artistic works is dependent, in many instances, on economic reward. 
Copyright protection promotes creativity, social and cultural exchange and 
                                                           
191 E. C. Hettinger ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (1989) 18 (1) Philosophy and Public Affairs 
p. 48.  
192 This thesis will not engage in a definition of ‘utility’. As noted by Resnik, supra note 120, it 
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193 Resnik supra note 120, at p. 324.  
194 Fisher, supra note 114, at p. 169. 
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interaction.’195 In Breyer’s view ‘… an author will not write unless he is paid his 
“persuasion” cost’.196  Against this, Tushnet is of the opinion that  ‘… the desire 
to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the need for 
economic incentive. Psychological and sociological concepts can do more to 
explain creative impulses than classical economics.’197 Building on this Sterk 
questions the blanket application of the model to all creators – amateurs and 
professionals alike – arguing that hobbyist photographers will create no less snap 
shots irrespective of the existence of copyright protection. The opposite is true of 
professional photographers, authors and indeed publishers who are, in the main, 
driven by a need to secure monetary reward.198 The difficulty with this type of 
argument is that it must rely on empirical data which may not exist.199 As Robert 
Merges points out, ‘[t]he sheer practical difficulty of measuring or approximating 
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all the variables involved means that the utilitarian program will always be at 
best inspirational. Like designing a perfect socialist economy, the computational 
complexities of this philosophical project cast grave doubt on its fitness as a 
workable [model].’ 200  Related to this, Gordon, questions whether ‘… subsidies, 
cash prizes, reputational advantage, or tax credits …’ may act as a better means 
of incentivising creators.201 Despite these criticisms there are those who believe 
that the greatest benefit that utilitarianism has to offer is as an analytical tool 
rather than as a justification for IPRs. Svatos sees utilitarianism as a useful 
means of analysing whether policy choices are most beneficial for society,202 
concurring, Resnik concludes that  ‘… the utilitarian justification for IP is … the 
dominant paradigm for evaluating laws and policies.’203 
 
The second major failing of a utilitarian justification for intellectual property and 
copyright is that it might produce more harm than good. Resnik gives the 
example of patent law and the possibility that a company might patent an 
invention in order to keep it off the market.204 It is also possible to patent an 
invention that has only harmful uses – i.e. guns and ammunition.205 In addition, 
Paine notes that the utilitarian approach does not provide a convincing account of 
trade secrets and private, personal information.206 Such information may indeed 
benefit the wider public thereby providing the ‘greatest good’ but these 
institutions do not demand that these rights holders disclose such socially 
                                                           
200 R. Merges, supra note 199, at p. 3. 
201 Gordon, supra note 109, at p. 632. 
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valuable information.207  In the field of copyright, extensive term protection of 
copyright – life of the author plus 70 years – arguably prevents secondary users 
from appropriating copyrighted material in order to create secondary works. 
Examples include fan fiction and music sampling.208  
 
Furthermore Sunder contends that intellectual property is more than simply a tool 
for incentivizing creative production in the form of more things:209  
 
‘… intellectual property law must adopt broader social and cultural 
analysis. The fundamental failure in the economic story of intellectual 
property has to do with information’s role in cultural life and human 
flourishing … . Thus rather than narrowly viewing intellectual property 
as incentives-for-creation – that is, as merely economic or technology 
policy – we must understand intellectual property as social and cultural 
policy. Increasingly in the Knowledge Age, intellectual property laws 
come to bear on giant-sized values, from democracy and development to 
freedom and equality.’210 
 
For Bentham the public good ‘ought to be the object of the legislator; general 
utility ought to be the foundation of his reasoning.’211 In order to achieve this 
there has to be a balancing of individual interests with communal welfare. This 
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idea of the balancing of interests plays an important part in moral and political 
theory however Bentham did not adequately show how such balancing could be 
achieved.212 Social Citizenship  presents a rubric in which the contrasting 
requirements of individual interests and communal welfare may be aligned. 
Under Harris’s formulation, where an individual has been deprived of full 
community membership – for instance, where they have been deprived of a 
livelihood/work – they are entitled to compensation. However, and as already 
noted, for compensation to follow three requirements must be met; a) the social 
process which caused the harm can be identified, b) the agent who bears the 
responsibility for the harm can be identified, and c) the individual or group who 
are to benefit can be identified. The ARR satisfies this criteria in that the social 
process that causes the harm is the process by which the visual artist sells his 
work ‘at a mere pittance’ because he is unable to ascertain the true value of the 
work, only to see subsequent buyers profit substantially from a future sale.213 
The agent who bears the responsibility for causing the harm in this case is the 
buyer – art market intermediary. And the individual or group who are to benefit 
are visual artists. In addition, it must be remembered that the harm which 
citizenship theory writers such as Harris refers to is much more encompassing 
than the notion of harm that lawyers conventionally understand from areas of the 
law such as tort and contract law. The agent need not be morally culpable, only 
that he or she benefited from the transaction – the social process –  while another 
member of the community suffered a loss.214 
 
                                                           
212 Dias, supra note 2, at p. 593.  
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Concluding on this point, it may be noted that utilitarianism as a construct is 
conceivably more useful as a model for comparing competing policy options 
then as an adequate justification for the various forms which intellectual property 
rights assume. Indeed, utilitarianism does not adequately describe the processes, 
which drive visual artists to create. In addition, the inadequacy of utilitarianism 
to provide a functioning model for balancing the rights of individuals as against 
that of the wider society can be seen in its most starkest light when applied to 
visual artist’s who are unable to make an adequate living from their art and are 
therefore cast to the margins of society.    
 
However, for all its failings, utilitarianism and its ‘greatest good’ principle, when 
combined with citizenship’s compensation principle has the potential to create a 
defendable justification for a socially orientated ARR model. Under this 
construction, where the market fails to provide adequate compensation for visual 
artists, compensation through a social welfare scheme is justifiable on the basis 
that society as a whole is better off where more cultural goods are produced than 
not. Utilitarianism and social citizenship combined arguably provide a sufficient 
justification for the current ARR Directive, as well as for the reform proposals of 




The third justification for intellectual property rights that this thesis explores is 
the personhood or personality theory: ‘… creative people define themselves by 
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reference to their work, and giving them control over their work is essential in 
order to protect their self-conceptions.  Intellectual property rights are designed 
not so much to provide financial rewards as to allow the author to maintain a 
sense of identity.’215 
 
Juxtaposed to Locke’s theory of property rights lies Hegel’s personality theory. 
Several political philosophers and legal theorists such as Radin,216 Waldon217 and 
Rawls218 have drawn inspiration from Hegel’s work. Hegel posits that property 
provides an adequate means for individuals to achieve self-actualisation or self-
fulfilment.219 This has been described as the ‘personhood perspective’ whereby 
‘to achieve proper self-development – to be a person – an individual needs some 
control over resources in the external environment.’220 This theory maintains that 
a system of property and its incumbent rights represents the best means of 
achieving self-actualisation.221  
 
Personality or personhood theory intuitively lends itself to certain classes of 
intellectual property, none more so than copyright which deals with literary, 
dramatic and artistic works. Accordingly, many have justified the expansion of 
author’s rights, particularly in civil law countries, on Hegelian and Kantian 
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conceptions of personality/personhood.222 A central theme in Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right is the concept of human will, personality, and freedom. For Hegel, 
individual will represents ‘… the core of the individual’s existence, constantly 
seeking actuality (Wirklichkeit) and effectiveness in the world.’223 Under this 
construction ‘[p]roperty becomes [an] expression of the will, a part of 
personality, and it creates the condition for further free action.’ Property 
represents the first stage of this actualizing process. It is one of the first acts of 
free will in which the will as personality takes on a concrete, free form. However 
property, for Hegel, does not primarily exist to satisfy ordinary needs, desires or 
cravings, although he concedes that it can easily appear so.224 The underlying 
reality is that ‘property is the first embodiment of freedom.’225 To Hegel, the 
person, in its initial state is an abstract entity. He has no distinguishing 
characteristics and cannot be distinguished from others in this initial state. 
‘Property transforms abstract individuals into persons with distinguishing 
individual characteristics’.226 The acquisition of property enables individuals to 
relate to each other. For Hegel, property plays a crucial role in defining an arena 
of social life in which desires rather than law are the prime determinants of 
choice and activity.227 But property also has a more fundamental role; in the 
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223 Hughes, supra note 221, at p. 28. 
224 G. W. F. Hegel Philosophy of Right (1821; T. M Knox translation, Oxford, Clarenden Press 
1952, 1st ed., 1967 reprint) para. 45.  
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context of the individual’s social system it is essential to individual survival. To 
survive, man must accumulate property.228  
 
Hegel’s theory posits an absolute right of appropriation but this does not confer a 
monopolistic or exclusive entitlement.229 Hegel elucidates on this point by 
presenting the case of extremely needy individuals and the ‘rightful property of 
someone else’.230 There is in this situation a ‘right of distress’.231 The needy 
individual is entitled to take those resources he requires for survival. Drahos 
observes that for Hegel ‘… where the denial of property involves the denial of 
life, a person is truly being deprived of his freedom of will.’232 This part of 
Hegel’s theory has some interesting implications for a personality based 
approach to the ARR, particularly the ‘starving artist’ justification. In addition, 
the theory shares some of the traits inherent in social citizenship. Ultimately, 
property serves a merely instrumental purpose and the greater ‘good’ for Hegel is 
‘freedom realized, the absolute end and aim of the world’.233 The abstract right of 
property is subordinate to this end; it has no independent validity.234 
Furthermore, Hegel views property as serving a functional link between state and 
civil society. Property therefore becomes the subject matter of a social contract 
between individual personality and the state.235 This theme is reminiscent of 
Locke’s idea of legitimate government. 
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 242 
Hegel purports that the free mind may consider anything to be the subject matter 
of property whether that be tangible or intangible. There is no normative 
argument for what should and should not be the subject matter of property, just 
an explanation of their nature: ‘[p]roperty is whatever the will chooses to occupy, 
although the nature of the thing in question can determine the effectiveness of the 
occupation.’236 For instance, food may be completely appropriated but the 
elements may not.237 Furthermore, Hegel contends that ‘… mastery of things in 
the sense of occupying them is always likely to be incomplete238… our 
equipment, cunning and dexterity also condition the activity of occupation.’239 
However, for highly advanced societies there is very little that lies outside its 
potential for appropriation.   
 
In addition to the appropriation of property, Hegel posits that property may be 
abandoned or alienated through an act of will.240 Any such abandonment or 
alienation can only be asserted on goods that are ‘external by nature.’241 
Therefore it would appear that personality cannot be abandoned or alienated.242 
However, within the Hegelian framework, whatever is ‘not external by nature’ 
can be made external through alienation or by force, for instance personality can 
                                                           
236 Drahos, supra 227, at p. 79.  
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242 Ibid. at 67. This supports Hegel’s proposition that ‘… those goods, or rather substantive 
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be externalised through slavery.243 That does not infer that under such 
circumstances personality is lost forever and cannot be re-appropriated, on the 
contrary, regaining personality ‘… involves negating just those actions which 
make it external and therefore capable of possession by someone else.’244 For 
instance where the individual had given someone else power over their conduct, 
the re-appropriation of personality could only occur where the individual 
subsequently denied this external power over their conduct.  
 
Hegel’s claim that ‘property is the embodiment of personality’ has lead many to 
use his theory as a justification for IPRs in artistic works. Hughes posits that 
poems, stories, novels … musical works … sculptures, paintings and prints are 
‘natural receptacles for personality’ while ‘patents, microchip masks and 
engineering trade secrets’ are not.245 However, Drahos argues correctly that 
within Hegel’s framework ‘[a]rtistic forms and objects have no privileged 
position in this respect.’246 According to Hegel, ‘[a] person has the right to place 
his will in any thing … [t]he thing thereby becomes mine and acquires my will as 
its substantial end.’247 The imposition of artistic form is simply one means by 
which we can take possession of something. Under the Hegelian construction 
personality does not allow for special rights for artists and other creators. 248 The 
individual’s will may be used to appropriate property in any form; tangible or 
intangible, creative or non-creative. Hegel’s argument is that private property is 
an essential part of the process in which personality realises itself in the world. 
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However, Hegel does not suggest that there is a hierarchy of rights whereby 
certain types of labour results in greater entitlements. Interestingly, in the context 
of visual art, the visual artist may imbue his work with his creative sprit or 
personality but then this manifestation of personality may be appropriated by 
another and employed as an expression of their own will/personality. Therefore 
the artist’s personality may become another’s will expressed through the work of 
art.  
 
Another key feature of Hegel’s theory relates to the acquisition of ‘products of 
the mind’ by others and how this relationship between creativity and use is 
managed. For Hegel, products of the mind which are ‘peculiarly’ ours may, when 
externalized, be produced by others.249 Hegel does not see this as a problem but 
rather as a good. An individual, by coming into possession of externalized 
thoughts, whether in literary or inventive form, comes in contact with ‘universal 
methods of so expressing himself and producing numerous other things of the 
same sort.’250 For Hegel, intellectual products must be accessible and 
recognisable to others and therefore form the basis for learning by others. This 
view implies that the creative process cannot operate in a vacuum or in isolation. 
Contributions and developments to society’s ‘stock of knowledge’ – the 
commons – is dependant upon previous innovations and processes of thought 
that have been acquired by society through individual ingenuity.251 For Hegel 
knowledge is a stream that individuals can dip into and re-direct in a new 
direction, thus reworking knowledge and giving it a new form:  
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… the destiny [Bestimmung] of a product of the intellect [Geistesprodukt] 
is to be apprehended by other individuals and appropriated by their 
representational thinking, memory, thought, etc. hence the mode of 
expression whereby these individuals in turn make what they have 
learned …  into an alienable thing will always tend to have some 
distinctive form, so that they can regard the resources which flow from it 
as their property, and may assert their right to reproduce it.252 
 
According to Hegel the furthering of arts and science relies on ‘… the repetition 
of established thoughts, all of which have already been expressed and acquired 
from external sources.’253 Furthermore, Hegel’s conception of IP mirrors many 
of the attributes of both Lockean and Utilitarian theory. Hegel states that  
 
‘[t]he purely negative, but most basic, means of furthering the sciences 
and arts is to protect those who work in them against theft and to provide 
them with security for their property, just as the earliest and most 
important means of furthering commerce and industry was to protect 
them against highway robbery.’254  
 
The question that arises in this context is how society should confer property 
rights in this new form of knowledge? And how should society balance public 
versus private control of information? For Hegel, it is for communities and 
ultimately the legislature to set the balance between society’s access to 
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knowledge while protecting the creators of this knowledge. Like Locke, Hegel 
recognises the role of the state in delineating the boundaries between public and 
private property, thus recognising the importance of an intellectual commons.255 
 
One criticism of Hegel’s theory in relation to IP is that it provides too low a bar 
for creativity and therefore appropriation of intangible goods. Resnik is critical 
of Hegel’s theory when applied to IP because it is possible to obtain a copyright 
or patent despite minimal ‘self-expression.’256 For example, a photographer may 
randomly ‘point and click’, thereby producing a series of photos, vested with 
copyright, with little creative input. Resnik’s critique also reflects recent CJEU 
case law which has raised the test for copyright from ‘labour, skill and judgment’ 
to possessing a ‘creative’ element.257  However, this is not detrimental to Hegel’s 
theory. Hegel’s explanation of how personality begins to actualise itself in the 
world allows individuals to place their ‘will into any and everything.’258 Plucking 
an apple from a tree may require little effort but it does not prevent the individual 
from appropriating it. Similarly, under the Hegelian construction, the 
photographer can claim a property right in the photo despite minimal effort. 
Hegel’s test for appropriating property is therefore quite low and necessarily 
raises the question of how Hegelian theory can be used as a justification for 
intellectual property? There is a clear incongruity between the means of 
appropriation under Hegelian theory and that employed by traditional IP regimes. 
Again, like Locke, Hegel recognises the role of judges and legislatures in this 
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capacity. Society, through its institutions, may determine the nature and scope of 
IPRs. Accordingly, Resnik’s critique is not detrimental to Hegelian theory as a 
justification for IP.  
 
4.7.3.1 The Hegelian Construct and the Artists’ Resale Right 
 
Similar to Lockean theory, Hegel’s theory allows for the creation of property 
rights in intellectual, intangible goods. And like Locke, Hegel views the state as 
the primary arbiter of these rights. There is nothing in Hegel’s theory which 
contradicts the ARR and its interference with the property rights of subsequent 
purchasers; once the legislature has provided for it, it is deemed legitimate.  
 
As previously noted, for Hegel, ‘needy individuals’ have a ‘right of distress’259 
which is a right to take the resources that they require from society.260 The 
‘needy individual’ is entitled to take those resources from others, which he 
requires for survival.261 Similarly, the ‘starving artist’ rationale employed by the 
original proponents of the droit de suite maybe interpreted as a manifestation of 
this Hegelian justification albeit within a defined legal framework which delimits 
the boundaries of said transfer. Despite the apparently militant connotations of 
the ‘right to take’ Hegel’s personality theory maybe aligned and tempered in 
many respects by Harris’ theory of social citizenship. For Hegel, the deprivation 
of property, is a denial of individual will which excludes individuals from 
realising their full potential and from participating effectively as a member of 
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their community. This idea of social exclusion shares much with social 
citizenship and its demand for community membership. Where individuals are 
marginalized a right to aid is realized and citizens are entitled to compensation 
based on their contribution or harm endured. For Harris the ‘need principle’ 
plays a key role in defining citizenship262 and welfare rights.263 Similarly, George 
and Wilding posit that the ‘… fundamental principle of radical social policy is 
that resources, whether in the field of health, education, housing or income, 
should be distributed according to need.’264 In this context need is a social 
construct determined by the type of society in which we live.265 The concept of 
need is explored further in Chapter 5.  
 
The combination of Hegelian and citizenship theory therefore creates a dialectic 
based upon personality and community membership which most fully grounds a 
socially concerned ARR model. Social citizenship also presents a more 
justifiable basis for Hegel’s ‘needy individuals’ by recasting their ‘right to take’ 
as a right to compensation. Furthermore, where the compensation requirement 
demands a social process, an agent and a beneficiary to be identified, this 
safeguards society from an unfettered right of the needy to take the property of 
others. Social citizenship also implicitly identifies a role for legitimate 
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government in this process rather than allowing unfettered individual rights from 
dictating when a redistribution of resources occurs. This dialectic provides the 





This chapter has critically analysed three of the primary justifications for 
intellectual property. Social citizenship has been employed as a theoretical 
framework through which to view the application of these theories to the artists’ 
resale rights. It has been found that the dialectic of social citizenship and 
Hegelian theory overcome many of the shortcomings of current IP models as 
they apply to the ARR.  
 
A question that arises in this context is whether IPRs and more specifically 
copyright have the capacity to legitimately function as an instrument of social 
welfare? The first challenge in this regard concerns whether any precedent exists 
within the common law for the use of IPRs as an instrument of social welfare. As 
Sterk observes the Statute of Anne attempted to remedy a situation wherein 
authors were unable to benefit financially from their exploits to the ‘detriment’ 
and ‘ruination’ of them and their families.266 The Act possessed a social 
character that in no way resembled the ‘poor laws’ of the 18th century but instead 
responded to a market failure to recompense deserving authors. The Act instead, 
in recognising this social dis-service,  provided authors with the means to 
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participate in an economy designed to allow citizens reach their full potential. 
This in turn provided creators with a legitimate means of employment.  
 
As noted by Harris, employment is a ‘good’ in itself because it provides citizens 
with the wherewithal to participate in a community life.  However, the form of 
liberalism upon which the free market is premised requires a general duty of non-
interference where there are no special relationships. Therefore, in relation to the 
ARR, where visual artists have been compensated for the first sale of their work, 
no further ‘special-relationships’ exist; all rights and obligations under the initial 
contract for sale have been discharged. Accordingly, a strict application of free-
market liberalism does not provide adequate grounds nor support the ARR, 
indeed, this has been the charge of many of the opponents of the resale right.267  
 
However, the second condition of the preamble to the Statute of Anne states that 
the Act incentivises ‘learned men’ to compose and write ‘useful books’. The 
ARR Directive in recognising many of the deficiencies of the extant copyright 
rubric, and specifically its application to visual artists, encourages visual artists 
to create by guaranteeing them their just deserts. In this context where an artist’s 
work subsequently sells for sums far beyond the original sale price, an additional 
re-sale royalty follows.  It therefore provides a form of compensation to visual 
artists who were unable to assess the true value of their work at the time of its 
first sale.   
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Harris’s theory of citizenship takes this compensation principle and expands it to 
encompass situations where social processes operate in ways which prejudice 
one’s standing as a full member of the community. Harris’s argument proposes a 
theory of rights ‘… radically different from the property rights theory of market 
liberals. It suggests the existence of a right to have one’s status as a full member 
of the community protected by social rights in the name of citizenship.’268 Such a 
theory, when considered in conjunction with the IP justifications considered here 
not only provide a more complete grounding for the ARR Directive but also 
provide grounds for an ARR Directive that embodies a more socially progressive 
outlook.   
 
A second challenge in this regard concerns whether social citizenship as a 
communitarian theory of civic-republicanism has a place within common law 
jurisdictions that are the product of individualistic free-market liberalism. As an 
answer to this, and as suggested in section 4.2, it is proposed that both liberal and 
republican schools of thought acknowledge the competing forces of individual 
autonomy and community obligation. Neither school of thought guarantees 
absolute and untrammelled respect for individual rights to the detriment of the 
community or vice-versa. Harris notes that ‘[t]he welfare state civilizes market 
relations; it compensates for their inadequacies and promotes goals they could 
never achieve alone. It does not, however, seek totally to replace the market.’269 
Indeed, the modern ‘mixed economy’ of free-market liberalism and welfare 
statism – which exists in the EU today270 – reflects the communitarian ethos of 
community belonging and a refusal to allow the marginalisation of society’s 
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 252 
weakest members. Accordingly, Harris’s conception of citizenship, as a basis for 
welfare reform finds fertile grounds in an EU context. Under Harris’s model of 
citizenship, welfare reforms are justified once a social process can be identified 
along with the parties who benefit and suffer from the social des-service. In the 
context of this thesis, the social dis-service in question is the inability of many 
visual artists to make an adequate living from their profession. Accordingly there 
is nothing preventing a more socially focused ARR model grounded upon social 
citizenship theory.   
 
A related theme that was explored in Chapter 1 is that the EU ARR Directive, by 
adhering strictly to the strictures of extant EU IP institutions, emphasises ‘form 
over function’ or in other words places greater importance on the character of the 
ARR Directive rather than focusing on the function that it ought to serve. In this 
regard, social citizenship theory is drawn upon to justify the expansion of the 
ARR to encompass a social welfare function and in doing so fulfil its original 
intended function – to remedy the plight of the ‘starving artist’. 
 
In conclusion and to cite Brierly once more, ‘[law] is only a means to an end, and 
that end is to assist the problems of the society in and for which it exists.’271 The 
EU ARR Directive as it currently stands does not adequately assist the vast 
majority of visual artists and as such most be reformed to reflect the needs of 
these cultural creators.    
 
**** 
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Chapter 5 – The ARR Directive: a Means of Targeted 




The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section one focuses on the 
progressive realisation of social rights within the EU over the past 60 years and 
in doing so grounds the argument for a socially orientated ARR Directive. 
Having established a legal basis for reform the chapter progresses to consider the 
related issues of welfare, need and poverty. It is proposed that within the 
construct of the free-market, the exclusion that social citizenship seeks to 
alleviate is dependent upon the welfare state. However the extent of a state’s 
response to the issue of poverty is largely dependent upon whether it adopts a 
narrow or broad based understanding of welfare and indeed need.1 In this context 
the competing forces of welfare and poverty are explored before considering 
‘need’ and its function as a determinant of state welfarism.2 While these concepts 
are formulated and advanced at a certain level of abstraction, they nonetheless 
translate into concrete institutional practices evident in European welfare models 
and more pertinently the German and Norwegian ARR models, which are 
explored in the final section of this chapter.   
 
                                                           
1 Broadly conceived, the institution of welfare not only includes policies related to income 
security but policies relating to education, housing, employment and health initiatives. How a 
state deals with the issue of poverty is reflected in the degree to which it orientates its focus 
within each of these policy areas.  While each policy area plays a pivotal role in its own right, the 
focus of this thesis, being the artists’ resale right, naturally centres the debate within the income 
security policy arena.  
2 Welfarism refers to the principles and policies associated with the welfare state.  
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In considering whether visual artists might benefit from an ARR derived income 
security benefit this chapter evaluates empirical research on the socio-economic 
status of various creative classes with a specific focus on visual artists. This 
serves to highlight the often extremely precarious position of visual artists and 
the extent to which they experience social exclusion. Having established the 
financial benefits that an ARR derived, income security benefit is capable of 
providing for visual artists, the chapter outlines and evaluates two socially 
orientated ARR rubrics; namely that of Germany and Norway. These models 
form the basis of the reforms proposals of Chapter 6.  
 
5.1 EU Social Policy Framework 
 
Within the majority of discussions concerning Social Europe, the concept is 
framed as a broad commitment to ‘… a mixture of values, accomplishments and 
aspirations, varying in form and degree of realization among European states.’3 
Preece notes that ‘… beyond these broad values and orientations, the specific 
operation of the European social model is left explicitly undefined, reflecting the 
wide variety of welfare practices among the member states … .’4 Within the 
context of EU social rights this approach is also observable, largely due to the 
fact that EU social policy is structured around the principle of subsidiarity.5 
Accordingly, EU involvement in member state social policy remains limited to 
                                                           
3 A. Giddens ‘A Social Model for Europe?’ in A. Giddens, P. Diamond and R. Liddle (eds.) 
Global Europe, Social Europe (Alden: Polity Press, 2006) p. 15; D. V. Preece Dismantling Social 
Europe: The Political Economy of Social Policy in the European Union (London: 
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5 B. Cantillon, S. Marchal and C. Luigjes ‘Decent Incomes for the Poor: Which Role for Europe’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies (2017) (55) 2, p. 242.  
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soft governance initiatives, which include non-binding policy targets – for 
instance the Europe 2020 social targets – and the monitoring of member state’s 
progress towards these targets through the Open Method of Co-operation 
(OMC).6 Therefore, as noted by Hervey, ‘[a] distinctly ‘European’ model is 
discernible only at a high level of abstraction.7 With a view to understanding the 
dynamics, extent and form of EU social policy, the following section reviews the 
development of the EU’s social agenda over the past 60 years.  
 
Originally, the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic 
Community (EEC) (1957) was predominantly market driven.8 The six original 
EEC member states – Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands – adopted a laissez-faire position to the social 
implications that an unrestricted market might have on member states. 9  In line 
with the teachings of liberal economists such as Hayek and others, it was thought 
that an unrestricted market would create the optimal re-allocation of resources, 
thus enabling economic growth and social development.10 Accordingly, in the 
early days of the EU (as it is now) social harmonisation was seen as a natural 
development of economic integration and accordingly no specific social 
provisions were written into the founding Treaty.11 However, in 1973 when 
                                                           
6 Ibid. 
7 T. K. Hervey ‘Social Security: the European Union Dimension’ in N. Harris eds.  Social 
Security Law in Context (Oxford, OUP, 2000) p. 247.  
8 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
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Ireland, Denmark and the UK joined the EEC a more active approach to social 
reform was espoused. The inequalities created by an unfettered market were now 
evident and no longer considered to be in member states’ long-term interests.12 
As a result the following decades witnessed a growing commitment to the 
development of social policies as a necessary counter balance to the 
Community’s economic mandate.13 
 
Nevertheless the Treaty of Rome was not devoid of social responsibility, while 
the primary aim of the Treaty of Rome was to create a European economic 
community, twelve of the 248 Articles also referred to matters of social policy.14 
Article 118 gave the Commission responsibility for promoting close co-operation 
between member states relating to training and employment, working conditions, 
social security and collective bargaining but without stating the means of 
achieving these objectives. Article 119 defined the equal pay principle,15 Article 
121 provided for the implementation of common social security measures for 
migrant workers16 while Article 123 – 128 set out specific arrangements for 
                                                           
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.  That is not to say that the founding text of the EEC Treaty was devoid of any social 
character. Article 2 committed member states to raise standards of living while Article 3 
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of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community 
Official Journal L 149. 
 257 
operating the European Social Fund (ESF).17 The ESF was intended to 
compensate workers for the costs related to geographic and occupational 
mobility within the EU by providing assistance with the cost of vocational 
retraining and resettlement allowances.18 However, it also helped poorer regions 
‘catch up’ with wealthier member states and prevent ‘a race to the bottom’,19 
otherwise known as social dumping.20 The ESF made provision for equal pay, 
the improvement of standards of living and social harmonisation to the extent 
that these social objectives supported the overall aim of economic integration.21 
From the perspective of member states, Caune et al note that economic 
integration and its focus on a sound public budget, reducing national debt, 
lowering inflation (which means both wage moderation and stabilising social 
contributions) placed real constraints on member state’s social policies.22 
Similarly, from the supra-national perspective, Pierson and Leibfried, 
recognising the constraints of economic integration, note that national welfare 
states became ‘semi sovereign’, limiting member state’s control of the social 
                                                           
17 See European Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund (1975) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.1.2.html> (date 
accessed: 25th May 2017).  
18 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 3. 
19 The danger was that the ‘internal market’ might give states with lower minimum wage levels 
and lower social security provision an unfair competitive advantage over states with more 
developed minimum wage and social security structures. For more see H. Caune, S. Jacquot and 
B. Palier ‘Social Europe in Action’ in P. R. Graziano, S. Jacquot and B. Palier (eds.) The EU and 
the Domestic Politics of Welfare State Reforms (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) p. 20.  
20 While there is no exact definition of social dumping it may be described as ‘… a set of 
practices on an international, national or inter-corporate level, aimed at gaining an advantage 
over competitors, which could have important negative consequences on economic processes and 
workers’ social security. Examples include actions taken by actors from 'low wage' Member 
States to gain market advantage over actors from Member States with higher pay and social 
standards; multinational companies from ‘high wage’ countries searching for ways to avoid legal 
constraints by employing subcontractors from low-wage countries; and companies engaging 
cheaper and more vulnerable temporary and agency workers, or relocating production to lower 
wage and less regulated locations. Social dumping takes different forms in different sectors.’ EU 
Parliament Think Tank ‘Understanding Social Dumping in the European Union’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)59935
3> (date accessed: 26 May 2017).  
21 See Caune et al, supra note 19, at p. 20. 
22 Ibid.  
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field.23  However, this ‘shared competency’ resulted in an EU social agenda 
which has been described as ‘… modest, cautious and narrowly focused … .’24 In 
addition, the ‘Merger Treaty’ (1965)25 which brought together the institutions of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) 
thereby establishing a single Council and Commission did not result in any 
formal changes in the social policy field.26 Signs however, of a growing political 
commitment to social policy were evident in the Community’s Council of 
Ministers’ Resolution ‘concerning a social action programme’ (1974)27 (SAP)28 
which noted that economic expansion was not to be seen as an end in itself but 
should result in an improvement of workers quality of life.29 The SAP neither 
sought to establish a ‘… standard solution to all social problems …’,30 nor to 
take responsibility in this area away from member states, instead it continued to 
adopt a cautious approach, which in many ways foreshadowed the concept of 
                                                           
23 P. Pierson and S. Leibfried European Social Policy: between Fragmentation and Integration 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995).  
24 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 4.  
25 Treaty of 8 April 1965 establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Communities, OJEC No. 152.  
26 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 4. 
27 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme, OJ 13/1  
28 See EurWORK – European observatory of Working Life 
<https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/industrial-relations-dictionary/social-
action-programme> (date accessed: 2 April 2017). ‘Social Action Programmes (SAPs) are 
launched periodically by the Commission to promote the EU’s social objectives. SAPs identify 
areas for EU initiatives, which may take the form of legislative proposals and, more often, non-
legislative activities. The Community’s first SAP of 1974 was in response to a mandate issued by 
the Heads of States meeting in Paris at the Summit of October 1972. The final communiqué 
declared that the Member States ‘attached as much importance to vigorous action in the social 
field as to the achievement of economic union ... (and considered) it essential to ensure the 
increasing involvement of labour and management in the economic and social decisions of the 
Community’. Accordingly, the Commission was instructed to draw up a Social Action 
Programme. By a Resolution adopted on 21 January 1974, the Council of Ministers approved the 
Social Action Programme involving more than 30 measures over an initial period of three to four 
years. The three main objectives were: the attainment of full and better employment in the 
Community, the improvement of living and working conditions, and the increased involvement 
of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of the Community and of 
workers in companies.’  
29 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 4. 
30 Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme (OJ C 13/1 
12.2.74). 
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subsidiarity.31 Importantly, the EEC Treaty did not require a social programme, 
and the community did not have direct powers of intervention. Instead, its focus 
was on the promotion of co-operation between member states, therefore ‘ … 
action had to be justified on political rather than legal grounds.’32 Accordingly 
SAP represented the ‘political will’ to act albeit within the confines of the EEC’s 
economic objectives of free movement and equalisation of competition.33 Within 
this political economy, the ESF acted as a means of ‘… palliating the uneven 
effects of economic growth on weaker sectors of the population.’34 SAP set the 
scene for the development of the Community’s social policy for the next decade 
in areas such as education and training, health and safety at work, workers’ and 
women’s rights and poverty.35  
 
By the mid-1980s, pressure was building to further harmonize EU social 
policy,36 however given the lack of legislative competence and political will at 
that time, the adoption of social standards through European regulation was 
neither ‘realistic’ nor ‘desirable’.37 It was in this environment that the idea of a 
‘social space’ (espace social) developed as a means of harmonizing laws through 
convergence rather than regulation.38 In this regard, the ‘social space’ forwarded 
by Mitterand, in 1981, and adopted by the Commission under Delors, in 1985, 
attempted to reduce the role of the Commission, thereby signifying an alternative 
                                                           
31 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 4. 
32 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 5. 
33 Caune et al, supra note 19, at p. 23. 
34 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 5. 
35 Ibid. p. 6. 
36 Ibid. p. 6.  
37 S. Smismans ‘The Open Method of Coordination and Fundamental Social Rights’ in G. de 
Búrca and Bruno de Witte Social Rights in Europe (Oxford OUP, 2005) p. 218. 
38 Ibid. at p. 228. 
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approach to harmonization.39 Due to the aforementioned structural constraints 
(competency),40 and the non-binding nature of convergence measures over 
regulation,41 the ‘social space’ that Mitterrand advocated, merely provided 
aspirational rather than substantive guidance to member states in the 
harmonization of their social policies.42 These ‘soft governance initiatives’ 
encouraged member states to adopt traditionally corporatist principles that 
favoured the creation of policy objectives through stakeholder dialogue between 
member state governments, trade unions and employer representatives.  It is 
perhaps worth noting that in parallel with EU IP policy at that time, EU social 
policy was equally fragmented and incoherent.43 Nevertheless, the notion of a 
‘social space’ developed at a time when the importance of EU social policy was 
considered to be a pre-cursor to economic performance.44 For Delors it was the 
                                                           
39 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 6 notes that ‘By referring to a social space, Delors appeared to be 
seeking to introduce an equivalence of standards, which would be agreed and accepted by both 
sides of industry through social dialogue, a concept central to his thinking. The social dialogue 
was intended to make trade unions and employers act as initiators of social policy, on the 
understanding that in return, the Commission would refrain from developing new initiatives 
itself. The social partners would thus be concerned with principles and objectives, leaving 
member states to implement them within existing industrial relations frameworks, thereby 
achieving convergence in the employment and labour policy goals of the member states, rather 
than the standardisation of industrial relations institutions and processes.’ See also P. Teague The 
European Community: The Social Dimension. Labour Market Policies for 1992 (London: Kogan 
Page in association with Cranfield School of Management, 1989) p. 69 - 70. 
40 Hervey, supra note 7, at p. 235. ‘Before the Treaty of Amsterdam … virtually all social 
measures had to be enacted by unanimity in Council, and even after Amsterdam the unanimity 
procedure remains for various social security and social welfare measures.’ For instance Article 
153(c) TFEU – social security.  
41 Caune et al, supra note 19, at p. 20. 
42 B. Bercusson ‘The European Community's Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’ 
(1990) 53 The Modern Law Review, p. 631; In relation to the creation of a wage standard under 
the Community Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers: ‘[t]he final Draft does not make 
clear where the standard to ‘be assured’ is to be found: in law, collective agreements at various 
levels, national practices, or any of these.’  
43 For further, see Chapter 1; see also S. Weatherhill ‘Flexibility or Fragmentation: Trends in 
European Integration’ in J. Usher (ed.), The State of the European Union (Harlow: Longman, 
2000). 
44 D. Beretta (rapporteur) Social Aspects of the Internal Market: European Social Area (Brussels: 
European Communities/Economic and Social Committee, 1989). p. 5. 
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European social dimension that allowed competition to flourish and any attempt 
to exclude the former would be self-defeating.45  
 
When the Single European Act was signed in 1986 little had changed regarding 
the integration of social policy into the legislative framework.46 In 1989 the 
heads of all member states, with the exception of the United Kingdom, adopted 
the Community Charter of the Fundamental Rights of Workers.47 The preamble 
of the Charter states that ‘… the same importance must be attached to the social 
aspects as to the economic aspects and … therefore, they must be developed in a 
balanced manner.’48 However, similarly to the Council of Europe’s Social 
Charter, the Community Charter did not enjoy the force of law and was therefore 
not binding on its signatories. At a minimum, the Charter represented a ‘solemn 
declaration’ of intent by member states to establishing a baseline of social rights, 
49 and at best, it opened up the wider debate concerning the interventionist role of 
the Community in matters of social policy and the extent to which this might 
challenge national sovereignty. For Berghman however, the SEA was largely 
ineffectual and did nothing to expand the Community’s indirect and limited 
competence in the social welfare field.50  
 
                                                           
45 J. Delors ‘Preface’ in J. Vandamme, ed., New Dimensions in European Social policy (London: 
Croon Helm, 1985) p. xviii; G. Room ‘European Social Policy: Competition, Conflict and 
Integration’, in R. Page and J. Baldock (eds), Social Policy Review 6 (Canterbury: Social Policy 
Association, 1994) p. 21, In a similar vein, Room is of the opinion that European social policy 
was a ‘functional prerequisite of economic, monetary and industrial policy.’ 
46 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 9. 
47 Commission of the European Communities, Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers (Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990). 
48 Ibid, ‘Preamble.’  
49 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 8. 
50 J. Berghman ‘The Implications of 1992 for Social Policy: A Selective Critique of Social 
Insurance Protection’ Cross-National Research Papers, 2 (1) in S. Mengen (eds.) The 
Implications of 1992 for Social Insurance (London-Birmingham: London School of Economics, 
1990) p. 9.  
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The principles set out in the Community Charter were followed in the Agreement 
on Social Policy annexed to the Treaty on European Union (EU) signed in 
Maastricht on 7 February 1992.51 This was not a binding document and despite 
its ‘soft-law’ nature, the UK insisted upon its removal from the Treaty.52 The 
Maastricht summit once again illustrated the difficulties in reaching agreement 
on the ‘social chapter’. By including a separate Protocol on Social Policy the 
other eleven member states proceeded with the development and expansion of 
the Social Charter without the UK. In addition ‘… by incorporating the principle 
of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, member states seemed to be confirming 
their continued reluctance to develop an overarching social policy which might 
impinge upon national sovereignty.’53 At this point in time EU relations may be 
characterised as distinctly intergovernmental rather than supranational in 
nature.54 
 
As highlighted above, the first four decades of the European project contained    
varying attempts to incorporate member state’s diverse social policies into the 
burgeoning supranational EU framework. This resulted in a somewhat 
fragmented system of rights which, Weatherhill describes, in the broader sense, 
as an ‘accumulation of texts, breeding ever deepening intransparency.’55 
                                                           
51 Treaty on European Union (EU), signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, came into force on 
1 November 1993 Agreement and Protocol on Social Policy, concluded between the member 
states, with the exception of the United Kingdom.  
52 B. de Witte ‘The Trajectory of Fundamental Social Rights in the EU’ in G. de Búrca and B. de 
Witte eds. Social Rights in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 2005) p. 165.  
53 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 12. 
54 For further see Preece, supra note 3, at p. 19 - 42. At p. 26 ‘Informed by the realist tradition in 
international relations theory, the theoretical framework of intergovernmental maintains that the 
process of integration is being driven by states in an attempt to pursue their interests and enhance 
their relative power. …  the history of European integration may alternatively be read as an 
attempt to rescue the nation-state rather than a process that would ultimately subsume it (Cini 
2004 p. 96).’ See also Caune et al, supra note 19, at p. 33. 
55 Weatherhill, supra note 43, at p. 18.  
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Accordingly, a review of member state laws was a necessary pre-requisite to 
further legislative action in this area. In 1993 the Commission published a Green 
Paper outlining the acquis communautaire in the area of social policy56 before 
proceeding to develop a White Paper on ‘European Social Policy – a Way 
Forward for the Union’ in 1994.57 Arguably the most significant aspect of the 
White Paper was its clear intention to extend social rights to categories of people 
who were not in work, thereby establishing ‘… the fundamental social rights of 
citizens as a constitutional element of the European Union’;58 a goal which the 
Community Charter did not espouse.59 The recognition of social citizenship 
marked an important turning point in EU social policy.60 The 1994 White Paper 
was followed by a medium-term SAP for 1995 – 97, it contained the message 
that ‘… social policy is a productive factor facilitating change and progress 
rather than a burden on the economy or an obstacle to growth.’61 Hantrais notes 
that at this time: 
 
 ‘[t]he main challenge the Union faced was how to adapt social protection 
to sustain high standards of provision in a context of population ageing, 
changing family structures, a new gender balance and enlargement, 
without abandoning the values of solidarity and cohesion.’62  
 
                                                           
56 Commission of the European Communities, European Social Policy: options for the Union, 
Green Paper, COM(93) 551, 12.11.1993, OOPEC, 1993. 
57 European Commission, European Social Policy: a way forward for the Union, White paper, 
COM(94) 333 final, 27.7.1994, OOPEC, 1994.  
58 Ibid. p. 53. 
59 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 13. 
60 No longer was the focus restricted to workers rights. 
61 A Medium-term social action programme for 1995 – 97, Social Europe, 1/95; Progress report 
on the implementation of the medium-term social action programme 1995-97, Social Europe 
Supplement, 4/96 p. 1.   
62 Hantrais supra note 11, at p. 14. 
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Guided by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality SAP 1998 – 2000 
again reaffirmed the underlying relationship between social and economic 
progress – ‘… economic and social progress go hand in hand … ’63 – but for the 
first time specified what this might entail: ‘… a decent quality of life and 
standard of living for all in an active, inclusive and healthy society that 
encourages access to employment, good working conditions, and equality of 
opportunity.’64 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) continued this momentum by amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities.65 The Treaty renumbered the articles in the original EEC Treaty 
and following the British opt-in,66 the Agreement on Social Policy was 
incorporated into the main body of the Consolidated Treaty under Title XI on 
social policy, education, vocational training and youth.67 For Hantrais this move 
solidified ‘… member states commitment to the development of the social 
dimension as an important component in the process of European integration.’68 
                                                           
63 European Commission, Social action programme 1998 – 2000, COM(1998) 259 final, 
29.4.1998, OOPEC, 1998 p. 8 
64 European Commission, Social action programme 1998 – 2000, COM(1998) 259 final, 
29.4.1998, OOPEC, 1998 p. 8; Hantrais supra note 11, at p. 14 - 15, notes that the Union was 
facing increased pressure from major social challenges at the turn of the 21st century. ‘On the one 
hand, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was creating the economic conditions needed to 
underpin social progress. On the other, population ageing and, more especially, the ageing of the 
workforce were raising concerns about the implications of demographic trends for employment 
and social protection systems in Europe. In addition the prospect of enlargement was fuelling 
debates about the role that social policy could play in the transition to a market economy in 
candidate countries, raising questions about how they would bring their social legislation into line 
with other member states and develop adequate systems of social protection.’  
65 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997.  
66 P. Craig and G. De Búrca 2nd ed. The Evolution of EU Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2011) p. 656. ‘A 
new labour government was elected in the UK in May 1997. This precipitated a sea change in the 
British approach towards the European Union.’  
67 The original EEC Treaty articles 117 - 128 on social provision and the European Social Fund 
were re-numbered articles 136 - 150. 
68 Hantrais, supra note 11, at 14. In addition to various policy changes on the Environment and 
competition the Treaty inserted a new article 13 which extended action against discrimination to 
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De Witte on the other hand is more cautious in this regard, noting that while ‘… 
the new Treaty text extended the EU’s capacity for social regulation of the 
market, … this change was not accompanied by a major new role for 
fundamental social rights.’69 Nevertheless, the Treaty of Amsterdam signified an 
important milestone in EU social policy and while it did not establish the means 
by which social exclusion might be eradicated it did progress the realisation of 
this objective by further strengthening the position of social policy within the 
Treaties.  
 
The progressive realisation of social rights continued under the Treaty of Nice 
(2000).70  Due to the enlargement of the European Union one of the Treaty’s 
primary objectives was to ensure that smaller member states would not enjoy 
disproportionate influence in EU decision-making. While this would have clear 
ramifications for the development of EU social policy,71 the more direct effect on 
social policy brought about by the Nice Treaty related to the establishment of a 
Social Protection Committee and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.72 The 
Social Protection Committee – another soft governance initiative – was charged 
with monitoring the social protection policies of member states, promote 
exchange of information and prepare reports and opinions.73 The Charter of 
                                                           
encompass ‘sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ 
thereby expanding the notion of citizenship and inclusion.  
69 De Witte supra note 52, at p. 158. 
70 Treaty of Nice, adopted on 11 December 2000, ratified in 2002, and brought into force on 1 
February 2003.  
71 Mainly because the requirement of unanimity was replaced with the ordinary decision making 
process. For further see the European Parliament ‘Fact Sheet on the EU’ 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.4.1.html> (date 
accessed: 3 April 2017).  
72 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, OJ C 364.   
73 For further see N. Moussis Access to the European Union: Law, Economics and Policies 22nd 
ed. (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2016). < 
http://www.europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/5/13/05/03/?all=1> (date accessed: 13 July 
2017). 
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Fundamental Rights, respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
extended the boundaries of social policy beyond the workplace – as protected 
under the Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers74 – to the 
reconciliation of family and professional life, the protection and care of children 
and older people, social and housing assistance, preventive health care, and 
religious belief and practice.75 Hantrais notes that ‘[t]he aim was to consolidate 
the union’s commitment to the values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity, while continuing to respect the diversity of cultures and traditions.’76 
However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights – like the Charter of the 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers – again took the form of a solemn 
proclamation, which meant that it was not legally binding. While attempts were 
made to incorporate the charter into the Constitutional Treaty of Europe,77 that 
Treaty’s failure to be ratified did not change the ‘soft law’ status of the social 
charter.78  
 
The most profound change for EU social rights came with the Treaty of Lisbon 
in 2007.79 The focus on inclusion is most clearly expressed in Article 2(3) which 
again acknowledges the important link between social and economic policy: 
 
                                                           
74 The impact of which can be seem in the development of Directives such as the Pregnancy and 
Maternity Directive 2002/73/EC, The Working Time Directive 93/104/EC, The European Works 
Council Directive 94/45/EC (now updated by the recast Directive 2009/38/EC) and the directives 
based on the framework agreements on parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term work. 
75 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 17. 
76 Ibid.  
77 Constitutional Treaty for Europe, signed on 29 October 2004, not ratified by 1 November 
2006, OJ C 310 47/1. 
78 Hantrais, supra note 11, at pp. 17 - 18. 
79 Treaty Of Lisbon Amending The Treaty On European Union And The Treaty Establishing The 
European Community (2007/C 306/01) 17.12.2007. The Treaty took effect in 2009.  
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‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth 
and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming 
at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment … It shall combat social 
exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and 
protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between 
generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote 
economic social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member 
States.’80 [emphasis added]  
 
However, given the EU’s shared competence in the area of social policy, the 
forgoing is arguably merely aspirational, signposting a general intention to 
influence the social policies and legal framework of member states.  
Nevertheless, the Treaty of Lisbon elevated the standing of social rights within 
the Treaties; for instance, Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union now 
emphasises the EU’s social objectives, including full employment and solidarity 
between generations,81 but most importantly, Article 6(1) provides that ‘[t]he 
Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union […], which shall have the same legal 
value as the Treaties.’82 The Charter, therefore, constitutes primary EU law, 
against which the validity of secondary EU legislation and national measures 
                                                           
80 Ibid. Article 2(3).  
81 Article 3, Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On European Union (TEU) OJ C 326/13.  
82 Ibid. Article 6. 
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may be assessed.83 Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has direct effect84 and 
is binding on EU institutions and member states when implementing EU law.85  
 
Furthermore Title X TFEU recognises the social obligations of the Union and 
member states to its citizens, setting a number of objectives, including the 
promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper 
social protection and the combating of social exclusion.86 More specifically 
Articles 151 – 153 of Title X provide the legal basis upon which the Union may 
legislate for social change.87 Importantly, for the first time, the Treaty recognises 
the EU economy as a ‘… competitive social market economy …’ 88 and not 
simply an open market economy free of state intervention. A competitive social 
market economy may be described as a social and economic system combining 
free market capitalism, which supports private enterprise alongside social 
                                                           
83 European Parliament Fact Sheet on the European Union 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.6.html> (date 
accessed: 12 July 2017).  
84 J. Blackstock ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Scope and Competence’ (2012) Justice 
Journal pp. 19 - 32. <https://eutopialaw.com/2012/04/17/the-eu-charter-of-fundamental-rights-
scope-and-competance/> (date accessed: 12 July 2017).  
85 International Labour Organization Studies on Growth with Equity: Building a Social Pillar for 
European Convergence (Geneva: ILO, 2016) p. 25.  
86 Title X, TEU, supra note 81.  
87 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.  
See also <https://portal.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity/policyareas/Pages/SocialPolicy.aspx> (date 
accessed: 13 June 2017). Article 153 states that: ‘With a view to achieving the objectives of 
Article 151, the Union shall  support and complement the activities of the member States in the 
following fields: (a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' 
health and safety; (b) working conditions; (c) social security and social protection of workers; (d) 
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; (e) the information and 
consultation of workers; (f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and 
employers, including codetermination, subject to paragraph 5; (g) conditions of employment for 
third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons excluded 
from the labour market, without prejudice to Article 166; (i) equality between men and women 
with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; (j) the combating of social 
exclusion; (k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c).’ 
Clearly the provision of social security (section c) and the combating of social exclusion (section 
j) – provide the strongest legal basis and justification for the incorporation of an income 
maintenance provision within the current architecture of the ARR Directive. 
88 As opposed to democratic socialism where democratic control of a socialist economic system 
which combines political democracy with social ownership of significant elements of the means 
of production.  
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policies which establish both fair competition within the market and a welfare 
state.89 Reframing the ‘internal market’ as a social market economy rather than 
as a purely economic construct has inescapable normative value in terms of 
influencing the objectives and expanding the limits of the EU.  In addition the 
Treaty acknowledges the role of the state in combating social exclusion while 
promoting social justice and protection.90 For Kraatz, the Treaty therefore 
mandates that member state action is compatible with the objective of ‘social 
justice.’91 In this regard the socially oriented ARR models of Germany and 
Norway fulfil this function by providing a means of income redistribution, albeit 
between visual artists.  
 
Tentatively, the Lisbon Treaty also created a space for an EU cultural 
programme by amending the TFEU and the TEU. Article 167 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the principles and the 
current framework concerning EU cultural policy. Furthermore, Article 6 TFEU 
states the EU’s competences in the field of culture: ‘The Union shall have 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions 
                                                           
89 A welfare state is a concept of government in which the state plays a key role in the protection 
and promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens. It is based on the principles 
of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those 
unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life. The general term may cover 
a variety of forms of economic and social organization. The sociologist T.H. Marshall described 
the modern welfare state as a distinctive combination of democracy, welfare, and capitalism. See 
generally M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (eds.) Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of 
T.H. Marshall (London: UCL Press, 1996). 
90 R. Lister Poverty  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) p. 75, describes social exclusion as ‘a 
travelling concept’ that originated in the work of Max Weber; but more recently social policy 
analysts in the nations of the European Union have embraced it. Although the term means 
slightly different things to different analysts in different geographic contexts, the bottom-line 
shared understanding is that if categories of people are in fact victims of social exclusion, they 
are incapable of exercising their rights as citizens in the same way as those who are fully 
included into the polity.  
91 P. Kenna Housing Law, Rights and Policy (Dublin: Clarus Press, 2011) p. 121; Kenna asserts 
that ‘[s]ocial justice is a concept associated with rights … [and] … is used to demand a greater 
degree of economic egalitarianism, income or property redistribution, as well as laws and policies 
which promote equality of opportunity or equality of outcome for particular groups in society.’ 
 270 
of the Member States’.92 In addition the preamble to the TEU explicitly refers to 
the need to draw ‘…  inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe’. Article 3 TEU states that one of the EU’s key aims, as 
specified in the Treaty, is to ‘respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and 
[…] ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced’.93 
 
Post Lisbon, and in response to the economic down turn in 2007, the EU 
Commission published a renewed social agenda entitled ‘Opportunities, access 
and solidarity in 21st century Europe’.94 Under this initiative measures were 
introduced to enhance the impact of existing financial instruments such as the 
ESF and the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF).95 The ‘Europe 
2020 Strategy’ which replaced the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ of 2000 was such a 
measure.96 The Strategy placed  ‘inclusive growth’ – fostering a high-
employment economy that delivers social and territorial cohesion – as one of its 
primary objectives.  In addition the strategic agenda mentions for the first time a 
clear social target; with the objective of lifting 20 million people out of the risk 
of poverty by 2020, and by raising employment to 75% of capacity for the 20-64 
age group.97 The OMC has been employed in the achievement of these targets 
however Healy, Reynolds and Murphy note that the OMC has in fact ‘little 
impact’ and that over time the gap between economic/market policies and social 
                                                           
92 Supra note 87. 
93 Article 3, TEU. 
94 S. Kraatz  ‘Social and Employment Policy: General Principles’, Section C. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.10.1.html> (date 
accessed: 15 May 2017). 
95 Ibid.   
96 EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth /* COM/2010/2020 final 
*/ < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC2020> (date 
accessed: 18 July 2017).  
97 Kraatz, supra note 94.   
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policy continued.98 Furthermore the authors are of the opinion that the Lisbon 
strategy, which concluded in 2010, failed to deliver on either its economic or 
social goals and that the Europe 2020 strategy has already failed ‘… to get to 
grips with some of the major challenges that face the welfare state … .’ 99 
 
Nevertheless, the progressive realisation of social rights continues under the 
Commission’s Work Programme 2016 and its focus on creating a ‘European 
Social Pillar of Social Rights’. This initiative focuses on equal opportunities and 
access to the labour market, fair working conditions and access to adequate and 
sustainable social protection.100 In this regard the EU has resolved to ‘support 
and complement the activities of the Member States’ under shared 
competences.101  
 
In summary, this section has mapped the historic initiatives in the field of EU 
social policy from the Treaty of Rome to the Commission’s current work 
programme in this area. Since social policy is primarily a competence of member 
states, the progressive realisation of social rights within the EU has been at times 
slow and arduous but nonetheless real. The analysis in this section leads to the 
conclusion that EU action in this area ought not be conceived of as ineffective 
because of the soft governance approach adopted but instead pragmatic. Soft 
governance in this area has established social rights that EU institutions and 
                                                           
98 S. Healy, B. Reynolds, M. Murphy ‘The European Social Model and Ireland – Re-imagining 
for the twenty first century’ in B Reynolds and S. Healy eds. Does the European Social model 
have a Future: Challenges and Responses, 70 years after the Beveridge Report Dublin: Social 
Justice Ireland, 2012) p. 94. 
99 S. Healy, B. Reynolds and M. Murphy ‘The European Social Model and Ireland – Re-
imagining for the twenty first century’ in B. Reynolds and S. Healy eds. Does the European 
Social model have a Future: Challenges and Responses, 70 years after the Beveridge Report 
Dublin: Social Justice Ireland, 2012) p. 95; See also Caune et al, supra note 19 at pp. 36 - 37. 
100 Kraatz, supra note 94.   
101 Article 153 TFEU.  
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members states cannot ignore. Moves towards a ‘social union’ are as real as the 
aspiration of an economic union 50/60 years ago. It is now incumbent upon EU 
institutions and member states to reflect this social mandate in their laws. It is 
clear from the foregoing that social policy is an integral part of the European 
Union and that within both the TEU and TFEU there exists a legal basis for such 
reforms, namely, Article 3 and Article 6 TEU, Article 2(3) and Article 151 – 153 
TFEU. Furthermore, Article 4(2)(b) and (c) TFEU recognise the shared 
competence of the EU and member states in the area of social policy.102 The 
combined commitment to solidarity, social protection and the elevation of the 
Charter of Fundamental rights to that of the Treaties provides a legal basis upon 
which a socially orientated ARR Directive may be based.103  
 
The following section investigates the triumvirate of welfare, poverty, and need, 
and in doing so serves the purpose of linking the theories explored in Chapter 4 
with the reform proposals of Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.2 Social Citizenship and Social inclusion 
 
Before continuing to consider the concept of need it is informative to consider 
the relationship between social citizenship, social rights and welfare. Procacci 
describes the nexus as follows; ‘…  citizenship at the theoretical level refers to 
                                                           
102 Supra note 87.  
103 Hervey, supra note 7, at pp. 231 - 234: Legal basis provisions both provide the source of the 
EU’s competence to make law and policy and the legislative procedures to be applied. In the area 
of social security and social welfare, Hervey notes that since the Treaty of Amsterdam (Articles 
TFEU 151 – 53), “… the Council is empowered to ‘adopt, by means of directives, minimum 
requirements for gradual implementation’ in order to achieve the aims of ‘proper social 
protection’ and ‘the combating of exclusion’ and may ‘adopt measures designed to encourage co-
operation between Member States … in order to combat social exclusion.’” 
 273 
social rights whereas at the institutional level it refers to the welfare state.’104 
Social citizenship is directed towards regulating inclusion and exclusion so that 
those at the margins of society are brought closer to the centre. This raises the 
question as to how inclusion can be achieved? In the mixed economies of Europe 
where the free-market has failed to provide full employment and eradicate 
poverty,105 the welfare state assumes the role of countervailing force to unbridled 
capitalism106 and in doing so creates an environment in which social inclusion 
can and must exist.107 A number of related questions thus present: how is welfare 
to be determined, and who should benefit from the social welfare system?108 In 
answering these questions, the concept of ‘need’ requires attention because need 
provides the basis upon which social rights are construed.109 Spicker notes that 
‘[n]eeds are not neutral concepts … they have a normative purpose – they are 
used to make an argument for provision. It is implicit in the idea of need that 
some kind of response is possible – and it generally follows that something must 
be done.’110 Social rights, such as the right to participate fully in one’s 
community, are a direct response to the recognition of a society’s needs, however 
                                                           
104 G. Procacci ‘Poor Citizens: Social Citizenship versus Individualization of Welfare in C. 
Crouch, E. Klaus and D. Tambini (eds.) Citizenship, Markets and the State (Oxford: OUP, 2004) 
p. 50.  
105 T. Fahey ‘Welfare and Debt: Lessons from Beveridge and his Times’ in B. Reynolds and S. 
Healy eds. Does the European Social Model have a Future?: Challenges and Responses 70 years 
after the Beveridge Report (Dublin: Social Justice Ireland, 2012) p. 22.  
106 T. Novak Poverty and State Support (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1988); Novak 
advances the argument that within the market economy the unequal distribution of assets is not 
only a product of the market economy but is essential to the operation of the market economy.  
107 P. Spicker Social Policy: Themes and Approaches, 2nd ed. (Bristol: Polity Press, 2008) p. 25. 
Spicker notes that ‘… the idea of ‘social exclusion’ has been mauled and twisted … it was 
developed, initially, to refer to people who were not part of the networks of solidarity that others 
experienced – people who were left out of the systems of support developed in welfare states.’  
108 R. Mishra The Welfare State in Crisis (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1984) p. xi and ch. 1; Mishra 
notes that the state accepts responsibility for welfare and (via legislation and other constitutional 
means) provides mechanisms – institutions and procedures – for the delivery of the services and 
other forms of provision required to meet basic needs. The welfare state is defined partly by its 
functions and partly by the mechanisms which are developed to enable it to perform them.  
109 Spicker, supra note 107, at p. 51 - 66. 
110 Ibid. at  p. 66. 
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defined.111 The way in which a society or its government respond to these needs 
determines the degree to which an individual’s status in the community is 
preserved. This is a key component of social citizenship. The related concept of 
poverty also plays a pivotal role in this respect. In many ways the success and 
failure of the welfare state can be measured in terms of poverty.112 Furthermore, 
the extent of citizen’s social rights largely depends upon whether a broad or 
narrow interpretation of need is adopted.  Where a society adopts a broad 
interpretation of need, universal rights analogous to the social democratic model 
of Scandinavian countries follow.113 Where a society adopts a narrow 
interpretation of need, residual rights epitomised by the US social welfare system 
follow. This chapter draws on the related themes of social citizenship, welfare, 





In considering the argument for a socially orientated ARR model an 
understanding of the concept of welfare is required. The origins of the modern 
welfare state can be traced back to the Beveridge Report (1942)114 which 
identified the ‘Five Giant Evils’ of Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and 
                                                           
111 Ibid. at p. 51 - 66.  
112 B. Cantillon, S. Marchal and C. Luigjes ‘Decent Incomes for the poor: Which Role for 
Europe’ Journal of Common Market Studies (2017) 55(2) pp. 240 - 256; see also B. Cantillon 
and F. Vandenbroucke (eds.) Reconciling Work and Poverty Reduction: How Successful are 
European Welfare States? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 157 – 184. 
113 P. Dwyer ‘Understanding Social Citizenship: Themes and Perspectives for Policy and 
Practice, 2nd ed. (Bristol: Policy Press, 2003) p. 12. 
114 W. A. Beveridge Social Insurance and Allied Services. Report by Sir William Beveridge, 
CMD 6404. (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1942). 
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Idleness.115 Today the concept of welfare evokes a multitude of understandings. 
T.H Marshall describes welfare as the satisfaction of wants.116 Fitzpatrick defines 
welfare in terms of well-being, with the ‘welfare system’ acting as a ‘… set of 
socio-economic and cultural relations that effects social change by trying both to 
address social problems and to promote well-being.’117 Titmuss sees ‘social 
welfare as a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist 
services outside the market on the principle of need.’118 Dominelli adopts a much 
broader definition of welfare by incorporating the work of both public and 
private actors119 while Cochrane et al adopt a distinctly narrow view that ignores 
the work of informal carers such as women within the family and 
voluntary/charitable organisation.120 In a similar vein to Marshall, Dean defines 
welfare rights as ‘… rights to needs satisfaction’.121 However for Dwyer, 
‘[c]laims to welfare rights are often underpinned by differing views as to what 
constitutes a legitimate need and the role that the state or other agencies should 
then play in meeting that need.’122 A central theme, which the majority of these 
                                                           
115 Fahey, supra note 105, at pp. 21. These social problems were to be dealt with through the 
mechanisms of social insurance and social assistance to overcome want, health services to 
overcome disease, education to overcome ignorance, housing to overcome squalor, and full 
employment to overcome idleness. While in the main the report focused on alleviating the social 
problem of ‘want’, the report ‘outlined the package of services that later were to become the 
pillars of the welfare state … .’ 
116 T. H. Marshall ‘Welfare in the Context of Social Development’ in J. S. Morgan (ed.) Welfare 
and Wisdom (1966) republished in T.H. Marshall The Right to Welfare and other essays 
(London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981) p. 54.  
117 T. Fitzpatrick Welfare Theory: An Introduction to the Theoretical Debates in Social Policy, 
2nd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) p. 3.  
118 See R. M. Titmuss Social Policy: an introduction (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974) p. 
10. 
119 L. Dominelli Women Across Continents: Feminist Comparative Social Policy (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) p. 9; ‘the welfare state comprises those public and 
domestic relationships which take as their primary objectives the well-being of people.’ 
120 A. Cochrane, J. Clarke, and S. Gewirtz Comparing Welfare States: Family Life and Social 
Policy, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 2001) p. 6. Defining the ‘welfare state’ as ‘… the 
involvement of the state in the provision of welfare services and benefits.’ 
121 H. Dean Welfare Rights and Social Policy (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2002) p. 29. Similarly 
Dwyer supra note 113, at p. 11, notes that ‘[t]he meeting of social needs is a central concern of 
social welfare institutions.’  
122 Dwyer, supra note 113, at p. 12. 
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authors share in their exposition of welfare, is the concept of need. But what is 
this ‘need’ and why is it so intrinsic to the concept of welfare? Thus, before 
delving deeper into the concept of welfare, the fundamental concept of need is 
explored.   
 
5.2.2 The Need Principle 
 
For writers such as Titmuss and Harris the ‘need principle’ plays a key role in 
defining social citizenship123 and welfare rights.124 Fitzpatrick draws a distinction 
between basic and social needs. Basic needs are those ‘… natural needs whose 
lack of fulfilment means that human life cannot flourish nor perhaps even 
survive.’125 Social needs on the other hand are those, which recognise the 
importance of ‘social participation’, one’s engagement with their community.126 
Fitzpatrick observes that once social needs are recognised, the distinction 
between basic and non-basic needs becomes blurred.127 The point being that need 
satisfaction is not merely limited to physical survival. Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of 
needs’ presents a useful point of departure in conceptualising human need.128 
Maslow proposes a five tier understanding of need which begins with the 
satisfaction of physiological needs (food, clothing); second, needs related to 
physical safety and security (housing); third, the need for companionship (love); 
fourth, self esteem (external validation); and finally, self actualisation (life 
ambition fulfilment). While Maslow’s hierarchy is useful as a didactic tool, it 
                                                           
123 D. Harris Justifying State Welfare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p. 48. 
124 Ibid. at p. 49. See also Titmuss supra note 118 at p. 10. 
125 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at  p. 110.  
126 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at  p 110. 
127 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117, at  p 110.  
128 A. Maslow ‘A Theory of Human Motivation’ (1943) 50 Psychological Review, pp. 370 - 396. 
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proposes a rigid, linear, graduated and relatively discrete understanding of 
human need. It also ignores the point that in highly developed societies, 
individuals may ignore lower level needs in order to satisfy higher level needs.129 
Therefore need is an elastic concept that can be defined in a number of ways;130 
in this regard Bradshaw makes three basic distinctions between ‘felt needs’, 
‘normative needs’ and ‘comparative needs’.131  ‘Felt needs’ are needs that we are 
aware of ourselves, for example when we are ill we realise that we need medical 
attention.132 ‘Normative needs’ are needs defined by professionals or others who 
can take an objective view based on expert knowledge.133 Finally ‘comparative 
needs’ are defined relative to comparable individuals or groups134 and are 
determined by a society’s concept of justice.135 Dwyer notes that ‘… all three 
dimensions are important for decisions about the allocation of welfare.’136 For 
example, some individuals may feel that they are living in poverty, experts may 
in turn agree or disagree depending on how poverty is defined and measured and 
finally the degree or extent of the poverty experienced may be evaluated by a 
comparison of income levels, assets and wealth.137 
  
An alternative approach to the concept of need proposed by Doyal and Gough138 
focuses on the concepts of personal autonomy and the avoidance of serious 
                                                           
129 Fitzpatrick, supra note 117; Dwyer, supra note 113; Dean supra note 121.   
130 Dwyer, supra note 113, at p. 12. 
131 J. Bradshaw ‘The Concept of Social Need’ (1972) 30 New Society p. 640 – 643. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid 
134 Ibid 
135 K. Blakemore Social Policy: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
2007) p. 29. 
136 Dwyer, supra note 113, at p. 12. 
137 Ibid.  
138 L. Doyal and I. Gough A Theory of Human Need (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) p. 50. 
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harm.139 Serious harm maybe understood ‘… as the significantly impaired 
pursuit of goals which are deemed of value to individuals. To be seriously 
harmed is thus to be fundamentally disabled in the pursuit of one’s vision of the 
good.’140 In a similar vein to Fitzpatrick, Doyal and Gough state that there are 
certain basic needs – survival (health) and autonomy – that must be met for 
citizens to engage in the social activities that are central to the human 
condition.141 This concept also shares much with Harris’s understanding of need 
in that an individual is in need ‘… to the extent that he lacks the resources to 
participate as a full member of society in its way of life.’142  
 
The concept of need, whether narrowly or broadly defined determined the 
constructs of welfare and social citizenship:143  
 
‘[a] broad definition of needs emphasises an expansive universal notion 
of citizenship that favours extensive shared rights to public welfare. In 
contrast, a narrow definition of needs leads us towards a residual welfare 
state in which welfare is discretionary and entitlement often subject to a 
means test’ (emphasis in original). 144  
 
                                                           
139 The advantage of using ‘harm’ as an indicator of ‘need’ is that it removes subjective influence 
of feelings such as anxiety and sadness as determinants of ‘need’.  
140 Ibid.  D. Miller Social Justice (Oxford, Clarendon, 1976) p. 134 ‘Harm, for any individual, is 
whatever interferes directly or indirectly with the activities essential to his plan of life; and 
correspondingly, his needs must be understood to comprise whatever is necessary to allow these 
activities to be carried out. In order, then, to decide what a person’s needs are, we must first 
identify his plan of life, then establish what activities are essential to that plan, and finally 
investigate the conditions which enable those activities to be carried out.’ 
141 Doyal and Gough, supra note 138 at p. 50 – 55.  
142 Harris, supra 123, at p. 101. It is perhaps worth noting the similarities to Sen’s ‘Capabilities’ 
approach – the idea that needs and rights are grounded in social practice. For more on this 
discussion see Dean supra note 121, at p. 24. 
143 R. Lister ‘Citizenship and Gender’ in K. Nash and A. Scott (eds.) The Blackwell Companion 
to Political Sociology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003). 
144 Dwyer, supra note 113, at p. 12. 
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In the context of EU welfarism and social citizenship, the question that arises is 
whether a broad or narrow definition of need ought to be adopted? Preece argues 
that EU social policy has been increasingly narrowed to focus upon questions of 
efficacy, competition, and innovation and that:  
 
[w]ithin this policy environment, the question of how focused welfare 
policies should be on enhancing solidarity and decommodification is now 
being rephrased as an attempt to bring social protection regimes in line 
with the goal of greater competitiveness. By manipulating the discourse 
surrounding Social Europe, neoliberal actors have systematically 
dismantled the social dimension of the EU and reoriented European 
social policy to strengthen their own hegemonic project.’145  
 
While Preece makes a compelling and sometimes prescient argument, as outlined 
in the previous section, the progressive realisation of social rights within the EU, 
cannot be ignored.146 The concept of social citizenship, which forms part of the 
fabric of EU social policy imagines an inclusive social space in which all 
individuals can achieve their full potential.147 Accordingly, a broad interpretation 
of need is required because in the alternative, a narrow definition would prove 
inconsistent with the historical social character of EU member states and current 
EU social policy.148  
 
                                                           
145 Preece, supra note 3, at p. 1.  
146 See section 5.2; see also Kraatz, supra note 94.  
147 See ‘White Paper’ supra note 57 
148 Preece, supra note 3, at p. 2; P. Spicker ‘Exclusion’ Journal of Common Studies 35 (1), pp. 
133 - 43, contends that the form of inclusion that developed in France in the 18th and 19th 
century and which spread to neighbouring European nation states – Belgium, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy – become a integral part of the fabric of the policies of the European Union. 
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While a thorough exploration of the concept of need is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the distinction between basic and social need will be returned to when 
considering whether the ARR Directive ought to include a social welfare 
component. 
 
5.2.3 European Models of Welfare 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the forebear of the ARR Directive, the droit de suite 
served a quasi-welfare function in early 20th century France, in that it attempted 
to alleviate the experienced poverty of visual artists. Attempting to position a 
socially orientated ARR Directive within today’s EU welfare environment 
requires an understanding of the dynamics of member state’s welfare systems. 
Accordingly the following section explores these dynamics. 
 
Within the social and political discourse of welfare there are generally three 
proposed models of welfare. Titmuss proffers the residual model, the industrial 
achievement-performance model, and the institutional redistributive model. 
Under the residual model, social welfare institutions take effect where the private 
market and the family have failed, state intervention is therefore limited to 
marginal and deserving groups.149 However, the assessment of who deserves is 
not value free and in the majority of EU welfare states today, indicators of 
poverty are employed in this assessment.150 Under the achievement-performance 
model, social needs are met on the basis of merit, work performance and 
                                                           
149 Titmuss, supra note 118, at p. 30 - 32. 
150 Cantillon et al, supra note 5, at pp. 240 - 256. 
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productivity.151 Under the institutional redistributive model, social welfare is 
seen as a major integrated institution in society, operating to provide universalist 
services outside of the market.152 These models represent very different 
conceptions of welfare: minimum-targeted provision, performance related 
provision and optimum universal provision.153 
 
Gosta Esping-Anderson provides a typology of welfare that is broadly 
comparable to the models put forward by Titmuss. These include liberal welfare 
regimes, conservative corporatist regimes and social democratic regimes. Liberal 
welfare regimes (residual model) are primarily characterized by market-based 
social insurance systems and the use of means-testing in the distribution of 
benefits.154 Social insurance and universal welfare payments are ‘modest’ and 
welfare is largely targeted at a stigmatized and disenfranchised poor.155 Private 
schemes are often subsidised by the state to encourage the working and middle 
classes to pay for services above that offered by the state.156 Esping-Anderson 
describes these liberal welfare regimes as highly differentiated and stratified; 
providing a blend of ‘… relative equality of poverty among state-welfare 
recipients, marked differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-
political dualism between the two.’157 In these systems, like Titmuss’s residual 
model, there is a marked reluctance to interfere with the free-market.  Examples 
of liberal welfare states include the USA, Canada and Australia.158 
                                                           
151 Titmuss, supra note 118, at p. 30 - 32. 
152 Ibid.   
153 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 28. 
154 Cochrane et al, supra note 120, at p. 11. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid.  
157 G. Esping Anderson The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 
p. 27.  
158 Cochrane et al, supra note 120, at p. 11. 
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As in the industrial achievement-performance model, Esping-Andersen’s 
conservative corporatist regime could be applied to countries such as Germany, 
where a conservative central government developed systems of occupational 
social insurance in an effort to ensure that the working and middle classes 
contributed. Conservative welfare regimes are those in which ‘corporatist’ 
arrangements dominate. Corporatism maybe described as a socio-political 
organisation of society where social partnership between employers, labour 
representatives and the state, is used as a means of establishing economic 
policies.159 Esping-Anderson notes the tendency of these arrangements to 
maintain class differences rather than promoting redistribution and equality.160 
These welfare regimes largely exist in countries where the Church has 
traditionally enjoyed high levels of influence and accordingly promote the 
standing of the family within society. The state only intervenes where the family 
cannot resolve the problems of its members. Cochrane et al note that ‘[t]he entry 
of married women into the labour market is discouraged, and benefits tend to 
encourage motherhood, while collective forms of childcare provisions are 
underdeveloped.’161 Examples of this welfare regime include Austria, France, 
Germany and Italy.162 Ireland shares many of the attributes of the conservative-
corporate model however historically the social partner that exerted the greatest 
                                                           
159 Ibid. at p. 154, describe corporatist as ‘… meaning that various interest groups are 
incorporated into policy making and administrative processes and into the delivery of welfare. 
This inclusion is in the interests of coalition building, incremental change and the maintenance of 
social stability.’ Dean supra note 121, at p. 7 describes it as ‘… a process of tri-partite 
negotiation between the representatives of business, workers and the government. What is often 
involved in the development of social rights is not an impersonally established equilibrium 
between formal principles, but a directly negotiated compromise between substantive class 
interests.’  
160 Esping Anderson, supra note 157, at p. 26 - 30.  
161 Cochrane et al. supra note 120, at p. 10. 
162 Ibid. at p. 12. 
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influence on the state was the Catholic Church. McLaughlin describes this form 
of social partnership as Catholic Corporatism.163 Under this model the state had a 
limited welfare role with the church providing ‘ … a rudimentary mixed 
economy of social welfare.’164  
 
Esping-Anderson’s third taxonomy, the social democratic regime, corresponded 
to the institutional redistributive model, as represented by Scandinavian 
countries. The model is characterised by principles of universalism and equality. 
The social democratic regime promotes equality across classes by promoting 
high-level social welfare rights as opposed to residual rights. Crucially, these 
services and benefits are not only appealing to both working and middle class 
groups alike but are universal.165 The model promotes class solidarity and 
reduces the role of the market in the provision of welfare. The place of the family 
changes to that adopted under the former models; here the state takes on many of 
the traditional roles of the family such as carer thus encouraging independence, 
particularly for women.166  
 
Hantrais purports that the founding members of the EEC shared a certain 
similarity of approach to welfare in that their social protection systems were 
                                                           
163 E. McLaughlin ‘Ireland: From Catholic Corporatism to Social Partnership’ in A. Cocharine, J. 
Clarke, and S. Gewirtz Comparing Welfare States: Family Life and Social Policy, 2nd ed. 
(London: Sage Publications, 2001) p. 223 - 260.  
164 Ibid. at p. 255. The influence of the church can further be seen in relation to the National 
Insurance Act 1911 which established the beginnings of insurance-based social security in 
Ireland. The Act was based on contributory insurance, with contributions coming from three 
sources, the employer, the employee and the state. The first part provided health insurance giving 
entitlements to medical benefits, the second provided national insurance in the event of sickness 
or unemployment. However, many groups in Ireland including the Catholic Church objected to 
the Act. As a compromise the medical benefit entitlement was removed thus removing the 
opportunity to develop a state insurance based health system such as the UK’s NHS. 
165 Cochrane et al. supra note 120, at p. 11. 
166 Ibid. 
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mainly derived from the corporatist model, in accordance with the principle that 
workers are guaranteed benefits and substitute income related to their previous 
earnings through a contractual insurance scheme.167 This ‘continental’ insurance 
model was based on the assumption that employment qualifies individuals for 
welfare benefits as well as wages, and that benefits were funded primarily, if not 
exclusively, by employer and employee contributions as part of labour costs,168 
whereas, the states that joined the Community in 1973 – Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom – shared a general conception of social protection closer to 
what Hantrais describes as the ‘citizenship’ or ‘welfare’ (i.e. social democratic) 
model. Traditionally, the British and Scandinavian models, guaranteed a right to 
pensions, health care, and family allowances, on the basis of social citizenship. 
However, the extent of social citizenship in Ireland, historically, and in the UK 
today, is questionable.169 As highlighted above, Ireland’s catholic brand of 
corporatism represented a unique form of welfare provision while in the UK, the 
Blair administration’s ‘third way’ reforms of the 1990s, moved the UK closer to 
traditional understandings of corporatism, distinct from the universal 
entitlements envisaged by Beveridge.170 It is submitted that Hantrais’ 
observation’s regarding the member states that joined the EU in 1973 ignores the 
nuances of these distinct systems. Nevertheless, EU enlargement brought with it 
many challenges and in this respect, highlighted the degree to which European 
                                                           
167 Hantrais, supra note 11, at p. 32. 
168 Ibid.  
169 Dwyer, supra note 113, at p. 87 - 109. 
170 Ibid. at p. 73; ‘this new politics [‘third way’] simultaneously rejected what it regarded as the 
Old Left approach to social citizenship (that is the social democracy of Titmuss and Marshall, 
typified by state control, high taxation and public spending), and the New Right approach with its 
hostility to collective forms of welfare. Both the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair and the 
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way; built around certain core values.’ These core values included, equal opportunity, 
opportunity for all, responsibility, community, freedom of autonomy, and no rights without 
responsibility. This approach shares much with communitarianism. 
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welfare states differed in terms of the nature and extent of their welfare 
provision.   
 
In the context of welfare and social citizenship a further factor that must be 
considered is that of poverty. Procacci writes that ‘[t]he challenge of poverty vis-
á-vis citizenship has been crucial in acknowledging society’s needs.’171 In this 
way, a society’s understanding of what constitutes poverty not only helps define 
need but also determines the extent of the state’s welfare apparatus. It is to this 
issue that the following section turns.  
 
5.2.4 Poverty: Defining the Limits of Social Citizenship 
 
Within the field of welfarism, the definition, measurement, relief and prevention 
of poverty is of central concern, serving as the contextual framework within 
which the relationship between need and welfare can be analysed.172 For 
Procacci:  
 
‘[p]overty is identified with individual trajectories of social exclusion and 
[that] the idea of shared social risk as the basis for organizing solidarity is 
rejected. The desocialization of poverty reinforces the political exclusion 
of the poor, and risks strengthening a process of décitoyenneté, raising 
anew a question that we had thought solved once for all (sic): when 
                                                           
171 Procacci, supra note 104, at p. 54. 
172 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 20. 
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poverty is no longer treated as a social problem, are the poor still 
citizens?’173   
 
Building on Procacci’s question of the relationship between poverty and 
citizenship, it may be observed that the ‘Poor Laws’ that preceded the modern 
welfare state174 ascribed the nomenclature of ‘pauper’ to the recipients of 
welfare.175 Paupers were not citizens and as such were deprived of certain rights, 
such as the right to vote.176 By repealing the Poor Laws the modern welfare state 
– UK and Ireland – sought to end both poverty and pauperism.177 This 
phenomenon can be seen in civil as well as common law jurisdictions; examples 
include the social laws that followed the French Revolution of 1789 and in 
Germany, Bismarck’s social reforms of the late 19th century.178 Welfare rights 
therefore denote a formal equality of citizenship.179 However for Dean, ‘[i]f 
poverty persists in capitalist welfare states this implies a failure of citizens to 
secure their rights and a failure by the welfare state to honour those rights.’180 
Building on this relationship between welfare, poverty and citizenship, Roche 
                                                           
173 Procacci, supra note 104, at p. 51. Décitoyenneté is not a word per se but it is used in this 
context to represent the opposite of citizenship: ‘without citizenship’ or ‘losing citizenship’ 
(definition provided by Emilie Ghio).  
174 Examples of ‘Poor Laws’ can be found in Ireland, the UK and continental Europe. For further 
see Cochrane at al. supra note 120.   
175 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 20. Here Dean is referring to the UK position but as noted below 
the Act of Union would have also made this distinction relevant to Ireland.  
176 Ibid. at p. 20, it is worth noting that Ireland introduced its first Poor Law in 1838. Under the 
Act of Union 1800, Ireland and the UK were one political body, therefore this distinction 
between pauper and citizen existed in Ireland as well as the UK. 
177 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 20; see also D. Lucey, The End of the Irish Poor Law? Welfare 
and Healthcare Reform in Revolutionary and Independent Ireland (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2015) “The 1919 Democratic Programme – the Irish republican declaration of 
social and economic objectives read out at the revolutionary First Dail – claimed that the ‘Irish 
Republic’ would abolish the ‘odious, degrading and foreign' poor law system: J. J. Lee, the Irish 
historian, sardonically notes that Irish independence merely succeeded in bringing about a 
'degrading and native system’.” 
178 Bismarck’s reforms represented a form of ‘worker’s insurance’, which foreshadowed the 
development of the current corporatist system.  
179 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 20. 
180 Ibid.  
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argues that poverty determines the boundaries of social citizenship.181 
Furthermore, in developing this nexus, Dean contends that poverty is the ‘… 
yardstick against which the effectiveness of welfare rights is to be defined and 
judged.’182 If it can be accepted that welfare advances social citizenship and that 
the effectiveness of the welfare state can be judged in terms of poverty, the 
question is how can poverty be determined?  
 
The difficulty in defining poverty is that politically and technically it is a highly 
contested concept.183 Traditionally, a distinction has been drawn between an 
‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ understanding.184 The absolute definition represents the 
view that it is possible to identify an absolute minimum standard of living based 
on the requirements of physical health.185 The relative definition, favoured by 
Fabian academics ‘… expands the term poverty so as to apply to people with 
                                                           
181 M. Roche Rethinking Citizenship (Cambridge: Polity Press 1993) p. 55. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 20. 
184 Although in Ireland today we also refer to a third measure, ‘consistent poverty’. The official 
Government approved poverty measure used in Ireland is consistent poverty, developed 
independently by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). This measure identifies the 
proportion of people, from those with an income below a certain threshold (less than 60% of 
median income), who are deprived of two or more goods or services considered essential for a 
basic standard of living. 
The consistent poverty measure was devised in 1987 using indicators of deprivation based on 
standards of living at that time. The Government in 2007 accepted the advice of the ESRI to 
revise the deprivation indicators to better reflect current living standards and, in particular, to 
focus to a greater degree on items reflecting social inclusion and participation in society. This 
resulted in the measure, originally based on lacking one or more items from an 8-item index, 
changing to one based on lacking two or more items from the following 11-item index: 
1. Two pairs of strong shoes 
2. A warm waterproof overcoat 
3. Buy new not second-hand clothes 
4. Eat meals with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day 
5. Have a roast joint or its equivalent once a week 
6. Had to go without heating during the last year through lack of money 
7. Keep the home adequately warm 
8. Buy presents for family or friends at least once a year 
9. Replace any worn out furniture 
10. Have family or friends for a drink or meal once a month 
11. Have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight, for entertainment.  
For further see <http://www.socialinclusion.ie/poverty.html> (date accessed: 25 April 2017).  
185 J. H. Mack and S. Lansley Poor Britain (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985) p. 16.  
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insufficient resources for normal social participation.’186 These points of 
conceptual divergence raise issues of a technical, explanatory, political and 
sociological nature.187  
 
First, at the technical level, there is no agreed upon way of measuring poverty. In 
1901 Rowntree, defined ‘primary poverty’ as an income ‘… insufficient to 
obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical 
efficiency.’188 Under this approach policy makers attempt to identify a ‘poverty 
line’ with reference to average household incomes, against which individual’s 
income is then measured to establish whether they qualify for social assistance 
benefits. Another approach, proposed by Orshansky, uses statistical or ‘income 
proxy’ measures to identify the level of income below which need replaces 
choice in determining household expenditure.189 Sociologists such as Townsend 
focus instead on indicators of ‘deprivation’ such as diet, housing and working 
conditions to identify poverty rather than simply income levels alone.190 
Irrespective of whether the ‘poverty line’, ‘income proxy’ or ‘deprivation’ 
approach is employed in the measurement of poverty, none offer a complete 
definition or universal solution. Second, there are explanatory conflicts between 
descriptions of poverty based on pathology and those based on structural 
causes.191 Pathological explanations blame poverty on the failures of the poor 
due to genetic make-up, personality, laziness or incapacity.192 The clergyman 
                                                           
186 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 21. 
187 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 21. 
188 S. Rowntree Poverty: A study of Town Life (1922) p. 167. 
189 M. Orshansky,  ‘How Poverty is Measured’ (1969) 92 (2) Monthly Labour Review p. 37 - 41. 
190 P. Townsend Poverty in the United Kingdom (London: Allen Lane and Penguin Books, 1979) 
p. 31 – 60; this is referred to as the deprivation index.  
191 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 22. 
192 See C. Murray Losing Ground: American Social policy 1950 – 1980 (New York: Basic Books, 
1984).  
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Joseph Townsend encapsulated this understanding in his Dissertation on the 
Poor Laws: ‘[t]he poor know little of the motives which stimulate the highest 
ranks to action – pride, honour, and ambition … [i]n general it is only hunger 
which can spur and goad them onto labour; yet our laws have said, they shall 
never hunger.’193 Malthus goes further, for him, poor relief causes poverty, 
destroys the work ethic and reduces productivity. Poverty he argues should be 
tackled through shame: ‘… dependent poverty ought to be disgraced.’194 
Structural problems on the other hand attribute poverty to ‘diswelfares’ created 
by the free market economy,195 the nature of class relations196 or on other 
structural issues such as race and gender.197 Solutions based on the former 
approach (pathological) tend to address the effects of poverty whereas the latter 
approach (structural) attempts to address the causes of poverty. Third, there are 
political conflicts concerning the role of the state, and whether social policy 
should be directed at preventing or limiting relative poverty or to relieve absolute 
poverty.198 The varying models of welfare discussed in the previous section – 
liberal, corporatist, and universal – highlights the role of the political system in 
shaping social policy. The model of welfare favoured by political elites in turn 
defines the content and limits of state welfare systems. Fourth, there are 
sociological issues concerning the definition of poverty as a social or symbolic 
construct. While for many a ‘breadline’ definition of poverty is appealing, in real 
terms, poverty is an individually relative construct with many people who are in 
fact ‘poor’ not regarding themselves as such. As Dean convincingly explains, 
                                                           
193 J. Townsend A Dissertation on the Poor Laws: By a Well-Wisher to Mankind (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1971, originally published in London in 1786). 
194 T. Malthus ‘An Essay on the Principle of Population’ (London: J. Johnson, 1798). 
195 R. Titmuss Commitment to Welfare (London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 
196 Townsend supra note 193, at pp. 369 - 412.  
197 F. Williams Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge; Polity, 1989).  
198 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 22. 
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‘[p]overty is not an objective state – in either an absolute or a relative sense – but 
a discursively created spectre that can impact on the personal experiences and 
private identities of everybody.’199 It may be inferred from Dean that a society’s 
conception of poverty is not only a unique experience but also a layered and 
multi-faceted experience perceived differently by social actors and individuals 
alike. Therefore the question is not only, what is poverty, but also, when a 
measure of poverty has been adopted, when should social policy and its social 
systems intervene?   
 
Related to this question Room identifies a conceptual divergence in the definition 
of poverty between common law and civil law traditions. Common law traditions 
tend to focus on distributional issues – related to how resources are distributed – 
while civil law traditions tend to focus on ‘social exclusion’ which is 
relational.200 Social exclusion as a concept is not concerned with distributional 
inequality but with inadequate social participation and lack of social 
integration.201 Therefore the concept of social exclusion – being relational, rather 
than absolute – shares a natural affinity with the concepts of social citizenship 
that this thesis incorporates.202 Interestingly, social exclusion as a relational 
concept may be compared to concepts of relative poverty because both employ 
the use of a benchmark to determine social or economic inequality. However, for 
Dean, poverty and social exclusion are not one and the same: ‘[w]hile one is 
ultimately concerned with the (mal)distribution of incomes, goods and services, 
the other is concerned with the processes by which people may become 
                                                           
199 Ibid. at p. 23. 
200 G. Room Beyond the Threshold: The Measurement and analysis of Social Exclusion (Bristol: 
Polity Press, 1995)  
201 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 25. 
202 See generally Chapter 4, p. 203 - 209. 
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marginalised within society.’203 This may be defined as the difference between 
treating the symptoms of a disease rather than treating the underlying problem 
itself. It is submitted that while poverty and social exclusion are not one and the 
same, poverty as an indicator of need – and of the failures of the welfare state – 
performs a preliminary function in that the structural causes of social exclusion 
cannot be examined until poverty has been defined.    
 
Before proceeding, it may be informative to restate the nexus between these 
related concepts.  It will be remembered that social citizenship advances social 
rights, which in turn promote participation and inclusion in one’s community. 
For those at the margins, this inclusion is achieved via the welfare state; the 
nature and scope of which is derived from each society’s definition, tolerance 
and response to poverty. These binary concepts of poverty and welfare are 
reducible to the fundamental concept of need. Once need is understood in terms 
of being both basic and social, the inclusion which social citizenship espouses 
can begin to be realised. How need is defined also determines how poverty is 
defined and in turn the extent of state welfarism. A purely basic definition of 
need results in a limited definition of poverty and a residual welfare state. 
However, where a broader social understanding of need is employed, both the 
notion of poverty and what it means to be poor expand proportionally with state 
welfarism. Such an understanding of need results in the recognition of social 
needs, which in turn creates social rights. These social rights can also be given a 
narrow or broad interpretation. A narrow interpretation of social rights results in 
the mere recognition of basic needs of survival, reminiscent of the initial stages 
                                                           
203 Dean, supra note 121, at p. 24 ‘It is possible for people to be poor but socially included, or 
affluent but socially excluded. In practice however, poverty and social exclusion are closely 
related and tend to occur together.’ 
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of Maslow’s hierarchy.204 A broad interpretation on the other hand gives rise to 
social citizenship with the associated right to social inclusion. To quote Harris 
once more: ‘[s]ocial rights are rooted in a conception of need which takes its 
bearing from what is necessary to grant an individual fair access … to the 
community way of life.’205 It is within this broad conceptualisation of need, 
social rights, welfare and citizenship that a socially orientated ARR model may 
be proposed.  
 
Before determining the validity of a socially orientated EU ARR model, it is 
necessary to consider the practical reality faced by visual artists in their everyday 
lives.  Accordingly the following section analyses available empirical data 
relating to the socio-economic position of artists in general and where possible 
visual artists specifically.  
 
5.3 The Socio-Economic Condition of Visual Artists 
 
 
In 1882 Thomas Edward Scrutton J. asked the following question: ‘[w]here are 
the great works that might have been produced if the great minds that could have 
written them had not been forced to spend precious hours in uncongenial tasks, 
in the drudgery of earning a livelihood?’206 With this question in mind this 
section reviews the socio-economic standing of contemporary artists in Ireland, 
the EU and further afield. The Irish position, which represents the focus of this 
                                                           
204 Maslow, supra note 128.  
205 Harris, supra note 123, at p. 38. 
206 T. E. Scrutton The Laws of Literary Property – An examination of the principles which should 
regulate literary and artistic property in England and other countries (London: John Murray, 
1882) (London: Clowes & Sons, 1884) p. 11. 
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section, presents a case study, which is drawn upon to assess the socio-economic 
conditions of contemporary artists in Ireland. Many of the conclusions reached in 
this regard are compared and contrasted against European and international 
reports. Accordingly, the thesis takes the position that the Irish experience is 
indicative of the position of contemporary artists in Europe and further afield. 
Indeed, the majority of reports referred to in this section support the view that the 
Irish position, as a case study of the socio-economic position of artists, is capable 
of extrapolation, and is consistent with international findings in this area.207  
 
Due to the nature of the available data, this assessment adopts a broad 
understanding of the term ‘artist’ to include, architect, circus performer, street 
performer, craft worker, dancer, film maker, writer, musician and composer, 
theatre maker and actor, and of course, the visual artist.208 It is acknowledged 
that this approach is to some degree problematic because of the diversity of this 
sub-section of the workforce. However, as noted in previous chapters, empirical 
data pertaining broadly to artists and specifically to visual artists is in short 
supply, and where it is available it is somewhat imprecise in its definition of 
what constitutes a ‘professional artist’.209 The EU Parliament came to a similar 
                                                           
207 For instance see generally, UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artists 
(1980); G. Neil ‘Full Analytic Report (2015) on the implementation of the UNESCO 1980 
Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist’ (UNESCO, 2016) 
<https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/analytic-report_g-neil_sept2015.pdf> (date 
accessed: 13 July 2017).  
208 C. McAndrew and C. McKimm ‘The Living and working conditions of artists in the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland (ROI Version) (Dublin: The Arts Council of Ireland, 2010), 
<http://www.artscouncil.ie/uploadedFiles/LWCA_Study_-_Final_2010.pdf> (date accessed: 10 
July 2017) p. 17 - 18. 
209 Arts Council of Ireland Report (Prepared by Leigh-Doyle & Associates) ‘Joint Research 
Project into the living and Working Conditions of Artists in Ireland (2008), at p. 1; Leigh-Doyle 
Associates observe that: ‘There is no agreed definition of the category ‘professional artist’ in 
Ireland; this is not unique to Ireland. Working definitions of artists are often based on either the 
criteria or categories used by official data sources or independent studies. Many countries have 
no legal or fiscal definition of the term ‘artist’ despite having specific tax rules to deal with 
them.’ See also European Statistical System Network on Culture (Final Report) (Luxembourg: 
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conclusion in 2004 in its report on ‘The Status of Artists in Europe’210, as did the 
US Copyright Office in 2013, when conducting a study into the Artists’ Resale 
Right;  ‘… the general lack of reliable empirical evidence in this area makes any 
comparison of the relative position of visual artists and other artists inherently 
imprecise.’211 Nevertheless, where empirical data, specific to visual artists is 
available, it is drawn upon to assess whether visual artists are socio-economically 
disadvantaged relative to the broader class of artist as well as the general work 
force.  
 
In 2010, in a joint report commissioned by the Arts Councils of the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland entitled, ‘The Living and Working Conditions of 
Artists in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland,’ the authors, McAndrew 
and McKimm found that 59% of artists ‘… balance their work as artists with 
other work, either in or outside of the arts.’212 They do this for a number of 
reasons; varying from the need to supplement their income, better job security, 
more stable income, to higher levels of pay.213 The report found that the mean 
income of professional artists in Ireland derived solely from their work product, 
was under €15,000 in 2008, with 50% of artists earning €8,000 or less. When 
                                                           
ESSNet-Culture, 2012) < ec.europa.eu/culture/library/reports/ess-net-report_en.pdf> (date 
accessed: 13 July 2017).  
210 EU Parliament ‘The Status of Artists in Europe’ (2004) IP/B/CULT/ST/2005-89, p. 8 < 
https://www.andea.fr/doc_root/.../51b5afb01bb8d_The_status_of_artists_in_EU.pdf> (date 
accessed: 13 July 2017); Previously, and as noted in Chapter 2, s. 2.3.3, the Committee on Legal 
Affairs in their 1997 Report ***I A4-0030/97 were of the view that to effectively determine the 
appropriate resale rate, a study, ‘based on unassailable data’, should have been carried out on the 
art market over a relatively long period of time. It was also the rapporteur’s [Committee on Legal 
Affairs] impression that no reliable harmonised data existed at that time. See also Chapter 2, s. 
2.4.4. fn. 193 (MTIC 2000 data). 
211 See United States Copyright Office Report ‘Resale Rights, and Updated Analysis’ 
(Washington: USCO, Dec. 2013) p. 65. 
212 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 8; Similarly Leigh-Doyle, supra note 209, 
found that the main source of artists income in 1998 were earnings from ‘non-art’ related 
endeavours.  
213 Ibid. p. 8.  
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income from all sources (including social welfare)214 is taken into account, the 
mean income rose to just over €25,000, however, 50% of artists continued to 
earn less than €19,832.215 This compares less favourably than to the mean 
earnings of Irish workers of €36,229 for the same period.216 Earnings of an 
average Irish worker were more than 1.4 times the earnings of the average artist, 
with the average professional (manager, teacher, nurse, solicitor) earning 2.2 
times that of artists despite obtaining similar levels of education.217 The report 
also highlights that between 1978 and 2008 artists incomes have fallen relative to 
other workers over this period.218 This finding is corroborated by the EU 
Parliament’s report on ‘The Status of Artists in Europe’.219 
 
In relation to these artists’ standard of living, 58% of Irish artists found it 
difficult to ‘make ends meet’.220 Some 23% were in arrears in relation to a utility 
bill in the year prior to study, compared to 8% of the wider population.221 CSO 
data indicates that 31% of Irish artists made provision for a pension compared to 
54% of all workers.222 The main reasons given were affordability and the 
                                                           
214 These are often referred to as ‘social transfers’.  
215 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 10.  
216 Ibid. p. 11. It may be important to note that the figure of €36,229, when compared to the 
information available from the CSO’s website was not corroborable (i.e. these are not CSO 
statistics). When this author contacted the CSO, (January 20th 2017, 12:10pm) Brian Cahill from 
the CSO advised that the figures for ROI mean earnings were not available nor did he know 
where the authors of the report (McAndrew et al) might have received this information. Mr. 
Cahill advised that the first three income categories (Manager…, Production…, & Clerical…) on 
page 11 of the McAndrew’s report (Fig. 5) were CSO figures but not the latter ‘bars’ (referring to 
a bar chart) ‘ROI All Workers (Mean)’ and ‘ROI artists (Mean)’. The Authors of the report were 
contacted subsequently but no response was received.  
217 McAndrew and McKimm supra note 209, at 12; ‘The same CSO release shows that average 
2008 earnings in the ROI private sector were €32,453, or 1.3 the average earnings of an ROI 
artist. Average public sector 2008 earnings were €48,367, or 1.9 times the average income of an 
artist.  
218 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 12. 
219 Supra note 211, at p. 57. 
220 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 12. 
221 Ibid.  
222 National pensions figures from Central Statistic Office (2008) Quarterly National Household 
Survey – Pensions Update (data for Q1 2008). (Cork: CSO, 2009). 
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unpredictability of their work patterns. The authors note that these findings are 
consistent against studies conducted in the UK, Austria, Demark, Finland, the 
US, Canada and Australia.223 However, McAndrew and McKimm suggest that 
‘… the challenges faced by artists are faced by self-employed workers in 
general.’224 This would suggest that the socio-economic conditions experienced 
by artists has more to do with their employment status – being self-employed – 
than their occupational status. Nevertheless, artists in general were found to be 
more likely to suffer from a long term illness than the general population,225 with 
female artists less likely to have children.226 These indicators suggest that artists 
experience higher levels of poverty and deprivation than self-employed 
contemporaries in comparable occupational categories. Heightened levels of 
experienced poverty, deprivation and social exclusion objectively undermine the 
argument that visual artists’ socio-economic condition is related to their 
employment status rather than choice of occupation.  
 
In addition, in their comparison of related international studies, McAndrew and 
McKimm, observed that: 
                                                           
<http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/qnhs/quarterlynationalhouseholdsurveyquarter1
2016/> (date accessed: 13 July 2017)  
223 (UK) R. Davies and R. Lindlet Artists in Figures: A Statistical Portrait of Cultural 
Occupations. (London: Arts Council of England, 2003); (Canada) Hill Strategies Artists in 
Canada’s Provinces and Territories based on the 2006 Census (Hamilton, Ontario: Hill 
Strategies Research Inc., 2009); (Fn) P. Karhunen and K. Rensujeff Preliminary Findings from a 
Survey on the Economic and Labour Market Situation of Finnish Artists. Working Papers no 39. 
(Helsinki: Arts Council of Finland, 2002); (US) N. Alper and G. Wasall Artist’s Careers and their 
Labour Markets in D. Throsby and V. Ginsburgh (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Art and 
Culture. Volume 1 (Amsterdam: B.V. Elsevier, 2006); (Dn) T. Bille Labour Market and 
Education for Artists and the Creative Industries – Some Descriptive Results from Denmark 
Creative Encounters Working Paper No. 4, pp. 1-26 (Denmark: Copenhagen Business School, 
2008); (Aus) P. Wetzel et al Study on the Social Situation of Artists in Australia (Vienna: L&R 
Sozialforschung, 2009); (Auz) D. Throsby and V. Hollister Don’t Give Up Your Day Job: An 
Economic Study of Professional Artists in Australia (Sydney: Australia Council, 2003). 
224 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 15. 
225 Potentially, this is due to the older age profile of artists and their propensity to work past 
retirement. 
226 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at pp. 80 - 81. 
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‘… despite the increased recognition of the importance of the arts, many 
artists worldwide struggle to make ends meet.227 A recurrent finding in 
international research is that artist’s typically earn less on average than 
other workers with comparable education and skills set.’228  
 
Furthermore, many artists experience under employment and spend a significant 
part of their lives ‘income-less’. The designation of ‘income-less’ for social 
welfare purposes acknowledges that individuals may spend periods of time in 
forms of employment that does not generate income. Artists in general are 
particularly vulnerable to this designation because they ‘… devote long periods 
of unpaid time to artistic practice, research and other aspects of personal and 
career development … .’229 The net result of which is that while these creators 
are acknowledged to be without income, they are not recognised ‘job-less’ and 
therefore cannot claim unemployment and other associated benefits.230 The 
European Parliament’s 2006 report makes a similar point; ‘[s]ocial security 
programmes which are structured according to classic employment models 
penalise professional artists regardless of the nature of the social protection 
regime be it insurance based, universal, public or private.’231 Drawing on related 
research McAndrew and McKimm show that artists are particularly sensitive to 
                                                           
227 See generally, supra note 223.  
228 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 21. 
229 Ibid.  
230 Ibid.  
231 Supra note 210, at p. 21; See also S. Coffey ‘A Perspective on the Situation of Visual Artists 
in Europe’ in World Congress on the Implementation of the Recommendation Concerning the 
Status of the Artist (1997) Appendix 3 p. 51. CLT/CONF/206/INF.4. 
 298 
worsening economic conditions and are prone to leaving their profession during 
income down turns for paid work in other fields.232  
 
More pertinently, a number of international reports cited by the authors note that 
visual artists tended to be the art form most disadvantaged alongside musicians 
and dancers.233 In the US, dancers, fine artists and musicians were in general 
earning half of that earned by creators in other art forms.234 Similarly in Finland, 
Karhunen and Rensujeff found that the share of artists earning €10,000 or less 
per annum was highest for visual artists, writers and dancers.235 Worse still, only 
15% of Finnish visual artists income was derived from their art.236 In Canada, an 
earnings gap of 25% was found to exist between artists and comparable workers, 
whereas visual artists were found to earn 61% less than the average worker.237 It 
may be observed from the foregoing that while visual artists are not alone as a 
disadvantaged class of artist, the findings clearly indicate that visual artists and 
performers earn less than comparable creators – writers and composers – thus 
underlining the raison d’être of the ARR Directive – to create parity between the 
creative classes.238 
 
                                                           
232 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 28 citing, (US) National Endowment for the 
Arts ‘Artists in the Year of a Recession: Impact on Jobs in 2008.’ (Washington: NEA, 2009). 
233 Ibid. p. 29. 
234 Ibid. citing the National Endowment for the Arts Artists in the Workforce 1990 – 2005 
(Washington: NEA, 2008), the research showed that $34,800 was earned by the average arts 
worker as opposed to $15,000 for fine artists, musicians and dancers. 
235 Ibid. citing P. Karhunen and K. Rensujeff Preliminary Findings from a Survey on the 
Economic and Labour Market Situation of Finnish Artists. Working Papers no 39. (Helsinki: Arts 
Council of Finland, 2002). 
236 Ibid. at p. 30. 
237 Ibid. at p. 29 citing Hill Strategies Artists in Canada’s Provinces and Territories based on the 
2006 Census (Hamilton, Ontario: Hill Strategies Research Inc., 2009). In addition, dancers 
earned 64% less, with musicians earning 60% less than the average artist.  
238 See generally, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. p. 78.  
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Furthermore, a study conducted in 2009 by Visual Artists Ireland – The Social, 
Economic and Fiscal Status of Visual Artists in Ireland – found that visual artists 
represent a highly educated part of the community, with 57% having a third-level 
education.239 Most visual artists were found to have two or three other jobs and 
the main reason for not having enough time for their arts practice is insufficient 
income from art making.240 The 2009 report also found that visual artists are at 
the lowest income level of society with 67% earning under €10,000 per year 
from their creative work.241 The finding showed that 72% have no private 
pension and 45% have no private health insurance.242 According to the visual 
artist, economist and sociologist, Hans Abbing, while there is much talk about 
‘rich visual artists and high prices of artworks’, the majority of visual artists in 
Europe are poor.243 Abbing contends that in Europe 40 -60% of visual artists 
have a total income that is below the poverty line.244 Regarding a working 
definition of poverty ‘The European Anti Poverty Network Ireland’ (EAPNI) 
define poverty as follows: 
 
‘People are living in poverty, if their income and resources (material, 
cultural and social) are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a 
standard of living, which is regarded as acceptable by Irish society 
                                                           
239 Visual Artists Ireland The Social, Economic and Fiscal Status of Visual Artists in Ireland. 
(Dublin: Visual Artists Ireland, 2009) < http://visualartists.ie/advocacy-advice-membership-
services/advocacy/advocacy-datasheet-1-topic-the-status-of-the-artist-in-ireland/the-social/> 
(date accessed: 13 July 2017).  
240 Ibid.  
241 Ibid.  
242 Ibid. The results were broadly similar to McAndrew and McKimm’s finding (p. 65) in relation 
to the wider class of artist. 
243 H. Abbing ‘Are Artists Rich? The Value of Artistic – Working Conditions, Rights and 
Demands of Visual Artist in Europe’ (Berlin: IGBK, 2012) p. 21, fn. 1; ‘Around 40% of the 
visual artists cannot cover their costs … for instance in the Netherlands almost 80% [of artists 
have] an income below the Dutch minimum wage. In Europe, the average [visual] artist earns 
circa 40% less than the average worker. And the percentage he earns less than professionals with 
a similar level of previous training is much higher (sic).’ 
244 Ibid. at p. 21.  
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generally. As a result of inadequate income and resources people may be 
excluded and marginalised from participating in activities which are 
considered the norm for other people in society.’245 
 
According to the EAPNI and the Central Statistics Office, people or households 
are considered to be ‘at risk of poverty’ when their income is less than 60% of 
the median income.246 In 2014 Irish median incomes were found to be €18,210 
per annum, placing the ‘poverty line’ at €10,926.247 If it can be assumed that the 
‘art incomes’ earned by visual artists is relatively stable then, the majority of 
visual artists ‘are at risk of poverty’,248 and therefore experience some degree of 
deprivation.249 Had the data been available, a year on year analysis would have 
proved useful in this regard. McAndrew and McKimm note that ‘the risk of 
poverty’ forces visual artists, and artists more generally, to substitute their 
income by working in other occupational categories or through welfare.250 This 
not only reflects Scrutton J.’s observation251 but highlights the stark inequities 
                                                           
245 See European Anti Poverty Network Ireland Website ‘Relative Poverty Rates’ 
<http://www.eapn.ie/eapn/training/poverty-in-ireland> (date accessed: 13 July 2017). To varying 
degrees the EAPNI and the CSO employ a combination of the ‘poverty line’, ‘income proxy’ and 
‘deprivation’ approaches in measuring poverty. For instance the CSO incorporates a ‘deprivation 
index’ into their analysis that is broadly comparable to the deprivation indicators proposed by 
Townsend. 
246 See CSO Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 2014 results. 
<http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/silc/surveyonincomeandlivingconditions2014/> 
(date accessed: 24 January 2017).   
247 Supra note 245; According to the EAPNI between 2008 and 2013, median disposable income 
for an individual dropped from €20,758 to €17,550. 
248 Eurostat <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:At-risk-of-
poverty_rate> (date accessed 20 January 2017). ‘The at-risk-of-poverty rate is the share of people 
with an ‘equivalised disposable income’ (after social transfer) [i.e. social transfers include 
employment benefits, pension entitlements etc.] below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is 
set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income [total disposable income after 
tax and other deductions] after social transfers.’  
249 Supra note 246, the CSO employ a number of poverty indicators, which include the ‘at risk of 
poverty’ rate, the ‘consistent poverty rate’ and rates of ‘enforced deprivation’,  
250 McAndrew and McKimm, supra note 209, at p. 11. 
251 Scrutton J., supra note 206, ‘[w]here are the great works that might have been produced if the 
great minds that could have written them had not been forced to spend precious hours in 
uncongenial tasks, in the drudgery of earning a livelihood?’ 
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between the exorbitant market value maintained by certain classes of art and the 
lived experience of many visual artists. In addition, it has been found that when 
artists are faced with short to medium term poverty they are more inclined to 
leave their profession.252 McAndrew and McKimm conclude from their analysis 
that the threat of poverty is significantly higher for artists than comparable 
occupational categories of workers.253 
 
With regard to national responses to the plight of artists, McAndrew and 
McKimm note that a number of options for intervention exist in the form of 
income tax and VAT relief, social security measures, the ARR, as well as other 
direct and indirect measures provided by governments.254 However, the authors 
note that ‘… it is impossible to evaluate fully the effectiveness of a country’s 
response without evaluating all of the measures in place on aggregate and their 
interactions with each other and with other non-arts policies and programmes.’255 
Nevertheless, a general trend emerges in that ‘[m]any schemes such as royalties 
and some tax-related programmes by their nature benefit more established artists 
most, while leaving those that may have higher needs (e.g. emerging artists) with 
less assistance.’256 In relation to the ARR Directive, this observation is only 
partly reflected by the finding of Chapter 2. It will be remembered that while it 
was generally assumed by commentators in the field that successful and 
established visual artists benefited the most from the ARR Directive and its 
predecessor the droit de suite, more recent studies indicate that emerging visual 
                                                           
252 Ibid. at p. 28; Although as previously noted, what drives artists is not always logically 
deducible. 
253 Ibid. at p. 29; citing the National Endowment for the Arts Artists in the Workforce 1990 – 
2005 (Washington: NEA, 2008), 
254 Ibid. at p. 47. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid.  
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artists also benefit from the ARR albeit to a lesser extent.257 A wider dispersal of 
ARR royalties is indicative of a functionally redistributive royalty model and 
therefore exhibits facets of many EU income maintenance, social assistance, and 
general welfare schemes. While it could be argued that this observation 
undermines the reform proposals suggested in this thesis, – for a socially 
orientated ARR Directive – it is instead contended that this redistributive quality 
reflects the underlying raison d’être of the droit de suite, thus exposing a shared 
social commonality between the historic and extant European resale right rubrics. 
Nevertheless, this redistributive quality, in its current EU manifestation is limited 
and pales in comparison to the historic droit de suite and the ARR rubrics of a 
number of EU member states.  
 
Having demonstrated the depressed socio-economic conditions faced by visual 
artists the following section reviews two EU ARR models – Germany and 
Norway – that incorporate an income security provision and in doing so 
alleviates the plight of these creators.  
 
5.4 Germany: The Resale Right as a Social Welfare Right  
 
Although Germany was one of the first countries to consider implementing the 
droit de suite,258 the right did not enter the German statute books until 1965 and 
is protected under section 26 of the German Copyright Act. 259 When the droit de 
                                                           
257 See Kawashima, Chapter 2, section 2.3.5, p. 121.  
258 For a detailed and extensive history of the development of the folgerecht see Max-Planck-
Institute ‘The Droit de Suite in German Law’ in Legal Protection for the Artist VI, VI-35 (M. 
Nimmer ed. 1971) Chapter. VI, p. 13 - 34.  
259 See German Copyright Act of 1965 [BGBI.I 1273] §26, reprinted in F. K. Beier and G. 
Schricker, ‘German Industrial Property Copyright and Antitrust Laws’, 6 IIC Studies in Industrial 
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suite or the Folgerecht260 as it is referred to was enacted, it imposed a 5% 
statutory royalty rate and included a social welfare scheme.261 This scheme 
contains a number of component parts and primarily pursues two objectives; 
firstly, to provide pension entitlements to qualifying artists; and secondly, to 
support contemporary fine art.262 On September 29th 1980 VG Bild Kunst,263 a 
collective management organisation (CMO) completed a blanket agreement with 
the Association of German Art Dealers and Auctioneers264 [hereinafter 
BVDG].265 The agreement effectively replaced266 the statutory 5% resale royalty 
                                                           
Property and Copyright Law  (Munich: Max Planck institute, 1983) p. 121. For a full history of 
the legislative process in Germany see The Register of Copyrights of the United States of 
America ‘The Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty’ (A Report of the Register of 
Copyrights 1993) p. 35 - 38 
260 Other terms proposed included: Nachgangsrecht (right of pursue), Wertzuwachsanspruch 
(right on increase in value), Beteiligungsrecht (participation interest), Zuwachsgebúhr (growth 
fee) Tantiemenrecht (royalty right), Tantiemenanteil (royalty share) Urheberanteil (author’s 
share), See M.Nimmer ‘The droit de suite in German Law’ (Munich: Max-Planck-Institut, 1968) 
reprinted in N. Nimmer Legal Rights of the Artist (California: Nimmer, 1971) Chapter VI. p.2. 
261 See US Register of Copyright Report ‘Droit de Suite: The Artists Resale Right’ (1992) p. 44.  
262 See K. Lubina, H. Schneider et al ‘One Year and Millions of Euros Later: Taking Stock of the 
Implementation of the European Directive 2001/84/EC on Droit de Suite’ in Demarsin, Schrage, 
Tilleman & Verbeke eds. Art & Law (Belgium: die Keure, 2009), p. 309. 
263 Bild-Kunst is an artists’ rights licensing and collection organisation. Bild-Kunst was founded 
in 1968. The society administers the claims and enforces the rights of its members and is not of a 
commercial nature. It is financed solely from its own income, membership is free and all 
proceeds after administrative costs are distributed to its beneficiaries. In 2013, VG Bild-Kunst 
distributed €54 million to its rights holders in Germany and abroad. See 
<http://www.bildkunst.de/en/vg-bild-kunst/about-vg-bild-kunst.html> (date accessed: 13 July 
2107); For further details see German Commission for UNESCO ‘Survey on the economic 
Situation and Social Status of the Artist in Germany (1992) p. 1. Social welfare (health insurance, 
occupational accidents, disability, unemployment and pensions): 
‘While regularly employed artists in Germany are covered by the same social security system 
with regard to health care, pensions, occupational accidents and unemployment payments as 
other employees. The same could not be said for those who work as self-employed or on a 
freelance basis. This situation prompted the Federal Parliament, in the early 1970s, to 
commission the Centre for Cultural Research (ZfKf) with a large-scale empirical survey among 
professional artists. Following publication of this ‘Künstler-Report’ in 1975 and debates with 
professional organizations, the Federal Government developed a specific social insurance system 
for self-employed artists, the ‘Kün-stlersozialkasse’ (KSK). The 1981 Artists’ Social Security 
Act (Künstler-Sozialversicherungsgesetz - KSVG) established the KSK with strong links to the 
public social security system in the fields of health insurance and pensions.’ See UNESCO 
website <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=34252&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html> (date accessed: 13 July 
2017). 
264 Bundesverband Deutscher Galarien und Kunshandler e.V.  
265 Lubina et al, supra note 262, at p. 307. See also J. Merryman, A. Elsen and K. Urice Law 
Ethics and Visual Art (5th ed.) (Netherlands: Kluwer International, 2007) p. 582.  
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rate with a blanket levy.267 The agreement covered both the droit de suite and the 
art trade’s contribution to the German social security system.268 Up until 
December 31st 2014, BVDG were obliged to report all sales to the commonly-
instituted independent body, Ausgleichsvereinigung Kunst, [hereinafter AV 
Kunst] which calculated the sum due to artists and their successors.269 Under the 
agreement the levy was calculated as a lump sum from sellers/galleries who paid 
a percentage of their annual net sales of art created after 1900.270 The lump sum 
was calculated as a percentage of the volume of sales ranging between 0.8% and 
1.3% for galleries and 1.3% to 3% for auction houses.271 The sum formed part of 
the tax declarations that each auctioneer and gallery has to provide to the German 
tax authorities.272 The levy was divided equally into two parts, one dealing 
specifically with resale royalties and the other with the contributions due to the 
                                                           
266 The majority of art market intermediaries opted for the contractual ‘blanket agreement’ rather 
than adopting the administrative burden associated with paying the resale royalty on each 
individual art sale.  
267 L. de Pierredon-Fawcett, The Droit de Suite in Literary and Artistic Property, A Comparative 
Law Study (Louise-Martin Valiquette Translation), (New York: Columbia University, 1991) p. 
132 reports that over 300 galleries and auctioneers choose the contractual solution.  
268 Ibid. p. 132.  
269 Lubina et al, supra note 262, at p. 309. For the current position see VG Bild-Kunst’s Annual 
Report 2014 <http://wwwbildkunst.de/en/vg-bild-kunst/about-vg-bild-kunst/what-do-we-
do.html>  
270 Ibid.  
271 Ibid. at p. 309. See also L. de Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 267, at p. 132; ‘An agreement was 
signed on September 29, 1980 between the Bild Kunst collecting society and the working party 
of the art dealer organization. This agreement provides for a general and joint settlement 
regarding the droit de suite and contributions to Social Security. A statute passed in 1980, which 
took effect on January 1, 1983, extended the Social Security system to artists, who had previously 
been unable to benefit from it. Dealers were required under this law to pay to Social Security 5% 
of the amounts they paid each year to living artists so as to cover 2/3 of the employer’s share, the 
remaining third being paid by the state. These payments could be made, however, through a 
compensation office by means of royalties paid over by its members … . The agreement provided 
that the monies paid to the Kunst Compensation Office would be 1% of the revenues for 20th 
century works. The Compensation Office was to pay 50% of the amounts thus collected to the 
Artists’ Social Security Fund, the other 50% being distributed to artists able to claim the benefits 
of the droit de suite. 10% to 15% was deducted from the monies collected as droit de suite to go 
into a fund to aid artists who did not qualify for any other social benefits. This agreement became 
applicable as soon as the artists’ Social Security law took effect, i.e., January 1, 1983. Each 
dealer and each auctioneer, by entering into an individual contract, could thus declare he was 
ready to accept such a method of collection which had the advantage of great simplicity. Those 
who decided not to subscribe had to comply with the requirements of the law, in particular to 
make payments for each separate transaction.’  
272 Lubina et al, supra note 262, at p. 309. 
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Kunstler Sozialkasse273 [hereinafter KSK].274  Previously the AV Kunst 
transferred the collected royalties to the collecting society VG Bild-Kunst, which 
then distributed the levies due to artists under their distribution scheme.275 
However, as of January 1st 2015, AV Kunst is no longer in existence, accordingly 
resale rights are now settled individually with VG Bild-Kunst. VG Bild-Kunst 
applies a 10% administration fee before paying obligatory deductions to two 
separate funds – Stiftung Sozialwerk & Stiftung Kulturwerk276. These funds serve 
two very different purposes. The Sozialwerk scheme is a separate and additional 
social security bond scheme which is designed to aid artists who do not qualify 
for the official state pension scheme and ‘artists in need’.277  The main recipients 
are elderly artists who do not receive adequate monthly support and who are not 
entitled to a pension under the Artists’ Social Fund (KSK).278 Recipients also 
include ‘artists in need’ and assistance under this scheme is limited to artists who 
have suffered a loss and are in crisis due to fire or other such accident.279 A 
supervisory board made up of members of VG Bild-Kunst decides which 
applications for support qualify for aid. The second fund – Kulturwerk – is 
designed to cultivate contemporary fine art by providing, amongst others, 
                                                           
273 The KSK is partially publicly financed as a social security scheme for self-employed artists in 
Germany. For further see Lubina et al, supra note 262, at pp. 307 and 309. 
274 De Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 267, at p. 132.  
275 Lubina et al, supra note 262, at p. 309. 
276 The Stiftung Kulturwerk cultural foundation carries out the cultural mandate of the collecting 
society VG Bild-Kunst. It supports projects and programmes run by organisations of visual artists 
that have legal capacity, awards grants to photographers, illustrators, graphic artists and graphic 
designers and sponsors projects of cultural significance in the film industry. The resources of the 
foundation come from the revenues of VG Bild-Kunst. The society is required by the German 
Copyright Administration Act to use a certain proportion of the income it receives from the 
management of copyrights to promote cultural objectives in all three professional groups. < 
http://www.bildkunst.de/en/vg-bild-kunst/stiftung-kulturwerk.html> (date accessed: 17 February 
2016).  
277 Lubina et al supra note 262, at p. 309. 
278 Ibid. These artists are not entitled to a pension because they fell outside the age threshold 
when the legislation was introduced.  
279 Ibid.  
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promotion and exhibition bursaries.280 The distribution scheme differentiates 
between the various recipients of levies as follows: for living artists, a further 
10% is deducted for the Sozialwerk and 10% Kulturwerk, i.e. the artist receives 
80% of the net royalty; for artist’ heirs and their estates, 10% is deducted for 
Kulturwerk, but no deductions are due for the Sozialwerk scheme – this category 
of beneficiary receiving 90% of the net contribution. Foreign artists who are 
collecting royalties in Germany under the International Confederation of 
Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) are not subject to further 
deductions. These artists receive 100% of the royalty.281 In cases where the 
society feels that the levy paid by the art intermediary is insufficient, the society 
may renegotiate the amount due with the intermediary.282  
 
In addition there is a third funding body that is partly financed by the Stiftung 
Kulturwerk fund, it is known as Stiftung Kunstfonds283 – ‘Art Fund Foundation’ – 
which supports young and less successful artists who do not enjoy a secondary 
market for their work.284 A mix of public and private investment funds Stiftung 
                                                           
280 Ibid.  
281 Minus the collecting society’s administrative expenses etc. as outlined above.  
282 De Pierredon-Fawcett supra note 267, at p. 132; Lubina et al supra note 262, at p. 309.  
283 According to the VG-Bild Kunst website: ‘[t]he 'Stiftung Kulturwerk' cultural foundation 
carries out the cultural mandate entrusted with the Verwertungsgesellschaft Bild-Kunst [Visual 
Arts Collecting Society]. It awards project grants to photographers, illustrators, graphic artists 
and graphic designers and sponsors projects of cultural significance in the film sector. Advisory 
councils decide on funds granted by the 'Kulturwerk' and their members are elected separately 
within each professional group. In the field of visual art, funds are passed on to the 'Stiftung 
Kunstfonds' [Art Fund Foundation] – no funds of its own are granted.’ 
<http://www.bildkunst.de/en/vg-bild-kunst/contact-partners/stiftung-kulturwerk.html> (date 
accessed: 11 December 2016).  
284 The purpose of the arts fund is to promote contemporary art in Germany. See German Statute 
from 3 June 2002, last modified in 15 November 2012. Statute available (German version) at  < 
http://www.kunstfonds.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Kunstfonds/Sonstige_Dokumente/Satzung-
2012-11-15-web.pdf> (date accessed 17 February 2016) The founding members of the Art Fund 
were the Federal Association of artists, the German Association of Artists, the community of 
artists and art lovers, the Federal Association of German Galleries, the collecting society Bild-
Kunst and the artist Rune Mields. Later, the International Artists Committee and the Working 
Group of German art associations were added. See Stiftung Kunstfonds website 
<http://www.kunstfonds.de/ueberuns.html> (date accessed: 13 July 2017). 
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Kunstfond.285 Lubina et al note that ‘[t]he German system is quite remarkable 
insofar as the collected resale royalties are at least partially used for social 
purposes.’286 
 
From the foregoing it is clear that the German system operates within the remits 
of the EU Artists Resale Rights Directive; its primary function is to collect resale 
royalties from art sales involving ‘art market intermediaries’ and distribute the 
resulting royalties to their respective artists. The Directive does not prohibit the 
taxing of resale royalties287 to provide, for all intents and purposes, an income 
maintenance element for visual artists who reside in Germany.288 Lubina et al 
note that these deductions can be categorised ‘… as a specific tax on resale 
royalties.’289 Furthermore, the German scheme complies with Recht’s definition 
of a ‘tax’ ‘… collected by authority of the state and allocated to a public service 
… .’290  Importantly, because the German ARR model directly funds social 
security entitlements it therefore presents a direct challenge to Becker’s view that 
                                                           
285 See Stiftung Kunstfonds website <http://www.kunstfonds.de/ueberuns-organisation.html> 
(date accessed: 13 July 2017) – the German Federal Cultural Foundation provide the Stifung 
Kunstfond with €1,000,000 annually, VG Bild Kunst also make a contribution, which is currently 
estimated to be €250,000 p.a. Since 1981 the fund has contributed over €30 million to art 
projects.  
286 Lubina et al supra note 262, at p. 309. 
287 Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 
on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art [2001] OJ L 272/32, 
[hereinafter ARR Directive] Article 5 merely notes that the calculation of the resale royalty be 
net of tax, thus acknowledging that the royalty is susceptible to taxation.  
288 See Lubina et al, supra note 262, at p. 309. 
289 Ibid.   
290 P. Recht ‘Le droit de suite est-il un droit d’auteur?’ 3 Bulletin du Droit d’Auteur [Copyright 
Bulletin] (UNESCO) (1950) 1, p. 65, [English Translation] p. 66, for the droit de suite to fit the 
‘tax’ characterisation the royalty/tax would have to be collected by government and used for 
public purposes. See also K. L. Boe ‘The Droit de Suite has arrived: can it thrive in California as 
it has in Calais? (1977 – 1979) 11 Creighton Law Review, p. 543. 
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‘… the droit de suite [ARR] does not lend itself to being an instrument of social 
security.’291 
 
5.5 The Norwegian Social Model 
 
Despite Norway’s original objection to the inclusion of the droit de suite into the 
Berne Convention, it today embodies one of the most progressive regimes.292  In 
Norway the social welfare function of the ARR is administered by the ‘Relief 
Fund for Visual Artists’ – Bildende Kunstneres Hjelpefond (BKH). The Artists’ 
Resale Right is protected under Norwegian Law under Section 38c of the 
Norwegian Copyright Act.293 Just like the early French model as it applied to 
gallery sales and the German model, the Norwegian model bifurcates revenues to 
a social fund as well as providing royalties to entitled visual artists. The Fee on 
Sale of Visual Art Act of 1948,294  established the ‘Relief Fund’ which obliged 
buyers of art to pay a fee of 5%, supplemental to the sale price, provided the sale 
price surpassed the threshold of 2000 NOK.295 Today the BKH or ‘Relief Fund’ 
administers this art tax (Kunstavgiften) and has done so for over 50 years. 
According to Hege Imerslund,296 Managing Director of the Norwegian Visual 
                                                           
291 L. Becker, P. Huber and E. Kronjager (Project Leader: Marlies Hummel) The Droit de Suite 
Report Commissioned by the French Authors’ Society ADAGP, The German Authors’ BILD-
Kunst and the Groupement Européen des Sociétés d’Auteiurs et Compositeurs (GESAC) 
(Munich: IFO Institut, 1995) p. 32. 
292 See Chapter 1, Section 1.2, p. 34. 
293 (Nor.) Copyright Act (Act No. 2 of May 12, 1961, relating to Copyright in Literary, Scientific 
and Artistic Works, as last amended by Act No. 103 of June 19, 2009) accessed from WIPO 
webpage < http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=11086> (date accessed: 13 July 2017). 
See <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9661> for English translation of S. 38c from 
2006 Act. 
294 See Norwegian Statute of November 4, 1948, ‘Fee on Sale of Visual Art a.o. - Lov om avgift 
på offentlig omsettning av billedkust, 1948, cited in M. Heikkinen & the Arts Council of Finland 
The Nordic Model for Supporting Artists Research, Reports of the Arts Council of Finland No. 26 
(Helsinki: Nykypaino Oy, 2003) p. 90. 
295 See BKH website <http://kunstfond.no/index.php/about-bkh> (date accessed: 13 July 2017).  
296 E-mail correspondence with Hege Imerslund and author, 5 May 2015 - 10 June 2015.  
 309 
Artist Collecting Society, the tax is applied to all sales of art and not just 
resales.297 Imerslund notes that the tax is based on the concept of the resale right, 
but is more of a ‘cultural political tool’ since the tax that is collected is 
distributed mainly to living artists on a collective basis (as scholarships, funds 
etc.). 
 
Norway implemented the Artists’ Resale Right Directive in 2007, since its 
inception the resale right has been subject to compulsory collective 
management.298 The Norwegian Visual Artists Copyright Society (Billedkunst 
Opphavsrett I Norge) [hereinafter Bono], a state appointed collecting society, 
collects royalties from the ‘Relief Fund’ for works subject to the artists’ resale 
right. Art dealers are obliged to collect the fee and send it to BKH and in turn 
BONO collects on behalf of members as well as non-members. After the 
amounts have been collected, royalties are paid out to visual artists whose works 
have been resold.299 The fund has distributed over €30 million since its 
creation.300 
 
The question which arises from the foregoing is whether the German and 
Norwegian models are exemplars of the droit de suite as an ‘instrument of social 
security’ or are merely droit de suite systems with an adjunct tax that funds 
specific social projects? It must be remembered that when the droit de suite 
entered the French statute books in 1920 it ‘… involved a significant social 
                                                           
297 Applicable works include copyright-protected as well as non-protected works, first sales 
(including works sold in commission for the artist), as well as works that are resold. 
298 The Artists’ Resale Right is regulated under Article 38(c) of the Norwegian Copyright Act 
1961 (as amended by Act No. 103 of June 19, 2009) 
299 Supra note 295. 
300 Ibid.  
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component …’301 which is arguably as relevant today. For Becker, the droit de 
suite is not suited to the function of wealth redistribution302 and while each 
country must decide how it wishes to provide social security for its visual artists 
‘[t]he droit de suite does not lend itself to being an instrument of social 
security.’303 The German and Norwegian schema perhaps reflects Becker’s 
conclusion by separating the author’s rights function from its social welfare 
function. Indeed today, under the current EU ARR Directive that social welfare 
component has been abandoned. Crucially however, the German and Norwegian 
models embrace the dialectical nature of the artists’ resale right as part 
intellectual property right and part social welfare. In doing so, these models 
suggest a re-conceptualising of the ARR Directive that more adequately reflects 
its civil law origins and the needs of visual artists today. 
 
The preceding exploration of European welfarism provides a contextual 
background against which the development of extant European ARR models can 
be better understood. It can be seen from the foregoing that the socially 
orientated ARR models of Germany and Norway originate from quite distinct 
welfare models. Germany’s ARR regime, and in particular the blanket agreement 
reached between galleries and the state is a socio-political arrangement and 
therefore distinctly corporatist in nature.304 Furthermore, because the relationship 
between the gallery and the visual artist is framed as that of a typical employee-
employer relationship, the social entitlement derived by visual artists from the 
scheme is a form of occupational social insurance. Like any insurance scheme, a 
                                                           
301 Becker et al, supra note 292, at p. 32. 
302 Ibid. at  p. 32.   
303 Ibid.  
304 See section 5.3.3.  
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recipient’s entitlement to the benefits of the scheme is justified on the basis that 
they have made a financial contribution. The notion of contribution shares an 
affinity with Harris’s concept of social citizenship.305  The German ARR model, 
in particular its social security component, is therefore distinctly corporatist in 
nature and a product of the state’s wider social security regime. The Norwegian 
scheme on the other hand, which neither attempts to justify ARR social welfare 
payments on the basis of social insurance nor the creation of an artificial 
employee-employer relationship reflects Esping-Anderson’s social democratic 
and universalist form of welfare. These schemes are typified by state control, 
high taxation and public spending.306 The Norwegian ARR model represents one 
of the means by which the Norwegian state provides for universal social 




Scrutton J.’s observation not only bemoans the personal loss that artists 
experience when they are forced to leave their profession but also the fact that 
society may ultimately bear the greatest loss. As Arnold Hauser convincingly 
argues, any bifurcation of effort inevitably confines the exploits of the creative 
classes to that of the dilettante.307 The taxonomy of dilettante further entrenches 
the process of social exclusion for visual artists. Doubtless, being deprived of the 
opportunity to fully develop one’s talents deepens this experience. As noted in 
                                                           
305 For further see Chapter 4. Section 4.5. p. 209.  
306 Dwyer supra note 113, at p. 73. 
307 A. Hauser The Social History of Art Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1957) p. 22. On this 
point see, H. Read Art and Society 2nd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), Chapters 1 & 2. See 
also, A.P. Elkin ‘The Secret Life of the Australian Aborigines’ (1932) 3(2) Oceana p. 210. T.E. 
Scrutton The Laws of Literary Property – An examination of the principles which should regulate 
literary and artistic property in England and other countries (London: John Murray, 1882) 
(London: Clowes & Sons, 1884) p. 11. 
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Chapter 4, social citizenship focuses on certain types of social ‘dis-services’ 
which compromise the status of individuals as full and participating members of 
the community.308 Harris gives the example of employment, and society’s view 
of employment as a prized activity where the failure to hold or find a job is a 
reflection of personal failure. Not only does unemployment mean a loss of 
income but it also results in a lowering of self-esteem. For Harris, ‘… a society 
in which what you are is bound up closely with what you do, work is [a] source 
of self-definition. To be effectively deprived of an opportunity to work is to be 
cruelly handicapped.’309 The international reports cited by McAndrew and 
McKimm evidence the inability of visual artists to make a living from their 
profession, therefore furthering the process of social exclusion. As noted in 
Chapter 3, historically the visual artist was nothing more than a slave and as such 
not a citizen of the ancient city-state. Arguably the treatment of visual artists 
today – as modern day paupers, unable to translate their talents into tangible 
financial reward – continues to deprive them of the status of citizen and full 
community participation.310   
 
In response to this glaring inequity, the ARR Directive, as an interventionist 
measure, presents a means of addressing the social exclusion of visual artists. 
However, the question that this thesis continually returns to is whether the ARR 
Directive ought to be extended to engender a social orientation and adopt a social 
security or welfare function reflective of its civil law origins? In answering this 
question it is worth reflecting upon the French jurist Plaisant’s observation. He 
was of the opinion that the resale right was never at ease within traditional 
                                                           
308 Chapter 4, Section 4.5, p. 209 - 213.   
309 Harris, supra note 24, at p. 50 
310 See Chapter 4, Section 4.5, p. 209 - 213.   
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copyright rubrics; that it was a ‘historical phenomenon’ enacted to satisfy a 
specific need – the starving artist – and that its ‘maintenance element’ 
represented its most legitimate raison d’être.311 It is this social element that 
historically underpinned the right’s legitimacy and it is with this social 
understanding of the ARR Directive and its potential to alleviate the experienced 






                                                           
311 R. Plaisant – ‘The Droit de Suite’ General Studies - Copyright (1969), Monthly Review of the 
United Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual  Property (BIRPI), pp. 159 – 160; see also A. 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion and Reform Proposals 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
It has been said that writers such as Hobbes and Locke could not have been more 
wrong when they claimed that in the state of nature we were engaged in a war ‘of 
every man against every man’.1 For Monbiot this was not the case, man was 
always a social creature ‘… mammalian bees, who depended entirely on each 
other.’2 In the context of visual artists and the artists’ resale right, the interactive 
and dependent relationship that Monbiot describes is equally as relevant. Society 
thrives when it is immersed in a rich and diverse culture but for society to 
experience this rich existence and for culture to thrive the creators of this culture 
need to be provided for, encouraged and protected. President Higgins could not 
have been more unerring when he noted that: 
 
‘[c]reativity and culture are about the articulation and vindication of 
rights, the right for everyone to participate fully in society. They are a 
social good which, if left to the vagaries of the marketplace, will either 
fail to survive or become so compromised and distorted that the public 
good will not be served.’3 
 
                                                           
1 G. Monbiot How Did We Get Into This Mess?: Politics, Equality, Nature (London: Verso, 
2016). p. 9. 
2 Ibid.  
3 President Michael D. Higgins address to the General Assembly of Aosdána 2015. 
<http://www.president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/speech-at-the-2015-aosdana-general-
assembly> (date accessed:  6 July 2017). 
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Similarly, for Hauser the creation of great art is dependant upon the support of 
the community, without it the visual artist would be inevitably confined to that of 
the dilettante.4 Worse still, Scrutton J. imagined a somewhat present dystopia 
when he asked: ‘[w]here are the great works that might have been produced if 
the great minds that could have written them had not been forced to spend 
precious hours in uncongenial tasks, in the drudgery of earning a livelihood?’5 
Notably, there is a slight hint of irony in the latter part of Scrutton J.’s comments 
concerning the drudgery of earning a livelihood. After all, why should the 
creative classes be spared the ‘humiliation’ of earning a livelihood? Indeed, the 
Greek’s distaste for manual labour did not survive the demise of the ancient city-
state.6 Whether well intentioned or not, Scrutton J.’s comments nevertheless 
serve a vital purpose in exposing a common misconception about the creative 
arts, a misconception that President Higgins also eluded to. As Abel Ferry argued 
when he petitioned for the droit de suite in 1920, it is not ‘alms for the poor’ that 
is sought and similarly the modern manifestation of Ferry’s petition does not 
attempt to excuse visual artists from earning a livelihood by giving them a ‘hand 
out’.  It is quite the opposite, the socially orientated, or socially constructed ARR 
that this thesis proposes provides visual artists with the means to vindicate their 
rights as citizens, to be drawn in from the margins and to participate fully as 
members of society. This social construction not only rewards successful visual 
artists through royalties but also provides a form of social security that existed 
                                                           
4 A. Hauser The Social History of Art Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1957) p. 22; see also, 
H. Read Art and Society 2nd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), Chapters 1 & 2; A. P. Elkin ‘The 
Secret Life of the Australian Aborigines’ (1932) 3(2) Oceana p. 210. 
5 T. E. Scrutton The Laws of Literary Property – An examination of the principles which should 
regulate literary and artistic property in England and other countries (London: John Murray, 
1882) (London: Clowes & Sons, 1884) p. 11. 
6 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1, p. 141 fn. 18.  
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under the guild and patronage system of old.7 Both systems realised the 
importance of nurturing talent and creating a space in which creative talent could 
transcend that of the dilettante and produce social and cultural goods that not 
only enriched the lives of their patrons but of the wider community. Just like the 
guild and patronage systems of old it is proposed that an ARR rubric, with an 
attendant social security, social welfare or income maintenance function, would 
allow many visual artists to professionalise their art form and earn a livelihood. 
Such a system also recognises the precarious nature of visual artists and in 
addition to nurturing talent, creates a social security net during times of hardship. 
 
6.1 Justification for a Socially Orientated ARR Directive 
 
Highlighting the social component of all IPRs, Waldron observes that ‘… in our 
legal culture, the defense (sic) of intellectual property is seldom cast in purely 
individualistic terms. Officially the justification is supposed to have more to do 
with the social good than with the individual natural rights of authors … ‘  
(emphasis added).8 Reflecting upon Waldron’s observations, and drawing on the 
conclusions of Chapter 3, it is submitted that the EU ARR Directive, by adhering 
to the strictures of extant EU IP law, emphasises ‘form over function’ thereby 
placing greater importance on the character of the ARR Directive rather than 
focusing on the function that it ought to serve. The distinctly individualistic 
                                                           
7 Ibid.  
8 J. Waldron ‘From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual 
Property (1993) 68 (2) Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review p. 849. Here the author cites cases such as Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burrows 2302, 98 Eng. 
Rep. 201 (1769) and Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burrows 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774) as 
authority for this statement.  
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character of the extant ARR Directive implicitly undermines the social basis of 
the historic droit de suite and in doing so undermines its raison d’être.    
 
The German and Norwegian schemes tie together many of the themes that have 
been discussed throughout this thesis. As to the question of whether society 
values the creators of great works of art, the German scheme answers this 
question in the affirmative by acknowledging the binary and dependent 
relationship between visual artists and society. If society wishes to enjoy a rich 
culture – Art 167 TFEU – then it must be willing to provide adequate 
recompense for these cultural creators; this is the social contract upon which 
copyright law is built,9 it is the underlying rationale of the historic droit de 
suite,10 furthermore, this recompense must be inclusive of all visual artists and 
not just the select few whom today’s society deem valuable.11 The multiple 
strands of the German model recognise the complexities and nuances of this 
relationship. The scheme not only provides a royalty to reward successful visual 
artists but it also provides incentives and social security to artists whether they 
are at the nascent or latter period of their professional lives. The Norwegian 
model operates in much the same way albeit to a lesser extent. This in turn 
allows visual artists to earn a living from their art commensurate to that of other 
creators. The German and Norwegian schemes, the former underpinning the 
reforms herein, provide a normative framework upon which a contemporary EU 
ARR model might be based. These schemes in turn provide a benchmark against 
which policy makers may assess the utility of both the ARR Directive and 
national resale right’s models, thus providing an impetus for reform.  
                                                           
9 See Statute of Anne. 
10 See Chapter 3. Section 3.3, p. 151 - 155. 
11 After all, Van-Gough was not recognised by his contemporaries during his life-time. 
 318 
 
As noted in Chapter 4, social citizenship focuses on certain types of social ‘dis-
services’ which compromise the status of individuals as full and participating 
members of the community.12 Harris gives the example of employment, and 
society’s view of employment as a prized activity where the failure to hold or 
find a job is a reflection of personal failure. Not only does unemployment mean a 
loss of income but it also results in a lowering of self-esteem. For Harris, ‘… a 
society in which what you are is bound up closely with what you do, work is [a] 
source of self-definition. To be effectively deprived of an opportunity to work is 
to be cruelly handicapped.’13 Arguably the treatment of visual artists today – as 
modern day paupers, unable to translate their talents into tangible financial 
reward commensurate with the time, effort and talented invested – continues to 
deprive these creators of the status of citizen and full community participation.14 
Indeed despite the dearth of empirical research relating to the socio-economic 
condition of visual artists, McAndrew and McKimm’s research evidences the 
struggles that artists generally and visual artists specifically face when 
attempting to make a living from their profession. The vast majority of which are 
forced to subsidise their profession by alternative means or through the stigma of 
welfare supports. It may be observed that in almost 100 years since the 
enactment of the droit de suite little has changed in this regard and while this 
very fact may appear to support claims that the ARR is a 20th century solution to 
a 19th century problem that no longer exists,15 it is argued in this thesis that the 
                                                           
12 Chapter 4, Section 4.5, p. 210.  
13 D. Harris Justifying State Welfare (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p. 48. 
14 See Chapter 5, Section 5.6, p. 313.  
15 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3.5, p. 121 - 126.  
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removal of a social component from the historic droit de suite and its successor 
Directive created a right that does not fulfil its ultimate potential.    
 
Drawing on the conclusions of Chapters 1 and 2, and in anwering the first 
research question, it is submitted that the ARR Directive harmonizes EU law in 
this area and that the attendant royalties go some way towards creating 
remunerative parity between the creative classes, although the extent of which is 
unknown. It will be remembered from Chapter 3 that while established and often 
wealthy visual artists receive the greatest share of ARR royalties by value, a 
modest coterie of visual artists benefit from the ARR by volume.16 This finding 
suggests that the ARR Directive functions efficiently and is not in need of 
reform.17 To leave the matter there would ignore the vast inequality in terms of 
distribution between established and nascent career visual artists. This 
observation was again reflected in McAndrew and McKimm’s analysis 
concerning state intervention and those who benefit the most.18 Indeed, it can be 
presumed that the original proponents of the droit de suite never intended for the 
resale right to enrich the wealthy, it was, as outlined numerous times throughout 
this thesis, to remedy the plight of the ‘starving artist’.19  
 
In answering this thesis’s second research question – whether visual artists would 
be better served under a socially oriented ARR model and whether the apparent 
tension between copyright and social rights is resolvable? – the German and 
Norwegian models, by redistributing ARR royalties in a more equitable manner, 
                                                           
16 For further see Chapter 3, Section 3.6, p. 185.  
17 Ibid.  
18 i.e. established artists.  
19 See generally Chapter 3 and 4. 
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reflective of the historic droit de suite, undeniably benefit a broader cohort of 
visual artists while not disproportionately disadvantaging visual artists that 
currently benefit under the Directive. Both models clearly demonstrate that the 
apparent tension between social rights and copyright is not irresolvable. As noted 
by Brierly, the law ‘… is only a means to an end, and that end is to assist the 
problems of the society in and for which it exists.’20 The end is this context is the 
recognition of the unique nature of the visual arts and the establishment of a 
rights matrix that effectively rewards these creators. The primary failure of the 
extant ARR Directive is that it overwhelmingly rewards established and wealthy 
visual artists above emerging and struggling visual artists. Accordingly, and 
reflecting Plaisant’s21 observations, it is proposed that the ARR Directive be 
reframed to engender a social focus and adopt a social security or welfare 
function reflective of its civil law origins.  
 
It will be remembered from Chapter 4 that the combination of Hegelian theory 
and social citizenship creates a dialectic based upon personality and community 
membership that most fully grounds a socially concerned and redistributive ARR 
rubric.22 Social citizenship also presents a more justifiable basis for Hegel’s 
‘needy individuals’ by recasting the ‘right to take’ as a right to compensation. 
Furthermore, where the compensation requirement demands a social process, an 
agent and a beneficiary to be identified, this safeguards society from an 
unfettered right of ‘the needy’ – in this construct visual artists – to take the 
property of others. It is the role of government to balance these competing 
                                                           
20 J. L. Brierly The Basis of Obligation in International Law: And Other Papers H. Lauterpacht 
and C. H. M. Waldock eds. (Oxford: Scientia, 1977) p. 72.  
21 R. Plaisant – ‘The Droit de Suite’ General Studies (1969) Copyright:  Monthly Review of the 
United Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual  Property (BIRPI) 157, pp. 159 &160. 
22 For further see Chapter 5, Section 5.6, p. 313 - 316. 
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demands. In this paradigm, the social process that provides visual artists – the 
needy – with the right to compensation is the failure of the market to adequately 
reward visual artists for their labour. Those who benefit are wealthy visual artists 
and those harmed are impoverished/emerging visual artists. The ultimate 
injustice in this social process derives from the fact that struggling artists are 
represented as the beneficiary of the right when in fact it is already wealthy 
visual artist that stand the most to gain. By establishing a mechanism in which a 
portion of earned royalties is redistributed from wealthy visual artists to 
emerging visual artists, Harris’s paradigm is complete.  
 
Furthermore in Chapter 5 it was firmly established that social policy is an 
integral part of the European Union and that within both the TEU and TFEU 
there exists a legal basis for such reforms, namely: Article 3 TEU (full 
employment and solidarity between the generations), Article 6 TEU (recognising 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European union), Article 2(3) 
(recognising the social market economy … solidarity … combating social 
exclusion) and Article 151 – 153 TFEU (providing the legal basis upon which 
the Union may legislate for social change). Furthermore, Article 4(2)(b) and (c) 
TFEU recognise the shared competence of the EU and member states in the area 
of social policy.23 The recognition of a social market economy, a combined 
commitment to solidarity, social protection and the elevation of the Charter of 
Fundamental rights to that of the Treaties provides a legal basis upon which a 
socially orientated ARR Directive may be based.24 
                                                           
23 Consolidated Version Of The Treaty On the Functioning of the European Union 26.10.2012 OJ 
C 326/13. 
24 T. K. Hervey ‘Social Security: the European Union Dimension’ in N. Harris (eds.)  Social 
Security Law in Context (Oxford, OUP, 2000) p. 231 – 234: Legal basis provisions both provide 
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A further question that arises in this context relates to why financial support for 
visual artists might be placed, in part, outside developed state welfare systems? 
The answer to this question centres upon the issue of stigma as related to 
dependency and the receipt of social services. As noted by Townsend, basic 
social assistance tends to ‘… lump the unemployed, sick, widowed, aged and 
others into one undifferentiated and inevitably stigmatised category.’25 
Employing the ARR Directive as both a means of rewarding successful visual 
artists and as a means of securing the incomes of less successful visual artists 
captures the liminal essence of the historic droit de suite as part royalty, part 
income security and in doing so prevents the stigmatization of this creative class 





In answering the third research question, the following recommendations employ 
the Kulturwerk facet of the German Artists’ Resale Rights exemplar as the 
paradigmatic schema for reform of the Artists’ Resale Right Directive. The 
Kunstler Sozialkasse which taxes German art dealers and auctioneers is not relied 
upon in this regard because it supposes a somewhat manufactured and artificial 
                                                           
the source of the EU’s competence to make law and policy and the legislative procedures to be 
applied. In the area of social security and social welfare, Hervey notes that since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (Articles TFEU 151 – 53), “… the Council is empowered to ‘adopt, by means of 
directives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation’ in order to achieve the aims of 
‘proper social protection’ and ‘the combating of exclusion’ and may ‘adopt measures designed to 
encourage co-operation between Member States … in order to combat social exclusion.’” 
25 L. Leisering and S. Leibfried Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp 245 – 9; see also P. Towsend Sociology and Social Policy 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976) p. 14.  
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relationship between these market intermediaries and visual artists so that the 
German art trade make a contribution to the German social security system on 
behalf of affected visual artists.26 While this arrangement may reflect the 
historical nuances of the German social security system it would not be 
appropriate to propose, transplant or scale this model across EU member states 
that do not share a similar social typology or history.27 Furthermore, the 
Norwegian system is not employed because it taxes the purchasers of art in a 
similar way to the German Kunstler Sozialkasse. The German Kulturwerk model 
conforms to both Harris’s conception of social citizenship and his 
contribution/compensation based exchange model. Again this exchange model 
has three primary facets: a) the social process which caused the harm can be 
identified; b) the agent who bears the responsibility for the harm can be 
identified and c) the individual or group who are to benefit can be identified (a 
social process, an agent and a beneficiary).28 As previously noted it is the failure 
of the market to adequately reward visual artists for their labour that is the social 
process that causes harm and therefore requires compensation or in the 
alternative it is the failure of the market to adequately reward visual artists for 
their exploits that deprives them of the financial benefit that their contribution to 
society deserves. The beneficiary, under the construction proposed in this thesis, 
is the visual artist who struggles to maintain a standard of living above that of the 
poverty line.29  The agent who bears the responsibility for the harm however is 
not so neatly categorical. The agent nomenclature could be ascribed to the art 
dealer who purchased the artwork from the artist and subsequently sold it to a 
                                                           
26 See Chapter 5, Section 5.4, p. 303 - 309.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Harris, supra note 13, at p. 30 acknowledges that some social policies are not responses to 
harm, for example medical care and education.  
29 See Chapter 5, Section 5.3, p. 293 - 308. 
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willing purchaser for a multiple well above the initial perceived value that the 
dealer and artist agreed upon. For present purposes, whether the dealer enjoyed 
the benefits of an asymmetrical bargaining position or possessed additional 
information pertaining to the market for said goods is largely irrelevant; there 
simply needs to be a winner and a loser.  Alternatively the agent might be the 
legislator who created the discriminatory legislation. It is however the visual 
artist himself to whom the nomenclature of agent is ascribed. Or more 
specifically those visual artists who are already benefiting from the initial sale 
price of their work or are benefiting from alternative exploitations of their work 
because the market deems their work to be of value. Effectively, the agent for 
present purposes is the successful and wealthy visual artist who inadvertently 
benefits from an ARR royalty that was historically intended to benefit the 
‘starving artist’. Admittedly they too may have once sold their work below 
market value and are therefore deserving beneficiaries of ARR royalties related 
specifically to those works but clearly not for works that firstly sold at a ‘fair 
market price’ reflective of the work’s long term value and secondly continue to 
enjoy a healthy resale market. The incongruity of a right that was intended to 
benefit the ‘starving artist’, or at least a comparable class of visual artist, but now 
largely benefits wealthy, successful and independent visual artists is antithetical 
to the raison d’être of the historic droit de suite and therefore creates the agent. 
As noted by Harris:  
 
‘The injustice inheres in the social process itself and in the failure to 
recognise the unfairness of any claim to keep full control of the use and 
disposition of resources so derived. It is not simply that one is not entitled to 
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everything one earns because one does not deserve it on the grounds of effort 
or desert; one’s lack of entitlement is a consequence of the price which some 
must pay to make earnings possible.’30     
 
The ‘price’ in this context is the use of the ‘starving artist’ designation to justify 
a royalty that in the main benefits ‘not so starving artists’. Those who benefit, for 
the most part, are wealthy visual artists and those harmed are 
impoverished/emerging visual artists. By distributing ARR royalties from 
wealthy visual artists to emerging visual artists, Harris’s paradigm is complete 
and the true raison d’être of the historic droit de suite is satisfied.  
 
Hence there is a perfect symmetry between the aforementioned distribution or 
redistribution of royalties and the Kulterwerk element of the German schema 
which taxes the ARR royalty earnings of visual artists. In this sense, successful 
visual artists nurture emerging talent by ‘giving back’ to their community which 
in turn fosters inclusion and participation by providing visual artists with an 
income source that is capable of providing said artists with a livelihood.  
 
6.3 Proposed Reforms 
 
It is proposed that the ARR Directive incorporate a recital with a social 
orientation. This social provision finds a legal basis under Article 6 TEU 
(recognising the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European union), Article 
2(3) (recognising the social market economy … solidarity … combating social 
                                                           
30 Harris supra note 13, at p. 40. 
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exclusion) and Article 151 – 153 TFEU (providing the legal basis upon which 
the Union may legislate for social change). 
 
It is proposed that the Directive incorporate a provision based on the German 
Kulterwerk model, mandating that member states adopt a social redistributive 
mechanism, which takes a small percentage of ARR royalty earnings from all 
visual artist beneficiaries. The monies collected are to be referred to, for present 
purposes, as the ARR Tax-Social (ARRTS). 
 
A precursor to the effective operation of the fund requires the collection of ARR 
royalties by nationally appointed CMOs. Central administration is key to the 
effective collection of royalties and the overall legitimacy of the system. In 
parallel an independent body should be created to administer the fund in a similar 
fashion to the German ‘commonly instituted body’. Under this rubric, it is 
envisioned that the independent body apply to CMOs for a quarterly statement of 
accounts relating to collected ARR royalties. CMOs would then pay the 
independent body a percentage of monies collected minus an administration fee. 
Again drawing from the German model, it is proposed that ARR royalties be 
‘taxed’ for this social purpose at 10% and that the independent body and CMOs 
administration fees amount to no more than 1% of ARRTS. After administration 
fees have been deducted the remainder benefit derived from the tax on ARR 
royalties provides the financial basis of ARRTS. 
 
Furthermore, it is proposed that ARRTS be divided into three social strands: 
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Firstly, it is proposed that (and for simplicity) ‘Fund 1’ provide a form of income 
maintenance for visual artists that are unable to earn a livelihood from their art. 
‘Fund 1’ would provide a modest but additional income to earned incomes and in 
doing so provide a substitute, either wholly or partly, for state social welfare 
contributions. The degree to which this substitution occurs is to be defined by 
member states on a national basis, reflective of the national poverty line.  
 
Secondly, in recognition of visual artists’ contribution to society and culture 
during their working lives it is envisioned that ‘Fund 2’ provide an additional 
pension entitlement to supplement private and state pension provisions. As 
previously noted by the reports cited in Chapter 5, visual artists do not always 
enjoy retirement in the traditional sense, and often work throughout their lives. 
Accordingly, the additional pension benefit can be justified on the basis of 
reward for continued participation in the labour-force rather than as a traditional 
pension entitlement that provides a level of subsistence for individuals who are 
no longer active members of the labour-force.  The level of entitlement will be 
dependant upon the financial resources of the fund, the number of annual 
applicants seeking relief, the estimated longevity of claimants, as well as the 
individual’s personal financial resources.  
 
Thirdly, it is envisioned that ‘Fund 3’ provide nascent and emerging career artists 
with a bursary fund which would cover the cost of materials, travel expenses and 
exhibitions etc. Both the German and Norwegian models incorporate a bursary 
fund. It is envisioned that this fund operate alongside extant national funding 
models and not act as a replacement. Potentially the criteria for the allocation of 
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bursary funds to visual artists might be based on non-conventional metrics. For 
instance, failure to obtain funding from traditional funding models might provide 
a pre-requisite to approval. While on the one hand this may seem wasteful, 
because it might appear to reward undeserving creators it might also serve the 
purpose of presenting a counter-balance to the influence of current trends on the 
allocation of art funds. Once again, Van Gough, arguably one of the most 
important visual artists in the post-impressionist movement would never have 
created many of his masterpieces without the financial aid of his brother. Had he 
not been able to obtain funding, albeit quite modest and from familial sources, 
society and culture would have been significantly deprived. Once again, echoing 
Scutton J.’s comments, it is difficult to think of Van Gough’s body of work 
absent ‘Starry Night’ or ‘Sunflowers’. Finally, these proposed social provisions 
find a legal basis under Article 6 TEU, Article 2(3) and Article 151 – 153 TFEU. 
 
In conclusion, if creativity and culture are truly about the ‘articulation and 
vindication of rights’ and the ‘right for everyone to participate fully in society’ 
then a socially constructed Artists’ Resale Right Directive offers an un paralleled 
opportunity for EU member states to recognise the great talents and contribution 
of the visual arts to European culture and society. Much like social housing, the 
maintenance of a rich and diverse culture depends upon state intervention and 
cannot be left to the ‘vagaries of the marketplace’ because if that view continues, 
great art ‘… will either fail to survive or become so compromised and distorted 
that the public good will not be served.’31                   
*****
                                                           
31 President Michael D. Higgins address to the General Assembly of Aosdána 2015. 
<http://www.president.ie/en/media-library/speeches/speech-at-the-2015-aosdana-general-
assembly> (date accessed:  6 July 2017). 
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DIRECTIVE 2001/84/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 27 September 2001
on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 95 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee (2),
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
251 of the Treaty (3), and in the light of the joint text approved
by the Conciliation Committee on 6 June 2001,
Whereas:
(1) In the field of copyright, the resale right is an unassig-
nable and inalienable right, enjoyed by the author of an
original work of graphic or plastic art, to an economic
interest in successive sales of the work concerned.
(2) The resale right is a right of a productive character
which enables the author/artist to receive consideration
for successive transfers of the work. The subject-matter
of the resale right is the physical work, namely the
medium in which the protected work is incorporated.
(3) The resale right is intended to ensure that authors of
graphic and plastic works of art share in the economic
success of their original works of art. It helps to redress
the balance between the economic situation of authors
of graphic and plastic works of art and that of other
creators who benefit from successive exploitations of
their works.
(4) The resale right forms an integral part of copyright and
is an essential prerogative for authors. The imposition of
such a right in all Member States meets the need for
providing creators with an adequate and standard level
of protection.
(5) Under Article 151(4) of the Treaty the Community is to
take cultural aspects into account in its action under
other provisions of the Treaty.
(6) The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works provides that the resale right is available
only if legislation in the country to which the author
belongs so permits. The right is therefore optional and
subject to the rule of reciprocity. It follows from the
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities on the application of the principle of non-
discrimination laid down in Article 12 of the Treaty, as
shown in the judgment of 20 October 1993 in Joined
Cases C-92/92 and C-326/92 Phil Collins and Others (4),
that domestic provisions containing reciprocity clauses
cannot be relied upon in order to deny nationals of
other Member States rights conferred on national
authors. The application of such clauses in the
Community context runs counter to the principle of
equal treatment resulting from the prohibition of any
discrimination on grounds of nationality.
(7) The process of internationalisation of the Community
market in modern and contemporary art, which is now
being speeded up by the effects of the new economy, in
a regulatory context in which few States outside the EU
recognise the resale right, makes it essential for the
European Community, in the external sphere, to open
negotiations with a view to making Article 14b of the
Berne Convention compulsory.
(8) The fact that this international market exists, combined
with the lack of a resale right in several Member States
and the current disparity as regards national systems
which recognise that right, make it essential to lay down
transitional provisions as regards both entry into force
and the substantive regulation of the right, which will
preserve the competitiveness of the European market.
(9) The resale right is currently provided for by the
domestic legislation of a majority of Member States.
Such laws, where they exist, display certain differences,
notably as regards the works covered, those entitled to
receive royalties, the rate applied, the transactions
subject to payment of a royalty, and the basis on which
these are calculated. The application or non-application
of such a right has a significant impact on the competi-
tive environment within the internal market, since the
existence or absence of an obligation to pay on the basis
of the resale right is an element which must be taken
into account by each individual wishing to sell a work of
art. This right is therefore a factor which contributes to
the creation of distortions of competition as well as
displacement of sales within the Community.
(10) Such disparities with regard to the existence of the resale
right and its application by the Member States have a
direct negative impact on the proper functioning of the
internal market in works of art as provided for by
Article 14 of the Treaty. In such a situation Article 95 of
the Treaty constitutes the appropriate legal basis.
(1) OJ C 178, 21.6.1996, p. 16 and OJ C 125, 23.4.1998, p. 8.
(2) OJ C 75, 10.3.1997, p. 17.
(3) Opinion of the European Parliament of 9 April 1997 (OJ C 132,
28.4.1997, p. 88), confirmed on 27 October 1999, Council
Common Position of 19 June 2000 (OJ C 300, 20.10.2000, p. 1)
and Decision of the European Parliament of 13 December 2000 (OJ
C 232, 17.8.2001, p. 173). Decision of the European Parliament of
3 July 2001 and Decision of the Council of 19 July 2001. (4) [1993] ECR I-5145.
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(11) The objectives of the Community as set out in the Treaty
include laying the foundations of an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, promoting closer rela-
tions between the Member States belonging to the
Community, and ensuring their economic and social
progress by common action to eliminate the barriers
which divide Europe. To that end the Treaty provides for
the establishment of an internal market which presup-
poses the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of
goods, freedom to provide services and freedom of
establishment, and for the introduction of a system
ensuring that competition in the common market is not
distorted. Harmonisation of Member States' laws on the
resale right contributes to the attainment of these objec-
tives.
(12) The Sixth Council Directive (77/388/EEC) of 17 May
1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member
States relating to turnover taxes — common system of
value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (1), progres-
sively introduces a Community system of taxation
applicable inter alia to works of art. Measures confined
to the tax field are not sufficient to guarantee the
harmonious functioning of the art market. This objective
cannot be attained without harmonisation in the field of
the resale right.
(13) Existing differences between laws should be eliminated
where they have a distorting effect on the functioning of
the internal market, and the emergence of any new
differences of that kind should be prevented. There is no
need to eliminate, or prevent the emergence of, differ-
ences which cannot be expected to affect the functioning
of the internal market.
(14) A precondition of the proper functioning of the internal
market is the existence of conditions of competition
which are not distorted. The existence of differences
between national provisions on the resale right creates
distortions of competition and displacement of sales
within the Community and leads to unequal treatment
between artists depending on where their works are
sold. The issue under consideration has therefore trans-
national aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated
by action by Member States. A lack of Community
action would conflict with the requirement of the Treaty
to correct distortions of competition and unequal treat-
ment.
(15) In view of the scale of divergences between national
provisions it is therefore necessary to adopt harmonising
measures to deal with disparities between the laws of the
Member States in areas where such disparities are liable
to create or maintain distorted conditions of
competition. It is not however necessary to harmonise
every provision of the Member States' laws on the resale
right and, in order to leave as much scope for national
decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit the harmoni-
sation exercise to those domestic provisions that have
the most direct impact on the functioning of the internal
market.
(16) This Directive complies therefore, in its entirety, with the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as laid
down in Article 5 of the Treaty.
(17) Pursuant to Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October
1993 harmonising the term of protection of copyright
and certain related rights (2), the term of copyright runs
for 70 years after the author's death. The same period
should be laid down for the resale right. Consequently,
only the originals of works of modern and contempo-
rary art may fall within the scope of the resale right.
However, in order to allow the legal systems of Member
States which do not, at the time of the adoption of this
Directive, apply a resale right for the benefit of artists to
incorporate this right into their respective legal systems
and, moreover, to enable the economic operators in
those Member States to adapt gradually to the aforemen-
tioned right whilst maintaining their economic viability,
the Member States concerned should be allowed a
limited transitional period during which they may
choose not to apply the resale right for the benefit of
those entitled under the artist after his death.
(18) The scope of the resale right should be extended to all
acts of resale, with the exception of those effected
directly between persons acting in their private capacity
without the participation of an art market professional.
This right should not extend to acts of resale by persons
acting in their private capacity to museums which are
not for profit and which are open to the public. With
regard to the particular situation of art galleries which
acquire works directly from the author, Member States
should be allowed the option of exempting from the
resale right acts of resale of those works which take
place within three years of that acquisition. The interests
of the artist should also be taken into account by
limiting this exemption to such acts of resale where the
resale price does not exceed EUR 10 000.
(19) It should be made clear that the harmonisation brought
about by this Directive does not apply to original manu-
scripts of writers and composers.
(20) Effective rules should be laid down based on experience
already gained at national level with the resale right. It is
appropriate to calculate the royalty as a percentage of
the sale price and not of the increase in value of works
whose original value has increased.
(21) The categories of works of art subject to the resale right
should be harmonised.
(1) OJ L 145, 13.6.1977, p. 1. Directive as last amended by Directive
1999/85/EC (OJ L 277, 28.10.1999, p. 34). (2) OJ L 290, 24.11.1993, p. 9.
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(22) The non-application of royalties below the minimum
threshold may help to avoid disproportionately high
collection and administration costs compared with the
profit for the artist. However, in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, the Member States should be
allowed to establish national thresholds lower than the
Community threshold, so as to promote the interests of
new artists. Given the small amounts involved, this
derogation is not likely to have a significant effect on the
proper functioning of the internal market.
(23) The rates set by the different Member States for the
application of the resale right vary considerably at
present. The effective functioning of the internal market
in works of modern and contemporary art requires the
fixing of uniform rates to the widest possible extent.
(24) It is desirable to establish, with the intention of recon-
ciling the various interests involved in the market for
original works of art, a system consisting of a tapering
scale of rates for several price bands. It is important to
reduce the risk of sales relocating and of the circumven-
tion of the Community rules on the resale right.
(25) The person by whom the royalty is payable should, in
principle, be the seller. Member States should be given
the option to provide for derogations from this principle
in respect of liability for payment. The seller is the
person or undertaking on whose behalf the sale is
concluded.
(26) Provision should be made for the possibility of periodic
adjustment of the threshold and rates. To this end, it is
appropriate to entrust to the Commission the task of
drawing up periodic reports on the actual application of
the resale right in the Member States and on the impact
on the art market in the Community and, where appro-
priate, of making proposals relating to the amendment
of this Directive.
(27) The persons entitled to receive royalties must be speci-
fied, due regard being had to the principle of subsi-
diarity. It is not appropriate to take action through this
Directive in relation to Member States' laws of succes-
sion. However, those entitled under the author must be
able to benefit fully from the resale right after his death,
at least following the expiry of the transitional period
referred to above.
(28) The Member States are responsible for regulating the
exercise of the resale right, particularly with regard to
the way this is managed. In this respect management by
a collecting society is one possibility. Member States
should ensure that collecting societies operate in a trans-
parent and efficient manner. Member States must also
ensure that amounts intended for authors who are
nationals of other Member States are in fact collected
and distributed. This Directive is without prejudice to
arrangements in Member States for collection and
distribution.
(29) Enjoyment of the resale right should be restricted to
Community nationals as well as to foreign authors
whose countries afford such protection to authors who
are nationals of Member States. A Member State should
have the option of extending enjoyment of this right to
foreign authors who have their habitual residence in that
Member State.
(30) Appropriate procedures for monitoring transactions
should be introduced so as to ensure by practical means
that the resale right is effectively applied by Member
States. This implies also a right on the part of the author
or his authorised representative to obtain any necessary
information from the natural or legal person liable for
payment of royalties. Member States which provide for
collective management of the resale right may also
provide that the bodies responsible for that collective
management should alone be entitled to obtain informa-
tion,




Subject matter of the resale right
1. Member States shall provide, for the benefit of the author
of an original work of art, a resale right, to be defined as an
inalienable right, which cannot be waived, even in advance, to
receive a royalty based on the sale price obtained for any resale
of the work, subsequent to the first transfer of the work by the
author.
2. The right referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply to all acts
of resale involving as sellers, buyers or intermediaries art
market professionals, such as salesrooms, art galleries and, in
general, any dealers in works of art.
3. Member States may provide that the right referred to in
paragraph 1 shall not apply to acts of resale where the seller
has acquired the work directly from the author less than three
years before that resale and where the resale price does not
exceed EUR 10 000.
4. The royalty shall be payable by the seller. Member States
may provide that one of the natural or legal persons referred to
in paragraph 2 other than the seller shall alone be liable or
shall share liability with the seller for payment of the royalty.
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Article 2
Works of art to which the resale right relates
1. For the purposes of this Directive, ‘original work of art’
means works of graphic or plastic art such as pictures, collages,
paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, lithographs, sculptures,
tapestries, ceramics, glassware and photographs, provided they
are made by the artist himself or are copies considered to be
original works of art.
2. Copies of works of art covered by this Directive, which
have been made in limited numbers by the artist himself or
under his authority, shall be considered to be original works of
art for the purposes of this Directive. Such copies will normally






1. It shall be for the Member States to set a minimum sale
price from which the sales referred to in Article 1 shall be
subject to resale right.
2. This minimum sale price may not under any circum-
stances exceed EUR 3 000.
Article 4
Rates
1. The royalty provided for in Article 1 shall be set at the
following rates:
(a) 4 % for the portion of the sale price up to EUR 50 000;
(b) 3 % for the portion of the sale price from EUR 50 000,01
to EUR 200 000;
(c) 1 % for the portion of the sale price from EUR 200 000,01
to EUR 350 000;
(d) 0,5 % for the portion of the sale price from
EUR 350 000,01 to EUR 500 000;
(e) 0,25 % for the portion of the sale price exceeding
EUR 500 000.
However, the total amount of the royalty may not exceed
EUR 12 500.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, Member States
may apply a rate of 5 % for the portion of the sale price
referred to in paragraph 1(a).
3. If the minimum sale price set should be lower than
EUR 3 000, the Member State shall also determine the rate
applicable to the portion of the sale price up to EUR 3 000;
this rate may not be lower than 4 %.
Article 5
Calculation basis
The sale prices referred to in Articles 3 and 4 are net of tax.
Article 6
Persons entitled to receive royalties
1. The royalty provided for under Article 1 shall be payable
to the author of the work and, subject to Article 8(2), after his
death to those entitled under him/her.
2. Member States may provide for compulsory or optional
collective management of the royalty provided for under
Article 1.
Article 7
Third-country nationals entitled to receive royalties
1. Member States shall provide that authors who are
nationals of third countries and, subject to Article 8(2), their
successors in title shall enjoy the resale right in accordance
with this Directive and the legislation of the Member State
concerned only if legislation in the country of which the author
or his/her successor in title is a national permits resale right
protection in that country for authors from the Member States
and their successors in title.
2. On the basis of information provided by the Member
States, the Commission shall publish as soon as possible an
indicative list of those third countries which fulfil the condition
set out in paragraph 1. This list shall be kept up to date.
3. Any Member State may treat authors who are not
nationals of a Member State but who have their habitual resi-
dence in that Member State in the same way as its own
nationals for the purpose of resale right protection.
Article 8
Term of protection of the resale right
1. The term of protection of the resale right shall corre-
spond to that laid down in Article 1 of Directive 93/98/EEC.
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, those Member
States which do not apply the resale right on (the entry into
force date referred to in Article 13), shall not be required, for a
period expiring not later than 1 January 2010, to apply the
resale right for the benefit of those entitled under the artist
after his/her death.
3. A Member State to which paragraph 2 applies may have
up to two more years, if necessary to enable the economic
operators in that Member State to adapt gradually to the resale
right system while maintaining their economic viability, before
it is required to apply the resale right for the benefit of those
entitled under the artist after his/her death. At least 12 months
before the end of the period referred to in paragraph 2, the
Member State concerned shall inform the Commission giving
its reasons, so that the Commission can give an opinion, after
appropriate consultations, within three months following the
receipt of such information. If the Member State does not
follow the opinion of the Commission, it shall within one
month inform the Commission and justify its decision. The
notification and justification of the Member State and the
opinion of the Commission shall be published in the Official
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4. In the event of the successful conclusion, within the
periods referred to in Article 8(2) and (3), of international
negotiations aimed at extending the resale right at international
level, the Commission shall submit appropriate proposals.
Article 9
Right to obtain information
The Member States shall provide that for a period of three
years after the resale, the persons entitled under Article 6 may
require from any art market professional mentioned in Article
1(2) to furnish any information that may be necessary in order





This Directive shall apply in respect of all original works of art
as defined in Article 2 which, on 1 January 2006, are still
protected by the legislation of the Member States in the field of
copyright or meet the criteria for protection under the provi-
sions of this Directive at that date.
Article 11
Revision clause
1. The Commission shall submit to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee not
later than 1 January 2009 and every four years thereafter a
report on the implementation and the effect of this Directive,
paying particular attention to the competitiveness of the
market in modern and contemporary art in the Community,
especially as regards the position of the Community in relation
to relevant markets that do not apply the resale right and the
fostering of artistic creativity and the management procedures
in the Member States. It shall examine in particular its impact
on the internal market and the effect of the introduction of the
resale right in those Member States that did not apply the right
in national law prior to the entry into force of this Directive.
Where appropriate, the Commission shall submit proposals for
adapting the minimum threshold and the rates of royalty to
take account of changes in the sector, proposals relating to the
maximum amount laid down in Article 4(1) and any other
proposal it may deem necessary in order to enhance the effec-
tiveness of this Directive.
2. A Contact Committee is hereby established. It shall be
composed of representatives of the competent authorities of
the Member States. It shall be chaired by a representative of the
Commission and shall meet either on the initiative of the
Chairman or at the request of the delegation of a Member
State.
3. The task of the Committee shall be as follows:
— to organise consultations on all questions deriving from
application of this Directive,
— to facilitate the exchange of information between the
Commission and the Member States on relevant develop-
ments in the art market in the Community.
Article 12
Implementation
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive before 1 January 2006. They shall forthwith inform
the Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain
a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such
reference on the occasion of their official publication. The
methods of making such a reference shall be laid down by the
Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
provisions of national law which they adopt in the field
covered by this Directive.
Article 13
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publica-
tion in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
Article 14
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
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